Can design mitigate school shootings? We must try.

Can design mitigate school shootings? We must try.

Schools are on the front line. When deranged people attack schoolchildren with firearms, all other defenses have failed. School buildings become the last line of defense for pupils and teachers. No design can ever defeat well-armed attackers who are determined to kill and prepared to die. There is no substitute—none—for keeping firearms away from people who should not have them. There is no substitute for reacting promptly and firmly to behaviors of concern. But design measures can help—to issue prompt alerts, shelter potential victims, and offer escape routes.

Learning must remain first. We build schools to educate and to nurture, not to defend against armed attack. Defensive design principles and security measures have a long history in architecture and engineering, and they remain in use today. But such measures are often incompatible with qualities we want in places for learning—openness, a sense of welcoming, and freedom of movement. Still, in both new and existing schools, we can employ security-oriented design principles and features. We can use measures that are unobtrusive, reasonable, and suitable for learning environments—and we can do this without inducing anxiety in children, teachers, and parents.

The measures schools need. We need to employ architectural design measures and building features that deter and delay attackers, alert others rapidly to violent acts, and provide shelter or egress for targets. We need affordable measures in both new and existing schools. We need to use design to reduce the harm caused by attacks when they occur. School boards, administrators, and government authorities need to know about proven measures that can enhance safety during assaults.

The questions we should ask. What design measures in architecture, landscape design, and engineering are most effective in preventing armed attackers from gaining access to schools? What intelligent tools and systems are effective? What measures are most effective in preventing students and intruders (former students in some cases) from bringing firearms and other weapons into school buildings? What measures can give early warning of the presence of armed intruders? What measures can offer shelter or escape when attacks do occur? How can school systems use proven security measures without detracting unduly from the quality of the educational experience? What are the costs of reasonable security measures, and which ones are most affordable?

How to proceed. We can learn from international experience and careful reviews of documented cases. Security system vendors and equipment manufacturers can help. We can obtain views from architects, landscape designers, engineers, and others who design for security. We can learn from educators and administrators who have worked to address school violence. We can learn from psychologists and police veterans who have dealt with school shootings. We can review lessons learned in Australia, Norway, South Africa, Israel, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan—all have experienced grave incidents of school violence.

Learn from examples. We can learn from measures employed in schools all over the world. These measures include steps to: use perimeter fences that deter trespassing; limit the number of entrances; funnel pedestrian traffic to focused access points that are controlled and watched closely; provide ways to secure rooms to withstand assault; establish emergency response and notification procedures and testing them regularly; implement strong visitor management systems; use window glazing systems that ease natural surveillance and provide strong physical barriers; monitor all exterior doors electronically to determine if they are closed and locked; and provide duress and panic buttons in main administrative areas.

Act now. Let us find the funds to complete applied research on how design can better protect schoolchildren against shootings. Let us engage the most experienced architects designing educational facilities, the top researchers in our academic institutions, the security equipment manufacturers in non-military markets, and the leaders in artificial intelligence and building control technology. Let us enlist leading school psychologists and architects with hands-on experience in security design. Let us formulate clear, viable design recommendations, and then let us disseminate them in ways that encourage their widespread adoption.

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