Belarus, between East and West.

Introduction.

Belarus is a landlocked Eastern European country bordering Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, and Russia. In addition to this disadvantageous geographical attribute, its weak economy and authoritarian regime—Belarus has also been named “Europe’s last dictatorship”—make it a “small state” in international relations. Small states are countries with limited size, means, and power capabilities. Consequently, their actions can be considered irrelevant in their global environment and system.[1] However, examples such as Belarus prove that small states still possess a margin for manoeuver in international politics. Despite its status, Belarus remains an essential actor in global geopolitics, especially in the current context of the war in Ukraine since 2022.

This paper analyzes Belarus’ foreign policy in 2022, a year that marked a significant shift in recent European history. The internationalization of the conflict in Ukraine (Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation"), which has now extended for over two years, reshaped geopolitics in Eastern Europe. It deepened global polarization dynamics between the East (mainly Russia and its allies such as China) and the West (primarily the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization), making Belarus' foreign policy in 2022 particularly relevant.

State of the historiographic debate.

This research contributes to the academic debate on Belarusian foreign politics. Historiography about this topic essentially focuses on Belarus’ relationship with Russia. Because of their historical ties (both countries were part of the Soviet Union), Russia and Belarus were always strong partners. Though their diplomatic relationships were tumultuous in the past decades, their economic ties were consistently strong. Both countries rely on each other to import and export natural resources and material goods. Economic interdependency is often the subject of articles about Belarusian relations with Russia. Oksana Valion’s 2021 publication argued that between 2014 and 2021, Belarus depended on Russia to import natural resources, especially oil and gas. Russia also used Belarus to import food commodities to bypass the EU’s sanctions.[2] A second perspective on studying Belarus’s foreign politics approaches its relationships with Western institutions, mainly the EU and NATO. Though the country is neither a member nor aims to become one, it has never hidden its aperture to normalize relationships with the West. The EU and Belarus have worked to create cooperation in recent decades, as Algirdas Miskinis et al.’s 2012 article argues.[3] Nevertheless, West-Belarus relations are hindered by Western-imposed economic sanctions answering proven human rights violations by the Belarusian authoritarian government. Sanctions reduce cooperation and foster polarization.[4] Finally, a third perspective completes the debate on Belarusian foreign affairs by addressing Belarus’ balance policy. As Alex Nice explained in his 2012 article “Playing Both Sides: Belarus Between Russia and the EU,” Belarus exploits the competition between the EU and Russia to extract subsidiaries in the interest of its government.[5]

Although highly garnished, the academic debate on Belarus fails to recall its balanced behavior over the last few years. The enormity of the Ukrainian war and all its regional/global consequences have indeed relegated the study of Belarus to the second row, especially in Western academia, which tends to focus on bigger dynamics. Within this historiographical context, this paper opens the way to orienting research toward an often-forgotten aspect of Belarus's foreign policy, its balanced policy in 2022, and how it evolved.

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Research Question, argument, and structure.

This research seeks to answer the central question: how did Belarus’ strategies for manoeuver, as manifested in its economic, diplomatic, and military relations with Russia and the West, evolve in 2022? This paper argues that Belarus’ balanced foreign policy suffered from a general bandwagoning to Russia. This materialized in the increasing economic dependency on Russian resources and Lukashenko’s open support and actual collaboration in the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Nevertheless, Lukashenko’s bandwagoning policy furthers the interdependency with Russia, which meets Belarusian interests. This paper does not consider Belarus as Russia’s puppet but as an influential actor in Russia’s inner existence. Indeed, Minsk is aware of its strategic location, which allows it to prevent the expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe. Belarus’ behavior can also be attributed to the status of a smart state because it plays on two fields. First, the paper presents Belarus's bandwagoning strategy towards Russia, primarily focusing on economic exchanges, interdependency, and its support for the Ukrainian invasion. Second, the research will analyze the extent to which Belarus behaves as a smart state by endorsing the role of a buffer state between the West and Russia; this second part will prove that Belarus is more than a puppet for Russia, and it knows it.

Methodology.

