Beijing’s Trojan Horses? How Some KMT Lawmakers Undermine Taiwan from Within
Relations between Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) and mainland China’s Communist Party of China (CPC) have remained active in informal channels even as official ties are frozen. From 2020 to 2025, multiple KMT legislators and officials maintained frequent contacts with PRC officials through visits, meetings, and collaborative events. DPP lawmakers have tallied at least 24 trips by prominent KMT figures to China since Taiwan’s Anti-Infiltration Act took effect in 2020.
These interactions have included direct meetings with senior CPC leaders, economic and cultural exchanges, and coordination on policy proposals. Such ties have sparked debate in Taiwan over national security, with critics arguing that some KMT members have “repeatedly visited China and even cooperated with Beijing on bills detrimental to Taiwan…becoming outright united-front collaborators and a direct threat to national security and democracy”
This article examines key individuals – Fu Kun-chi (傅崐萁), Chen Yu-jen (陳玉珍), and Hsu Chiao-hsin (徐巧芯) – and how their connections with the CPC influence Taiwan’s domestic politics. We explore direct meetings, financial or economic linkages, political cooperation, and informal interactions, and analyze how these ties shape legislative trends and potential alignments with Beijing’s interests.
Fu Kun-chi (傅崐萁)
Fu Kun-chi is a veteran KMT politician, former Hualien County magistrate and since 2020 a legislator, rising to KMT’s Legislative Yuan caucus chief. Known as the “King of Hualien,” he commands a powerful local faction. Analysts note that the CPC has cultivated relationships with such local faction leaders for years – “Beijing engaged figures like Fu long ago, and now that he’s KMT caucus leader, the CPC is eager to use him for united-front purposes”. Fu has been notably receptive to Beijing’s overtures, consistently advocating the “1992 Consensus” (the KMT’s one-China framework) as a basis for cross-strait dialogue.
In April 2024, Fu led a KMT delegation of legislators on a high-profile visit to China, where they received an unusually senior reception. During this three-day trip to Beijing, Fu’s group met Wang Huning (王滬寧) – Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and a top CPC strategist in charge of Taiwan affairs. This meeting was extraordinary (“超規格”), as Wang is ranked among China’s top leadership. According to Taiwan’s Economic Democracy Union, Wang Huning effectively gave Fu a united-front task during this visit. Fu had gone “vowing to bring Chinese tourists to Hualien by year-end”, but Beijing’s response made clear that rewards would be conditional. Wang and other officials pressed Fu to lobby Taipei to open a direct ferry route between Hualien (Taiwan) and Pingtan (Fujian) – a PRC-controlled route – as a precondition for China allowing tour groups from Fujian to visit Taiwan. In other words, Fu was presented with a quid pro quo: if he could help get Taiwan’s government to approve new cross-strait links favored by Beijing, then mainland tourists from Fujian (a limited subset, just one province) would be permitted to visit Hualien. This demand reflected Beijing’s “economic united front” tactics – using market access (tourists, trade) to induce Taiwan to yield on sovereignty-related issues.
Fu appeared willing to entertain Beijing’s ask. He publicly promoted the outcome as a success in “securing tourism benefits”, even though critics noted the one-sided nature of the deal (Taiwan would have to open links to all of China, while Beijing only opened one province’s tourists). At Beijing’s Great Hall, Fu also reiterated the KMT’s support for cross-strait peace and possibly the 1992 Consensus, aligning with CPC positions (though details of his statements were not fully disclosed). Notably, Taiwan’s opposition lawmakers and experts cautioned Fu not to become Beijing’s lobbyist. They warned that if Fu returned and pressured Taiwan’s ministries (like the Mainland Affairs Council or Ministry of Transportation) to approve the Pingtan-Hualien route per Wang Huning’s “instruction,” he could violate the Anti-Infiltration Act, which bars lobbying on national security matters on behalf of a hostile foreign power. In a press briefing, legal experts pointed out that Wang Huning, as China’s top united front official, squarely fits the law’s definition of a “source of infiltration,” and any lobbying by Fu under Wang’s behest (for example, to change cross-strait transport policy) “would constitute a criminal offense under Article 5 of the Anti-Infiltration Law”. Despite these warnings, Fu’s trip clearly showcased a direct channel of political cooperation between a serving Taiwanese legislator and the CPC leadership. Beijing leveraged Fu’s influence in the legislature to push its agenda, while Fu sought economic gains (tourists, trade for his constituency) by aligning with Beijing’s proposals.
