Can we blame centralized integrity oversight bodies for low trust in Government?

I recently stumbled upon a policy brief authored by Mr. Carl Dolan (https://www.epc.eu/content/Screen-Time-Commissioners-PB.pdf), which examines the quality and independence of the EU’s ethics screening processes. The brief sheds light on flaws observed during conflict of interest screenings for newly appointed #Commissioners and proposes recommendations for improvement.

While I agree with most of Mr. Dolan’s arguments and findings, I identified one claim that appears speculative. Specifically, the author addresses central oversight bodies dealing with conflicts of interest and raises doubts about their effectiveness.

To illustrate, Mr. Dolan cites the following example:

“There is much to admire about the rigour brought to the job by the Haute Autorité pour la transparence de la vie publique and similar centralized agencies specializing in verifying asset declarations, such as Romania’s National Integrity Agency (ANI) or, for senior officials, the US Office of Government Ethics (OGE). ANI in particular has an impressive track record of enforcement. If all we want from an integrity screening process or an ethics regime is clear and hard rules that are ruthlessly enforced, then these agencies serve as standout models.”

Then he brings onto the stage the natural tendency of measuring the impact of such bodies and he chooses (wrongfully in my opinion) survey data of trust in national governments:

“Among EU countries, France and Romania are some of the worst performers, with recent Eurobarometer results for France particularly alarming – less than one in five people trust the national government (…) The US executive is no better placed”

Although Mr. Dolan acknowledges that “there are many more determinants of public trust in institutions than just how conflicts of interest are handled” he concludes that these results should make us reconsider whether centralized bodies deliver better outcomes than alternative institutional arrangements.

In my opinion, the author implies a (small but evident) correlation between low public trust and the presence of centralized watchdogs where no such causal relationship has been established. Even so, narrowing the focus to corruption-prevention bodies as one of the determinants of trust oversimplifies the issue.

Now, I am no expert in determinants of public trust or even in public trust, I didn’t even get to seriously scratch the surface. But I witnessed the tremendous work that agencies such as ANI or HATVP put in over the years. These bodies centralized the disclosure processes, identified and sanctioned conflicts of interest, scrutinized thousands and hundreds of thousands of declarations, constantly having their mandates and scope extended despite their scarce resources. Especially in Romanian ANI`s case, I witnessed more and more citizens submitting potential integrity incident claims or public servants becoming more mindful when engaging in different potentially conflicting public-private / public–public capacities. These are outcomes that can hardly influence citizens attitudes towards government but this does not mean that the outcomes are not there.

Try to strip France or Romania of such instruments and in turn enhance collegial capabilities of separate bodies to identify and mitigate or sanction conflicts of interests: Parliament for the MPs, Government for its Ministers, Head of the judiciary for magistrates, and see if the trust of people is increased. Would such decentralization increase public trust? I find this scenario unlikely, as it risks fragmentation, weaker oversight, and greater opportunities for conflicts of interest to go unaddressed.

A study from a couple of decades ago argued that modernizing the public sector could restore trust in government by improving the quality of public service delivery, leading to increased citizen satisfaction and, ultimately, higher trust. However, the study itself cautions that “this reasoning contains many steps that are neither theoretically nor empirically supported and are even contested” (source: KULeuven study).

It is also important to clarify that the discussion pertains to corruption-prevention bodies, not prosecution agencies. These oversight bodies aim to manage conflicts of interest before they escalate, applying administrative sanctions rather than relying on headline-grabbing arrests or convictions. And then there is the Trocadero complex: the more corruption scandals are exposed, the higher the perceived level of corruption becomes, regardless of actual progress made in combating it.

Ultimately, while Mr. Dolan acknowledges the broader factors influencing trust, his argument risks undermining the very existence of central oversight bodies. There is a circular reasoning that goes like this:

“Central oversight bodies detect wrongdoings effectively, yet public trust remains low; therefore, we should consider alternative institutional settings.”. This could erode confidence in oversight institutions that operate under adverse conditions and often face resistance from political and judicial actors. Weakening these bodies would not restore trust but instead exacerbate governance challenges.

Again, it is obvious for me (and to some extent for the author) that trust in government is a broad issue and it is highly influenced by macro-issues such as political instability, economic challenges and less by the narrowed focus prevention of corruption bodies. However, while centralized watchdogs like ANI or HATVP are not panaceas for building trust in government, dismissing their contributions based on tenuous links to public dissatisfaction overlooks their critical role in promoting integrity and accountability.