Breaking the web is as simple as 1, 2, and 3.

Did you know there are approximately 85 organizations authorized to issue TLS certificates for the web today? Or that seven of them issue 99% of all certificates currently in use? The presence of the others is largely intended to accommodate web openness and national sovereignty—an admirable goal, albeit one that introduces a significant attack surface for every web user.

But were you aware that the recent eIDAS legislation, that was just signed, will obligate browsers to trust all QWAC-approved CAs listed on the EU Trust List (https://esignature.ec.europa.eu/efda/tl-browser)? To illustrate, Spain has 16 CAs approved to issue these certificates and there are 27 member states in the EU. Additionally, did you know the legislation will not permit browsers to remove of CA with a history of repeated incompetence without government approval?

The most famous of all CA distrust events was an EU CA known as DigiNotar, and those in the PKI space might say that 12 years ago and today, the Conformity Assessment Bodies would have caught that and dealt with it proactively.

But is that true? Check out the history of Camerfirma (https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Camerfirma_Issues) and ask yourself why an organization with such poor operational practices that the internet isn't dependent on is still trusted by anyone. Then consider why the associated CAB still lets it be approved as a CA for issuance.

For those who say that the web doesn't need Browsers for such actions, consider this recent incident involving a Turkish CA (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1801345). And for those who doubt governments would use CAs to gain visibility into web traffic, take a look at this case where a French CA was doing just that: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/french-agency-caught-minting-ssl-certificates-impersonating-google/.

Supposedly the final text has a recital that was added to the language to suggest that the scope of these requirements is to be limited to trusting these CAs for identity information and not the domain but the document is still private so we don't know for sure. Even if true recitals are not binding and the bill has other issues, for example, it requires browsers to reinstate user interface that has been proven to be harmful and misleading to users. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/12/nope-this-isnt-the-https-validated-stripe-website-you-think-it-is/.

It also prevents the Browsers from establishing additional requirements for the CAs above and beyond what is included in the associated EU legislation, for example, they won't be subject to https://certificate.transparency.dev which has helped catch many many issues. All this means calcifying the web making it impossible to move forward without legislative change and leaving the web less secure at the same time.

Change will now be governed by regulators, lobbyists, and standards boffins that either benefit from this weakening of the web or have no accountability for its consequences.

There are 195 sovereign nations in this world. each would love to be in a position to observe everything their citizens and everyone who interacts with them does. When the world's most liberal and democratic governments put into place the tools to enable mass surveillance and weaken internet security in this fashion what makes us think the rest won't as well.