A brief evaluation of the normative implications of the rise of bureaucratic autonomy throughout the development of the American administrative state

INTRODUCTION

The development of the American state has a long, substantive, and rather contentious history. This history is exceedingly broad. Therefore, when examined holistically, conclusions are often generalized and specific aspects of, or contributing factors to, the development of the state can be unintentionally overlooked or underemphasized. Further, innate biases are pervasive – particularly in matters of the state – as individuals’ personal socio, political, and economic experiences shape their perspectives, guide their ordering of values, and subsequently explain their value judgements. These biases are unavoidable. They can only be identified and then limited by the collective presence and informed understanding of the contrasting biases of others. Nevertheless, these biases serve to define the various interpretations of the history of the American state and its development over time. One particular aspect of this history has been the rise of bureaucratic autonomy.

Many historians and scholars have identified the normative implications of this rise in a purely advantageous manner, exclusively emphasizing the benefits of bureaucratic autonomy or, if evoking them whatsoever, minimizing the negative results of bureaucratic autonomy and its evident rise in the American state. In order examine whether or not the normative implications of this rise have been solely beneficial to the development of the American state, one must first identify and comprehend normative political theory, and a normative approach to understanding public administration and politics as compared to positive social theory, and a positive approach. Next, one must clearly define bureaucratic autonomy and discern whether it exists currently or has ever truly been achieved and, if so, to what degree.

It is imperative to avoid incorrectly suggesting that bureaucratic autonomy is exclusively beneficial.

Finally, a thorough historical examination ought be made with regard to the rise of bureaucratic autonomy throughout the development of the American state. Once satisficed, these components of inquisition should result in a more holistic understanding of: 1) the significance of bureaucratic autonomy today and throughout the development of the American state, 2) the degree to which autonomy has had an advantageous effect on the state’s development, both currently and over time, and 3) the future implications of autonomy’s affect on the nature of the American state. One thing is for certain: Whether or not the rise of bureaucratic autonomy throughout the development of the American state has yielded beneficial results to date, if such a phenomenon has even occurred,?it is imperative to avoid assumedly suggesting that bureaucratic autonomy is exclusively beneficial.

In order examine the normative implications of the rise of bureaucratic autonomy and identify whether or not they have been exclusively beneficial to the development of the American state, one must first identify and fully comprehend normative political theory and a normative approach to understanding public administration and politics. According to Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves (2017), “Normative theory is concerned with norms or normative principles. A normative principle can be defined as ‘a general directive that tells agents what (they ought, or ought not) to do’” (p. 177). This approach is contrary to a positive approach, which is entirely objective, merely empirical, and is focused on what is, not what ought to be. A positive approach, according to Pietrzyk-Reeves, “… attempts to explain how the social world works in a value-free way” (p. 177). While a normative approach is prescriptive and value-infused, a positive approach is descriptive and value-neutral. The difference between these two contrasting approaches is important to understand because the contrast serves to define the manner in which political theory is interpreted and the perspective from which certain findings are disseminated.

Many scholars have rejected the positive approach as a dangerous, utopian fallacy and have accepted the normative approach as a somewhat unfortunate reality of standard practice. Interestingly, many scholars have expressed that the most important facet of examination, whatsoever, is to identify the existence of biases in the first place. In his work “Neutrality in Political Science,” Charles Taylor (1994) said, “There is nothing to stop us making the greatest attempts to avoid bias and achieve objectivity. Of course it is hard – almost impossible – and precisely because our values are also at stake; but it helps, rather than hinders, the cause to be aware of this” (p. 569).

Moreover, the normative approach has not only been considered a form of best practice because of the innate biases ubiquitous in human nature; this approach has also received popular acclaim due to the benefits it yields with regard to policy examination. Because innate biases are unavoidable, they ought to be clearly identified, closely examined, constantly considered, and consistently compared with their conflicting counterparts. Ultimately, it is, first, important to understand the naturally subjective tendencies of human nature. Subsequently, it is best practice to harness this understanding rather that naively deny the existence of these naturally subjective, value-infused tendencies. Utopianism is a great disease – within all aspects of political science. The idea and pursuit of an achievable perfect world presents a vast array of dangers to public policy and public administration. These dangers parallel those which are presented when the existence of unavoidable, humanly innate biases is incorrectly rejected.

Understanding the implicit, innately unavoidable biases that historically have and will perpetually exist throughout the human experience is the first and most critical step toward examining any concept within the realm of political science. As Taylor (1994) said, “The findings of political science are not and will never be value-free. A given explanatory framework secretes a notion of good, and a set of valuations, which cannot be done away with – though they can be overridden – unless we do away with the framework” (p. 559).

