The Brief – Europe’s African blindspot
The Brief is EURACTIV's evening newsletter
The latest coups in Africa have exposed some uncomfortable truths: The continent is on the verge of unravelling, and the EU is not only unable or unwilling to help – it is most probably not even fully aware of the situation on the ground.
Africa has now seen 33 military coups in 33 years. And at least 45 of the 54 nations across the African continent have experienced at least a single coup attempt since 1950, according to analyst data.
Some of the coups have been more obvious than others. Yet, somehow, the West always appears to be taken by surprise by a continent that EU officials refer to as a ‘partner’ or ‘sister’ continent.
The latest episode is in Gabon, where a group of senior military officers appeared on national television in the early hours of Wednesday (30 Wednesday) and said they had taken power after the state election body announced that President Ali Bongo had won a third term.
It should not have come as a huge surprise. The Bongo family has held the presidency for over 55 years and the elections last Saturday, like those in 2019, were very close, despite being widely believed to be fraudulent. A coup attempt in early 2019 was foiled.
It is not unlikely that other recent coups in Niger and Burkina Faso encouraged the army in Gabon to think they could pull it off.?
It remains to be seen whether the possible ‘domino effect’ will frighten the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) away from potentially intervening in Niger.
Cameroon and Congo-Brazzaville, neighbouring states with corrupt, geriatric and little-loved presidents who have rigged elections for decades, are obvious next dominoes.
Either way, it’s clear that we’re potentially facing years of region-wide instability and that risks derailing efforts by the EU and the wider international community to tackle jihadist violence.
That, in turn, has implications for the EU’s migration control strategy in North and sub-Saharan Africa.
That the coups are able to take hold is also a sign of European weakness. Twenty years ago, France would have stepped in. Now, however, anti-francophone sentiment is so strong in the Sahel and West Africa that Paris is powerless.
This, and the chaos in the region, has been leapt upon by Russia and its notorious mercenary wing, the Wagner group.
Extremist groups linked to the Islamic State and al-Qaida have spread in the Sahel region, particularly in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso in recent years, making the region increasingly unstable.
“The whole area – starting with Central African Republic, then Mali, then Burkina Faso, now Niger, maybe Gabon – it’s in a very difficult situation,” the EU’s chief diplomat Josep Borrell told reporters in Toledo, Spain.
For Europe, it is a problem, he added.
While EU foreign and defence ministers grapple to assess the situation and find a response to stem the increasing instability in West Africa and the wider Sahel region, one question looms large.
Why does the EU have so little situational awareness here (but also in other regions)?
The EU’s Strategic Compass, the bloc’s first-ever military strategy, was meant to fix this by producing a “shared threat assessment and a joint commitment to action”, covering security trends in different regions of the world.
Last year, Borrell courted controversy when he publicly criticised his ambassadors for failing to develop political links and intelligence networks.
The EU’s diplomatic service (EEAS) is a young institution that, in many third countries, is still finding its feet.
But the truth is that the bloc is doomed to rely on member states’ intelligence in the absence of its own intelligence service.?
Unfortunately, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that, in diplomatic and intelligence terms, the blind are leading the blind here.
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?One month after the coup against President Mohamed Bazoum, the situation in Niger is?stagnant and volatile. ECOWAS remains determined to restore constitutional order in Niger despite the expiration of its original August 7th ultimatum. However,?after sending a delegation to Niamey that failed to deliver concrete results, the bloc faces two scenarios: continued negotiation?or military intervention.
?With the junta refusing to restore Bazoum to power whilst appointing a new government, announcing a? three-year transition, warning?that military intervention would be seen as a declaration of war, and ousting ambassadors,?many questions linger for the international community. As African states and the world watch to see how ECOWAS will proceed,?the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center?hosts a special conversation to explore what is currently happening in Niamey, the wider region overall, and to assess the systemic consequences of the crisis.
?Join us virtually on Thursday, August 31 at 1:00 p.m. ET for this discussion with Atlantic Council experts.
?Featuring
领英推荐
?Joseph Lemoine Deputy Director Freedom and Prosperity Center, Atlantic Council
?Karim Mezran Director of the North Africa Initiative and Resident Senior Fellow Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs, Atlantic Council
?Michael Shurkin Senior Fellow Africa Center, Atlantic Council?
Moderated by?
David A. Andelman Executive Director, The RedLines Project Editorial Columnist, CNN Opinion?
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Nigerian president appoints new minister accused of helping a former dictator launder looted billions
The new minister, Abubakar Atiku Bagudu, whose offshore dealings were detailed in the Pandora Papers, is a former ally of Nigerian dictator and notorious looter Sani Abacha.
