Book summary: Duterte - A Populist Revolt against Elite Democracy

Man of the Hour

Duterte, who is almost exactly as old as the post-independence Philippine state, is a man of many firsts.

He is the first Filipino president from the southern island of Mindanao, the country’s most impoverished and conflict-ridden. He is the first Filipino politician who leapfrogged from local politics, as mayor of Davao City, straight to the Malacanang, the seat of presidential power in Manila. He is the first Filipino president, who has openly boasted about his (real and imagined) Chinese and Muslim ethnic heritage and never failed to remind the Catholic majority about the “historical injustices” against the minority Muslims.

Quite simply, the Philippines has never had any leader like him—a man full of chutzpah, cuss, and conviction. Above all, he is a man of extraordinary contradictions.

Duterte is often portrayed, by both supporters and critics, as a maverick and “political outsider” par excellence, though Duterte, whose children currently occupy the top elected offices in his home city,

is related to one of the country’s most powerful political dynasties, the Duranos and Almendras of Mindanao, and the Roa clan of the Visayas.

His father was mayor of Danao in Cebu and a provincial governor of Davao, who later became the interior minister in the early years of Ferdinand Marcos administration

Trouble in Paradise

After years of rapid economic growth, millions of Filipinos were still struggling with difficult working conditions abroad, while many more, out of sheer desperation, set their sights on distant horizons far away from domestic woes.

According to one report, between 2009 and 2015, the number of Filipinos leaving the country for work abroad more than doubled, from a daily deployment of 2500 to 6092

One thing that caught the public’s attention, and largely to the benefit of Duterte, was a sudden spike in reported crimes in the latter half of Aquino’s term.

According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, between 2012 and 2014, total reported crimes jumped from 217,812 to 1,161,188, an almost fivefold increase in just over a decade.

Index crimes and the overall crime rate saw an almost fourfold increase in the same period.

Meanwhile, crime solution efficiency, namely the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies in dispensing justice after the commitment of a crime, dropped from 89.86 in 2004 to 28.56 in 2014.

To many voters, while Benigno Aquino may have been the most popular and competent post-Marcos president, his best was simply not enough—and no less than a new breed of leadership was now necessary to correct the mistakes of the past.

Capitalising on the moment

Showing little respect for the mainstream political elite, Duterte astutely recognized a historic opportunity to contest the highest elected office. Aside from benefiting from the zeitgeist of grievance politics, Duterte’s electoral success was built on three contingent factors: the fatal weaknesses of his opponents; the strength of his social media strategy; and his uncanny ability to portray himself as the only hope for national salvation

Duterte also optimized his mixture of Visayan-Cebuano (via his father, Vicente, who was from Danao, Cebu) and Mindanaon-Moro (via his mother, Soledad, who was from Agusan del Norte) ethnic background to tap the Visayan and Muslim voters spread across the country, including in the industrialized north and Manila.

More concretely, he promised more political autonomy and fiscal resources to Visayan and Mindanao regions, ending the reign of “imperial Manila.” During the presidential elections, 96.6% of residents of Davao voted for him, a commanding performance that was replicated across Mindanao.

He also had a strong electoral showing in (central) Visayan regions such as Cebu (53%), where his father came from, and Bohol (49.5%). Duterte presented himself as the voice of the margins, the leader of a “revolt of the periphery” against an uncaring center.

This proved as a winning formula in the 2016 presidential elections, as he offered “real change” to voters across the ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic fault lines.

The Strategic Rupture

Bilateral relations reached a nadir when US President Barack Obama promised to place human rights concerns front and center in his scheduled bilateral conversations with Duterte on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Laos in September.

In short? Duterte was seemingly provoked by his American counterpart.

The Obama administration adopted a tough langauge on the human rights records of its Southeast Asian ally? a remarkable departure from its generally tepid and carefully-crafted statements on the human rights record of Middle Easter allies such as Saudi Arabia and Egyp

While signaling the Philippines’ decoupling from the liberal international order, as well as age-old alliances with Western powers, Duterte sought to open a new chapter in his country’s relations with Eastern powers, particularly China and Russia.

Historically, Filipino presidents visited China after meeting their counterparts in the White House and/or Tokyo.

