BNZ lining the judges pockets with lies and an elite currency the public are exempt from using. PROMISSORY NOTES" aka: mortgage agreements

For transparency and public awareness this article is written and shared in good faith *without prejudice" under s14 NZBORA 1990.

THE SUPREME COURT SC 62/2023 [2023] NZSC 89, 26 July 2023, O’ Regan, Ellen France and Williams JJ issued a decision dismissing an appeal of Auckland High Court regarding BNZs discrimination: https://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/assets/cases/2023/2023-NZSC-89.pdf

This dismissal has been appealed on several grounds including:

a) The supreme court judges erred in stating: [4] The Associate Judge concluded that the applicant’s cause of action was without merit and that it should be struck out.3 He said that the idea that the Bank was committed to the applicant’s promise to pay simply through her having posted her promissory note to the Bank without more was untenable, and that the proceeding could not be salvaged.4 He described the applicant’s proceeding as “fatally flawed”.5 He also rejected the applicant’s claim that the Bank had breached the privacy of its customers.

This was not accurate fact discovery at the hearing, where Judge Lester confirmed the plaintiffs case was not that a promissory note magically waived any repayment, rather, in accordance with the act- the promissory note overshadowed the previous promissory note of the bank [named “mortgage agreement”] Which Justice Lester reiterated to counsel for the defendants, whos’ response to this fact was “we don’t agree.”

b) [5] In a separate judgment, the Associate Judge awarded costs against the applicant in favour of the Bank of $25,632.75 and disbursements of $970.89.7 This award included a 50 per cent uplift over the amount of costs payable on a 2B basis.

This is as excessive amount of “costs” not accurately incurred by the bank and unjustly awarded to serve not as costs, but rather a form of punishment to serve as a deterrent for other victims of court and bank abuse. This amounts to a deliberate act of financial abuse to impose further financial hardship on someone already unable to afford justice, disregarding a precedent case of Nikau Holdings Limited v Bank of New Zealand" (1992) 5 PRNZ 430 Master Williams QC who said: “As far as it is possible so to do at what is, usually a fairly early stage of a case, the Court should endeavour to assess the merits of the statements of claim and defence and endeavour to form some view as to the prospective prospects of success.”

c) [6] Under s 74 of the Senior Courts Act 2016, this Court must not give leave to appeal unless it is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for the Court to hear and determine the appeal. As the proposed appeal in this case is a direct appeal from the High Court, s 75 of the Senior Courts Act also applies. That section limits this Court’s ability to give leave to directly appeal against a decision made by a court other than the Court of Appeal. The s 74 “interests of justice” test must be met and there must be “exceptional circumstances that justify taking the proposed appeal directly to [this] Court”.

This paragraph deliberately omits the fact appeal efforts at the Court of appeal to examine the correctness of the decision from the HIGH Court were obstructed by the court of appeal due to un affordable security costs- thus disregarding: Mannix v Namsang [1994] Judge Hillyer: , page 6 Davison CJ from [1986] Bell-Booth Group V Attorney General [PRNZ] 457 and the decision of Master Williams Q.C in Nikau Holdings Ltd V Bank of NZ (1992] 5 PRNZ 430 “Those cases emphasize that the granting of security for costs is a matter which depends solely on the exercise of the court “balancing” discretion, weighing all the 3 circumstances of the case to achieve the ends of justice. “There is no burden one way or the other. The court should not allow the rule to be used oppressively to shut out a genuine claim by a plaintiff of limited means.”

d) [7] Applying the criteria in s 74, we are satisfied that no matter of general or public importance or matter of general commercial significance arises in relation to the strikeout judgment or the costs judgment.10 Rather, the High Court applied well settled law in an orthodox manner in both judgments. We are also satisfied that there is nothing in the High Court judgments or in the submissions made by the applicant indicating any risk that a substantial miscarriage of justice may have occurred or may occur unless the appeal is heard.”

It is in err to state that a bank is able to trade in a currency the general public can not AND that they are exempt from admonishment for blatant discrimination [under s18 HRA 1993] and disregard of induvial payment of legal tender [as traded with by BNZ at the time] without ANY investigation into their solvency or financial status.

e) [8] We consider that the criteria for the grant of leave to appeal under s 74 are not met. Nor are there any exceptional circumstances justifying a direct appeal to this Court.”

