BP's Crisis Management: Lessons Learned and Reputational Impact
1. Enhancing Crisis Management: A Comprehensive Analysis of BP's Response
BP's handling of the Deepwater Horizon crisis could have been more effective by implementing proactive measures to prevent the disaster. Meigs (2016) argues that BP's overconfidence and failure to recognize warning signs contributed to the incident. To improve its response, BP should have prioritized prevention and preparation by implementing robust safety protocols and preventive measures. Additionally, the company could have developed better contingency plans and emergency response strategies to address the immediate aftermath. Prompt and effective control of the blowout, as well as prioritizing safety over expediency, would have made a significant difference. It is worth noting that the regulatory authorities responsible for oversight also played a role by approving plans without sufficient scrutiny (Meigs, 2016).
2. Mitigating Reputational Damage: A Proactive Crisis Communication Approach
A better and more adequate response from BP could have mitigated the reputational damage suffered by the company. To minimize the negative impact, BP should have adopted a swift and transparent crisis communication strategy (Smith, 2018). By demonstrating accountability, empathy, and a commitment to resolving the issue, BP could have restored public trust. This entails acknowledging the seriousness of the situation, providing accurate and timely information, and outlining concrete steps taken to address the crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2012). Moreover, a comprehensive approach to addressing the environmental impact, supporting affected communities, and compensating impacted parties would have demonstrated a commitment to responsible behavior (Argenti, 2016). Prioritizing safety and implementing measures to prevent similar incidents in the future would have reassured stakeholders and signaled a positive change in practices (Coombs & Holladay, 2012).
3. Media Coverage and Public Response: Assessing BP's Actions during the Crisis
During the Deepwater Horizon oil spill crisis in 2010, extensive media coverage focused on the magnitude of the disaster, containment efforts, environmental impact, and economic implications. The response of BP and other involved parties, transparency, and effectiveness of containment efforts were scrutinized (Cornelissen, 2017). While assessing whether BP did enough to respond to the public is subjective, criticisms regarding the initial response, perceived lack of transparency, and effectiveness of containment were prevalent (Cornelissen, 2017).
Conclusion: Lessons Learned and the Normalization of Deviance
Experts like Meigs (2016), Dekker, and Vaughan emphasize that major accidents are often rooted in organizational cultures. The Deepwater Horizon crisis serves as a stark reminder of the dangers of normalizing deviant behaviors within high-risk industries. Maintaining a strong safety culture, upholding established standards, and actively challenging deviations are crucial to prevent catastrophic events (Vaughan, 1996). By addressing the normalization of deviance, organizations can learn from past mistakes and improve their crisis management practices.
References
Argenti, P. A. (2016). Corporate communication. McGraw-Hill Education.
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2012). The Handbook of crisis communication. John Wiley & Sons.
Cornelissen, J. P. (2017). Corporate communication: A guide to theory and practice. Sage.
Jones, J. M. (2012). Crisis leadership and reputation management: The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Journal of Business Ethics, 135(4), 617-628.
Meigs, J. (2016). Blame BP for Deepwater Horizon. But Direct Your Outrage to the Actual Mistake. Slate. Retrieved from https://slate.com/technology/2016/09/bp-is-to-blame-for-deepwater-horizon-but-its-mistake-was-actually-years-of-small-mistakes.html
Smith, A. (2018). Crisis communication and reputation management in the digital age. Routledge.
Vaughan, D. (1996). The Challenger launch decision: Risky technology, culture, and deviance at NASA. University of Chicago Press.