As a long-time local power-broker, Fu has also reportedly courted Chinese investment and business opportunities in his region. In past years he promoted projects like inviting Taiwanese to invest in Nanning, China, and welcomed PRC trade delegations, though such activities waned during COVID-19. By 2023–2024, with pandemic restrictions lifted, Fu eagerly resumed cross-strait exchanges. His delegation in 2024 included talks on agricultural exports and tourism marketing to China. Fu even promised Hualien residents that he would bring back concrete economic benefits from Beijing – an indication that he sees mainland ties as key to local development. This raises questions about financial dependencies: for instance, reliance on PRC tourists or buyers of Hualien’s agricultural produce could give Beijing leverage. Indeed, pro-democracy activists described Fu as “a willing united-front agent, happy to echo Beijing’s line in exchange for economic favors”. The perception in Taiwan is that Fu Kun-chi’s cozy ties with CPC officials make him prone to push policies favored by Beijing, blurring the line between fostering cross-strait exchange and enabling Beijing’s influence in Taiwan’s politics.
Chen Yu-jen (陳玉珍)
Chen Yu-jen is a KMT legislator representing Kinmen, the small offshore island county of Taiwan extremely close to mainland China (Xiamen). Kinmen has unique cross-strait interests – it relies on trade, transport links, and even water supply from nearby Fujian Province. Chen, as Kinmen’s lawmaker since 2016, has become an outspoken advocate for deepening Kinmen’s exchanges with the mainland. Her stance is that facilitating travel, tourism, and business with China is crucial for Kinmen’s economy and peace. This has led her to cultivate direct contacts with Chinese officials and agencies more extensively than perhaps any other legislator in this period.
Chen Yu-jen has personally met high-level PRC officials, especially from the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). In late 2022, frustrated by pandemic-era restrictions on the “Mini Three Links” (small-scale ferry routes between Kinmen/Matsu and Fujian), Chen took the unusual step of flying to Xiamen to negotiate with the mainland side in person. On December 12, 2022, just after recovering from an illness, she traveled to Xiamen to confer with PRC officials about reopening Kinmen-Xiamen ferry routes and resuming trade (including Kinmen’s famed sorghum liquor exports). At Xiamen, Chen met representatives of Chinese authorities (reportedly receiving a special quarantine exemption for this trip) and urged that both sides “speak good words and communicate more” to restart links in time for the Lunar New Year. She framed it as an apolitical, people’s welfare issue, even as such negotiations normally fall under the Taiwan government’s purview. Chen’s proactive outreach signaled to Beijing that KMT local representatives were willing to bypass Taipei to get things done. She even told media she planned an official visit to Beijing after the legislative session, indicating ongoing dialogues.
Throughout 2023, as cross-strait travel gradually reopened, Chen Yu-jen frequently interacted with TAO officials. In January 2023, Song Tao (宋濤) assumed office as the new head of China’s TAO, and Chen promptly cultivated a relationship with him. On January 23, 2023, Song Tao attended a “Cross-Strait Spring Festival” meet-and-greet event with Taiwanese businesspeople and Kinmen residents in Xiamen – and Chen Yu-jen was “by his side the entire time” as an honored guest. Photos published by Chinese media showed Chen accompanying Song at this Lunar New Year celebration with Kinmen compatriots, symbolizing a united-front image of “one family” celebrating together. Such informal interactions (festive events, cultural exchanges) allowed Chen to build personal rapport with CPC officials.