The idea and pursuit of an achievable perfect world presents a vast array of dangers to public policy and public administration.

The succeeding examination of the rise of bureaucratic autonomy in the development of the American state is not immune to this philosophical notion and, therefore, is no exception to this approach. The implications that follow, and the interpretations of the academic works involved in this examination – even many from the academic works themselves – were developed and produced from a normative perspective. Understanding and gaining an appreciation for this normative approach is the first step toward identifying the normative implications of the rise of bureaucratic autonomy.

Next, one must define bureaucratic autonomy and, further, discern whether or not it has ever been achieved if it can truly exist at all. If bureaucratic autonomy is not a mere fallacy, to what level or degree can it exist? Has true bureaucratic autonomy ever truly been achieved? To answer these questions, one should look to arguably the most comprehensive historical examination on the subject of bureaucratic autonomy to date: Daniel P. Carpenter’s book, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy (2001).

According to Carpenter (2001), “Bureaucratic autonomy occurs when bureaucrats take actions consistent with their own wishes, actions to which politicians and organized interests defer even though they would prefer that other actions (or no action at all) be taken” (p. 4). This phenomenon involves all or any combination of the components of the “iron triangle” – that is, the policy-making relationship among the elected officials of Congress, the unelected bureaucrats of the administrative state, and the privately organized, publicly voiced activists of special interest groups. The “iron triangle” was first popularized by Gordon Adams (1981) in The Iron Triangle: The Politics of Defense Contracting. This multidimensional relationship serves as the backbone of the American governmental state, and bureaucratic autonomy is a significant component of its dynamic, ever-evolving interaction.

“Autonomy prevails when agencies can establish political legitimacy – a reputation for expertise, efficiency, or moral protection and a uniquely diverse complex of ties to organized interests and the media – and induce politicians to defer to the wishes of the agency even when they prefer otherwise” (Carpenter, p. 4). According to Carpenter, autonomy is achieved as a result of public-service-minded bureaucrats’ entrepreneurial motivation to participate in coalition building through networking and the development of strong, professional relationships. These relationships manifest as a result of what Carpenter calls “bureaucratic legitimacy” – a prerequisite for a reliable reputation and, subsequently, “the foundation of bureaucratic autonomy in democratic regimes” (p. 14). “Two features of bureaucratic legitimacy – reputational uniqueness and political multiplicity – are crucial… Autonomous agencies must demonstrate uniqueness and show that they can create solutions and provide services found nowhere else in the polity. If politicians can easily find compelling policy alternatives to an agency’s plans, then agency autonomy will not be stable” (p. 5).

Over time, when no elected official has the intellectual fortitude to question the reliability of the bureaucratic “expert,” a positive, reliable reputation is achieved. This reputation is both accompanied and sustained by a favorable press, infallible public statements, and the constant capitulation of opponents. “Genuine bureaucratic autonomy exists when agencies take the decisive first moves toward a new policy, establishing an agenda or the most popular alternative that becomes costly for otherwise recalcitrant politicians and organized interests to ignore… when agencies can alter the preferences of the public or organized interests, of presidents, of members of Congress, or media organizations, and of partisan elites. When agencies – by virtue of their recognized legitimacy in a policy area… can make it politically costly to oppose or restrain their innovations, or deny them leeway, they have achieved a form of autonomy that modern political science fails to recognize” (p. 355). Thus, according to Carpenter, as a result of all of this, full bureaucratic autonomy is ultimately achievable.

But why, then, does Carpenter often reference the achievement of bureaucratic autonomy in a varying and temporary sense throughout his work? Can various degrees or levels of bureaucratic autonomy exist, or is autonomy always a universal term? For example, would it be possible for some bureaucratic organizations to achieve autonomy, but only with regard to specific policy areas? Thereby, the organization, as a whole, has not achieved autonomy, but autonomy has effectively been achieved merely with within specific policy areas or areas of expertise. Furthermore, what is the difference between mere reputational “legitimacy” – as Carpenter espoused to be a vital prerequisite to autonomy – and autonomy itself? Is reputation or legitimacy merely a weaker term for autonomy, or is this concept entirely distinguishable?

