Can rockets be recycled? The value of a defining a problem well in business and technology
Over this weekend, as the world witnesses the first human spaceflight mission in a reused rocket, it is a good time to consider the value of defining a problem well. When it comes to solving problems, the commonsensical view may be guided by the accepted problem definition. What we have accepted as the de rigueur problem to be solved may not be the right problem. It may just be the one our brains have seen and formed an initial view of. And what we see quickly, we are likely to define narrowly — underestimating our future interests and overestimating our current priorities.
Solving the root problem, and not a symptom of it, removes impediments to growth not just for today but for tomorrow as well. This leads to non-incremental growth where value is unlocked in the fullness of time. Digging into a problem beyond the accepted level of inquiry (it is not the same as reinventing the wheel) may seem contrarian and earn us the impatience of those around us but it is what will steer us to the biggest returns eventually.
Human beings are driven by a bias for action. As soon as we are presented with a problem, our instincts goad us to solve it. This is evolutionary. Man survived in the wild because of his speed of response. He did not have the chance to consider the odds at length. Even though that same imminence of threat no longer exists today, the neural mechanisms driving our reactions have not disappeared. So when we see a problem, we jump to solve it. Often the earliest to frame a problem is the one that decides what exactly needs to be solved. If that solution seems to work at that point, subsequent parties tend to accept the problem as appropriately defined and invest themselves in finding better solutions to the same problem. But even the best solutions to age-old problems are capped in value at some point in the future. They are trapped in technologies that are closer to or past their use-by date: fossil-fuel-powered transport, meat production, analog photography (analog photography has made a comeback and has its own niche market).
Beating the narrow problem definition trap
Decoupling: A way to arrest the force of the automatic problem-solving behavior is to break it up into a two-step process. If we place problem definition before problem solving, we force ourselves to clearly articulate a problem before attempting to solve it. As important as unbundling problem definition from the problem-solving process is, it is especially hard because it is the better performers who make the swiftest leap between the two. How often have we been met with silence when our boss has put a problem on the table?
The best way to legitimize the separate processes of defining and solving a problem is to acknowledge and reward each. We have all been rewarded for solving a problem. Emphasizing that defining a problem well adds value is important. Such underscoring has to be backed up by encouraging a practice of rejecting problem definitions as they have been handed down.
Identifying the root problem: What a problem demands of us is a vector response. The speed with which we respond is only as good if we are aiming right. If we have mis-identified the source of the problem we are wasting the limited resources at our disposal. No matter how swift or powerful our attempts we are going to miss the mark. Safi Bahcall’s Loonshots offers a fascinating account of how tripping on the wrong problem led to the eventual downfall of Polaroid, an industry Goliath of the time. Through the 60s and 70s, Edwin Land, inventor and founder of Polaroid Corporation, doubled down to make the best polarizer that helped chemically develop prints quicker than anyone else in the market. Until the more pertinent question became “Should Polaroid invest in a new technology that does not rely on film at all and instead allows us to electrically record images on chips many times more sensitive than film that could then be produced back at will?” Land stuck to analog, going on to mastermind the launch of Polavision, which died in a year, as Sony and Nikon stole a march on Polaroid Corporation.
Often we end up examining symptoms when the cause is more upstream. Any cure, no matter how efficient, is worse than prevention. One sign of having arrived at the root problem is when the problem definition does not change depending on whom we ask. To get to this it is necessary to eke out a separate forum just for agreeing on the problem definition.
Inversion: Consider this Brian Regan joke from his Netflix special On the Rocks:
So I go to my regular doctor, and he’s like “What’s going on?” and I said “You tell me. Just above my right knee, there’s a little area about three inches up, it’s about the size of a fist — that’s where it doesn’t hurt.”
Inversion is quite simply the model for looking to achieve the desired outcome by making an approach counterintuitively in time (backward instead of forward), in intent (avoid the worst instead of seek the best), or in effect (subtract instead of add). Spending time considering what it is that you should avoid in pursuit of your goals can end up leaving you with what you need. Similarly, bringing to problems an additive approach urges us to construct a solution by adding elements only; yet, it can be equally effective to approach a solution by eliminating elements.
