Between the Cold War and the Cold Peace: How the West betrayed Russia - An interview with Professor Richard Sakwa

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tewVroLo9c

An exclusive interview with one of the greatest experts on Russian politics, and an associate fellow at the Chatham House on Russia’s relations with the West after the end of the Cold War, US foreign policy, Putin, Europe and its security, this year’s NATO summit in Warsaw, Poland, and more.

Adriel Kasonta: How would you define Europe? Is it correct to perceive it as a synonym of the European Union – the practice so much visible in the media coverage nowadays?

Professor Richard Sakwa: Absolutely not. European Union and Europe are very different things, and this is my model of Europe as follows. Basically there are three Europes at the moment in contestation. The first one is “the smaller Europe,” and that is the European Union. It is quite big with its 28 states now, but relatively if you look at the map of Europe it is still ultimately a minority. That is why it is a smaller Europe. Then you have the wider Europe, and this is the European Union to relations with the countries in between (we are talking about the six) - Eastern Partnership countries today: Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and the South Caucasus. And then the third Europe is “the greater Europe,” Pan-Europe, ‘Bolshaya Evropa’ (as the Russians would say), and this agenda for ‘Bolshaya Evropa’ (or the “Common European Home” as Gorbachev called it) is not over yet. It is very very important to remember that there is a Europe, which effectively is not just as de Gaulle put it in 1959 “from Lisbon to the Urals,” but it is from Lisbon to Vladivostok. It is one culture, effectively one European people, and the tragedy is that this is now divided. The thing is that even the tragedy of the Ukrainian crisis is that there is a wider Europe. Yes, we know that the European Union change its language quit quickly, from wider Europe to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), but the wider Europe in essence remains. This is an extraordinary vision. In other words, the European Union was never aware of the power consequences of its own actions. So in answer to your question, I would define Europe today as a Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Unfortunately, it is now divided into three Europes in contestation. And that is the tragedy of our times.

Kasonta: Often when we think Europe, we think “the West” – especially due to the fact that in order to become a member of the EU, you have to undergo the process of “Europeanization” of your country’s political system, even though the country lies in the European continent. Therefore, does it mean that one countries are more “European” than others?

Sakwa: Very much so. This is the great conceit of the European Union. It has claimed to speak on behalf of all of Europe. It has, in other words, become monist. It is a single vision of what it is that it cannot imagine a valid, a legitimate in normative terms (not just through a great power term, but substantively legitimate) alternative to itself on the European continent. So Europeanization is not negotiated, it is take it or leave it. Fair enough, you can say if you want to join the club you have to obey the rules of that club. But it has meant now - certainly if it comes to the Eastern Neighbourhood - that it is become almost an imperialist project, and it is extremely dangerous. As for Europe and the West, I think that you have to be very careful. I actually no longer use the term “the West,” I use the word “the Atlantic community.” And even Angela Merkel, you may have heard last year, invited Japan to consider joining NATO. So it’s now the Atlantic community, which has subsumed and squeezed out the vision of the West. The West was a cultural-civilizational concept, but the Atlantic community is a security-political community. The later has squeezed out the former.

Kasonta: Is the West privileged? And if so, what makes “Western values” superior over other values in the era of alleged pluralism supported by the liberal model of thinking?

