BREXIT WILL LEAVE DEEP SCARS ON THE UK LANDSCAPE AS WELL AS THAT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: CAN THEY BE HEALED?

Mary C. Murphy, University College Cork

Remarks at the MacGill Summer School, Glenties, Donegal, 22 July 2019

To understand the nature and depth of the UK’s Brexit scars, we need to reflect on the recent past. The result of the 2016 EU referendum in the UK provides ample evidence of a divided and scarred United Kingdom.

How Divided is the UK?

At its most basic level, the referendum result exposed bitter differences between those who supported EU membership and those who opposed it.

But the vote also masked deeper divisions between places and people within the UK; between the UK and its neighbours; and in terms of the UK’s conception of its place in the world.

The vote reveals territorial divisions – Northern Ireland and Scotland choosing Remain; England and Wales choosing Leave.

The vote points to demographic difference – with younger age cohorts much more supportive of Remain than older generations.

The socio-economic profile of those who voted Remain and Leave suggests that differences in relation to educational attainment, employment status and earnings influenced how people voted.

And politically, the referendum was not decided along typical party political lines.

The referendum brought all of these divisions and differences into sharp focus, but in truth they existed long before the vote was called. The UK’s experience of EU membership was always testy – Stephen George, one of the first academics to systematically examine the UK’s relationship with the EU, characterised the UK as ‘an awkward partner’ in Europe.

The question of EU membership has haunted both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party since the UK joined the EU nearly half a century ago. The issue has occasioned internal division and dissent, and neither party has ever been truly coherent on the EU issue – their ambiguous positions both reflected and reinforced wider public unease.

A strongly Eurosceptic press in Britain fuelled public discontent with and suspicion of the EU. There were also episodes of misinformation and misrepresentation of the EU by certain UK journalists. 

The emergence of UKIP – and its maverick leader Nigel Farage – in the 1990s, placed the contested question of EU membership right at the centre of British political discourse.

Brexit Reactions

The EU referendum in June 2016 did not resolve, settle or placate any of these existing divisions and contestations. It exacerbated them – the wounds, the divisions, the hurt have deepened. So what does the existence of these scars mean for the UK? How does it impact on the future? And what might it mean for Ireland?

As the UK retreats from the European stage – presumably at the end of October 2019 – there will be a series of political, economic and constitutional reactions (a No Deal scenario will exacerbate the situation):

Economically:

• Sterling is already showing signs of stress – and that will likely intensify particularly in the context of a No Deal exit.[1]
• The trickle-down impact of economic turmoil and currency volatility will pose a risk to UK competitiveness and put jobs and livelihoods at risk.
• This in turn will put pressure on public finances – and in this context, the ability of the British state to placate an agitated populace may be tested.
• Ireland will feel the economic impact of Brexit too in similar and equally intense ways.

Politically:

• The resolve of the new Prime Minister will be tested as the impact of Brexit begins to be felt directly and in some cases acutely by business, workers and society as a whole.
• The cohesion of the UK’s two largest political parties may come under further pressure – resulting in pronounced difficulties for the day-to-day operation of parliament and other institutions of the state.  
• A general election may be called, reopening difficult and toxic conversations, and likely resulting in some parliamentary representation for the Brexit Party. That party may become the king-maker in the formation of any future British government.  
• [And bear in mind, political instability will breed further economic turbulence].

Constitutionally:

• Nationalists in Scotland will intensify their moves towards securing independence.
• In Northern Ireland, the possible erection of a hard border will fuel political discontent – particularly among nationalists – and calls for a border poll will likely grow.
• Unionist fears will heighten – Senator Mark Daly provided a summary of those fears in his recent report.
• In a region emerging from conflict, the potential for shadowy forces to manipulate a period of volatility cannot be discounted.

Brexit – whatever its form – does not soothe the UK’s scars. It aggravates them and it does so in potentially troubling ways producing political, economic and possibly constitutional instability.

The Impact of Brexit Instability

The question is to what extent does this level of instability change the UK? Will these deep scars heal gently over time or will they prove to be a catalyst for profound political and constitutional change? Will they produce the kind of momentum necessary for systemic transformation in a form which permanently alters the UK landscape?

Research demonstrates that political stasis and stability can be punctuated by severe crises – usually a combination of exogenous and endogenous shocks – which in turn can lead to the breakdown of old institutions and arrangements. Social, political and economic conditions, when they change dramatically, can produce irresistible pressures which, when they reach a critical point, trigger major change.

Brexit has the hallmarks of what political scientists term ‘a critical moment’, when the potential for substantial systemic change exists: the type of change with the capacity to propel the UK towards an altered constitutional future. Should this materialise, there are marked consequences for Ireland. This represents the extreme end of the change spectrum, where the political and constitutional framework of state and government is altered.

Other forms of change are equally possible, if less dramatic in their effect. A state may witness marked organisational change where state offices, networks and personnel change, or the response may be limited to the regulative or procedural levels where rules and processes change.

So to what extent are the scars of the UK’s Brexit crisis likely to change the physical and the political parameters of the British state? Should we be preparing for constitutional continuity or constitutional change?

Brexit and the UK's Constitutional Future

As I see it, there are four options facing the UK in negotiating its constitutional future post-Brexit:

Firstly, the status quo remains. The UK ‘muddles through’ this period of instability and regains some sort of equilibrium. The economic challenges recede, the political system stabilises and the UK slowly adjusts to life outside the EU. This represents the least disruptive option but also the least likely. It is not credible to think that the forces which Brexit has released can be ignored or quieted or even reversed.

