Can't Prove a Negative
USS GREENEVILLE (SSN 772)

Can't Prove a Negative

This is not necessarily the most fun article to write. But, it's on my mind and I need to get it out. No movie references this time. Not much humor either. It is a somewhat somber topic. I need to share some thoughts. I hope this does not come across as ambulance chasing or taking advantage of a tragic event as I will briefly discuss the TITAN tragedy and relate it the importance of High Reliability Principles.

Our company recently conducted an assessment of a client's oil and gas operations. We have done many of these over the last seven years. We look at culture, leadership, the management system, and "feedback" (essentially how well information flows throughout the organization about what is really going on - think self assessments and more).

Our goal with these assessments (we call them Rapid Operational Assessments) is to provide a sort of "leading indicator" about the organization's operational culture and leadership compared to an ideal "High Reliability Organization" (HRO) - an organization that avoids catastrophes in high risk, high consequence environments.

This particular client did not fair too well on our assessment. But, that's okay - most don't. It's good that they are looking hard at their culture and operations. They invited strangers (us) in to take a hard look, too. They were transparent with us and we found some issues. Now they can fix some things and improve their process safety culture.

But, I did get a request to explain what adopting some of these HRO principles would actually do for them. I am guessing a bean counter corporate type wants justification on the "return on investment". It does take resources (time and money) to close gaps in HRO culture and leadership. Programs like Management of Change or Risk Management or Asset Integrity sometimes need improved. This takes time to teach the program manager and team how to use these tools to reduce risk. Coaching and mentoring someone to become a true HRO Leader takes a lot of time, interaction and trust. So the question is fair - companies want to be wise with their resources. I get it. I would ask the question too.

So, I had been pondering this a lot as it has always been a bit of an issue for us. You see our goal is to improve a company's process safety culture. We aim to reduce the risk of significant, catastrophic events where people are hurt or killed or the environment and major equipment is damaged. But events like this are relatively infrequent (thank goodness). This makes it very hard to measure the impact, especially in the short run. It's far easier to reduce some cost or improve some productivity to show immediate gain to the bottom line.

Fortunately, some clients have put faith in our HRO Principles and our approach. They usually have been suffering from a string of these major events and recognize they need to get their arms around it. With these clients who have invested years to improve their safety culture, we can see the improvement. One client went from having routine (almost quarterly) Tier 1 events to not one single Tier 1 event in over 3.5 years - (Woah - did I just jinx them? Nah, I don't believe in jinxing...besides, my fingers were crossed. ;))


Another client over the course of 36 months went from bottom quartile in process safety to top quartile. That's a pretty marked improvement in a reasonable amount of time. Their journey is not over. The HRO journey never is.


So, how do I answer the new client's question about ROI? Sure, I will explain to them that this process takes time. I will give them successful examples like those from above. Sometimes it is enough. I hope so. We sure believe in it and we have clients who will testify to the results. But, I would love to have some exact, clear answer. Is there a clear, exact, measurable answer to this question...I don't know but...


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As I was contemplating this ROI question, the tragic news of the Titan Submersible story hit the news. With this ROI question in my mind, coupled with the questions around Titan's alleged poor approach to quality assurance and the CEO not hiring "old white guys" from the submarine force who are "uninspiring", made a light bulb finally go on in my head..."YOU CANNOT PROVE A NEGATIVE".

Now I had heard this saying many, many times in the Submarine Force. I always kind of thought I understood it, but it finally really, truly sunk in. I was giving a speech at a chemical plant last Tuesday and as I was saying it "You can't prove a negative" in relation to what HRO Leaders ultimately do (avoid catastrophes) I noticed out of the corner of my eye a young woman in FR Coveralls nodding her head in agreement with me. And zing!

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USS THRESHER (SSN 593) - lost at sea 1963

That's it - we can't prove a negative. I cannot prove that all the work we did in the US Nuclear Submarine Force (like quality assurance on SUBSAFE equipment, Rig for Dive, Departure From Specifications, Temporary Standing Orders, following procedures, training, rigorous root cause analysis, maintenance observations, qualification program, etc.) directly saved us from a tragic event like the Titan submersible appears to have suffered. We do know what happened to USS THRESHER in 1963. We learned from that tragedy and apply those lessons every day. So, while we can't point to immediate return on investment, we do know that collectively over days, months, years and decades these practices and principles have served our submarine force well.


I believe in them so much I trust my daughter out on USS MISSISSIPPI (SSN 782) as we speak. Is there a better endorsement for safety practices and culture than to allow one of your children's lives be at risk? I can not think of one.


So, yes we know that these High Reliability/US Nuclear Submarine Force practices and culture make us a bit "uninspiring" - heck maybe even boring. I can't argue otherwise. But at 500 feet or 12,500 feet below the surface of an ocean trying to crush the life out of you and your shipmates...I will accept boring and uninspiring.


So to any future clients, I am sorry but I cannot give you an easy to measure, short term return on your investment. I can't prove a negative. But, considering the risks being taken, can we afford to find out?




Bob Koonce served for over 20 years in the U.S. Submarine Force and retired from active duty in 2011 after commanding USS KEY WEST (SSN 722), a nuclear submarine based in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Bob frequently speaks and writes on Operational Excellence and High Reliability Organizations based on the leadership and culture of the U.S. Nuclear Navy. He is co-author of?Extreme Operational Excellence: Applying the US Nuclear Submarine Culture?to Your Organization?available?here.?You can learn more about High Reliability Group by visiting?www.highrelgroup.com.


Mark Wrzyszczynski, ChPP

Program Manager, Leading technical teams to deliver complex programs and improve business results

1 年

Bob, I love your explanation. It begins to help people unfamiliar with the Navy's Nuclear Program understand that we were doing "Goal Zero" (No injuries are acceptable) long before it was an O&G industry cliche. You have short changed the very real dilemma that every executive faces when implementing what tactical programs and actions to take to accomplish this long term goal. I once had a boss tell me that we would do the safest procedure for setting a module on an offshore platform. I corrected her, that we would in-fact, set the module in a way that is safe enough to not get anyone hurt or any equipment damaged and be legal. The reality was that the Jones Act prevented us from doing the safest procedure. But, we accomplished the mission flawlessly by applying the lessons that we learned in the submarine force, and conducting risk assessments, bow ties, maintenance checks, & training evaluations. Similarly, your daughter is taking very real risks, as did you. But you, and she, manage those risks by having attention to details that escape most people. I hope that we can meet someday.

Edward Takesuye

Program Manager at the OUSD R&E Strategic Capabilities Office

1 年

Bob - nice article . . . it is helping me shape my thinking about a technical issue with a program that I am currently managing. Hoe you and your family are doing well! Take care shipmate!

Eugene Nemeth

Facility Operations & Maintenance Group Lead

1 年

Nice article and very true. Periodically I get the question “why do we take so much time to pre-job, perform tabletops, walkdowns, dry runs, rigorous OJT/OJE, and management observations, stress ConOps, reinforce a questioning attitude and ISMS, and much more when we haven’t had anything bad happen.” My response; exactly, let’s keep it that way! My opinion, root cause of Titan accident was a loss of respect for and understanding of the hazards the ocean presents. Happy 4th Bob.

Mark Kenny

Senior Vice President Strategy and Business Development at Ultra Maritime

1 年

Great article Bob, spot on !

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John P. Carter

Explorer | Inventor | PhD PE | Author | Former Submarine Squadron Commodore

1 年

Bob Koonce - if you need a served NPEB SBM consultant let me know. Cheers.

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