Sakwa: Absolutely. This is one of the great dangerous of our time. Yes, in many ways the West is privileged because it claims to be defending a set of values. Now, I would argue that these values are not simply Western values. In other words, the values of the rule of law, of constitutionalism, of defence of property rights are things, which everywhere people are getting to in their own way. Of course there are huge battles in China, huge battles in Russia, but the West’s claim to be a privileged defender of this order in some ways there is something to be set forth. Yes, I mean, I prefer to live in a country which has the all these good things, but the question is you cannot get to it in one leap. It is a gradual, organic process. So I think the danger is not that we challenge these values, we challenge the instrumentalization of these values. There are two processes going on: inter-democracy is the relationship of security and economics (that is effectively of NATO and EU), and there is another process called transdemocracy, and that is when democracy becomes a political ideology to be forced through democratization on to others. For example, imagine if the United States opened in Saudi Arabia all sorts of NGO’s for the democratization of Saudi Arabia. It is not allowed at the moment, but it would be an absurd. The Saudis would object. Why should Russia then accept this transdemocratic vision? I mean I am in favour of these achievements, of these goals, but you need to have a geopolitical or sensible political strategy of understanding the sovereignty of historical parts, because Europe’s other is considered its own past. In other words, Europe claimed the triumph of time over space. But unfortunately, we understand that space is now taking its revenge against time in the European Union. And by space I am simple saying: “No! this is a space where we have to solve our problems of history in our historical times. You have managed to solve good problems in European Union, fine! But let’s see. Fantastic! No one is objecting to it. Your answers cannot be simply imposed on us. You have to a degree solved it, but you cannot impose it on others. It has to be achieved organically.” And when Ukrainians say: “We want to join Europe” – I say: “You cannot.” Ukrainians have to solve their own historical problems in its own historical times. And that is the real level of a catastrophe, which is Ukraine today.  

Kasonta: What is “the West” in your understanding?

Sakwa: I think we are seeing a dissolution of the West in the way that I have just said, and it has been replaced by the Atlantic community. So I do not understand what the West is anymore. It is the Atlantic community now. We are seeing now the development not just of a multipolar world, we are seeing the emergence of a multiorder world, in which the Western order is this Atlantic community. And then there is another order emerging – this is the Russo-Chinese alternative, Indian, BRICS, Shanghai corporation organisations. This is a multiorder world, and both are hinged in defending the United Nations - so they are not completely opposed to each other. Can I just say another long thing? But it is very important. At the end of the Cold War Russia wanted to join a “Greater West.” They wanted to join an expanded West, which would change by the very fact of Russia joining this West. In other words, the traditional West would become a “Greater West” with Russia’s membership. The West refused to allow this, and this is the reason why we are at the “so called” new Cold War today. Instead of which all we got is a traditional West - that is the EU, NATO, its ideological “End of history” ideology and so on. So the West is now divided into two: you have the traditional West, which is militant, closed, hermetic, and you have the potential of Russia being still committed to joining this “Greater West,” which would actually have to accept Russia as the equal within it. They have refused to do so so far. In other words, there is a tension between the one which exists and is becoming more and more hermetic and closed, and the other, which is more potential, more open, and more pluralistic – something which is not what they have achieved, and that is the failure of the post-cold War years.

Kasonta: French poet Paul Valéry observed in 1927 that “Europe visibly aspires to be governed by an American commission. Its entire policy is directed to that end. Not knowing how to rid ourselves of our history, we will be relieved of it by

a fortunate people who have almost none.” On that note, is it possible for Europe to have its own vision of identity, or we are doomed to this highly Atlantic approach, where the US is dominating our internal and external agenda, which means we are its “51st state”?

Sakwa: First I would say that it was a fantastic quotation from Paul Valerie. That is a really good one. It is not quite like this. As we know, the United States (certainly since Obama) has got global concerns, whereas Europe (European Union even) has more regional context. Europe has so far outsourced its security to the United States. So there is more complex dynamic at work, but effectively, as we have seen since the crisis in the last two years, European Union is becoming more and more subsumed into this Atlantic community. But we should never forget, there is a lot of tensions and contradictions within this Atlantic community.

Kasonta: In terms of the US influence on formulating European external policies the most significant example is the EU’s approach towards Russia, which seems to be deeply rooted in different perceptions of the end of the cold war. What are these perceptions?