Carpenter suggests that autonomy is not as weak of a term as was previously depicted, but is a much stronger, more meaningful term, and should be used more sparingly. Because it involves and even requires the forging of personal relationships, coalitions, and the long-term development and sustainability of proven reputations, bureaucratic autonomy – according to Carpenter – is only achieved and only pertains universally, with regard to the organization as a whole and the individual bureaucrats themselves (pp. 354-367). Autonomy is much more macro and uniquely pertaining than most tend to acknowledge or assume. So, the significance of an organization or individual bureaucrat achieving autonomy should not be overlooked; however, once autonomy is effectively achieved, can it be lost? What, then, is the difference between the grandiose concept of autonomy and its immediately preceding requisite of mere reputational legitimacy – if neither are permanent?

According to Carpenter, because bureaucratic autonomy must first be created, it can also be lost. The fact that bureaucratic autonomy did not exist at one time for all administrative agencies, and agencies and leading bureaucrats had to establish autonomy by way of the frequented strategies aforementioned, proves that these organizations can just as easily lose said autonomy.

Autonomy is much more macro and uniquely pertaining than most tend to acknowledge or assume.

Carpenter alludes to this point in multiple occasions throughout his work. He constantly reiterates the notion that maintaining legitimacy and a positive, reliable reputation is just as important as obtaining it in the first place (pp. 14-36). However, Carpenter also makes clear that autonomy is more momentous than this legitimacy – which is a mere component, though the most significant, of bureaucratic autonomy. So, if bureaucratic autonomy must be actively maintained, and it is always susceptible to extinction within administrative agencies, does true bureaucratic autonomy exist today? Furthermore, even if it is effectively extinct today, how has bureaucratic autonomy altered the current administrative landscape of the American state over time? To answer these questions, we look to history.

According to Carpenter’s many detailed?historical examples, bureaucratic autonomy appears to have been an integral component of the development of the American regime throughout history. As autonomy went, so too did the advancement of society though the maturation of public entities. Specifically, Carpenter details the growing pains experienced by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of the Interior, and the country’s first postal regime as it grew into today’s national postal system and what is now the United States Post Office (USPS). According to Carpenter’s many specific, historical accounts of personnel interactions within the development of these three federal agencies – involving individual instances of the use of discretion, recruitment, lobbying, reputation-building, legitimacy-proving, and countless interactions among the actors of the “iron triangle” as well as various stakeholders within and outside of the agencies themselves – bureaucratic autonomy appears to coincide with, or even define, the development of the American state as a whole.

Further, bureaucratic autonomy has constantly shifted over time according to the influence of the American executive, as presidential administrations have infused their values and visions into the executive branch and, thus, the administrative state throughout the duration of their respective tenures. Somewhat surprisingly, President Woodrow Wilson – historically known to have been one of the pioneering progressives of the American state in his roles as both a scholar and a president – was more concerned about the role of executive administrations effectively fostering individual autonomy, or “essential unity,” and whether or not this requires bureaucratic autonomy, rather than bureaucratic autonomy itself.

Bureaucratic autonomy has constantly shifted over time according to the influence of the American executive.

According to Brian J. Cook (2007), “As a number of his speeches in the 1912 presidential election made clear, Wilson was uneasy with the commitment of Theodore Roosevelt and his Progressive Party to greatly expand administrative autonomy, checked only by an independent, elected executive and reliance on a presumptively neutral expertise. Wilson argued that an independent commission of experts in fact served to insulate administrators engaged in business regulation from the full range of business interest and opinion about monopoly practices and blocked other avenues of citizen interest expression and public scrutiny of business practices…” (p. 30).

Cook continues, “Wilson regarded any president or candidate who supported extensive autonomy and discretion for expert administration as unlikely to use his powers of interpretation and national opinion leadership to keep administration well integrated administratively and politically and in line with the prevailing popular thought” (p. 30). Instead, Cook says, “administration was to use its expertise, experience, and willingness to experiment to serve the pursuit of individual autonomy and development within the essential unity of the nation, and to become an integral part of democratic politics and popular control of government through authoritative leadership” (p. 31). Wilson is just one example of an American executive’s perspective of bureaucratic autonomy, though his administrative policies that resulted from this perspective had a significant influence on the American state as we know it today.

“Bureaucratic policymaking is the hallmark of modern American government” (Carpenter, p. 5). But ought autonomy be the ultimate goal of bureaucratic policymaking? What are the normative implications of the rise of bureaucratic autonomy throughout the history of the development of the American state? Has this evident rise in bureaucratic autonomy been ultimately good for the state’s development, damaging, or a mere obstacle holding development back? What is meant by development? According to Carpenter, all three components of the “iron triangle” are, in a way, possessed by the administrative state. “Bureaucrats are politicians, and bureaucracies are organizations of political actors” (p. 353). Is this level of control within any political system, to whatever extent it is overseen by an age-old system of governmental checks and balances, positive for the development of said system?

