Case Study: The Battle of Mogadishu

Following a previous article that I put together towards the end of 2021, I have repeated the process for The Battle of Mogadishu. Many will remember this pivotal conflict through the lens of Ridley Scott's Oscar winner 'Black Hawk Down'. As exceptional as that cinema was, I do not think it did justice to the lasting legacy (or lessons) that were left behind.

Our focus begins in Dec '92 which saw the US join the UN in Operation Restore Hope (Somali civil war). Then, in June '93, 24 UN peacekeepers were killed, and a resolution was immediately passed to arrest those responsible. The prime suspect was a former general and the (then) current leader of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), Mohamed Farrah Aidid.

In Aug '93, SNA bombs began targeting US personnel. This action prompted the deployment of Task Force Ranger (TFR) under Major General William Garrison. Garrison was a well respected soldier and TFR was afforded the best units and most advanced hardware from the US arsenal. This show of force was intended to bring the manhunt for Aidid to a swift end.

On 3rd Oct '93, actionable intelligence was received regarding a meet between SNA militia and Aidid's Habar Gidir clan. Garrison deployed a capture force of 19 aircraft, 12 vehicles, and 160 soldiers. The 18-hour fight ('The Battle of Mogadishu') cost 18 US soldiers, two UN peacekeepers, 82 wounded and two MH-60 Black Hawks. Over 1,000 Somali's were killed.

What follows are five lessons from the battle (this is not exhaustive):

Perfect is the enemy of good: Aidid was Western educated, led the overthrow of the last dictator, had children in the US, was sympathetic to US regional interests and had offered to eliminate the Islamist militias (who later became al-Shabaab). He could have been an ally.

Actions have consequences: Conflicts have second- and third-order effects. Al-Qaida later drew the US into Afghanistan after learning '...the Americans were not defeated militarily in Somalia...it fears being bogged down in a real war'. The Al-Qaida/ Aidid link is compelling.

Manage messaging: Although the US won the battle, Aidid won the 'war'. This was due to the psychology of a nation that recalled Vietnam and, even though a mortal blow had been dealt to the current enemy, saw withdrawal as preferable to any further loss of US life.

Urban battles are fought on human terrain: The protection offered by a 'local' population has the capacity to defeat almost any number of satellites or elite troops. In this instance, US intelligence struggled and were completely unaware of Aidid's location for the past month.

Technology does not guarantee success: The technology and personnel at the fingertips of the US was cutting edge. The team searching for Pablo Escobar were even reassigned to find Aidid. However, all this was ineffective against couriers and low-power walkie-talkies.

Aidid had quickly learned he was not a military match for Garrison, so he then brought the fight off the battlefield. He superseded the military advantage by ensuring pictures of dead soldiers were beamed directly into American homes. This horribly effective tactic elevated the conflict to a political level and, even with Somali losses in the thousands, Aidid won.

In summary, this case study teaches the vital importance of identifying all stakeholders and interested parties. It also shows that we should never discount the lesser of two evils as it is often better the devil you know than to face the one you do not. My thoughts are with those (and the families) on both sides, and I hope one day conflict like this is a thing of the past.