Sakwa: As we know Joe Biden has taken pride in the fact that he managed to whip the Europeans and to shape over sanctions. The G7 meetings basically have turned lately into the Americans giving the marching orders to Europeans on sanctions and on other issues. But you are absolutely right that these differences are rooted in the perceptions of the end of the Cold War. The United States influence in formulating European external action policies? Given what I have said in the previous answer, but within that framework – oh, absolutely! Unfortunately, European Union has failed to become an independent actor, in part because of Donald Tusk as head and president of the European Council. So you know, these things are never monolithic - there are always contradictions and debates within it. But do not forget when we are talking about the European Union, increasingly policy in the EU is dominated by Germany. Germany of course has its differences with the United States, is leading the Minsk process and so on. For peace it refused to allow NATO membership plans for Ukraine and Georgia, and of course the Snowden case, and the national security spying on Germany and so on. So there are contradictions there, but nevertheless Germany is absolute heart. The reconstitution of the independent German state after the end of the WWII is deeply an Atlanticist project. So the fact that Germany becomes the dominant power in the European Union means that it has to be an intensification of Atlanticism, because the very condition of Germany today is Atlanticism. Of course in those days are contradictions and differences and so on, but ultimately this is an Atlanticist project, and this is why to be different from Helmut Shmidt when he was still alive, and Gerhard Schr?der, who both criticised the policies of Merkel vis a vis Russia. Therefore, it is absolutely rooted in the different perceptions of the end of the Cold War. This my argument, very simple: at the end of the Cold War Russia, and it is to this day, was willing to join a “Greater Europe” and a “Greater West,” which would have been changed by the very fact of Russian membership, and for various reasons this did not happen. Instead of which we simply got a consolidation of traditional West and of smaller Europe, which is made this dividing lines. In other words, it is not the perceptions of the end of the Cold War, it is the fact of the way the Cold War was ended is the break ground for the continuation of conflict today.

Kasonta: Is it possible to overcome these differences in order to maintain peace? If so, what has to be done in order to normalize relations between Russia and broadly speaking the West?

Sakwa: Whether it is possible? I really do not know, and most people say “No.” That in other words we are doomed for a long period now of conflict and confrontation. A new division of Europe. Those crazy Poles in the front line with the crazy Lithuanians, which are absolutely insane. So what needs to be done we know: engagement, debate, and indeed an institutional framework to transcend the logic of conflict. Instead of which we are going exactly the opposite way, and what we are seeing now is the intensification of a logic of conflict. So that is the tragedy. Is it possible? Yes, but it is likely unlikely.

Kasonta: The current narrative in Europe portrays “Putin’s Russia,” as they call it, as the main obstacle to the EU project, which is suffering a deep crisis, as many European countries are currently rethinking their relationship with Brussels. Therefore, is it true that the main reason for the EU ongoing failure is Russia?

Sakwa: Absolutely not. Russia is used as a scapegoat. It is the way of externalising domestic problems. Russia is not the one who started the migration crisis. For example, even people like Breedlove says Russia is trying to weaponize it, which is insane. I mean, am I weaponizing this pint of beer? It is crazy. Secondly, Russia has nothing to do with the Eurozone crisis, and Russia has nothing to do with the perception of democratic deficit and so on. I think ill-advisedly sometimes is perceived to be trying to exacerbate the divisions by supporting unpleasant groups like Jobbik in Hungary, and some perhaps extremist groups in Poland, and elsewhere. Marie La Pen, that was open, was given a loan and they gave her a second loan now. But you got to be very careful, especially if it comes to Russia’s support of Syriza and others. I think that first of all the extent of support is exaggerated in Western media and second, that Russia does have to be very careful, because it opens itself up to this charge which you make - even whether it is true or not. Let European Union sort out its own problems. Russia is certainly not a cause of it, but it should be careful in the way that it tries to exploit and take advantage of divisions. On the other hand, you can understand it of course - giving the fact that the European Union is so proud of its standing “shoulder to shoulder” with the United States - that it is going to try to find divisions to try to establish a good old-fashioned relationship between the state-to-state - say for example, traditionally good relations with Italy, because of the Italian communist tradition and so on. And yet the European Union is trying to close off these options, including even for an example, traditionally good relations with Serbia. Furthermore, this is a part of the condition of joining the EU by Serbia.

