Beyond The Hill

Introduction

Western political thought has long presumed liberal democracy to be the pinnacle of governance evolution. From Francis Fukuyama’s famed declaration of the “universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” to popular discourse equating democratization with progress, a bias persists that electoral democracy is the superior (and inevitable) model for all societies. This study challenges that assumption by examining the experience of elite-led Gulf monarchies – specifically the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar – which eschew Western-style democracy yet exhibit notable governance successes. These cases invite a critical analysis of whether democracy is the sole path to effective government, or if alternative models can deliver equal or greater stability, development, and public satisfaction. In exploring this question, we will compare governance outcomes in the Gulf versus Western democracies, critique Western preconceptions, examine how Gulf monarchies achieve stability without elections, define metrics for comparing performance, and assess the sustainability of these monarchies in a modernizing world. The goal is an insight-driven, balanced evaluation that respects the merits of both democratic and non-democratic systems while challenging the Western bias that democracy is inherently best.

Democracy is not a “Highest Evolution”

In much of Western historical thinking, democracy is viewed as the culmination of political development. Enlightenment ideals and the triumph of liberal democracies in the 20th century fostered a sense of democratic inevitability. Fukuyama famously argued that liberal democracy represents “the end-point of mankind’s ideological evolution”. Similarly, many policymakers assume that as nations become more educated and prosperous, they will (or should) naturally transition to pluralistic, representative government. This bias often casts non-democracies as “unfinished” or retrograde in the evolutionary ladder of governance. Western governments and analysts have at times judged other regimes through this lens, pressuring for democratization or predicting the imminent failure of systems that don’t democratize.

However, a growing body of thought urges caution against such linear, universalist assumptions. History shows that governance forms are context-dependent and can’t be ranked on a single universal scale. As one commentary notes, modern liberal democracy “is not a universal truth, valid across time and space”. Non-Western perspectives and experiences frequently challenge the notion that Western-style democracy is the only legitimate model. For instance, several African and Asian scholars point out that effective governance and legitimacy can emerge from indigenous or non-liberal frameworks, and that externally imposed democratic models have sometimes faltered (4). This section establishes the Western democratic bias as a backdrop – a widely held belief that we will critically examine in light of the Gulf monarchies’ record.

Gulf Monarchies vs. Western Democracies

Governance Effectiveness and Stability

The elite-led monarchies of the Gulf offer an alternative template where unelected rulers emphasize technocratic governance, economic development, and stability. By many measures, these states perform effectively. The UAE and Qatar, for example, consistently rank high in government effectiveness and regulatory quality, translating oil wealth into modern infrastructure and public services at remarkable speed. Proponents of the Gulf model argue that centralized authority allows decisive, long-term action unencumbered by the frequent elections and partisan gridlock seen in Western democracies. Indeed, some political scientists have posited that monarchs may “produce better results for their citizens” economically than republican regimes and are “better able to credibly institute reform in the face of opposition,” thus defusing crises before they escalate. The Gulf states’ ability to swiftly implement mega-projects or policy shifts (e.g. building new cities, overhauling economic sectors) with minimal bureaucratic delay contrasts with the slower, negotiation-laden policymaking in democracies.

In Western democracies, governance is bolstered by institutional checks and balances and public accountability, but decision-making can be slow and short-termism often prevails. Elected leaders must contend with election cycles and opposition scrutiny, which encourage policies geared toward immediate voter approval rather than long-range national strategy. By comparison, Gulf rulers – often in power for decades or ruling by family succession – can pursue strategic plans spanning generations. They have launched ambitious visions like UAE Centennial 2071 and Saudi Vision 2030, signaling commitments to diversify economies and invest in future industries far beyond any single electoral term. This long-term planning horizon is a hallmark of Gulf governance. For instance, the UAE’s leadership implemented a 50-year development plan that transformed the country from a desert federation in 1971 to a global trade and tourism hub, an achievement made possible by policy continuity and forward-looking investment. Western democracies also create long-term plans, but these are more vulnerable to political turnover or shifting public priorities. In effect, Gulf monarchies can be “steady ships” plotting a long course, whereas democratic governments may change course with the winds of electoral politics.