Chen also led formal delegations to China. In August 2024, she accompanied Kinmen’s county council chairman and a group of local officials and tourism industry representatives on a visit to Beijing. On that trip, they directly met TAO Director Song Tao to push for specific cross-strait initiatives. Chen publicly stated that she would “face-to-face present several proposals to Song Tao”: chiefly, to allow mainland tour groups to visit Kinmen (lifting Beijing’s post-COVID ban on group travel to Taiwan), and additionally to open enrollment for PRC students in Kinmen’s schools, establish a Kinmen-Xiamen joint agricultural/fishery trade market, and permit Kinmen’s banks to set up branches in Xiamen. In the meeting on August 22, 2024, she indeed raised these ideas, essentially advocating deeper integration of Kinmen with the mainland’s economy and education system. Notably, she timed the request for mainland tourists to coincide with China’s “Golden Week” holiday, hoping for an influx of Chinese visitors by October 1 (PRC National Day) if agreements could be reached. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council cautiously welcomed any such tourism reopening, while emphasizing that Beijing also needs to lift its restrictions – a reminder that Chen was negotiating in a complex political context not entirely within her authority.
Chen Yu-jen’s endeavors illustrate a form of political cooperation with the CPC at the local/regional level. She has effectively acted as a liaison for Kinmen’s interests with Beijing. For example, during her January 2025 visit to Xiamen (again for a TAO-sponsored event), Chen claimed she personally secured a “positive answer” from Song Tao to expand the provinces permitted to send tourists to Kinmen. She has consistently echoed Beijing’s line that more cross-strait contact is “natural and necessary to reduce misunderstandings and promote peace”. Economically, Kinmen benefits from such exchanges – e.g. mainland tourists, trade in goods, and even basic supplies (since 2018, Kinmen pipes in water from Fujian). These constitute financial ties in a broad sense. Chen has lobbied Taipei to reciprocate Beijing’s openings: when China’s culture and tourism ministry announced it would let Fujian and Shanghai residents visit Taiwan in tours, she urged Taiwan’s government to “catch the ball” and lift its own pandemic-era ban on Chinese group tourists. In Kinmen, Chen is seen as a champion of local prosperity via China links, which undoubtedly wins her support from constituents (many Kinmen residents have family or business across the strait).
However, her closeness with the PRC has drawn domestic controversy. A prominent incident highlighting perceived divided loyalties came in early 2025: Chen played a key role in the opposition’s drastic cuts to the central government budget, including slashing funds for Taiwan’s public broadcaster and cultural projects she deemed wasteful. She had even admonished Taiwan’s arts community to “throw away that begging bowl” (stop asking the government for money). Yet immediately after the budget was finalized, Chen flew to Xiamen for another PRC-organized exchange, where she effectively begged Beijing for economic favors – urging Song Tao to send more mainland tourists to Kinmen. This juxtaposition was seized upon by the DPP. “She upended Taiwan’s rice bowl, only to ask for China’s rice,” scolded one lawmaker, likening Chen’s actions to “going to China to beg for food”. DPP officials accused her of undermining Taiwan’s interests – noting she helped cut national budgets (even defense funds) and then promptly “ran to Xiamen to celebrate Lunar New Year with Song Tao…every move of hers hurts the feelings of the Taiwanese people and the nation”. Another legislator questioned if Chen, after axing Taiwan’s resources, was “going to China to claim credit (邀功) for selling out Taiwan”, and even called for security agencies to investigate this “begging China” behavior as a potential national security concern.
Despite the criticism, Chen Yu-jen has remained unapologetic. She argues that caring for “Taiwanese businesspeople and compatriots in China is very normal”, and that more engagement with the mainland is ultimately beneficial for Taiwan. Indeed, she frames many of her China interactions as humanitarian or economic problem-solving: e.g. helping stranded Kinmen fishermen return home, coordinating the return of a deceased PRC fisherman’s remains, etc. In legislative debates, she has also pushed proposals aligned with Beijing’s “integration” strategy. For instance, in late 2024 Chen co-sponsored amendments to the Offshore Islands Development Act to create an “international medical and trade special zone” in Kinmen. Civil society groups warned this could turn Kinmen into a de facto “One Country, Two Systems” pilot zone – effectively opening the door for PRC law and capital to dominate the island under the guise of special economic privileges. Chen defended the idea as a way to boost Kinmen’s healthcare and economy, but the implication that Kinmen/Matsu could become experimental reunification zones clearly aligns with long-standing CPC proposals.