Kasonta: By being described as an author of the best book in English about Putin’s presidency titled “Putin: Russia’s Choice,” I would like to ask if you would agree that one of the main reasons for his popularity among Russians is an attempt to reverse a devastating impact of Yegor Gaidar’s neo-liberal reforms implemented during Boris Yeltsin’s presidency?

Sakwa: Not entirely, because Putin is actually building on these reforms. He has never repudiated it - that’s the program of the communists. Putin had tried to take the best part of it, but limiting some of the worst aspects. Therefore, I would not agree with that entirely, and do not forget that even to this day Putin and his government – especially the so called Liberal block and the Medvedev’s Cabinet – do not show any attempt to do it. Still, the economic policy in its broad terms, macroeconomic terms, remains liberal. And in terms of social policy Putin’s government is still pursuing neo-liberal policies of marketizing public welfare. So regarding your question on his popularity, the fact is that he pays wages on time to restore more effective state, and the dignity of Russia, as well as the grandeur if you like (how the French would put it) outside.

Kasonta: At that time, Vladimir Putin was a fervent supporter of an enlightened form of a conservatism, aiming at modernizing Russia. He was hugely inspired by Russia’s former Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs, Pyotr Stolypin, as well as (if it comes to perceiving the civil law as the strongest pillar of freedom in the society) Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, with whom he shared views on catastrophic condition of Russia, presented by the writer in a book titled “Russia under Avalanche.” Furthermore, Putin was agreeing with Solzhenitsyn’s views on abandoning the imperial ambitions of Russia due to the necessity of rebuilding the country, and even informed him during their meeting in Pskov-Caves Monastery that he wanted to follow the example of the US Republican Party. Knowing that, how it comes that the West did not use this fact as an opportunity to strengthen ties with Russia in order to effectively accommodate her in a global order?

Sakwa: Well, absolutely. This is the big missed opportunity, because we could not accommodate Russia, as you have putted, in the global order. That is the fundamental failure in the last 25 years that Russia was not able to be effectively accommodated even though, as you say, its conservative positions and many other positions would have been perfectly compatible with the enforcing of Western achievements. It is this failure, and I use this word the “hermetic” – closed in terms of thinking, closed in terms of institutional evolution. So indeed, why did not the West do it? How comes? Well, that is the question not me to answer, but in one way it is because all of this attempt to open up to Russia is considered the goalless heresy to achieve this. So anything to accommodate Russia is considered as rather the wedge between the European Union and United States. So that is of course the big question. It is

a failure.

Kasonta: Instead, we could have noticed increasing anti-Russian rhetoric among American political thinkers, where Zbigniew Brzezinski’s book titled “The Grand Chessboard” and creation of the “Project for a New American Century” (voicing William Kristol’s and Robert Kagan’s views) assured Russian President that America wants to capitalize on Russia’s weakness. Why is that?

Sakwa: Well, indeed. This is the view, which is reinforced by many liberals in Russia themselves. For instance, people like Garry Kasparov (the former chees champion), who in his book “Winter Is Coming” argued that the failure of the United States was not that it did not accommodate Russia, but it did not exploit the weakness of Russia adequately and push through its victory in the Cold War. And this is reflected in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s book and in these projects. Absolutely, the idea to capitalize on Russia’s weakness… of course policy officially was not to capitalize on Russia’s weakness, it was simply to continue “in the old way,” assuming that Russia did not matter (whether weak or strong) any more. That was even worse in many ways.

Kasonta: As we know, Boris Yeltsin won the presidential elections in 1996 due to the support of corrupted Russian oligarchs, and Lee S. Wolosky’s article for Foreign Affairs Magazine titled “Putin’s plutocrat problem” encouraged Russia’s president to take further steps regarding Mikhail Khodorkovsky, which was applauded by Joseph E. Stiglitz in his article for the Project Syndicate titled “Tax the Oligarchs,” where he encouraged Putin to “coming to terms with the illegitimate privatizations of the 1990’s”. Nonetheless, this notion in Russian politics has been perceived in Poland and neighbouring countries as a threat. Why is that?

