A Case for Repealing Anti-defection Law in India
Anti-defection law was introduced with good intentions in 1984, where at least a third of political party should split, otherwise anybody leaving a given party and joining the other was considered defection. In 2003, the threshold was increased to two-thirds.
The original trigger was Aya Ram Gaya Ram culture which constantly destabilized Governments. This was not an issue in initial decades when Congress alone was ruling the roost with very good majority.?Majority of politicians supported anti-defection law. Madhu Limaye’s was one lone brave voice[1] that stood up against anti-defection law.?Even today, I suppose there is consensus among politicians as well as general public about the necessity of anti-defection law.?This article challenges that consensus while recommending alternative approaches to tackle the problem of defections.
Let us consider a case where there is a clear mandate for a coalition of parties. Here one of the parties can easily join forces with the parties in opposition, even when there is a clear mandate. Further, a winning coalition may indeed form the Government, but the Chief Minister is chosen from a smaller party, which again compromises the mandate. In certain states irrespective of electoral outcome, the Chief Minister is chosen only from one of the regions or one of the communities, which again is unjust. In case of triangular contests, the third party may have the leverage as without that party nobody can form the Government. In summary we have wholesale defection instead of retail defection which compromises the mandate. Once there is instability, it will lead to all kinds of maneuverers to form an alternate Government, where legislators may defect and join the opposition or resign en masse and so on. There may be large scale inducements and attempts to cage legislators and so on.
The above is really not the core issue. The core issue is once there is an anti-defection law, it pretty much disempowers legislators. A handful of party leaders will decide the political agenda. The parties are not beholden to the legislators. When a leader walks out of the Parliament the whole party falls in line. Even when a leader makes anti-national statements, majority remain demure. Parties many cases agree on which are actually not good for the country, but bitterly block what is good for the country. There is hardly any bipartisan or multi-partisan voting on issues. There could be other situations where legislators may defy party line to represent a region or a lobby or a group. Even that to some degree is good, but not the ideal thing. The ideal thing is when each legislator can vote as per his conscience with pragmatism and national interest or public interest as guiding force. Only then there can be a robust debate and quality discussions, where multiplicity of views, find their expression and optimal mix among them will rule the day. There probably a fraction of issues which a party can not desert, but there can be significant part which is debatable. There could be certain situations which require whole of legislature to converge. In such a set up hopefully the interest of every section of society will have a chance to find its place. Things like whip should be only for select legislations.
Now then, what should be done about instability issue. We can allow legislators to defect, but once they defect, they may need to be in that party or independent status for at least a year. To prevent defections on the eve of elections of we can have a requirement that a person should be member of the party (and not of any other) at least for six months, before they can represent that party by contesting election. .This will also prevent celebrities from gate-crashing and contesting. The upper houses need not have that restriction to make space for talented experts, who can become ministers if need be.
Similar cooling period of six months to one year can be mandated before a defector can occupy a Ministerial position. This way legislators can not be enticed with Ministerial positions that easily. In case of hung parliament, the defectors will be able to vote for a viable combination but have to bide their time before they become ministers.
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Once legislators are freed from the shackles of anti-defection laws the parties and their leaders also will be more responsive to legislators and legislators to the parties, as parties can now also attract legislators from other parties with a compelling agenda and strong governance. The legislators also will be more enthusiastic and empowered.?When people vote they will give at least 50% weightage to the candidate and only the other 50% to the party.
It also may be a good idea to ask a voter to give 2 votes, one for the candidate and one for the party (in case of independents the candidate will get both votes) and then whoever gets most votes should win. This would mean a party with lot of votes but candidates far below should be able to nominate another and candidate with more votes than his party should have same privileges as independent candidate, when it comes to leaving the party. These situations are outlier situations, but they are important to choose the best candidates and force the party to choose the right candidates.
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