Chen’s rapport with mainland officials also manifests in softer, informal ways. She often accompanies visiting Chinese delegations in Kinmen and attends cultural events promoting cross-strait kinship. Her social media frequently emphasizes shared Kinmen-Fujian culture and she sometimes uses language signaling pan-Chinese identity. At times, Chen even speaks the rhetoric of Beijing’s “cross-strait family” narrative. During a press meet before one China trip, she stated the KMT’s policy is “pro-US, friendly to Japan, and harmonious with China (親美友日和陸)”, seeking friendship on all sides. This phrase “和陸” (amicable with the Mainland) dovetails with CPC messaging. All these interactions – formal negotiations, united-front festivities, policy coordination – make Chen Yu-jen perhaps the clearest example of a sitting Taiwanese lawmaker closely enmeshed with CPC officials from 2020 to 2025. Her actions have direct impacts on cross-strait policies and also symbolize the KMT’s twin role: an opposition party in Taiwan, and a quasi-dialogue partner to the CPC.
Hsu Chiao-hsin (徐巧芯)
Hsu Chiao-hsin is a younger KMT politician from Taipei. In the early 2020s she was a Taipei city councilor known for her sharp media presence, and in 2024 she became a KMT legislator. Hsu is part of the KMT’s new generation and a frequent spokesperson on political talk shows. While she may not have the same level of direct dealings with Beijing as Fu or Chen, Hsu is notable for how closely her rhetoric and positions often align with CPC narratives. She represents the ideological and propaganda front of KMT-CPC linkages – engaging with pro-China media and advocating policies favored by Beijing’s united front.
One of Hsu’s most striking connections is her willingness to be interviewed by PRC state-affiliated media targeting Taiwan, such as the China Review News Agency (中評社). On multiple occasions, Hsu gave exclusive interviews to China Review, echoing talking points that Beijing was keen to amplify. For example, right after Taiwan’s January 2024 elections (in which the DPP was defeated in legislative polls), Hsu spoke to China Review and asserted that “the DPP’s anti-China mindset has fully fermented” in the government. She criticized the outgoing DPP administration for “doing everything it can to ‘resist China to protect Taiwan’…using pro-independence ideology to strangle all policies, and labeling anyone who questions them as ‘CPC fellow travelers’”. Hsu listed new “anti-China” moves by the DPP, including extending a ban on Chinese tour groups, concealing details of a recent incident with a Kinmen fishing boat, and refusing to ease rules for PRC spouses’ ID cards. This narrative – that the DPP was irrationally antagonistic to China and provoking cross-strait tension – is exactly in line with CPC propaganda after the elections. By voicing it to Chinese media, Hsu was effectively communicating the KMT’s agreement with Beijing’s viewpoint to an audience in both mainland China and Taiwan. (Notably, China Review News, though Hong Kong–based, is widely seen as a CPC mouthpiece on Taiwan affairs.) The interview was published on March 2, 2024, complete with photos of Hsu taken by a China Review reporter in Taipei, underscoring that this was a deliberate media outreach on her part. In another case, in November 2024, Hsu commented on a controversy about a Mainland spouse set to become a legislator. When Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council insisted the individual must renounce her PRC citizenship (per law barring dual nationals from office), Hsu openly accused the MAC of harboring “Taiwan independence” notions. She told media (again via China Review) that under Taiwan’s legal framework, mainland China isn’t considered a foreign country, so “if you treat PRC nationals as foreigners, that’s basically ‘Taiwan independence’”. She argued that insisting a mainland-born citizen give up PRC nationality to serve in office was wrong – “if [the DPP] really think mainland is a foreign country, they might as well abolish the MAC and the Cross-Strait Act entirely”. Hsu’s stance here aligns perfectly with the KMT (and CPC) view that the ROC constitutionally includes the mainland, rejecting the idea of two separate countries. Her remarks were warmly received by unification-leaning media. Beijing’s outlets highlighted her quote that treating mainlanders as foreigners equates to pro-independence betrayal. This is a clear example of a KMT politician publicly pushing back against measures intended to firewall PRC influence – Hsu instead advocated equal treatment for PRC-related persons, a position favorable to Beijing’s united front (which seeks to bolster the political rights of pro-China voices in Taiwan).