Secondly, the UK may choose to engage in a process of centralisation – concentrating repatriated powers and increased political authority in Westminster to the disadvantage of the devolved units. Let’s not forget that the referendum campaign emphasised ‘taking back control’ (and presumably that was a reference to Westminster). This option radically alters the balance of power within the UK by rowing back twenty plus years of a trend towards decentralisation. It is highly politically problematic and would be strongly opposed in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Thirdly, the UK may choose to rethink, redesign and reform its internal devolution structures. Devolution was designed to function in the context of UK membership of the EU. Outside the EU, there is a necessity for the UK to create devolution mechanisms which are better fit for purpose (particularly in terms of inter-governmental relations mechanisms) and to find formulas which better accommodate English interests. To some extent, this kind of reform process is imperative if the British political system is to operate effectively in a post-Brexit era. Calls for such moves – particularly in Scotland and Wales – are already in evidence.

Fourthly, the most dramatic and transformative prospect; the UK disintegrates. Scotland votes in favour of independence. A Northern Ireland border poll narrowly supports a united Ireland. Wales begins to consider its place within the UK.[2] This option is existential in nature: it would mean the redrawing of borders and it would mark the end of the Union. This prospect is not beyond the bounds of possibility.  

During critical moments like we are currently witnessing, different possibilities of development emerge but it’s important to remember that there is no inevitability about the final outcome.

Systemic and constitutional change is dependent on a series of economic, social and political conditions coalescing to generate the necessary pressure needed to support a transformation of this magnitude. These forces need to be strong enough to produce internal processes of politicisation, contestation and cleavage formation. In the UK today, some of these conditions currently exist; others are less in evidence.

Brexit and the Conditions for Systemic Change

What is clear is that Brexit has unleashed some trends which hint at profound transformation. The entire British political environment and atmosphere have changed, and this potentially enables deeper and more fundamental political and constitutional change.

Where once the key fault-line in British politics was the left-right divide, a populist-nationalist turn in British politics has produced what some academic colleagues have labelled an ‘open vs closed society’ cleavage. In other words, British politics is increasingly defined by a new Leave-Remain cleavage where opposing, absolutist and purist positions on Brexit, leave little room for compromise or conciliation – and these are precisely the qualities which are needed at this precarious time.

On the face of it, the stability of the UK party system appears resilient. However, the politicisation of Brexit has spawned new political parties (like the Brexit Party), and changed the UK’s two largest political parties. The Conservative and Labour parties are experiencing some realignment. They are less anchored to traditional left-right positions. Their identities are now shaped more by Brexit and the contested issues and values which underpinned the vote. As old political moorings shift, the result may be the evolution of a less open, less diverse, and less liberal UK. Such an environment may well be conducive to profound political agitation and constitutional change.

Brexit has also heralded in a coarsening of political discourse; a poisoning of the political narrative; and a tolerance of mistruths and misrepresentations. These have infected the quality of public debate and they also potentially lay the groundwork for validating and legitimising radical political change. 

In terms of economic conditions, the severity of any Brexit-related economic crisis may be a determining factor in forcing constitutional change. A deep recession is likely to see heightened support for the disintegration of the UK among English voters seeking to cut off costly peripheries. We know that voters across England do not harbour deep-rooted loyalty to the idea of British unity. This is particularly marked in the case of Northern Ireland.[3]

Brexit and the Limits to Systemic Change

Not all of the evidence however, is quite so damning. The politicisation of the constitutional question in the UK – and the politicisation of Irish unity in Ireland – has not been fully achieved. Where the politicisation of Brexit mobilised and polarised voters, we have yet to witness any similiar patterns in relation to the dis-unity debate in the UK. There are signs of discontent and agitation among voters, but crucially these sentiments have not been captured or marshalled by a UK wide political movement or political party. The SNP in Scotland and Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland lead the charge in their respective territories, but even here the polls suggest that majority support for Scottish independence and Irish unity are elusive. In Northern Ireland, unionist opposition to Irish unity appears resolute.

There is also no national champion or leadership figure advocating for the break-up of the union. Where Brexit had Nigel Farage and others, the same cannot be said for the constitutional debate. It is also not clear that either of the candidates for future British Prime Minister have the stomach for a constitutional project of this magnitude.

And what of Ireland in this scenario? There is little political appetite for Irish unification at this juncture, and the depth of public support is also difficult to measure in the absence of a detailed vision for what a New Ireland might look like. Ireland is not a cheerleader for British constitutional change and for that matter, nor is the EU.  

Brexit and the Management of Change

At this critical moment, it is clear that Brexit has already split British society and wounded elements of the UK polity. The UK’s future has already been politically and economically recast by the very fact of Brexit, and the survival of the British constitutional polity in its current form cannot be taken for granted. However, the assumption that Brexit – whatever version of it we get – will inevitably lead to the constitutional collapse of the UK is also misleading.

Crucially, the wisdom of political leaders, parties and institutions will be decisive in determining how existing divisions and differences, bruises and scars are confronted. Words, actions and decisions have the potential to shape or shatter the UK’s political and constitutional landscape. The scale of responsibility facing the UK body politic – at this critical moment – is colossal.

[1] The UK’s Office of Budgetary Responsibility has warned that a No Deal Brexit will plunge the UK into recession; the House of Commons Committee on Exiting the EU issued an equally damming assessment of a No Deal scenario.

[2] The Welsh First Minister Mark Drakeford recently indicated that his government would consider supporting Welsh independence, were Scotland to leave the UK.

[3] An Ipsos Mori poll earlier this year revealed British indifference about Northern Ireland leaving the UK – over half of Britons either supported Irish unity or ‘didn’t mind’ either way whether Northern Ireland stayed or remained part of the UK.