In fact, Duterte postponed and downgraded (from state to official visit) an initially scheduled trip to Tokyo in favor of Beijing. In a move that caught even his own cabinet officials off guard, Duterte bid “goodbye” to and vowed strategic “separation” from America before his hosts in Beijing.

He then offered to realign the Philippines with China’s “ideological flow”, beckoning a new alliance against the West. It was Duterte’s way of embracing what he sees as an emerging new world order, where America is no longer in a position of strategic primacy

A more perspicacious analyst would have noticed that the main foreign policy theme throughout Duterte’s campaign and ahead of his inauguration were two things:

First, that America isn’t a reliable partner; and second, the Philippines has limited options when it comes to China, therefore accommodation is the only rational way forward. In short, he was consistently an American skeptic and China dove.

The implication was clear: The Philippines would take a different direction under its new president, yet few took him literally and seriously.

Struggle for Autonomy

Duterte often harkens back to this dark period in American colonial occupation of the Philippines, including in his full-throated anti-American tirades during the East Asia Summit in Laos, where Obama was uncomfortably present among leaders in attendance.

For the Filipino leader, America’s foray into Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines, is a clear demonstration of American hypocrisy and not-so-benign, if not nefarious, designs in the Philippines.

President William McKinley conveniently invoked the doctrine of Manifest Destiny to justify a controversial colonial project that aimed to “educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them.”

American colonialism of the Philippines was veiled by sanctimonious imperialism and tinged with systematic denigration of the indigenous population as uncivilized people

Instead of pushing for radical reform of the Philippines’ highly feudal politico-economic system, America struck a strategic pact with the Spanish-era elite, who proved eager to preserve their old privileges, including ownership of large swathes of lands as well as domination of the trading sectors of the economy.

The product was an American-style liberal democracy, dominated by a select group of landed gentry and tradesmen, who proved highly dependent on the good will and largesse of the new colonial master.

But it was precisely the more ‘benign’ aspect of American colonization of the Philippines, which proved to have a long-term corrosive effect on the Southeast Asian country’s strategic culture and state-formation process.

The upshot was a desperately dependent, confused and self-doubting nation, afflicted with what James Fallows called a “damage culture”

In effect, the Philippines served as a platform for the projection of American power in the region.

The Philippines wasn’t only a geographical launching pad and logistical hub for the American military, but also a key partner during major wars in Asia, namely the Korean War (1950–1953) and Vietnam War (1955–1975).

More broadly, it served as a critical node in the Washington-led hub and spokes alliance structure in the Asia-Pacific theater

Dealing with the Dragon

From the very onset, the arbitration option was controversial, provoking fierce internal bureaucratic debate within the department of foreign affairs and, more broadly, the Aquino administration.

Critics put forward at least three arguments: First, the decision, even if favorable to the Philippines, is nonenforceable, so it is ultimately fruitless. This is similar to Duterte’s arguments discussed earlier. Second, if the decision doesn’t go in the Philippines’ favor, whether on the jurisdiction question or merits of claims aspect, it might end up weakening the country’s claims and, correspondingly, strengthen China’s legal argument.

Finally, they argued that the move would only provoke China, turning the Asian juggernaut into an even more aggressive claimant state that will pursue de facto sovereignty by building facts on the ground regardless of its de jure basis

In retrospect, the Philippines was left with few options during the Scarborough Shoal crisis and its immediate aftermath. First of all, it didn’t have the requisite military capability to press its claim and hold Chinese ambitions over the contested shoal at bay. Second, the Obama administration was extremely reluctant to get militarily involved. Third, the ASEAN, then under the chairmanship of Cambodia, failed to even agree on discussing the South China Sea disputes.

Above all, Aquino wrestled with the specter of becoming the first Filipino president to have lost a piece of Philippine (claimed) territory, thus provoking a potential domestic political backlash.

Philippines-Japan Relations

Under the Abe administration, Japan has sought to act as a middleman, facilitating a recovery of bilateral relations between Washington and Manila. For Japanese officials, it is important to leverage longstanding cordial relations between Japan and Duterte in order to ensure that the Philippines remains as a pillar of the current US-led regional security architecture.

Japan, which maintains a consulate in Davao, has been a key partner in infrastructure development in Duterte’s hometown, while Japanese investors have been among the biggest business players in the southern commercial hub.

