Cargo Theft: Victim or Willful Nonfeasance?

@Adam Bryan:

Thanks for your good and timely question about cargo hijackers in Latin America using electronic detection and jamming equipment to defeat GPS trackers. Coincidentally I was in Lima, Peru a few weeks ago speaking with some of the smartest and most experienced pharmaceutical supply chain security experts in the world about just this topic. Naturally it’s a longer discussion than we could expect to answer here, but I’ll be happy to provide a couple brief ideas. To provide the best insights and most current thinking on this good question, I contacted our old mutual friend Gary Bryant for his thoughts.

Gary said the most successful strategic design he’s implemented in the past to circumvent scanning and detection is to deploy two GPS devices per shipment, one actively transmitting at regular intervals (e.g. every 2 minutes) and the other programmed in “sleep” mode. By covertly concealing the devices inside separate case boxes, which should be loaded on separate pallets, the devices are not likely to be found by visual inspection. In the event that electronic detection equipment is used to scan for GPS devices, however, the active device will be detected and neutralized. Upon detecting and locating the transmitting device, bad guys have historically been less likely to resume scanning at a subsequent time or location.

The device programmed in “sleep” mode, meaning it’s not powered on while in motion and therefore not transmitting electronic signals (e.g. GSM and GPS), it will not be detected by the scanning equipment when the active one is. Gary recommends programming the “sleeper” device to operate as follows:

·        Wake up after no movement detected for a specific period of time,

·        Upon waking, immediately upload data and transmit current GPS location to the server,

·        Repeat process every 30 minutes (or as deemed appropriate) of no movement thereafter, until the stolen merchandise can be recovered,  

·        Both the period of time of no movement and the transmittal time can be adjusted over the air at the operator’s discretion.

Lastly, Gary strongly recommends utilizing GPS devices with light sensors, which transmit location data via email upon the device sensing a change in lighting conditions (e.g. such as when a device is detected and removed from its packaging). This capability confirms that a device has been detected and positively identifies the precise location and time where the compromise occurred.     

I hope these ideas and suggestions are helpful and answer your friends’ . If your friends want additional information or have more questions, Gary said he’d be happy to speak with them and they can contact him directly at gary.bryant@gtoc.guru. In the meantime, enjoy your visit to Colombia and I’ll look forward to seeing you when you get back.  

ag      

 *Gary added that with technology now available at prices as low as $25/month, deploying two reusable GPS devices is a more feasible idea than even in the recent past.

While cargo theft statistics vary, it’s generally agreed upon that cargo theft constitutes a $15 to $30 billion-dollar per year problem in the United States. Additionally, the FBI reports that less than 20 percent of stolen cargo is ever recovered. Traditionally speaking, most people would likely agree that if something is stolen from you, you’re a victim, right? On the other hand, with all the theft prevention and mitigation technology readily available at one’s fingertips today, what responsibility does a company have to take reasonable measures to prevent or mitigate cargo theft?

At the risk of answering a question with a question, if a company does little to nothing to prevent their cargo from being stolen, might that be considered willful nonfeasance. Nonfeasance is described by www.dictonary.com as “the omission of some act that ought to have been performed.” In the professional world of corporate security, we’re well-armed with the statistics, categories, heat maps, and additional immeasurable intelligence about who, what when, why, and where cargo theft occurs. We’re also bombarded daily with the latest and greatest new mouse trap guaranteed to track, trace, disrupt, dismantle, prevent, and mitigate supply chain disruptions and cargo theft.  

For the sake of brevity, let’s look at one such technology like GPS, the evolution of which has had an incredibly steep efficiency evolution over the last several decades. It seems like hundreds of years ago that we were covertly concealing “bird dogs” in barrels of chemicals sold to cocaine traffickers in hopes of locating their labs in the Huallaga Valley of Peru. I think we all know how that worked out based on the capabilities of the technology at the time.

But if we fast forward to today, we have true GPS devices the size of a package of cigarettes that can operate for months pinging every five minutes on an agnostic SIM card that roams to the strongest GSM network in more than 180 countries, all for $25/month. With that in mind, why wouldn’t transportation security executives be covertly secreting these devices in their shipments of high risk commodities on a regular basis? And why wouldn’t insurance companies require the use of such technology before providing insurance? Or at least provide discounts to companies that proactively take responsibility for being part of the solution to mitigate the escalating cargo theft incidents, which of course drive up the price of everything downstream, all the way to the consumer?

Based on my background and experience, friends often ask what keeps me up at night. This would be one of those many things.