Sakwa: Certainly a lot of liberals in the West considered that Mikhail Chodarkovski was a gangster, and in fact we know CIA reports to that respect. What actually happened in 2003 it was using the law in order to undermine the law. There was an issue about the privatization in the 1990’, and they certainly abused the way that they gained their property. But I thought that they should have done this through open nationalization. In the sense that Putin took the worst of all worlds is it make himself look as if he was abusing the law (which he did in many ways), but the goal itself may or may not have been appropriate – as Stiglitz and others would putted. So in other words, there was a policy challenge definitely. The policy response may not have been the wisest one in the circumstances.

Kasonta: It is apparent that after the 9/11 attacks Putin was still very much eager to cooperate with America, even though his approach was condemned by Aleksandr Dugin, who used to saw him as a traitor of the national values. Do you believe Russia’s President was honest, or was it an orchestrated animosity between two Russians?

Sakwa: Absolutely not. Putin’s commitment after the 9/11- the first to telephone Bush, then the meeting of the 24th of September to open up airspace, basis in the Central Asia - was absolutely genuine. Dugin is a marginal figure. He pretends to exaggerate his influence, or exaggerates his influence. He is got marginal influence, even to this day. The criticism was genuine. Putin is still considered to be far too pro-Western, because he is still committed to this vision of Greater West – the transformed West, which would incorporate with Russia as an equal. I still support that policy myself. A West which includes Russia would be more pluralistic, it would solve a lot of security dilemmas of the crazy Poles and the crazy Ukrainians, and it would not be a battle between the two wings. I think it is the right policy, but it is only the stupidity of the West which is failed to see it.

Kasonta: It is worthwhile recalling the fact that in exchange for agreeing to dismantle the empire, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the unification of Germany Mikhail Gorbachev received a promise from President George W. Bush (Senior) and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher that NATO would not expand into the territories of the former Eastern bloc, and assurance that Russia will get help to carry on the needed reforms and be deemed to be a valuable partner for international cooperation. Furthermore, Boris Yeltsin was assured in 1997 that adoption of Poland and Baltic states into NATO structure is not a hostile move against Russia. Nonetheless, two years later, the brutal intervention of the Alliance in Serbia proved that NATO ignores Russia’s opinion, even if it comes to culturally close countries and almost adjacent. Do you consider it was mainly due to Samuel Huntington’s theory that the countries of the Orthodox are a separate civilization, and relations with alien civilizations should be driven by a conflict, not a dialogue?

Sakwa: There are two things here. As for NATO, do not forget that the idea of NATO expanding wasn’t even on the agenda at that stage. The promise was about East Germany, so it could not have been the enlargement question at that time. But it was a moral commitment. Absolutely, NATO enlargement is creating the crisis and the problems for which you need NATO enlargement. So in other words, it becomes circular argument. And in fact, NATO needs to exist to deal with the problems created by its own existence. As for the Samuel Huntington argument, I do not think it is very serious one. It is not an explanatory argument.

A lot of people tend to say that it was a civilizational conflict between Russia and NATO. It is not civilizational. It is a very classic, old fashioned, structural international relations problem. It is that an expanding alliance which will not include another next to it, creates a security dilemma. So it is not civilizational, it is not even cultural - even though that the debate is often caught in those terms.

Kasonta: Going back to Brzezinski’s “The Grand Chessboard” book saying among other things that rule over the world has to be directed from a single center (which is Washington, D.C.), and that Europe has to unite only to the extent that it does not threaten US hegemony, the author of Polish origin recognized Ukraine as the key to gain control over Eurasia, and therefore the world, and proclaimed that Ukraine has to join NATO despite its declaration of “perpetual neutrality.” Therefore, how damaging in your opinion was his thesis for our region, and would you agree that he made a huge disservice to the country of his origin? If so, why he did it?