To dismiss discrimination and judicial obstruction preventing an appeal due to unaffordable costs and ignoring the exorbitant extreme “costs” of in excess of $26,000 for a strike out hearing lasting less than 2 hours is dishonest and dishonourable. If this is deemed “orthodox” the judiciary should report themselves to the JCC and Attorney General for misbehaviour and a breach of the judicial oath to not act in “ill will and bad faith,”

f) The supreme court disregarded mandatory considerations of legislations including, magna carta, NZ BORA 1990, HRA 1993, s18 and natural and common law pertaining to plaintiffs rights to justice and matters being heard WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION for un affordable security costs to be paid, deliberately obstructing a just hearing and appropriate decision:

On 3 July 2023, The appellant, filed a response to the Supreme court to correct deliberately dishonest submissions of the defendants confirming facts of the matter the decision MUST be based on:

a) Primarily, It is misleading and knowingly false to state “Ms Dunstan says that because of the Promissory Note, the Borrower's Loan has been repaid and the Bank is obliged to discharge the Mortgage, despite no funds having been paid.” b) The legal basis of this appeal is that in accordance with the Bills of exchange act “deliverance is acceptance” and while I had every intention of repaying the loan in accordance with the terms of the promissory note [identical to the banks conduct with their promissory notes titled “mortgage agreements” or “loans”] That once the bank returned the original promissory note to me the debt became legally void- as cited under s45 Bill Of Exchange Act 1908. 4

c) It is false to state: “There is no evidence that the Borrowers gave authority for Ms Dunstan to act on their behalf, or that the Borrowers have ratified the Promissory Note, or otherwise ratified the actions purportedly taken on their behalf in respect of their Loan.”

d) The borrowers signature is on the promissory note as the witness, indicating they were clearly aware of this agreement and had signed to authenticate the document. [Of which High Court Associate Judge Lester acknowledges- as will be heard on the audio or read on the transcript for confirmation of this legal point.] *Sought for release under s14 NZBORA 1990 and precedent decision of justice Mallon "transparency over privilege" NZHC 620 STILL CONCEALED by the court, deliberately obstructing justice.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES 2.1 Section 74 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 provides: (1) The Supreme Court must not give leave to appeal to it unless it is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice for the court to hear and determine the appeal. (2) It is necessary in the interests of justice for the Supreme Court to hear and determine a proposed appeal if— (a) the appeal involves a matter of general or public importance; or (b) a substantial miscarriage of justice may have occurred, or may occur unless the appeal is heard; or (c) the appeal involves a matter of general commercial significance.

It is in err to allege discrimination and deliberate obstruction of justice by a bank to impose unaffordable costs to prevent fair hearings and the opportunity to appeal any decision on legal grounds- is not “a matter of public importance.” Particularly looking at this case in even the narrowest view- if the Court Of Appeal is enabled to abuse functions to prevent hearings, rendering matters “abandoned” and therefore unappealable- the supreme court MUST take over the role as the first and last appellant court to uphold MANDATORY Human rights under s27 NZBORA 1990.

Leave to appeal has been filed in accordance with s 78 SCA 2016: Appeals to proceed by way of rehearing “Appeals to the Supreme Court proceed by way of rehearing” To date no rehearing has been possible and therefore this right to appeal has been breached.

The consideration of “a miscarriage of justice” must also be weighed in with the publics confidence in the judicial system and it’s requirement to “appear” just and fair minded, despite any “indication of prejudicial bias” wishing to mass dismiss a promissory note matter in favour of a member of the public and not a banking institution without accurately addressing the legal merit of the case and mandatory considerations required to be upheld such as:

a) Magna Carta

b) NZBORA 1990

c) HRA 1993

d) Natural Law

e) Common Law

An appeal on the basis of “general or public importance” likely requires an important issue of law to be determined. As this Court has confirmed on a number of occasions, the Court is unlikely to allow a civil appeal on this ground when the law said to be in dispute is sufficiently clear and settled.

The requirement of a “substantial miscarriage of justice” is of limited application in civil cases: Considering no right of appeal has been awarded in any court to date- the supreme court MUST be seen to uphold natural law, common law and legislation that is as high as a country devoid of a written constitution holds: such as NZBORA 1990 and HRA 1993.

IT IS IN ERROR TO STATE “NOT A MATTER OF GENERAL OR PUBLIC IMPORTANCE” Ms Dunstan's application for leave relies on three alleged grounds:

(a) The legal issues in the proceeding are novel.

