Can The U.S.-Pakistan Agree on Afghanistan?

?????????Can Pakistan and the United States Agree on Afghanistan? ??????????

by??Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi????????????

Pakistan’s two senior officials, Adviser on National Security and Director General of the ISI, are on separate visits to the United States.?This is for the first time since the advent of the Biden Administration in the U.S. that such a high-level national security visits from Pakistan have taken place.?Earlier, a limited contact took place among the high officials of the two countries,?but no senior American official of the Biden Administration has visited Pakistan so far. The only exception is Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad who came to Pakistan twice after Joe Biden assumed the Presidency. The Director American CIA undertook a quiet visit to Islamabad in the first week of June.

???????It is difficult to suggest if the visit of Pakistan’s security officials can set the stage for a relationship of trust and cooperation with the U.S. ?on security issues in and around Afghanistan. There is so much divergence in their worldview that it will not be an easy task to cultivate a fully active and cooperative relationship.??However, both do not want to cause a breakdown in their relations because both know that cooperation is mutually advantageous. ?

????Pakistan has a limited relevance for the current American policy. ?In addition to bilateral relations in different domains of mutual interests, Pakistan appears to be relevant for?American agenda in Afghanistan.?The U.S. ?wants Pakistan to facilitate the result-oriented dialogue with the Afghan Taliban and contribute to Afghanistan’s internal peace and stability after American military withdrawal from there. ?Pakistan is expected to take steps at the individual level and work with the states of region to ensure an inclusive political settlement between the Afghan Taliban and the Kabul based Afghan government.

???If we compare this relationship with the Biden Administration’s relations with India, the sharing of goals is in the broader Asian context. The U.S. would like India to stay engaged in Afghanistan for its economic reconstruction and for support to the Kabul government. ??However, this relationship goes?beyond Afghanistan. India is directly relevant to American agenda for restraining China’s influence and role at the global level. ?This ?links India with?American policy in the Asia Pacific and South China Sea region.???

???The scope of Pakistan’s relations with the U.S. would therefore be limited, ?confined to some bilateral political, social and economic matters and the issues of internal harmony and peace in Afghanistan. ?They will agree in some areas of mutual interest but disagree in others. This means that this would be an issue-oriented relationship rather than a comprehensively positive relationship.

???The U.S.-China rivalry is?another constraint on the U.S-Pakistan relations.??The U.S. has strong reservations on China’s agenda for global economic connectivity through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). American officials have publicly rebuked the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) but Pakistan views it important for its economic and societal development and regional connectivity. ?The U.S. opposition to the CPEC is shared by India.?

???There are several obstacles to a smooth and fully cooperative relations between Pakistan and the U.S.??First, traditionally, the U.S. decided its Afghanistan policy unilaterally and expected Pakistan to shape its Afghanistan policies in accordance with the decisions made in Washington. Pakistan did not always come up to American expectations in this respect.????Second, a good?number of people in America’s official circles and think-tanks have their thinking frozen in Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policies in the 1990s and the beginning of the?21st Century. Most of them are unable to appreciate the changes in the mindset of Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment because of their bitter experience in the direct war on terrorism in the tribal areas and mainland Pakistan in 2014-18. Most of Pakistan’s senior and middle level officers and soldiers of today have done counter terrorism duties during these years and experienced the inhuman and brutal disposition of the terrorist groups. Therefore, they do not maintain goodwill towards them as was the case in the 1980s and the 1990s. Pakistan has been unable to project the change in the mindset of Pakistan’s current security establishment.

??Third, Pakistan’s influence on the Afghan Taliban has declined mainly because, with Doha, Qatar, as the new base of their activities, the Afghan Taliban are no longer dependent on Pakistan as was the case during 1990-2010. Their direct interaction with the U.S., Russia, and China has given them strong self-confidence. This was not the case when the above mentioned two decades. Now, the U.S.-NATO decision to withdraw from Afghanistan without any political settlement with the Taliban has given a sense of greater confidence to the Taliban who think that they can either make the Kabul government dysfunctional or dislodge it.

??Fourth, distrust has traditionally characterized the relations between the Afghan government and Pakistan. Now, as the Afghan Taliban are increasing their control of Afghan territory, the high officials in Kabul, including the President, Vice President and National Security Advisor are engaged in hostile propaganda against Pakistan by claiming that Pakistan is actively supporting the Afghan Taliban. Several developments in July have deteriorated their bilateral relation. The hostile attitude of the Afghan government makes the Pakistan less enthusiastic about seeking peace in Afghanistan. It also encourages the pro-Taliban religious groups in Pakistan to be active for the Taliban and ask the Pakistan government to take a tough line towards the Kabul government.

??Fifth,?the U.S. expects Pakistan to pursue its policies keeping in view American priorities in and around Afghanistan. However, the U.S. does not give any attention to Pakistan’s security concerns emanating from the policies of Afghan and Indian governments. Such a neglect of Pakistan’s security concerns reduces support for American policy in Pakistan at the official and non-official levels.

???The Kabul government is persistent in its propaganda against Pakistan and provides encouragement and funding to Tehrik-i-Taliban-i-Pakistan that is based in Afghanistan for violence inside of Pakistan.?The U.S. is dismissive of these Pakistani concerns. It never advises the Kabul government to observe diplomatic decencies and restraint while talking about Pakistan.????Similarly, there are serious problems between Pakistan and India. ?Pakistan accuses India of resorting to a propaganda war against Pakistan and that it also supports the Pakistani Taliban and other dissidents to resort to terrorist activities in Pakistan.?The U.S. is not willing to take any concrete?initiative to contain India’s hostility towards Pakistan. ??If Pakistan has act alone to counter Afghan and Indian pressures, it will accept American advice on Afghanistan if it fits into Pakistan’s security apprehensions. These concerns will shape Pakistan’s policy on making Pakistani territory or airspace available to the U.S. for anti-Taliban operations. Other Pakistani concerns are the influx of new refugees from Afghanistan, the spillover of the civil strife in Afghanistan on Pakistani territory, arrival of Afghan security forces into Pakistan to avoid the war in Afghanistan, and above all, the danger of the internal strife in Afghanistan turning into a proxy war for the competing states from the region and the outside

???American withdrawal from Afghanistan has added new complexities to the already difficult Pakistan-U.S. relations. If the U.S. distrusts Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy, Pakistan has reservations about American agenda in and around Afghanistan and South Asia.?

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