CEASELESS WARS

CEASELESS WARS

Ad-Dustour 2017-01-31

By: Oraib Al Rantawi

The wars between the armed factions have never paused or stopped. No sooner does one round end than another begins. And the victims in all cases and circumstances are Syrian civilians, along with their aspirations and yearnings for a better future for their country and their sons and daughters.

Ideological disagreements alone are not responsible for these wars among 'brother/enemies'. The multiple intelligence agencies to which they are beholden and their many 'operators' with conflicting agendas and different and changing priorities have lead to the proliferation and replication of factions, and consequently to widening the circle of wars and conflicts between them.

 The latest of these bloody rounds is currently taking place in the Aleppo and Idlib countryside between the Nusra Front – which changed its name to Fateh ash-Sham before finally settling on the Tahrir ash-Sham Organization – and its allies among the jihadi factions on the one hand; and the remaining factions that are affiliated with 'Turkey’s Sublime Porte' on the other. No sooner did the 'Porte' initiate its major U-turn towards Moscow than the map of [Syrian] alliances and loyalties began to change rapidly and dramatically, leading to the scene that we are witnessing today: Ferocious localized wars between yesterday's allies.

 The primary divide between the factions is gradually taking the following shape: The factions with Muslim Brotherhood affiliations backed by Turkey, versus the salafi jihadi factions that can no longer find many regional backers. This comes after the war on terrorism has intensified and the Nusra has become a heavy burden rather than an asset for its Arab and Turkish backers in the wars between sectarian and confessional groups and axes in which they have become immersed across the entire region.

Ahrar ash-Sham is a 'Brotherhood-affiliated' mix of factions that is loyal to Turkey and follows in its footsteps in its turnarounds and transformations, and a salafi jihadi camp that is only a short distance – a mere step – away from the Nusra and tends towards allying itself with it by nature and nurture. It showed no enthusiasm for Operation Euphrates Shield or the Astana track. The recent split in Ahrar ash-Sham's ranks is not complete, and is likely to expand and deepen the conflict between the two schools and their terms of reference locally and regionally.

 The fig-leaf that covered up the factions that used to be marketed by wrapping them in a 'moderate' garb has now fallen. Today, the factions have declared that they have joined the Nusra in a single organization whose leadership is shared between the Nusra and those who have broken away from Ahrar ash-Sham. The Nusra has been put in charge of the military/jihadi struggle with Abu-Mohammad al-Jawlani in command, while leadership of the political struggle goes to Ahrar 'sheikh' and former leader Hashem ash-Sheikh (Abu Jaber). The latter will hammer the last nail into the coffin of the Ahrar that has been playing an increasing role on the Northern and Western arena throughout the years of the Syrian crisis.

Because those involved in the recent wars of eradication between the jihadi groups represent the main body of the armed Islamist factions, a state of shock and depression has overtaken many of their open and covert supporters who have sought hard to describe these factions as part of the 'revolution' and the 'opposition,' and as 'moderate' and other such epithets. This is why we are now hearing them issuing loud calls for help to salvage what may be saved before it is too late.

 This is despite the fact that anyone who sincerely backs the Syrian people and their right to determine their own fate, choose their own regime, and pave their own path towards freedom and liberation must be repeating a prayer that calls for 'having the unjust strike the unjust.' After all, these factions not only hijacked the Syrian revolution and diverted it away from its proper path; they acted as a bridgehead for all the world’s intelligence agencies to infiltrate the Syrian interior, destroy the country’s social fabric, undermine the nation and society's unity, and present the worst model of governorship, administration, and management that the Syrians have ever experienced throughout their post-independence years.

 In the presence of such varieties of armed opposition, the Syrians cannot but miss the old regime. Anyone who sees [the leader of the Syrian opposition delegation to Astana] Mohammad 'Alloush sitting at one side of the table would be overcome by yearning for [the Syrian government's representative to Astana] Dr. Bashar al-Ja'fari. After all, 'Alloush and his Jayshul Islam are not that different from that the Nusra, Ahrar ash-Sham, Noureddin az-Zinki groups, and the many other factions, armies, brigades, companies, and units that have spread in the Syrian soil like some diabolical weed.

 The wars between brother/enemies in the Syrian Northwest recall the situation in Afghanistan on the eve of the Taliban intervention, infiltrating through the cracks created by the bloody conflicts between the CIA's mujahideen of those days. But there is one difference: Re-producing the Taliban in Syria seems unlikely, and time is not in its favor.

 What is certain is that the policy of 'collective suicide' that these factions are pursuing will enable the Syrian army and its allies to achieve their mission at lesser cost and with a more understanding reaction .