Public Satisfaction and Quality of Life

An important, often overlooked, aspect of governance is how satisfied and well-served the population feels. Here, the Gulf monarchies show surprisingly positive indicators. Despite lacking free elections, countries like the UAE and Qatar enjoy high levels of public trust in government and institutions. According to global surveys, the trust index in the UAE and Saudi Arabia stands around 70+, among the highest in the world – far above many Western democracies (for example, the United States scores below 50). These numbers suggest that many Gulf citizens approve of their government’s performance and direction, even without having a vote. The “social contract” in the Gulf has traditionally traded political participation for economic prosperity and welfare benefits. Thanks to oil wealth prudently redistributed through public sector jobs, subsidized services, and tax-free living, citizens of Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have enjoyed increasing living standards and a sense of stability. It is not surprising, then, that Kuwaitis, Qataris, and Emiratis have generally been more satisfied with their situation than citizens of many democratizing Arab republics, who often faced economic stagnation or turmoil. In short, when people experience tangible improvements in daily life – good healthcare, housing, infrastructure, and personal security – they may grant legitimacy to the ruling system, democratic or not.

Meanwhile, public satisfaction in Western democracies has been faltering in recent years, highlighting that electoral systems are no guarantee of contentment. A Gallup poll in early 2024 found only 28% of U.S. adults are satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country – an all-time low. Many Europeans likewise report frustration with political gridlock, inequality, and the performance of elected officials. By contrast, Gulf publics often express pride in their nations’ rapid development and relative safety. However, it’s important to note that measuring genuine satisfaction in elite-led non-democratic contexts is complex – some citizens may withhold criticism publicly. Still, the overall picture complicates the assumption that democracy automatically equates to happier or better-served citizens. Gulf monarchies have delivered high human development outcomes (UAE’s Human Development Index is 0.937, ranked 17th globally, with Qatar and Saudi Arabia not far behind at 0.875, in the very-high development category) that rival or even surpass many democracies. This comparative evidence suggests that governance quality does not neatly correlate with regime type – effective and ineffective governments can be found in both democratic and non-democratic camps.

Western Prejudgments and Policy Missteps

Western bias in favor of democracy has at times led to misjudgment of alternative governance models. A pattern of pre-judgment can be seen in policy and academia – expecting that non-democratic regimes will either liberalize or collapse under pressure. For example, during the Arab Spring of 2011, many Western observers predicted the wave of popular protests would inevitably sweep away the Gulf monarchies, or force them to democratize. Some analysts confidently wrote the obituary of these regimes: “traditional monarchy as a legitimate regime type in the region is soon going to reach the end of its lifespan,” declared one such prediction. In 2013, political scientist Christopher Davidson famously forecast the imminent “collapse of the Gulf monarchies,” citing youth discontent, economic strains, and modernizing societies as incompatible with absolute rule. Western media and policymakers, accustomed to viewing monarchy as archaic, largely shared the sentiment that it was only a matter of time before these regimes fell, either to popular revolt or to internal decay.

In practice, these dire predictions did not materialize – a lesson in the danger of wishful thinking or ideological bias. Not a single Arab monarchy was toppled during the Arab Spring; instead, they proved more resilient than several ostensibly more “modern” republican regimes. Gulf rulers navigated the unrest through a combination of financial largesse (e.g. big stimulus packages, public salary hikes), limited reforms, and, where necessary, coercive measures – and their states remained intact. As one observer wryly noted, “success cannot be evidence of failure” – yet some Western analysis almost treated the monarchies’ very survival as an anomaly that must surely herald their eventual failure. This reveals a blind spot in Western thinking: an assumption that elite-led non-democratic regimes lack legitimacy or adaptability, and thus any crisis will unmask fatal weaknesses. Western governments have at times based policies on this flawed assumption. For instance, the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq in 2003 was partly predicated on the idea that removing a dictator and holding elections would naturally yield stability and good governance – an expectation proven overly optimistic. Similarly, Western democracy-promotion efforts in the Middle East often underestimated local power structures and the appeal of non-Western governance concepts (such as Islamic or tribal legitimacy, or monarchic tradition).