(b) There is public interest in the appeal because: (i) The Judge relied on legal authorities that were not referred to by the parties in their submissions. [The “submissions of the judge” were not authorities, rather banking legislation not relied on by either party to form the legal grounds of the case.] (ii) New Zealand banks accept certain types of promissory notes (i.e. bank cheques) but do not accept other types of promissory notes, which is discriminatory.

(c) There are various errors in the High Court Judgments [INCLUDING THE LIMITED JURISDICTION OF AN ASSOCIATE JUDGE UNABLE TO MAKE ANY DECLARATION, AS PER THE RELIEF SOUGHT- Therefore this matter was destined to fail and be obstructed, by design.]

Grounds of public importance remain ANY MATTER in the interests of the citizens INCLUDING transparency of justice and fair decisions that impact all members of society:

a) Until 2009, the Ministry of Culture was responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Law on Free Access to Information of Public Importance and it did not have the infrastructure necessary for initiating offense proceedings against authorized persons who do not act in accordance with the law.

b) Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified Great Public Importance Fifth District - Case No. 5D12-3823 (St. Johns County)Kendall B.

c) Article 17, Paragraph 41 of the Law on Free Access to Information of Public Importance defines the cases in which applicants shall be exempted from the duty of reimbursing costs. d) Article 38 of the Law on Free Access to Information of Public Importance stated that the responsible person in a public authority shall appoint one or more officials (authorized persons) to respond to requests for free access to information of public importance.

Here's a useful link for why "public accountability is important" https://oag.parliament.nz/2019/public-accountability/part3.htm

It is an act of discrimination [under HRA 1993, s21] for Banks to trade in a currency they will not accept WITHOUT ANY INVESTIGATION INTO THE ALLEGED RISK OF DEFAULT- as stated in counsels submissions: “It is entirely orthodox and permissible for a creditor to accept a bank cheque from a bank because there is a negligible risk.”

“Ms Dunstan is a private individual and not a bank, and she is impecunious. Accordingly, there was more than a remote risk that she might default on the Promissory Note.” This is known act of discrimination without any investigation simply on the face value of not being:

a) A bank

b) A government agency.

This risk, of obvious discrimination could easily be omitted if Banks clearly state payment methods not accepted include: promissory notes. This discrimination is outlined in NZBORA 1990 s18, s19 and HRA 1990 s20-22

It is knowingly misleading to state: “There is no error in the High Court Judgments and no miscarriage of justice may occur if the appeal is not heard.” When the associate judge Lester admitting to bringing his own legal argument to the matter of which he relied on in his judgement.

This fact is not to be distorted with the false implication that “It is also entirely orthodox and permissible for a judge to rely on legal authorities that the judge is aware of that the parties did not refer to in submissions.” The legislation Associate Judge Lester relied on was not a legal authority and had not been traversed nor awarded the appellants right of response to, which natural justice requires for a just hearing.

It is in error to allege “There is no commercial importance or precedent value to justify an appeal to the Supreme Court.”

As per mandatory legislation: “Magna Carta: 29 Imprisonment, etc contrary to law. Administration of justice “NO freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him,1 but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right.”

The appellant interoperates this passage to mean “man” amounting to any human being, not exempting female appellants or plaintiffs from equal rights and consideration of this act. AUTHORITIES RELIED ON:

1 Reekie v Attorney-General, SC 135/2019 [2020] NZSC 29 the Supreme Court noted the paradox created by requiring security for costs from a party who cannot pay them. Para [2] of the decision, the Court said: “The poorer the plaintiff, the more exposed the defendant is to costs and the greater the apparent justification for security. But, as well, the poorer the plaintiff, the less likely it is that security will be able to be provided and thus the greater the risk of a worthy claim being stifled.”

The Supreme Court found in Reekie at [3] that a different approach is needed in relation to first instance proceedings. Applications for security call for “careful consideration” and “Judges are slow to make an order for security which will stifle a claim”. “[3] The applicant commenced proceedings in the High Court alleging that he had been unlawfully detained and mistreated in prison in breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The applicant had some success in that litigation, obtaining declarations to the effect that the Department of Corrections had acted in breach of s 23(5) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (right of a person deprived of liberty to be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the person).” “[16] The respondents have filed submissions in response to the application and so have incurred costs. However, in all the circumstances, a reduced costs award is appropriate. The applicant must pay one set of costs of $250 to the first and second respondents.

In Highgate on Broadway Limited v Devine, CIV-2012-406-000136 [2012] NZHC 2590 Kos J stated: “The right of a successful defendant to costs ... is arguably subordinate to the plaintiff’s right to be heard. Strong policy considerations favour the use of Courts as an accessible forum for the resolution of disputes and grievances of almost all kinds.”