Backcasting is a specific implementation of the same model. Just as exploring a subtractive angle in defining problems opens up possible solutions, imagining ourselves at the end and looking back at the path helps identify obstacles that could hinder us en route. Mike Maples, Jr., co-founder at tech venture capital firm Floodgate and podcaster, posits that “backcasting from potential futures widens the range of possible futures you can consider.” It enables us to consider inflections in technology and accepted beliefs that would unlock the most value, except that it does so by making us define the summit first and then map our way back to the basecamp.
Forecasting sits well with what we are comfortable doing — defining the contours of a problem using our present view. We apply the rules of today to project how we will solve problems tomorrow. But that lends prevailing beliefs an air of permanence. While imagining the future of long-distance travel few fully took into account advances in battery technologies that would make the prospect of powerful electric vehicles real. Now we wonder when exactly did electric vehicles happen. The same may happen tomorrow with commercial space travel.
What makes solving redefined problems so hard?
Should we make cheaper rockets for one-time use or should we try and make them reusable? Should we rear farm animals more economically or should we learn to grow plant-based meats sustainably? Should we focus on designing faster versions of gasoline-powered automobiles we already have or could we consider a new form of transport altogether?
These redefinitions of prevailing global problems are no longer heresy. It is not for lack of knowledge that the world at large has not yet committed fully to these new visions, just as it’s not for lack of realization that business incumbents fall short of what the future demands of them. Why then do businesses continue to invest in building better versions of what they already have instead of seeking breakthroughs by breaking free of limited world views?
Scaling up is easier than starting up: Peter Thiel’s pithy Zero to One captures this as horizontal and vertical progress: “If you take one typewriter and build 100, you have made horizontal progress. If you have a typewriter and build a word processor, you have made vertical progress.” Horizontal progress is easier to imagine than vertical progress. The same distinction shows up, albeit under different labels, as loonshots and franchises in Loonshots.
Cost of switching: The question of “why should we stop this gravy train?” stems from considering time and effort-based switching costs. Business leaders know the dread of cold-starting after having invested heavily into building a franchise. We want to be able to imagine the future — revenue streams, break-even points, market positions — in sufficient detail so that going in we know the terrain forward inch by inch. But the rules of incremental growth do not apply in market creation. There is little certainty, there are inflections we can’t predict. Even though giving up our market advantage is tough, perhaps even more telling is the emotional cost of switching. In the case of Land, the story goes that he had fallen in love with what he had developed. He had been at the bleeding edge of polarization for decades and found it hard in the face of growing evidence to look beyond it.
Lack of personal incentive: “What’s in it for me?” is a powerful driver of leadership choices. If a CEO has a 5-year term before retirement, often her focus will be on maximising shareholder returns in the 5-year horizon. That is what she will be rewarded for, after all. No one will reward her 10 years later for having kickstarted a program that materialized and yielded returns much after she had retired.
Short-term thinking: In the wake of COVID, global economies are attempting to kickstart a recovery by pumping in money into coal and other fossil fuels, setting 2021 up to be the year with the second-highest emissions in history. This lifeline to coal arrives despite plummeting prices for renewable energy, which is now cheaper than coal. The last time we witnessed such a shot in the arm for coal? 2010, post the financial crisis. Be it governments or public companies, we are seduced by what we can see (instant effects of a stimulus package, instant win for shareholders) and oblivious to what we cannot (long-term effects of deeper problems).
Conclusion
Businesses that are able to achieve breakthroughs tend to emphasize on systemic changes. Could companies reduce the cost of switching by setting aside an R&D budget that leaves them with enough to navigate the present while allowing a taste of the future? They could make simultaneous bets, supporting several 0 to 1 initiatives at once, knowing fully well that even a solitary success will open up new markets. Could companies switch to a system of rewarding leadership roles to incentivize long-term thinking? Let’s say a CEO has a 5-year tenure but her compensation is structured in a manner such that rewards continue to flow in up to 5 years after her retirement if the longer-term milestones are met.
Continued progress springs from redefining problems and freeing the new definition of old assumptions. This is not just true for technologies, products, or businesses. This is why religious scriptures are questioned by every generation. This is why constitutions need to be updated and laws need amendments.
Food for thought
As per Moore’s Law we have for the last four decades continued to double the number of transistors on a chip every two years. Yet, if we continue to double down the same way we will run out of nanometres on a chip. Is the problem how to fit more chips per unit area or is to consider a new technology that will help drive Moore’s Law?
This piece was originally published here. Thanks to Atul Sinha for reading drafts and sharing thoughts.