By Micah Reddy
Nigeria’s president is facing a storm of media criticism after choosing a new budget minister accused of helping former dictator Sani Abacha loot billions of dollars from the country.
Abubakar Atiku Bagudu, who previously served as a state governor and senator, was confirmed as a new minister in Nigerian President Bola Tinubu’s government last week, despite having played an “instrumental role” in Abacha’s plundering of the country from 1993 to 1998, according to the United States Department of Justice .
Tinubu, who was forced into exile during Abacha’s reign, assumed the presidency earlier this year in a disputed election, after a campaign during which he promised to rid Nigeria of the “menace” of corruption. Despite Bagudu’s alleged role in the Abacha regime’s corruption, he and Tinubu became political allies following the formation of their All Progressive Congress party in 2013.
In a complaint from that year, the DOJ accused Abacha, Bagudu and other associates of “systematically” embezzling billions of dollars of public funds from Nigeria in the 1990s, siphoning the money out of the country via a network of offshore companies.
Over the past decade the DOJ, citing its jurisdiction over the U.S. banking system used in allegedly illegal transfers, has tried to seize offshore assets held in trust for Bagudu and his family under what the U.S. calls its Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative. The U.S. program has received limited help from Nigeria, which argues that its hands are tied as a result of a 20-year-old agreement it reached with Bagudu.
Since Abacha’s death in 1998, the Nigerian government has opted for a strategy of negotiation with his family and associates in an attempt to recover the stolen funds. In 2003, Nigeria reached a settlement with Bagudu who turned over hundreds of millions of dollars with no admission of guilt. Criminal charges and civil claims against him were dropped.
Bagudu’s offshore finances were also detailed in ICIJ’s 2021 Pandora Papers investigation , which revealed Bagudu was a client of Farrer & Co., the elite London law firm used by the British royal family. Reporting by media partners including Nigeria’s Premium Times and the Guardian showed how, from 2010, Farrer & Co. helped Bagudu and his brother, Ibrahim Bagudu, transfer 98 million euros (about $120 million at the time) in cash and securities from an offshore trust registered in the British Virgin Islands to a complex trust structure known as the Blue Group, registered in Singapore and the Cook Islands.
Farrer & Co. used the services of Singaporean trust company, Asiaciti Trust Group Ltd., to administer the Blue Group, which afforded the Bagudu even greater secrecy and control over his hidden assets. Both Farrer & Co. and Asiaciti took Bagudu on as a client despite the serious reputational risks and what Asiaciti referred to as his “somewhat colourful past.”
When Asiaciti decided to conduct “enhanced due diligence” on Bagudu, Farrer & Co. pushed back, saying it was unnecessary and that Bagudu’s brother was unhappy with the added scrutiny.
In response to the Pandora Papers revelations, Farrer & Co. told the Guardian that it had conducted “extensive due diligence” on Bagudu. The firm and a lawyer for Bagudu denied there was any attempt to conceal assets in the trust structure and that the assets and details of how they were controlled had been disclosed to the relevant authorities.
Bagudu’s appointment raises uncomfortable questions for Tinubu. Several activists and pundits have openly criticized Bagudu’s fitness for the role given his past, including one commentator who wrote : “It’s a reflection of the terrifying times we live in that Atiku Bagudu still resurfaces in the corridors of power and tries to position himself for an ‘important role’ in the new administration.”
Tinubu, who assumed the presidency earlier this year in a disputed election, promised during his electoral campaign that he would “not give up” the effort to rid Nigeria of the “menace” of corruption. But he is himself no stranger to controversy: Allegations of corruption and questions about the source of his considerable wealth have long hung over him.
In a case separate to Bagudu’s, the DOJ alleged that from the late 1980s accounts in Tinubu’s name received money from the sale of heroin. He was not charged, but was ordered to forfeit $460,000 from his U.S. bank account to U.S. authorities.
More recently, a partner of a Lagos-based consulting firm which won a major revenue collection contract from the Lagos government while Tinubu was governor, claimed in a civil suit that the president had a hidden interest in the firm via proxies. The suit, which was filed in Lagos and later settled, alleged that the company was used for “massive corruption purposes including tax evasion, bribery of government officials, diversion of the funds.”
Nigeria’s economy is hemorrhaging due to systemic corruption — a problem underscored by the charges U.K. police brought against former Nigerian oil minister Diezani Alison-Madueke earlier this month for allegedly accepting bribes in return for multimillion dollar gas and oil contracts.
According to the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the country makes up about 30% of the estimated $50–60 billion Africa loses each year to illicit financial flows.
About: Micah Reddy - Reporter and Africa coordinator
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