17 Oct [2016, Justice Whata stated in paar [35] his intention was to waive security costs, as was later done. re: Rangihuna v Auckland Council, the High Court dismissed the defendant's application for security for costs on the basis that the plaintiff's claim was of public interest and had a reasonable prospect of success. The plaintiff was seeking a declaration that the defendant had breached its statutory duty to consult with Maori under the Resource Management Act 1991. High Court Jones v Ministry of Education, where the plaintiff alleged that the Ministry of Education had breached her privacy by disclosing her personal information to a third party without her consent. The court also noted that privacy claims can be difficult to litigate, as they often involve complex legal issues and can be expensive to pursue. Therefore, the court was reluctant to grant security for costs in a privacy breach claim, as this could have the effect of deterring plaintiffs from pursuing legitimate claims.

CA287/2018 [2018] NZCA 629 JJ Lang and Moore 21 Dec 2018:

NORTH EASTERN INVESTMENTS LIMITED & HERITAGE LAND LIMITED V AUCKLAND COUNCIL & HOUSING NEW ZEALAND CORPORATION “[77] The costs orders made in the High Court as between North Eastern and the Council are set aside. Costs are to be determined by the High Court as between those parties in accordance with the outcome of this appeal.”

Further relevance to this matter can be seen in para [42] “Mr Marshall recognised that it would be wise for the substantive arbitration hearing to be deferred until after the Court of Appeal determines the landlord’s appeal. The rationale for this approach was the pragmatic concern that if the tenant was not entitled to relief under the Act then his claim for damages would disappear. However, while I agree waiting for the Court of Appeal’s judgment is sensible, the parties should diligently conduct all preliminary steps required by the arbitrator so that if the landlord’s appeal fails then the arbitrator can expeditiously discharge his task.”

In Nikau Holdings Limited v Bank of New Zealand, [2012] NZHC1554 Associate Judge Abbot stated: in para [1] the costs incurred were imposed as the result of dishonest conduct of counsel for the defendants.

CIV 1999-404-1850 [2005] Associate Judge H Sargisson: MAWHINNEY V WAITAKERE CITY COUNCIL [9] Mr Mawhinney and the companies applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal. The application was unsuccessful. Suffice it to note that the Court of Appeal saw no grounds for a second appeal. It approved the High Court’s reasoning except in respect of the abuse of process finding. As to that finding, the Court of Appeal described the matters in issue as a failure by the applicants to the Environment Court to comply with the statutory requirements of particularity set out in ss 269 to 288 of the Resource Management Act. It stated: "Where an applicant fails to comply with requirements of a statute or regulation in relation to a prescribed process it will generally be open to a statutory body, subject to any specific applicable statutory requirements, to adjourn the matter until there is proper compliance. It is unhelpful to catergorise that situation as an abuse of process. Ultimately what the Environment Court found was that the applicant was proceeding in a way that the statute did not countenance because of the lack of particularity in what was proposed. We are satisfied that question is predominantly one of fact and judgment for the specialist Court concerned, which the High Court has in effect upheld. It does not give rise to any question of law which warrants a second appeal."