Sakwa: Well, certainly. Do not forget that this argument in “The Grand Chessboard” was already outlined in his famous article in the journal Foreign Affairs in 1994 (almost word for word), which is then repeated in the book 3-4 years later. What Brzezinski done is that on the one side you could say it is perfectly reasonable to defend Ukrainian sovereignty and an independence, but the way it was done created a conflict potential. That is the tragedy. So when you say he is done a disservice, I would say it is absolutely catastrophic. As we see, 10000 dead in Donbas and counting, and the new Cold War. So it is more than a disservice to his country, it is a disservice to the World. He brought us to the edge of Armageddon again. So it is catastrophic lack of vision, a lack of understanding that the whole point about the end of the Cold War was to put in end this sort of language. Instead of which, they have got a deep cultural vision of Russia as a permanently revoltious power, and instead of which they have almost created this revoluties power because of what they have been warning against it. If you endlessly hedging about somebody, refusing them in, then obviously … or let us put it in a different way: If you keep having pocking the Russian bear with a sharp stick in the eye, in the end he is going to react. He will get annoyed. So it is a massive disservice. And indeed, this Polish vision of the world is catastrophic. It is so catastrophic that I would personally go so far to say, that there should be no question of Poland joining the European Union until it has been socialised into European Union as a peace project. Instead of which, Poland integration into the European Union has only brought in its own historical grievances, which is even genuine in my own family, and my father is now buried next to the Katyn monument (no one denies that), but the whole point is to overcome it, and to establish a dynamic of peace. People like Brzezinski, in the United States of course, have perpetuated that dynamic of conflict, and the result that we can see today. It is time for the Poles to come to terms with their own history, and to overcome the logic of conflict. They should become a more mature and positive force for peace instead of constantly dragging us back to the 19th century conflicts and grievances, which of course (we agree) are genuine. And by the way, can I just say that there was the Brzezinski doctrine, which perpetuated what we can call the Sikorski doctrine. So it is not just Brzezisnki. It has been incorporated by whole Polish elite, and unfortunately the liberally possibly as bad as the conservatively now dominant. Or even worse, indeed.

Kasonta: It is worthwhile noticing that Dugin, a fervent opponent to Zbigniew Brzezinski’s vision for Ukraine, warned in “Foundations of geopolitics” that any move from America to detach the country from Russia would mean a casus belli. However, it was ignored in the West. Why is that?

Sakwa: The thing is that I think Dugin is a very dangerous, crazy person. Some of his arguments may have a certain rationality to them, but because of the way in which they are encouched I do not think they are positive. And they are not positive, because they are again deeply divisive. So Dugin is the counterpart of your Brzezinski, and even both of them are deeply embedded in geopolitics. My view is that we need to get beyond that, to transcend it, and to build a Europe which is united and whole. Dugin hates that idea. Brzezinski hates that idea, including Russia. So I think that both are dangerous. What Dugin says wounds of course. The usual argument against this would be to say that these arguments deny Ukraine agency, they just making a plaything of great power politics. That is not what we are saying. We are simply saying is that precisely Ukraine should have its choice, its vision of its own future. But these visions, and visions of freedom if you like, never take place in a vacuum. They have to take into account its physical, its economic ties, its social makeup. The fact that people in Donbas and Crimea (I have been there many times) did not want this vision of monist Ukrainian nationalism and its ferocious pro-Europeanism, which is an ideology. Of course, you know, what European Union can offer is large market, rule of law, and so on. We all want that, but you do not get there by simply shouting it loudly in the Maidan.

Kasonta: Many people tend to forget, or do not want to acknowledge, that not only radicals like Dugin disagreed with Brzezinski, as it is crucial to mention Andrew Wilson’s book titled “Ukrainians, Unexpected Nation” or Anatol Lieven’s one titled “Ukraine and Russia”, where Lieven opposed Brzezinski’s plans and considered such ideas as dangerous and even vile. What is the reason for this mendacious coverage, which I know firsthand after publishing my report on the matter last year, and being ferociously attacked both at the UK and European Union level?

