Breaking the Chains of Fixed Assets: How the Next Conflict Will Target Vulnerable Infrastructure

The next major conflict will unfold with unprecedented speed, and hypersonic missiles and drones can obliterate critical infrastructure in minutes. Fixed assets—such as cable landing stations, Intermediate Line Amplifier (ILA) huts, and traditional data centers—no longer provide the reliability they once did. As adversaries deploy faster, use more complex weapons, securing these stationary infrastructures has become a major liability.

We should assume these key nodes will disappear early in a high-intensity conflict. To maintain command, control, and communication (C3), we must rethink our approach to protecting critical infrastructure. While initiatives like Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) promise to revolutionize warfare by integrating air, sea, land, space, and cyber domains, they remain vulnerable unless we embrace decentralized solutions.

Hypersonic Missiles and Drones: Unstoppable Threats

Hypersonic missiles, traveling at speeds beyond Mach 5, compress reaction times to mere minutes. Current defense systems struggle to keep up, allowing these missiles to strike critical infrastructure such as cable landing stations, power grids, and data centers before defenses can engage. This ability to outmaneuver traditional missile defenses makes fixed assets highly vulnerable.

Drones are equally dangerous. Modern drones can operate in stealth and carry out precision attacks. In the next conflict, swarms of inexpensive drones could target everything from communication nodes to power stations, crippling command and control. Unlike conventional aircraft, drones can fly below radar and attack with minimal warning, leaving high-value targets defenseless.

Fixed Infrastructure: Sitting Ducks in the Next Conflict

Despite these evolving threats, military operations still depend heavily on fixed infrastructure. Data centers, for example, are vital to storing and processing battlefield intelligence. However, they rely on external power and cooling systems, making them vulnerable to attacks. A well-executed strike on a power station or HVAC system could take down multiple data centers at once, rendering an entire region’s communications dark.

Cable landing stations and ILA huts—essential for global communication—are equally vulnerable. In a modern war scenario, adversaries would likely target these points early, effectively severing military command networks. Long-range communication becomes significantly harder without these assets, mainly when relying on undersea cables for secure information transfer.

GPS Vulnerability: Timing is Everything

GPS plays a critical role in timing and synchronizing operations in modern warfare. GPS underpins much of today's battlefield coordination, from guiding missiles to ensuring precise communication. However, adversaries can easily jam or spoof GPS signals, especially in contested environments. A successful disruption of GPS would affect everything from missile targeting to network timing.

With reliable GPS, systems may retain the ability to synchronize data flow across multiple locations. Emerging technologies like quantum-based timing or Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites may offer solutions, but these alternatives aren’t yet widely implemented. Therefore, GPS vulnerabilities will be a significant concern for military planners in the next conflict.

CJADC2: A Bold Vision with Critical Gaps

The Department of Defense launched the CJADC2 initiative to integrate real-time information across all domains of warfare—air, land, sea, space, and cyber. The goal is to ensure that data from multiple sources can flow seamlessly across military branches and allied forces, improving decision-making speed and effectiveness. However, CJADC2 faces significant challenges.

First, CJADC2 still relies on centralized infrastructure, including data centers and fiber networks, which hypersonic missiles or drone strikes can easily disrupt. A single attack on a vital communication hub could impede CJADC2’s ability to relay information across the battlefield. The current architecture doesn’t fully account for how adversaries could eliminate these centralized nodes early in the conflict.

Second, the system struggles with fragmentation between branches of the military. Each service has built proprietary systems that don’t easily communicate with one another. These silos of information create bottlenecks that prevent CJADC2 from functioning as a unified, joint command system. Until we break down these barriers, CJADC2 will fall short of its full potential.

Rethinking Infrastructure: The Path Forward

To secure the future of warfare, we must move away from static, centralized infrastructure. Instead, we must adopt modular, mobile systems that adjust and relocate based on battlefield needs. Deployable data centers powered by tactical microgrids offer a promising alternative. These mobile centers provide computing and communication capabilities without relying on vulnerable fixed assets.

Additionally, edge computing solutions must become integral to our strategy. By bringing computation closer to the battlefield, we reduce latency and ensure critical operations can continue even if centralized networks are disrupted. These mobile systems should also operate autonomously, allowing them to function even when GPS or traditional communication links are compromised.

In future conflicts, we should expect our fixed assets—data centers, cable landing stations, ILA huts, and GPS systems—to be prime targets. Hypersonic missiles and drones can render these assets obsolete within minutes, leaving command and control systems paralyzed.

CJADC2 represents a step forward in integrating real-time command, but we must embrace decentralized, mobile, and autonomous systems. The next generation of warfare will demand systems that can function independently, adapt to changing conditions, and survive without relying on traditional infrastructure. We can maintain operational effectiveness and outmaneuver our adversaries by focusing on resilient, decentralized networks and computing power.

Victory will not go to those with the most potent fixed assets but to those who can adapt and operate effectively under fire, regardless of the condition of their infrastructure.