A thorough analysis of primary sources supports the arguments presented above. These sources constitute a direct testimony of a specific event, making them relevant to the study of a past period. This paper draws on politician speeches and interviews, newspaper articles, official website contents, and governmental (and non-governmental) reports. These primary sources create a solid knowledge base to structure our claims. However, it must be highlighted that their reliability can be contested since Belarus is an authoritarian state that controls most media and research institutions. Although this paper is based on their analysis, the reliability of primary sources remains questionable.

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Belarus’ bandwagoning strategy towards Russia.

In 2022, Belarus maintained its bandwagoning strategy towards the Russian Federation. Bandwagoning is a political behavior in which a small state creates (or entertains) ties with a bigger power to obtain further influence and power in a given context.[6] Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Minsk has always bandwagoned Moscow because Russia is, at every point, more powerful than Belarus. This bandwagoning strategy granted the Belarusian government stability—Lukashenko has been in power since 1994—and economic and military resources that the country needed.

Belarus’s bandwagoning strategy towards Russia appeared more relevant in the economic sphere. In recent decades, Minsk has bandwagoned Moscow’s economy to the extent that it became dependent on it. This statement derives from the analysis of empirical data made available by the National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus. Although controlled by the government, this organism provides numerical information on the Belarusian economy. The Committee's reports, entitled ‘Belarus in Figures,’ propose detailed data sets, tables, and curves that allow the analysis of economic dynamics in a given period. The last accessible report was published in 2021 and concerns 2020 and its previous years. Other relevant datasets about 2023-2024 were recently published, proving that the Belarusian government voluntarily avoided publishing about 2022. Although this 2021-published report exits the paper’s time frame, it is still helpful in understanding the dependence of Belarus on Russia. In 2020, Belarusian imports of goods totaled USD 32,618.8 million, from which USD 16,387.2 million came from the Russian Federation.[7] Russian goods accounted for 50% of Belarusian imports in 2020 – data is unavailable for 2022. Several factors explain this proportion. First, Belarus suffered from significant economic sanctions from Western institutions like the EU, which responded to the national political crisis following the 2020 presidential elections and its alignment with Russia in Ukraine in 2022.[8] These coercive economic policies reduced the exchanges of goods and services between the West and Belarus. Belarus’ foreign trade volume with non-CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries decreased from USD 31,944 million in 2021 to USD 26,905 million in 2022.[9] Second, the 2020 figures show that during times of crisis (COVID-19), Belarus shifted its economy towards its Russian neighbor rather than trying to ease tensions with the West. In 2022, economic sanctions from the West definitively oriented the Belarusian economy towards the East, reducing its sovereignty because it created dependency.[10] Russia provided Belarus with affordable natural resources, such as gas and oil, and financial loans to cover Belarus’ debts. Although Belarus partly renounced its sovereignty, the country was interested in developing an economic alliance with Russia because it benefited from Russia's economic power and stability.[11]

Minsk’s bandwagoning strategy towards Moscow also appeared in its diplomatic choices. When Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation" resumed the Ukrainian War, Belarus sided with Russia. Aleksander Lukashenko’s discourse about Belarus’ position in the conflict was clear: Belarus and Russia are in the same camp. However, in an interview with the Associated Press on May 7, 2022, he explained that Belarus did not “intend to take part in Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine because there (was) no need at all.”[12] Throughout the interview, he made clear that Russia has the military capabilities to reach its objectives without the assistance of Belarus. Nevertheless, some Russian troops departed from Belarus to attack Ukraine at its northern border, and joint military exercises were organized before the conflict. Moreover, Lukashenko argued that Western policies were responsible for the conflict. By developing close diplomatic and military relationships with Eastern European countries, including Poland and the Baltics, NATO (and the United States) began expanding its regional influence. As Lukashenko explained, NATO’s expansion directly threatened Russia and Belarus, which, among other reasons, contributed to the Ukrainian conflict. Also, when being asked about proven violations of human rights and committed atrocities by Russian soldiers on Ukrainian civilians, Aleksander Lukashenko formally denied and attacked media coverage of the conflict. He argued that Western media remained enclosed in their Western points of view and dismissed Russian and Belarussian perspectives on the events. Lukashenko’s words positioned Belarus as a close friend of Russia, thus defending Moscow in the conflict. In return, Belarus benefited from Russia’s military power against external threats. Belarusian media Belta asked about his February 24th phone call with Putin; Lukashenko cited the former, who said, “I promise you and swear to you that any attack on Belarus will mean an attack on Russia.”[13]