Sakwa: Absolutely. This is a sign of the closure of public debate, the limitations of dialogue in Europe, in politics today. You are absolutely right, both Andrew Willson and Anatol Lieuven are excellent scholars, who fully understood the dangers of this sort of way of thinking. And with consequences, which we understand. As for mendacious coverage. Well, it is difficult to know why this happens, but impartially the reason is the failure really to transcend the institutions and ideology of the Cold War, which was institutionalized. Yes, it was reduced greatly, but it was never totally overcome. And it is like is now come back to life in full-fledged. In other words, liberalism has become more and more monist, even though liberalism is by definition a pluralistic ideology. A liberalism which can not envisage an alternative to itself becomes monist, and becomes the antithesis of its very essential, very own ideas. And that is, I am afraid, where we find ourselves today.

Kasonta: Regarding my own country, it is even more embarrassing and saddening that many academics and intellectuals became obsessed with overcoming Yalta Conference agreements, and using the EU and NATO membership to amplify historical grievances in order to force Russia to follow Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s reforms, as I do not agree at all that Russia should become a state devoid entirely of its imperial characteristics. Would you agree with me on that?

Sakwa: I think that Atatürk in large is very good, because he built the modern Turkish state on the repudiation of both cultural and Ottoman elements. And the idea that Russia should repudiate itself of its own history is absolutely crazy. Even though I do agree with it, it depends how you define “imperial” in this context. I go along with Solzenitsyn, that Russia should focus on its own development. But it also includes the sense of its power and status in the world, and it cannot repudiate this. So it ca not do as you say Turkey, which just turned inwards for 50 years. It is impossible. A nuclear power country of that size? So when you say devoid of imperial characteristics, this “imperialism” (if you could use this word) should be a benign hegemony for positive positive rules. So in that sense I would not use a word “imperial,” I would say “great power characteristics.”

Kasonta: The 22nd United States Secretary of Defense from 2006 to 2011, Robert Gates, admitted in his memoirs that “America did not treated Russia’s interests seriously, and the inclusion of the Baltic states, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary should have been the last attempt to enlarge NATO structure, as adding Georgia and Ukraine was reaching out too far.” On that note, it is astonishing that according to Poland’s President, Andrzej Duda, there is a need to give a “clear signal that the door to NATO remains open,” and in his opinion presence in the July summit of countries already cooperating with NATO (Sweden, Finland, Australia, Jordan, Georgia, as well as Moldova and Ukraine) should therefore be considered. What is your take on that?

Sakwa: My take is very simple. I have read Robert Gates’ memoirs, and I think they are very good. He is the most intelligent, perceptive people in all of this, so I agree with what he says. And secondly, as for Duda and others. Basically we have got a policy, which has provoked the gravest conflict in Europe since the end of the Cold War, if not since the end of the WWII. A policy which is clearly had negative consequences, so all you should do then is to intensify that same policy, and assume that a different outcome will emerge. In other words, the definition of madness is doing the same thing over and over again, and expecting different outcomes. And in this case, this is a classic example of madness.

Kasonta: Should Russia feel threatened by NATO’s never-ending expansionism, and take Ivan Ilyin’s book title “Resistance to evil by force” to its heart?