Another example of bias has been the inconsistent Western approach to Gulf allies. While espousing democracy as a universal ideal, Western powers maintained close partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE for strategic and economic reasons. This sometimes led to cognitive dissonance: publicly, democracy was lauded as the only acceptable form of government, yet Western capitals continued to do business with and even arm and protect absolute monarchies, implicitly acknowledging their stability and effectiveness in certain areas (energy policy, regional mediation, counterterrorism). The West’s failure to predict the longevity of Gulf regimes – and its ongoing reliance on them – suggests that our theoretical models of governance might need revision. Rather than viewing democracy as a one-size-fits-all “end of history,” analysts are increasingly recognizing that alternative governance models can produce viable, even successful, outcomes. A more nuanced view, freed from ideological pre-judgment, would examine how these monarchies derive legitimacy, how they perform for their citizens, and what trade-offs are involved, without assuming that the absence of elections equals failure.

How Gulf Monarchies Self-Correct

If not through electoral accountability, how do Gulf monarchies maintain their stability and legitimacy over time? Far from being static, these regimes have developed self-correcting mechanisms and adaptive strategies to respond to public needs and changing circumstances – short of free elections. Key tools include:

Consultative Councils and Traditional Consultation

Most Gulf states have advisory bodies or partial parliaments that provide a channel for input and debate. For example, Saudi Arabia’s King appoints a Shura Council of educated citizens to review legislation and advise on policy, and the UAE has a Federal National Council with half its members indirectly elected in a controlled franchise. While these councils lack real law-making power, they serve as a forum for airing grievances and proposals, which the rulers can use as a gauge of public sentiment. Equally important is the majlis tradition – open-door meetings where citizens can petition the ruler or local governor directly. This centuries-old practice of consultation and consensus-building is a cultural mechanism that substitutes, to some extent, for formal political opposition. As the new King of Bahrain noted when reintroducing municipal elections, policies that preserved stability “lacked the element…critical for continued legitimacy – popular consultation and consensus.” He pledged to “follow a course acceptable to the people,” acknowledging that monarchy must secure a degree of popular approval to survive. In short, Gulf monarchs use a mix of informal consultative governance and selective institutional openness to hear and co-opt public opinion, even if ultimate decision power remains with the elite.

Elite Coalitions and Power-Sharing

Unlike one-man dictatorships, Gulf monarchies are often family oligarchies, encompassing a broader royal family and allied elites. This creates internal checks and balances. Political scientist Victor Menaldo argues that a monarch’s authority is constrained by “fellow ruling family members and institutions of elite consultation,” which act as internal checks on autocratic power and encourage stable policies. In practice, major Gulf ruling families (Al Saud in Saudi Arabia, Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi, Al Thani in Qatar, etc.) include numerous princes or prominent figures who hold key military, regional, or economic posts. The ruler must maintain consensus and satisfaction among these elites – an internal self-correction mechanism that prevents gross misrule. If a king or prince were to veer into extremely unpopular territory, he could be pressured or quietly replaced from within. This elite cultivation extends to prominent business families and tribal leaders as well: by giving them government contracts, consultative roles, or prestige, the monarchy secures their loyalty and dampens any appetite for opposition. In essence, the regime continuously co-opts potential challengers.

Strategic Vision and Adaptive Reforms

Gulf monarchies have shown a striking capacity for adaptation and modernization from the top. Instead of waiting for popular demand to force change, rulers often preempt pressures by launching reforms on their own terms. This “elasticity of action” is cited as one of monarchy’s strengths. For example, Saudi Arabia’s leadership in recent years initiated bold social and economic changes – lifting the ban on women driving, curbing the religious police, diversifying the economy – all without ceding political control to an elected body. These moves address societal pressures before they fuel uncontrollable dissent. In Kuwait, the Emir pushed through the extension of voting rights to women in 2005, anticipating and channeling progressive change rather than resisting it. The Gulf rulers also use long-term national visions (e.g. “Qatar National Vision 2030” or “We the UAE 2031”) as blueprints for reform, often involving expert input, public outreach, and de facto referendums in the form of national dialogues. While not democracy, these practices introduce feedback loops between ruler and ruled, allowing policy adjustments if discontent rises.

Economic Distribution and Social Welfare

A cornerstone of Gulf monarchic stability is the rentier social contract. The state’s generous distribution of oil revenues in the form of public sector jobs, subsidies, free education, and healthcare has been a proactive mechanism to maintain public contentment. When challenges arise, monarchies often respond with material concessions. During the 2011 Arab Spring upheavals, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar all boosted social spending dramatically – Saudi Arabia announced tens of billions in new housing funds, salary bonuses, and unemployment benefits; Kuwait gave cash grants; Qatar raised public salaries – explicitly to “head off popular discontent”. This pattern of increasing benefits acts as a safety valve. Rather than conceding political reform under pressure, Gulf regimes typically concede economic relief. It also builds a reservoir of goodwill among citizens, who see their rulers as protectors of prosperity. Indeed, legitimacy in the Gulf often rests less on ideology than on performance – deliver stability and welfare, and the populace remains quiescent.