On a national level, Japan has been the leading trade and investment partner of the Philippines and, by far, the largest source of official development assistance. Duterte himself has repeatedly recognized the depth of Philippine-Japanese economic entwinement. Shortly ahead of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visit to Manila, Duterte declared in a ceremony in Malacanang: “Tonight, let me reiterate that Japan is a friend closer than a brother. That means Japan is a friend unlike any other. Ours is a special friendship whose value is beyond any measure.”

Cognizant of the “personalistic” nature of Philippine foreign policy, Japan has adopted cutting-edge personal diplomacy, with Abe becoming the first foreign leader to visit the Philippines under Duterte. Japan has offered large-scale infrastructure investments in Mindanao and

went even so far as expressing support, in principle at least, for Dutetre’s controversial war on drugs, which has come under heavy criticism by almost all Western nations.

During Abe’s visit in January 2017 to the Philippines, Japan also offered help in terms of drug rehabilitation, having earlier dispatched a group of experts to the Philippines for a 5-day study in December.

In fact, Abe, who was accompanied by his wife, went so far as having breakfast in Duterte’s home in Davao, with the Filipino leader even inviting him for an unconventional photo-op in his bedroom.

Any proper analysis of Duterte’s foreign policy can’t ignore how Japan has emerged as a fulcrum state, playing a critical role in shaping the Philippines’ relations with the two superpowers

War on drugs

At the heart of Duterte’s defiance was a simple argument, which resonated with many Filipinos:

The existing criminal justice system is too slow and ineffective to be respected and relied upon.

In a classic exercise of “penal populism,” he presented himself as the sole guardian of the republic, the one man that everyone can rely on to get the “bad guys,” no matter what it takes, including circumventing standard operating procedures of law.

Critics have blamed Duterte for creating an unprecedented atmosphere of impunity, which has encouraged a spree of what Panfilo Lacson, a senator and former PNP chief, described as “a clear case of extrajudicial killing” (EJK) across the nation.

Basic data shows that the Philippine criminal justice system is in dire need of investment.

There is only one court per 50,000 individuals or around 2000 courts for a nation of 100 million individuals; lower courts grapple with an average of 4000 cases daily; a single judge is responsible for an average of 644 cases per year.

With pretrial detainees constituting at least 64% of the prison population, the Philippines has the second worst rate of pretrial incarceration in entire Asia

The implication is clear: the ineffectiveness of the existing criminal justice system isn’t a byproduct of due process and human rights, but basic lack of state investment.

In spite of all its demerits, and widespread international concern over the human rights situation in the country,

Duterte’s crackdown on proliferation of drugs tracks closely with the public’s demand for a more robust response to perceived lawlessness in the country.

In the past year, surveys have consistently shown that fighting crime, which includes drug-related offenses, is among the top five priorities of the majority of Filipino voters. In a Pulse Asia survey, conducted on March 15–20, 2017, as many as 28% of respondents identified fighting criminality as among their fourth most urgent concerns, with as many as 79% of respondents favorably viewing the Duterte administration’s performance in this regard.

Beneath the glossy surface

It is precisely Duterte’s perceived decisiveness and audacity that explains why he enjoyed significant support even among some liberal reformists,

many in technocratic agencies such as department of finance and central bank, who saw in him the country’s best hope to push ahead with difficult, risky structural reforms, which orthodox politicians were expected to shun.

Despite the Aquino administration’s macroeconomic achievements, the Philippines’ growth has lacked both quality and depth, having been excessively reliant on the services sector, particularly in the retail, business process outsourcing, and real estate industries.

Closer analysis also reveals that the Philippines’ above-average growth rates in recent years had less to do with the policies of the Aquino administration than a serendipitous convergence of auspicious factors,

ranging from consistently increasing remittances from Filipinos overseas workers, post-Quantitative Easing infusion of capital from developed markets with low interest rates to emerging markets with higher interest rates, and the global investment community’s asset diversification from traditional emerging markets to newly emerging economies and politically stable nations

Meanwhile, the manufacturing and agriculture sectors, which are crucial to employment generation and sustainable development, continue to underperform,

mainly thanks to a combination of weak public infrastructure, regulatory uncertainty, and red tape.

Dutertenomics was supposed to address these fundamental imbalances in the Philippine economy.