Sakwa: I think it is very interesting reference to Ivan Ilian, who has been quoted by Putin, as you know, several times. Absolutely. We should be careful then. On one side NATO is quite right to say that it is not an aggressive alliance, and I agree with that. It is not an aggressive alliance until recently, but by definition if Russia is not a member or engaged in a deep way, inevitably you can have the security dilemma. This is called “Security Studies 1-on-1.” And the fact that they ca not see this in Washington D.C., or London, or indeed Berlin nowadays is absolutely shocking. So you do actually have the generation of a politics of resistance – including Ilyn, including all sorts of conservatives, and other mystical thinkers and crazies like Dugin. So indeed, its never expending expansion. I would not be opposed to expansionism if there had been a mode of reconciliation with Russia within that expansionist dynamic to create a Greater Russia, and Greater NATO. The failure to do this is the problem, not NATO as such. So those who defend NATO are quite right in some ways, but it is a logic devoid of context. But when you add the context, you must say: “Yes, NATO just enlarging.” Even the liberals, and the Valdai, and others in Russia are concerned by it. So it is almost a massive national consensus, just as a massive national consensus that Russia needs to be confronted. So we are heading for a massive confrontation. This is why I say we are grouping our way towards the apocalypse.

Kasonta: Do you think the possible regime change in Russia (bearing in mind 2018 Presidential elections) could end up with a worse bargain than Putin - considering much more radical forces waiting in Russia to come to power, which are perceiving the current president as being too soft on the West?

Sakwa: I 100% agree with that, that almost certainly any alternative to Putin will be far harder-line, and much more dangerous to the West. Putin is criticized mainly now for being too soft, and still committed to a greater European project, still committed to a greater Western project. So absolutely, all opinion polls, everything shows that the alternative would be far worse than Putin. I have just come back from Moscow and am honestly scared by what I have heard. I was on TV quite a lot in a debates and so on. There are absolutely crazies out there.

Kasonta: Is it possible for the West to finally come to its senses and make an honest effort to accommodate Russia in the global peace order on the partnership basis, or we are doomed to what former Minister of Foreign Affairs in Poland and the most famous neoconservative in this part of the world, Rados?aw Sikorski, expressed during being caught on tapes, which broke his parliamentary career: “The Polish-American alliance is not worth anything. It is even damaging, because it creates a false sense of security in Poland… We’ll get in conflict with the Germans, Russians and we will think that everything is super because we gave the Americans a blow job”?

Sakwa: I think it is very vulgar, and it shows the vulgarity and a primitive nature of his thinking. He is a very primitive individual of course. Is it possible for the West to come to its senses? It is certainly possible. Is it likely? I am not sure. In fact, at the moment it is going the opposite way. People like Sikorski and his associates of course are closing down debate, closing down dialogue, closing down the space for debate and discussion. I think that the last 25 years shows us that there is no possibility of establishing a global peace order. But I have to say that there is unlikely to be a regime change in Russia for the next 3 years, so I think that Russia’s strategy is to try let the West get on with it. I do not think the West is in a mood to accommodate Russia’s concerns and interest at the moment and therefore, Russia is not in a mood to make compromises either. So we see the intensification of conflict, the aggravation of a military confrontation of a Cold War sort without the structures, which would devise the end of the Cold War – of hotlines, a debate and so on. On the other side, we know that Kerry and Lavrov have been meeting quite a lot. Three meetings in the last 3 years, endless telephone calls. So a lot depends on the next American leader. We know that one of the reasons that Donald Trump is so detested by the establishment is because he understands and criticizes the existence of NATO. Trump said that one of the first things that he would do is to start talking with Putin. I think he is absolutely right. If Clinton wins the elections, she would be probably more dangerous in some ways. Though once in power, you never quite know how these leaders will change. So I think the world is in very dangerous confrontation at the moment. It is unlikely the West would come to its senses, but it is possible it will understand the dangers of its irrationality, and may try to calm things down, and to maintain the status quo - which is dangerous. And then wave of new generation of leaders to come will try to transcend this logic of conflict. But I am not holding my breath.

Biographical note:

Richard Sakwa is an Associate Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, Honorary Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies (CREES) at the University of Birmingham, member of the Eurasian Political Studies Network, and a member of Academy of Learned Societies for the Social Sciences. He is professor of Russian and European politics; head of the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent. Sakwa is the author of several books, including: “Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands,” “The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession,” “Putin: Russia’s Choice,” “Russian Politics and Society” among others.