In short, Gulf monarchs use a mix of informal consultative governance, elite coalitions, and economic largesse to remain responsive without electoral turnover. This is not to romanticize these systems: they maintain strong regulations to ensure stability and show limited tolerance for certain forms of public criticism. Nevertheless, the longevity of Gulf rulers indicates that a firm stance alone does not explain their endurance; they have also blended tradition, performance-based legitimacy, and responsiveness to social needs. Understanding these self-correction mechanisms helps explain why, contrary to Western expectations, Gulf monarchies have been politically stable for decades, even as many elected governments elsewhere see wild swings or instability.

Rethinking “Good Governance”

To objectively compare governance models, we must go beyond form (democracy vs. monarchy) and examine performance indicators. What outcomes do these governments produce for their people? Here are several key metrics:

Economic Stability and Development

Gulf monarchies have generally excelled in providing economic stability. They boast high GDP per capita and have navigated global economic swings using tools like sovereign wealth funds and currency reserves. Saudi Arabia, for example, accumulated nearly $700 billion in foreign assets during oil boom years to buffer against future busts. The UAE and Qatar invested oil revenues into diversification – airlines, tourism, finance – creating new streams of income. On raw economic indicators (growth rates, infrastructure, macroeconomic stability), the wealthy Gulf monarchies perform on par with affluent Western nations, underscoring that non-democratic systems can deliver competent economic governance. Western economies, however, are larger and more complex, and democracies generally provide more transparency; Gulf finances can be opaque by their nature. Still, the essential point is that monarchy does not preclude strong economic management.

Social Welfare and Human Development

In providing basic services and quality of life, Gulf monarchies again show strong results. As noted, the Human Development Index (HDI) scores for the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar place them in the “Very High” development category. Citizens enjoy universal healthcare, free education, and subsidies. Poverty among citizens is rare. Western democracies, too, generally rank high in human development, but face issues like homelessness or expensive higher education. Meanwhile, the Gulf’s small populations and oil incomes make generous welfare systems possible. Yet these states have undeniably transformed themselves in a few generations – with life expectancy around 75-80 years, modern hospitals, and advanced universities – matching or surpassing outcomes in many democratic countries. This challenges the notion that a visionary monarchy inevitably neglects human development; with the right incentives and revenue, it can invest heavily in social goods.

Institutional Resilience and Rule of Law

One area where democracies traditionally claim superiority is liberal rule of law and checks on power. Gulf monarchies do have bureaucracies, courts, and laws, but these remain subordinate to royal will. Nonetheless, the monarchies’ longevity indicates a form of institutional stability: they have endured wars and regional crises without collapsing. By one measure, they have “successfully contained different types of opposition threats for decades”. Regarding liberal freedoms, some observers note a divergence between Gulf states and longstanding democracies. This raises the question of which dimension of governance one values most—broad individual rights or a cohesive, stable order—and how each system balances these goals. Both can demonstrate resilience, though in different ways.

Public Trust and Satisfaction

Trust in government is a core indicator of legitimacy. Surveys such as the Edelman Trust Barometer find higher trust in government in some Gulf states than in many Western democracies. In 2025, the UAE and Saudi Arabia scored around 70+ on the Trust Index, versus the 40s in the U.S., UK, or Germany. Part of this stems from results-based legitimacy (prosperity, security), and part may be cultural. Still, it highlights that satisfaction does not always require elections. Low levels of mass protest further suggest that many Gulf citizens accept or even endorse their governance model. In comparison, Western democracies face growing polarization and distrust. Thus, performance legitimacy can partly substitute for electoral legitimacy. The key question is whether this performance-based model can adapt over time to changing citizen expectations.

