The Beirut Blast, our recent podcast and article and challenges received

Over the weekend we published both as a podcast and an article, the results of our research into companies associated with both the Beirut blast and sanctioned individuals operating in Syria and Russia.

Whilst generally extremely well received, we have had some criticism, not least by reference to the following article: https://www.moonofalabama.org/2021/01/guardian-smears-syrias-president-with-implausible-link-to-beiruts-port-blast.html#more

Now, I do not mind in the least, people challenging our assertions, especially when it is backed up by high quality research which tells a different story.

Sadly, in this case, it largely isn’t and I wanted to write an article explaining why.

First, if someone is going to post any sort of article and, as in this case, remain anonymous (it was post by “b”) then do not expect to be taken seriously. Everything we publish comes with our names attached and detailed explanations of the underlying research. We never hide behind anonymity.

Second, do not just take one element of the story, misunderstand it, and then use shoddy research to disprove it.

In this case, the “writer” has selected one element (the registered address in Russell Square) and performed a completely inadequate search that produces entirely spurious results and then used that as proof of their refutation.

Let me demonstrate.

The writer has taken this one connection (10 Great Russell Street, London WC1B 3BQ) and simply entered into the search box of Companies House. What he or she fails to understand is that the search will look for ANY element of the search term and NOT the entire term. Not surprisingly, the search elicits 140,895 matches.

This is then used to drive the entire refutation, per:

Now look what happens when I enter the Prime Minister's address using the same approach:

Apparently there are 481,053 companies registered to Downing Street. Except, of course, there aren’t.

A much better way to search is through OpenCorporates. Providing you have an enterprise account (which I have) you CAN search by registered address, although bear in mind it will only return those companies currently registered there, rather than those who were formally registered there and have since moved.

These results are somewhat different.

Using exactly the same search term as in the article we find the following:

Somewhat less than 140,895 but still quite a lot. However, that is not quite the story as the entities we highlighted all shared the fact that they were at Suite 351 at that address.

Searching by the full registered address yields the following

Far fewer again.

And this also ignores the fact that the three companies identified also shared their previous registered address, which they all changed on the same day (1 July 2008) as well as the address of their company register, which they all changed on the same day to the same new address.

Making the whole proposition identified by this article worthless.

The second point was that these three companies were not the only ones who moved on the same day and others had also followed suit.

And here I agree, they did. In fact, from inspecting the scan numbers on the paperwork filed at the time, it is clear that a number of companies did so.

But that misses the point of our research.

We were not alleging that Savaro Limited was owned and run by the same people as Hesco or Alfa. We were saying, quite rightly in my opinion, that all three companies were part of a network that was being operated on behalf of the owners in a way that suggested the network was separate from the companies themselves and was (probably knowingly) filing incorrect or possibly falsified information. For example:

·        Savaro filed dormant accounts throughout its existence even though it was demonstrably engaged in commercial activity

·        Hesco and Alfa provided PSC and director information which was inconsistent and often misspelt

·        Forms were signed on behalf of companies which were not in any way actng on behalf of the company it was supposedly representing

Four of the companies put forward as examples of others behaving in the same way were:

·        RAVENCROFT COMMERCE LIMITED

·        ABC MULTITRADE LIMITED

·        GELLA INVESTMENT LIMITED

·        EKOTRANS INVEST LIMITED

Let’s have a look at those in a bit more detail.

First of all, they also moved their register inspection address from their registered office to a new address in John Prince’s Street on the same day as the three in our article.

And all the forms were signed by Marina Psyllou, as in our article. So far, so good. What else can we discover?

Ravencroft Commerce Ltd.

Sure enough, the directors were Interstatus and Marina Psyllou. Marina Psyllou is also a director of Interstatus Limited alongside Status Grand of Cyprus, for whom Marina Psyllou is also a director. Status Grand is the sole declared shareholder of Ravencroft.

So, in effect, despite all those different companies, it all resolves (pretty much) to one person.

Despite at one point showing assets in excess of ￡200,000, Ravencroft has no independent existence on the internet. It applied for voluntary strike off in September 2012.

ABC Multitrade Ltd.

This company has exactly the same directors and shareholder as Ravencroft, and a very similar filing history. Despite at one point declaring assets of around ￡1.5m it applied for voluntary strike off in February 2013.

It also has no existence outside of corporate registers on the internet.

Gella Investment Limited

This company has exactly the same directors and shareholder as Ravencroft, and a very similar filing history. It too applied for voluntary strike off in August 2013 despite, at one point, declaring assets of more than ￡1.7m. Despite registering a branch in Cyprus it has no independent existence on the internet.

Ekotrans Invest Limited

This company had exactly the same directors and shareholder as Ravencroft, however at the commencement of the PSC regime, declared its PSC to be Vasyl Gavrylov, a Ukrainian living in Ukraine. The company is still active although it has a history of declaring losses.

It has no independent existence on the internet. I couldnot find any definitive presence for Mr Gavrylov (using variations of the spelling). In the form provided to Companies House I could find no confirmed existence for this gentleman on the internet outside of his appointment to the company.

So where does this leave us?

At the outset we wanted to show that a range of companies registered in the UK were potentially being used by sanctioned individuals and other dubious actors. We also wanted to show that there were consistencies in how these companies interacted with the company register that suggested that the day-to-day corporate requirements were being performed by the same person or group of people.

I think it is fair to say that we should be concerned if a significant number of entities are being run in this way as it suggests more than just coincidence.

I do not believe we were trying to suggest that the same underlying owners were responsible for both the blast in Beirut and dealing with ISIS but I do think it is fair to draw the conclusion that, at some level, there are connections between the two.

What is beyond doubt is that UK entities are being abused by actors who are happy to trade in dangerous chemicals whilst asserting that they own a dormant company, whilst others who have been sanctioned were (and possibly are still) actively owning and controlling UK companies.

Still others are incorporating companies in the UK but which have no independent existence outside the corporate registry whilst at the same time engaging in some sort of economic activity.

All of these should be a cause for concern.

And, finally, we completely welcome robust challenge to our findings.

But, if you want to avoid winding me up, please don’t challenge using anonymous articles and shoddy research.