Bandwagoning to Russia was thus Belarus's primary strategy in international politics in 2022. Despite creating a dependency on Moscow, Minsk consolidated its economy and could better face Western sanctions. This policy also developed better links with Russia. Furthermore, 2022 marked a turning point in Belarus-Russia diplomatic relationships because they both stood on the same point regarding Ukraine. While Russia attacked Ukraine, Belarus stuck to its bandwagoning maneuvers and assisted Russia in deploying troops and defending Russia’s position and interests. In doing so, Belarus gained derivative power in the region.

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Belarus smart state strategy.

Even though Belarusian foreign policy stuck to Russia in 2022, it should be highlighted that they undertook measures characterizing smart state behavior. The smart state strategy refers to a political behavior widely undertaken by a small state. It consists of adequately investing a small state’s means according to particular goals. The main objective of this strategy is to maximize the small state’s influence via pragmatic and reasonable investments.[14]

Belarus’s smart state strategy expressed itself through the ambiguity of its relationships with the West. Despite being an ally of Russia, Belarus wanted to maintain some degree of engagement with the West. It did so by distancing itself from the invasion of Ukraine and neglecting its direct participation. But also, Belarus, through its diplomatic discourse, made clear that it aimed to end the war and presented itself as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia. [15] This strategic choice was concretized by hosting the first peace talks between Russian and Ukrainian authorities in late February and early March 2022.[16] This orientation was not new, nevertheless. During the conflict in Donbas already, Minsk received delegations from different parties and European Union countries, leading to the Minsk Agreements signed in February 2015. Moreover, in his intervention at the 77th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 24th, Belarusian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Makei made clear that “Belarus stands ready to embrace dialogue and cooperation.”[17] This declaration goes along with Western organizations' projects with Belarus in 2022. For example, the European Union unblocked 25 million euros to support the Belarusian population in 2022.[18] Help targeted the economic situation and education of Belarusians.[19] If Lukashenko’s government, as authoritarian and anti-Westerner as it could be, refused these actions, such an amount of financial help to its society would not have even existed. These declarations and actions illustrated Belarus’s traditional balanced political strategy. ??????

Due to its geographical location and connections with the West and the Russian Federation, Minsk has an ambiguous yet strategic position in international politics. Lukashenko knows Belarus is vital to its neighbor's survival because it is situated “right between NATO and Russia.”[20] As of this, Belarus plays on both fields by entertaining relations with Russia and the West. This happened in 2022. After years of economic sanctions, Belarus oriented its economy eastwards. However, some links were maintained with Western institutions, as seen previously. This grants Belarus a key role in international politics. Belarus is a buffer state between Russia and NATO, representing big stakes for Moscow. Belarus’s presence allows Russia and NATO to not directly face each other, which would surely lead to further conflict. For NATO and the West, maintaining relations with Belarus is essential to stabilize the region and contain Russia’s aggressiveness towards NATO. Both Russia and NATO need Belarus, and the latter knows it. In 2022, Belarus succeeded in gaining power from both the West and Russia.

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Conclusion.

Two political behaviors characterized Belarus’ foreign policy in 2022. First, this essay has highlighted the extent to which Belarus acted as a bandwagoner of Russia. Indeed, Minsk solidified its ties with Moscow by orienting its economy eastwards. This resulted from economic sanctions that partially reduced Belarusian foreign trade with Western countries. Furthermore, Belarus supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It allowed the Kremlin’s soldiers to enter Ukraine from its territory while providing military resources to station them and their equipment. This added to the joint exercises organized a year before, which were undoubtedly prepared for the upcoming campaign. Also, Aleksander Lukashenko supported and defended Vladimir Putin in the international community by presenting a different perspective on the conflict and Belarus’s friendly behavior with Russia. However, 2022 witnessed Belarus’s balanced policy in the global sphere, which can be assimilated with smart state behavior. In 2022, Belarus succeeded in gaining power from both the West and Russia via concrete or subtle policies. Belarus was more than a puppet state to Russia. Moscow needed (and still does) Minsk to limit the expansion of NATO; NATO needed Minsk to contain Russia in Eastern Europe. This smart state strategy resulted from Minsk’s willingness to remain sovereign from Russia while maintaining ties.

