Beneath the Surface: How China’s CS Fu Tai and Russia’s Moma Class Kildin Threaten Global Undersea Cable Security

Undersea cables are the lifelines of modern civilization. These extensive, often forgotten networks carry the weight of the global internet, transmitting over 95% of international data traffic. Financial markets, international communications, and military operations depend on their uninterrupted functioning. Yet, they are increasingly at risk due to state actors leveraging advanced maritime assets. Two vessels recently thrust into the spotlight—the Chinese cable-laying ship CS Fu Tai and the Russian intelligence ship Kildin—exemplify how geopolitical tensions are encroaching on the invisible infrastructure that powers the modern world.

Critical Role of Undersea Cables in Daily Life

Undersea cables are integral to daily life. Spanning the globe, these cables carry data at astonishing speeds, enabling international business transactions, real-time communication, and secure military coordination. Key networks, such as those connecting Europe and the Americas or linking Asia to global hubs, are especially critical. Despite their robust construction, with steel-reinforced sheathing and fiber-optic cores, they remain vulnerable to damage and manipulation, especially from sophisticated state actors.

CS Fu Tai: A Strategic Asset in the Spotlight

The CS Fu Tai is a modern cable-laying vessel operated by SB Submarine Systems (SBSS), a prominent player in undersea cable installation and maintenance. Originally built as an offshore construction ship, CS Fu Tai was converted in 2021 into a state-of-the-art cable installation vessel. With its ability to carry up to 3,000 tonnes of cable and deploy advanced trenching remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) capable of burying cables up to three meters deep, the CS Fu Tai is a powerful asset in both commercial and potentially strategic applications.

Recent operations by the CS Fu Tai near the Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines have raised alarm bells. Subic Bay is a vital hub for Philippine-U.S. military cooperation and a strategic site for undersea cables carrying data critical to Southeast Asia and beyond. While SBSS operates under the guise of commercial interests, the dual-use nature of cable-laying technology means that the CS Fu Tai could also be used for data interception, mapping critical infrastructure, or laying groundwork for future sabotage.

Subic Bay’s proximity to contested waters in the South China Sea adds another layer of complexity. As China asserts its claims over the region, the strategic control of communication infrastructure becomes a potential weapon in geopolitical disputes.

Kildin: A Russian Intelligence Threat in the Atlantic

The Russian intelligence vessel Kildin, part of the Moma-class, is a purpose-built surveillance asset. These ships are equipped with electronic eavesdropping capabilities, allowing them to intercept communications, monitor naval activities, and potentially tamper with undersea cables. In recent months, Kildin has been active in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, with its latest movements tracked near the Bay of Biscay.

The Bay of Biscay is a crucial region for undersea cables connecting Europe to the Americas. These cables handle vast volumes of data, from transatlantic banking transactions to NATO military communications. The presence of Kildin in this area has raised concerns among European and NATO officials, as it suggests potential surveillance or preparatory actions for disrupting these critical links.

Russian interest in undersea cables is not new. Intelligence reports have frequently noted the presence of Russian naval vessels near cable routes. This strategy aligns with broader efforts to project power and gain strategic leverage in an interconnected world.

Mapping the Threats to Undersea Cable Security

The activities of the CS Fu Tai and Kildin are not isolated incidents but part of a broader trend of state actors targeting undersea cables for strategic purposes. These vessels, though operating under different guises, share the potential to compromise global communication networks in several ways:

• Mapping and Interception: Ships like the CS Fu Tai and Kildin can deploy ROVs or submersibles to map cable routes and intercept data flowing through fiber-optic cores.
• Sabotage: Both vessels have the capability to damage or sever cables, either as a prelude to conflict or as part of a broader strategy to disrupt an adversary’s communications.
• Cyber and Hybrid Warfare: Beyond physical damage, undersea cables are vulnerable to cyber-attacks aimed at disrupting data flow or stealing sensitive information.
• Geopolitical Leverage: Control over undersea cables can provide states with significant leverage in regional disputes, as the ability to disrupt communication networks can alter the balance of power.

Regional and Global Implications

The operations of CS Fu Tai near Subic Bay and Kildin in the Bay of Biscay have far-reaching implications. They highlight the need for stronger international cooperation, advanced surveillance, and legal frameworks to protect undersea cables. Key issues include:

• Regional Stability: The presence of these vessels in contested or strategically important regions increases tensions and risks miscalculation or conflict.
• Economic Impact: A single cable disruption can cause billions of dollars in economic damage, particularly in regions with limited redundancy.
• Military Vulnerabilities: For NATO and allied nations, the security of undersea cables is critical for operational readiness and coordination. The activities of Kildin suggest a direct threat to these capabilities.

Safeguarding Global Communication Networks

Addressing the threats posed by vessels like the CS Fu Tai and Kildin requires a multi-faceted approach:

• Enhanced Monitoring: Nations must invest in satellite surveillance, maritime drones, and AI-powered analytics to track the movements of vessels near critical infrastructure.
• International Agreements: Multilateral frameworks, such as those under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), should be strengthened to deter malicious activities.
• Infrastructure Resilience: Developing redundant cable routes and enhancing physical and cybersecurity measures can reduce the impact of potential disruptions.
• Strategic Deterrence: Clear signaling that tampering with undersea cables will result in significant repercussions is essential to prevent escalation.

Conclusion

The CS Fu Tai and Kildin are harbingers of a new era in global geopolitics, where control over undersea infrastructure becomes a battlefield for influence and power. As the world becomes more interconnected, the security of undersea cables will play a pivotal role in ensuring economic stability, military readiness, and global cooperation.

Protecting these silent highways of information requires vigilance, innovation, and collaboration. The actions of China and Russia, exemplified by the CS Fu Tai and Kildin, remind us that the battle for dominance is not just fought in the skies and on land but also beneath the waves.