Laura S. Jenson (2017), examined the history of the National Defense Research Council (NDRC) and found that not all agencies require the elaborate, exhausting process, as described by Carpenter, to obtain and retain bureaucratic autonomy. “In contrast to bureaucratic organizations that must achieve autonomy over time by gaining reputations for being able to anticipate and/or solve problems (Carpenter 2001), NDRC possessed and exercised autonomy from its creation, derived from the enormous professional reputations that the Committee’s members possessed and legitimacy acquired by their association with prominent public and private sector organizations and institutions” (Jensen, p. 475). Considering the relative ease of obtaining bureaucratic autonomy revealed in Jensen’s recent examination – particularly when compared to that of Carpenter’s historical examples – it is evident that bureaucratic autonomy is becoming more prevalent in the American state. But, if this rise in bureaucratic autonomy is truly this evident, should it generally be considered a normative good?

According to Cooper, Bryer, & Meek (2006), the expertise that comes with bureaucratic autonomy can be daunting to a non-bureaucratic citizenry and can lead to a diminished democratic spirit with regard to an active citizenry and consensus-based rulemaking. “Fear and uncertainty about engaging in consensus-based rulemaking may be rooted in the general culture of administrative and rulemaking agencies.” Similarly, according to Craig W. Thomas (1997), public agency executives are more likely to protect, or sustain, their autonomy than to form cooperative, interagency relationships. This can be highly damaging to the healthy development of a state – especially a citizen-government – not only with regard to the American state, but similar democracies around the world as well. Heinrich, Lynn, & Milward (2010) explain a European study involving the evolution of new forms of public and third-party governance in Europe. According to the study’s findings, “supranational institutions, governance networks, and other partnerships with a high degree of autonomy in their speci?c jurisdictions are creating new challenges for democratic policy-making, accountability and control” (Heinrich, Lynn, & Milward, p. 16-17).

So, clearly bureaucratic autonomy can and has been achieved, and lost, in multiple instances throughout the history of the American state. Concurrently, bureaucratic autonomy has increased in prevalence, notwithstanding historical accounts of objections from significant figures like President Wilson. Even though there have been many historical examples of the positive impacts of increased levels of bureaucratic autonomy in certain instances – as espoused by the agency examples of scholars like Carpenter – many other, more recent examples have revealed that bureaucratic autonomy is not exclusively beneficial, or beneficial to a maximum degree. However, this is not to say that the rise of bureaucratic autonomy has damaged or otherwise negatively impacted the American state, necessarily.

Clearly bureaucratic autonomy can and has been achieved, and lost, in multiple instances throughout the history of the American state. Concurrently, bureaucratic autonomy has increased in prevalence...

CONCLUSION

Even if the rise of bureaucratic autonomy has not yet negatively affected the development of the American state, from a normative perspective, bureaucratic autonomy as an idea is not necessarily, entirely good. Thus, it should not be infinitely pursued or exercised to a maximum degree. If there is one sociological finding that advanced societies throughout history have proven, it is that the benefit of controlled moderation as a beneficial public policy standard is a universally applicable concept. To suggest that bureaucratic autonomy, purely as a conceptual idea, is, without exception, ultimately – obviously normatively – “good” is to be na?ve to history and the usurpations of governments past.

Works Cited

Adams, G. (1981). The Iron Triangle: The Politics of Defense Contracting. New York, NY: Council on Economic Priorities.

Carpenter, Daniel P. (2001). The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Cook, B. J. (2007). Democracy and administration: Woodrow Wilson’s ideas and the challenges of public management. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Cooper, T. L., Bryer, T. A., & Meek, J. W. (2006). Citizen-centered collaborative public management. Public Administration Review, 66(1), 76-88. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00668.x

Heinrich, C. J., Lynn, L. E., & Milward, H. B. (2010). A state of agents? Sharpening the debate and evidence over the extent and impact of the transformation of governance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 20, 3-19. doi:10.1093/jopart/mup032

Jensen, L. S. (2017). The twentieth-century administrative state and networked governance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 27(3), 468-484. doi:10.1093/jopart/muw065

Pietrzyk-Reeves, D. (2017). Normative Political Theory. teorla poltykl, 173-185. doi: 10.4467/00000000TP.17.009.6588

Taylor, C. (1994). Neutrality of Political Science. M. Martin, L.C. McIntyre (eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Thomas, C. W. (1997). Public management as interagency cooperation: Testing epistemic community theory at the domestic level. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 7(2), 221-246.