Sustainability and Future Challenges for Gulf Monarchies

Despite their resilience and successes, Gulf monarchies face evolving pressures that will test their model:

Modernization and Social Change

Gulf societies are rapidly modernizing, with a young, educated population exposed to global norms. Leaders have responded by introducing controlled social liberalization (e.g. cinemas, concerts in Saudi Arabia), women’s empowerment, and more cultural freedoms. However, as expectations rise, demands for political participation may follow. The Army War College noted that “expectations of GCC citizens…are increasingly moving from socio-economic demands to political ones”. Monarchs may balance openness with retaining absolute authority.

Economic Diversification and Post-Oil Transition

Oil and gas revenues underpin the Gulf’s generous welfare model. With future global energy shifts and finite reserves, leaders are pushing diversification (Saudi Vision 2030, UAE’s non-oil sectors, Qatar’s sports and media strategy). They must succeed or risk fiscal crises that erode the rentier social contract. Already, Gulf states are introducing taxes (e.g. VAT) and reducing subsidies. As that trend intensifies, citizens might demand representation in exchange for taxation -? the classic “no taxation without representation” dynamic. Large financial reserves offer a cushion, but only for a time. The monarchies will forge an extended "good governance" narrative not wholly reliant on distributing oil wealth.

Political Reform and Institutionalization

Succession and governance in Gulf monarchies have historically placed significant responsibility on individual leaders, reflecting the vital role of personal accountability at the apex of power. In many instances, leaders have introduced measures to ensure smooth transitions and effective administration- such as the UAE’s federation model, Qatar’s partially elected Shura Council, and Saudi Arabia’s specialized Crown Prince role. At the same time, continued development of robust institutions (civil services, clear legal frameworks, and merit-based appointments) will further strengthen resilience as societies grow more complex. Observers note that these refinements enable these states to modernize while preserving their core governance features. By balancing tradition, leadership responsibility, and institutional progress, Gulf monarchies illustrate an ongoing commitment to evolving their systems to meet future challenges.

Conclusion

The examination of Western democracies versus Gulf monarchies reveals a more complex reality than a simple hierarchy of governance “stages.” Western bias, which holds democracy as the teleological end-point of political development, often overlooks the empirical successes and adaptive capacity of alternative systems. The elite-led regimes of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and their neighbors have delivered high levels of economic development, social welfare, and stability – in some cases outpacing long-established democracies on key indicators like infrastructure, citizen satisfaction, and state responsiveness. This is not to argue that monarchy is better than democracy, but rather to underscore that effective governance is multidimensional. Democratic institutions provide invaluable freedoms, accountability, and legitimacy in the eyes of those who prioritize political rights – advantages not matched in the Gulf. Conversely, the Gulf monarchies demonstrate that long-term vision, decisiveness, and a focused social contract can also produce legitimacy of a different sort – one based on performance and tradition instead of ballots.

Challenging Western preconceptions is useful because it forces us to identify what truly matters in governance. Is it the procedure of how leaders are chosen, or the outcomes leaders deliver? Ideally, a society wants both democratic voice and good governance. But as this study shows, in practice there are trade-offs and different paths. Western democracies can learn from the Gulf about strategic planning and investing in future generations beyond the election cycle. Gulf monarchies, on the other hand, might draw lessons from democracies about innovation through diversity of opinion and the value of institutionalized accountability to prevent abuse. Ultimately, recognizing Western bias helps us appreciate that no single system has a monopoly on good governance. Respecting different models means engaging with them pragmatically – acknowledging, for example, why Gulf citizens might be proud of their nations’ progress under monarchic rule, while also supporting incremental expansions of rights and participation that these citizens increasingly desire.

In the end, the “highest point” of governance may not be a fixed destination (like liberal democracy) but a moving target – a system that continually self-corrects, earns public trust, and meets the needs of its people. Western democracies and Gulf monarchies each have mechanisms to do this, and each have blind spots. A balanced, insight-driven analysis, as attempted here, shows that good governance comes in more than one form. By challenging our biases and examining real-world outcomes, we foster a deeper understanding of how diverse political systems can succeed or fail. This not only enriches academic debate but also encourages humility and openness in international relations: the West can support democratic values without dismissing the tangible achievements of non-democratic allies, and Gulf states can preserve their core governance while learning from democratic practices. In a world facing complex global challenges, such cross-learning and mutual respect for different governance paths will be crucial. Democracy is a powerful model, but it is not the only model – and the Gulf monarchies exemplify how an alternative, elite-led approach has crafted its own version of success, compelling us to rethink what truly constitutes the pinnacle of governance and its diversity.