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Bibliography.

Literary Sources.

Dermendzhiev, D., Malyarenko, A., “Biélorussia: crise postélectoral et avenir des relations avec la Russie et l’Union Européenne,” Diplomatie, N°110 (2021), pp. 31-35.

Fox, A.C., “Strategic Relationships, Risk, and Proxy War,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 14, N°2 (2021), pp. 1-24.

Kotljarchuk, A., Zakharov, N., “Belarus’ relations with Ukraine and the 2022 Russian invasion: Historial ties, society, and realpolitik,” Baltic World, Vol. 15, N°1-2, pp. 32-37.

Long, T., “Small States, Great Power? Gaining Influence Through Intrinsic, Derivative, and Collective Power”, International Studies Review, Vol. 19 (2017), pp. 185-205.

Maas M., “Chapter 2: Small States: surviving, perishing and Proliferating through History” in Godfrey Baldacchino and Anders Wivel (eds.) Handbook on the Politics of Small States (Handbook PSS, 2020), pp. 20-37.?

Marples, D.R., “Belarus’ Susceptibility to Russian Intervention,” American Enterprise Institute (September 2017), seven pages.

Marples, D.R., “Europe’s Last Dictatorship: The Roots and Perspectives of Authoritarianism in ‘White Russia,’” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, N°6 (2005), pp. 895-908

Martin, A., “Under Pressure: Can Belarus resist Russian coercion?” European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) (2020), nine pages.

Miskinis, A., Dultsau, I., “Economic Impacts of EU-Belarusian Trade,” Ekonomika, Vol. 91, Issue 2 (2012), pp. 49-65.

Nice, A., “Playing Both Sides: Belarus Between Russia and the EU,” Deutschen Gesellschaft für Ausw?rtige Politik (DGAP analyse), N°2, (2012), 19 pages.

Nizhnikau, R., “Jugar a ser enemigos – Playin the enemies,” Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internationals, N°125, Sanciones Internacionales: sus otros efectos (September 2020), pp. 113-138.

Polglase-Korostelev, G., “The Union State: A Changing Relationship Between Belarus and Russia,” Journal of the Belarusian State University. International Relations, Vol. 2 (2020), pp. 38-46.

Valion, O., “Belarus’ Economic Relations with Ukraine and Russia. Trends, Dynamics, Challenges (2014-2021)” Codrul Cosminului, Vol. 27, N°2, pp. 355-378.

Surwillo, I., “Belarus post-election crisis. The Impact of EU Sanctions on Belarus will be Limited”, Danish Institute for International Studies (2021), four pages.

Wivel, A., “From small state to smart state: Devising a strategy for influence in the European Union” in Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel, Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities (Farnham, 2010), pp. 15-29.

Wilson, A., Belarus, The Last Dictatorship in Europe (Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2011).

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Zinets, N., Williams, M., Williams, A.,(Eds.), “Ukraine and Russia agree to talks without preconditions, Zelensky says” Reuters, March 13th, 2022, Accessible via: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-russia-agree-talks-without-preconditions-zelenskiy-says-2022-02-27/

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Primary Sources.

Associated Press, “The AP Interview: Alexander Lukashenko full hour-long interview, part 1,” May 7, 2022., 27 min, 22sec., Accessible via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ShhqIrmd9EM

Belta, “Lukashenko: Situation on Belarus western, southern border changed dramatically” (February 24, 2022) https://eng.belta.by/printv/president/view/lukashenko-situation-on-belarus-western-southern-border-changed-dramatically-148077-2022/

EaP (Eastern Partnership), “The European Union and Belarus” (no precise date), 1 page.?

Embassy of the Republic of Belarus in Hungary, “Speech by the President of Belarus on May 9, 2022”, Accessible via: https://hungary.mfa.gov.by/en/embassy/amb/former/e616a99e750ced80.html?

