Best Negotiation Movie of 2015 – and What You Should Learn from It

The movie award season is upon us once again. As a committee of one, I am pleased to announce that Bridge of Spies wins the Best Negotiation Movie of 2015. 

Lincoln and A Hijacking, won the honor in 2012 and 2013, respectively. No  film qualified in 2014, but this past year Bridge was way over the bar.  (It’s also up for a Best Picture Oscar.) 

Steven Spielberg’s film is based on a negotiation to swap a captured Soviet spy for two Americans prisoners held being the Iron Curtain in the early 1960s. (SPOILER ALERT: they make the deal.) The movie compresses the time line and embellishes some facts, but the negotiation issues it depicts are real—and they apply to everyday situations. 

The upside of having someone negotiate on your behalf. Tom Hanks portrays Jim Donovan, a New York insurance lawyer who did, indeed, engineer the release of the Americans. He was neither an amateur nor a freelancer, however. As a naval officer during the World War II, he had worked with the Office of Strategic Services (the predecessor of today’s CIA). Afterwards he was an Associate Prosecutor in the Nuremberg War Crimes trials. 

Most significant for the real negotiation story, Donovan transacted the prisoner exchange with behind-the scenes-involvement of President John F. Kennedy. 

But why did Kennedy use a civilian—even an accomplished one like Donovan—instead of a State Department diplomat? Simple: deniability. 

East-West tensions were extremely high at the time. The Berlin Wall had been erected only six months earlier. The botched Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba had taken place only a few months before that. Early in his presidency, Kennedy couldn’t afford another public failure if the trade somehow didn't work out. 

The downside of using an independent negotiator. Donovan’s assignment was to secure the release of Francis Gary Powers, a U.S. Air Force pilot captured in 1960 after Russians shot down his U-2 spy plane. To get him back, American authorities were willing to hand over the Soviet spy Rudolf Abel (one of several aliases) who had been convicted of espionage a few years earlier. 

Donovan had been Abel’s defense lawyer in that criminal trial. His client was convicted, but Donovan saved Abel from execution by arguing that as a prisoner, he could be a useful bargaining chip in the event that one day the Soviets arrested an American. That day came when Powers’ plane went down. 

The Abel-Powers negotiations took several months (not days, as the movie suggests). During that time Donovan learned that East German security had arrested a young Yale University student, Frederic Pryor, for alleged spying. 

Donovan was intent on freeing Pryor, as well. But that was not a White House priority. At the time of the release, Kennedy himself confided in a friend, “I wouldn’t have busted my ass to get him out of jail all by himself.” 

Donovan’s commitment to free Pryor—admirable as it now appears—was at odds with the President he was supposedly representing. His personal dedication to Pryor delayed Powers’ release, and potentially might have blown up the whole deal. 

The importance of letting other parties save face. The sticking point was that Pryor was being held by the East Germans. They insisted that his case had nothing to do with the Abel-for-Powers trade. To include their prisoner in the package—while getting nothing more in the package—would confirm that their government was mere a puppet of Russia. 

Donovan found himself pushed on all sides, including by his own American government which was focused on getting the much higher profile Powers out of Russian hands. But Donovan didn't budge. And at that delicate stage of the negotiation, the White House couldn't risk replacing him with a new emissary.

Donovan essentially pursued his own agenda, not Kennedy's. But he still had to navigate the tricky relationship between the Russians and the East Germans.

It took deft choreography to execute the  final deal. It was agreed that the Abel-Powers exchange would take place publicly the morning of February 10, 1962, on the Glienicke Bridge, connecting East and West Germany. It was deliberately done in broad daylight (not at mignight, as the movie has it). At the same time Pryor was supposed to be quietly released at Checkpoint Charlie, a crossing point near the Berlin Wall. 

The American and Soviet sides met on the bridge at 8:20 that morning. But the Americans would not let go of Abel until they got confirmation that Pryor was at Checkpoint Charlie. Twenty-five tense minutes passed. Nothing was seen of him. Then word came that Pryor was crossing over. Finally Abel and Powers changed places on the bridge. 

Ultimately this was a great success. But we can never know how close Donovan came in pushing for Pryor’s release to overplaying his hand. 

*******************************

Professor Michael Wheeler teaches at the Harvard Business School.

Version 1.3 of his Negotiation360 self-assessment/best-practices iOS app now includes coaching videos and a new tactics exercise.