CIV-2013-404-658 [2013] NZHC 1165 the Defamation Act 1992 LAU V ACP MEDIA LIMITED AND DONNA CHISHOLM [2013] Judge Faire: 9 [36] In McLachlan v MEL Network Ltd helpful guidance is given as to the approach that should be taken on applications for security for costs.7 For the purposes of this application the Court’s comments at [13] – [16] are particularly helpful: [13] Rule 60(1)(b) High Court Rules provides that where the Court is satisfied, on the application of a defendant, that there is reason to believe that the plaintiff will be unable to pay costs if unsuccessful, “the Court may, if it thinks fit in all the circumstances, order the giving of security for costs”. Whether or not to order security and, if so, the quantum are discretionary. They are matters for the Judge if he or she thinks fit in all the circumstances. The discretion is not to be fettered by constructing “principles” from the facts of previous cases. [14] While collections of authorities such as that in the judgment of Master Williams in Nikau Holdings Ltd v BNZ (1992) 5 PRNZ 430, can be of assistance, they cannot substitute for a careful assessment of the circumstances of the particular case. It is not a matter of going through a checklist of so-called principles. That creates a risk that a factor accorded weight in a particular case will be given disproportionate weight, or even treated as a requirement for the making or refusing of an order, in quite different circumstances. [15] The rule itself contemplates an order for security where the plaintiff will be unable to meet an adverse award of costs. That must be taken as contemplating also that an order for substantial security may, in effect, prevent the plaintiff from pursuing the claim. An order having that effect should be made only after careful consideration and in a case in which the claim has little chance of success. Access to the Courts for a genuine plaintiff is not lightly to be denied. [16] Of course, the interests of defendants must also be weighed. They must be protected against being drawn into unjustified litigation, particularly where it is over-complicated and unnecessarily protracted. [38] The first part of the inquiry, often referred to as the threshold test, was summed up by Rodney Hansen J:8 In considering whether the threshold issue of the ability of the plaintiff to pay the defendants’ costs if unsuccessful has been reached, it is, as Hammond J said in Hamilton v Papakura District Council (supra), necessary to make a broad overall assessment. Something more than having difficulty in making payment is, however, required. Some plaintiffs will not be able to meet costs without some financial rearrangement: NZ Kiwifruit Marketing Board v Maheatataka Coolpack Limited (1993) 7 PRNZ 209. And if a plaintiff’s financial position is improving and is likely to improve still further, there may not be reason to find an inability to pay costs: see Rivendell Mushrooms Limited v Horowhenua Electric Power Board (unreported, High Court, Wellington, CP844/92, 13.11.98, Master Thomson)

The appellant reminded the supreme court of a 17.5 Case appeal the appellant won in her favour on 14 Feb 2023 without $1 of costs in her favour.

NEW APPEAL OF SEALED ORDERS 26 MAY 2023- GODDARD, COOPER and DUNNINGHAM.

CA431/2022, CA449/2022, CA452/2022, CA522/2022, CA556/2022 Paragraph [114] “We do not consider that it would be appropriate to order any other party to meet DFT’s disbursements.” Is in err and requires rectification.

CA431/2022 [2023] NZCA 193 [the decision of Goddard J declining to correct the wording for the sealed orders to reflect the actual grounds of the decision under a declaration AND the number of cases under 5 separate CA numbers]

Had costs rightfully been provided to the appellant, she would have been able to pay the $11,000 security costs for this appeal [and two other appeals of $7060] put in place since her successful appeal: SCA 2016, S162 STATES: Jurisdiction of court to award costs in all cases (1) If any Act confers jurisdiction on the High Court or a Judge of the High Court for the purpose of any civil proceedings or any criminal proceedings or any appeal, without expressly conferring jurisdiction to award or otherwise deal with the costs of the proceedings or appeal, 10 jurisdiction to award and deal with those costs and to make and enforce orders relating to costs must be treated as also having been conferred on the court or Judge. (2) Costs may be awarded or otherwise dealt with under subsection (1) at the discretion of the court or Judge, and may, if the court or Judge thinks fit, be ordered to be charged on or paid out of any fund or estate before the court.

This was further compounded by the SC decision: SC 18/2023 [2023] NZSC 78 issued: 29 June 2023 by O’Regan, Williams and Kós JJ SC https://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/assets/cases/2023/2023-NZSC-78.pdf

stating: [1] On 17 May 2023, this Court issued a judgment dismissing an application by the applicant for leave to appeal against aspects of a decision of the Court of Appeal.1 This Court ordered the applicant to pay each of the second and third respondents costs of $1,250. [2] On 26 May 2023, the applicant filed an application for recall of this Court’s judgment and a cancellation of the costs order. [3] None of the matters raised by the applicant provide a basis for recall of the judgment. The application for recall is therefore dismissed. [4] As the second and third respondents were put to the trouble of filing submissions responding to the application for recall, they are entitled to costs. We make an order that the applicant must pay to each of the second and third respondents costs of $500 in respect of the present application.

It is unethical and unjust to have one rule for court agents and government departments, and another rule for members of the public who are filing matters of public importance [primarily justice and freedom from discrimination and persecution] being dismissed on baseless and empty catchphrases, outdated and non-applicable even with the broadest of scopes.

I encourage the court to take this time to reassess their treatment of the appellant [and review the FACTUAL content filed and the upcoming cases of offenders yet to be held to account for their breaches of human rights and mandatory legislation] and consider the defamatory nature of the counsel for the defendants’ submissions, [Buddle Finlay] skating dangerously close to a defamation suit as cited in: [2012] NZHC 1554 “Nikau Holdings Limited v Bank of New Zealand”