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Nasha Niva, “Макей у л?сце да Е?ропы наракае на ?нешчасл?вую чараду падзей пасля 2020-га? ? закл?кае да дыялогу,” May 14th, 2022, Accessed on October 15th, 2024., Accessible via: https://nashaniva.com/288346

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[1] Maas M., “Chapter 2: Small States: surviving, perishing and Proliferating through History” in Godfrey Baldacchino and Anders Wivel (eds.) Handbook on the Politics of Small States (Handbook PSS, 2020), pp. 20-37.

[2] Oksana Valion, “Belarus’ Economic Relations with Ukraine and Russia. Trends, Dynamics, Challenges (2014-2021)” Codrul Cosminului, Vol. 27, N°2, pp. 355-378.

[3] Algirdas Miskinis, Ihar Dultsau, “Economic Impacts of EU-Belarusian Trade,” Ekonomika, Vol. 91, Issue 2 (2012), pp. 49-65.

[4] Izabela Surwillo, “Belarus post-election crisis. The Impact of EU Sanctions on Belarus will be Limited”, Danish Institute for International Studies (2021), four pages.

[5] Alex Nice, “Playing Both Sides: Belarus Between Russia and the EU,” Deutschen Gesellschaft für Ausw?rtige Politik (DGAP analyse), N°2, (2012), 19 pages.

[6] Long, T., “Small States, Great Power? Gaining Influence Through Intrinsic, Derivative, and Collective Power”, International Studies Review, Vol. 19 (2017), pp. 185-205.

?[7] National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus, “Main indicators of Foreign Trade” (2024). Accessible via: https://www.belstat.gov.by/en/ofitsialnaya-statistika/real-sector-of-the-economy/foreign-trade/foreign-trade-in-goods/annual-data/

[8] Dimitar Dermendzhiev, Alexander Malyarenko, “Biélorussia: crise postélectoral et avenir des relations avec la Russie et l’Union Européenne,” Diplomatie, N°110 (2021), pp. 31-35.

[9] National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus, “Belarus in Figures. Statistical Reference Book” (Minsk, 2021), 73 pages.

[10] RAND, “Cooperation and Dependence in Belarus-Russia Relations” (2024), 242 pages.

[11] Surwillo, “Belarus post-election crisis. The Impact of EU Sanctions on Belarus will be Limited.”

[12] Associated Press, “The AP Interview: Alexander Lukashenko full hour-long interview, part 1,” May 7, 2022., 27 min, 22sec., Accessible via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ShhqIrmd9EM

[13] Belta, “Lukashenko: Situation on Belarus western, southern border changed dramatically” (February 24, 2022) https://eng.belta.by/printv/president/view/lukashenko-situation-on-belarus-western-southern-border-changed-dramatically-148077-2022/

[14] Anders Wivel, “From small state to smart state: Devising a strategy for influence in the European Union” in Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel, Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities (Farnham, 2010), pp. 15-29.

?[15] Andrej Kotljarchuk, Nikolay Zakharov, “Belarus’ relations with Ukraine and the 2022 Russian invasion: Historial ties, society, and realpolitik,” Baltic World, Vol. 15, N°1-2, pp. 32-37.

[16] Natalia Zinets, Matthias Williams, Alison Williams (Eds.), “Ukraine and Russia agree to talks without preconditions, Zelensky says” Reuters, March 13th, 2022, Accessible via: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-russia-agree-talks-without-preconditions-zelenskiy-says-2022-02-27/

[17] United Nations, “Belarus – Minister for Foreign Affairs Addresses United Nations General Debate (English),” September 24, 2022., 18min, 7sec., Accessible via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zb7RkOwkCzU

[18] European Commission, “Commission implementing decision of 5.12.2022 on the financing of the special measure in favor of the people of Belarus for 2022” (Brussels, 5.12.2022), 4 pages.

[19] EaP (Eastern Partnership), “The European Union and Belarus” (no precise date), 1 page.?

[20] Embassy of the Republic of Belarus in Hungary, “Speech by the President of Belarus on May 9, 2022”, Accessible via https://hungary.mfa.gov.by/en/embassy/amb/former/e616a99e750ced80.html?

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