Though Hsu Chiao-hsin did not hold national office until 2024, she swiftly became involved in KMT legislative maneuvers that dovetail with CPC preferences. For instance, in the 2024 budget session, the KMT and their allies froze and cut significant defense and security budgets. Hsu herself took a leading role in freezing 50% of the funding for Taiwan’s indigenous submarine program – an important defense initiative aimed at countering the PLA Navy. During the vote, Hsu even jeered at DPP legislators, saying “let your prototype Haikun submarine actually surface first, then we’ll give you the money”. This move pleased Beijing, which has opposed Taiwan’s submarine project; commentators noted such cuts put Taiwan’s national defense in reverse gear – “the happiest one is China”. When a Taiwanese columnist lambasted Hsu as an obstructionist lawmaker driven solely by partisan hostility, even suggesting she was a “CCP fellow traveler,” Hsu indignantly denied it. She claimed that by persuading her caucus to only freeze half (instead of deleting the entire amount), she had actually saved part of the submarine budget. Nevertheless, the net result aligned with what Beijing would want – a delayed and constrained submarine program. Hsu’s involvement in such budget decisions indicates that her contacts with CPC ideas aren’t just talk; they translate into concrete legislative actions that hinder policies Beijing dislikes (like military strengthening).
Hsu has also been a strident opponent of Taiwan’s Anti-Infiltration Law and related regulations designed to curb Beijing’s influence operations. On various media appearances, she argued that the DPP uses national security laws to instill a “green terror.” For example, when local village chiefs were reportedly cautioned about accepting PRC invitations (to visit China on sponsored trips) under the Anti-Infiltration Law, Hsu publicly blasted it as a return of White Terror under a green (DPP) guise. She demanded the government not “politicize” normal exchanges like religious events or cultural performances by labeling them united front activities. This skepticism toward anti-infiltration enforcement mirrors the CPC’s line that Taiwan’s protective laws are excessive and hostile.
It’s noteworthy that unlike Fu or Chen, Hsu Chiao-hsin has not been reported visiting mainland China or meeting CPC officials face-to-face in this period. Her sphere of influence is primarily domestic public opinion and legislative debate. However, through channels like China Review interviews and social media, she interacts informally with PRC propaganda networks. Beijing benefits from amplifying voices like Hsu’s to show that even within Taiwan there is opposition to “anti-China” policies. Meanwhile, Hsu uses information and narratives that often originate from pro-Beijing sources. In essence, she serves as a conduit for CPC-friendly arguments into Taiwan’s political discourse. This is a more subtle form of connection – not financial or formal, but impactful in shaping mindsets.
What is the legislative impact?
The connections above – whether direct meetings or ideological alignments – have tangibly influenced Taiwan’s legislative politics from 2020 to 2025. KMT lawmakers with close mainland ties often champion proposals or actions in line with Beijing’s objectives, affecting the island’s policy directions. Several notable trends illustrate this alignment:
Blocking of Anti-CPC Legislation: The KMT has actively obstructed laws aimed at countering Chinese influence. A clear example was the fate of proposed amendments to the Cross-Strait Relations Act that would require high-level Taiwanese officials to report and disclose details of any meetings with PRC counterparts. In 2023, a DPP legislator (Shen Bo-ying) introduced such a bill to increase transparency and oversight. However, it was “killed in committee by KMT and TPP lawmakers,” preventing it from reaching the floor. Observers found the timing telling: KMT caucus whip Fu Kun-chi was organizing his China visit at that very moment, and the caucus seemed determined to avoid any new reporting requirements that might impede or expose their interactions. Likewise, after former President Ma Ying-jeou’s landmark trip to China in April 2023 – where Ma met Xi Jinping – Ma publicly urged the KMT to revise or repeal the Anti-Infiltration Act (a 2020 law penalizing agents of PRC influence). Beijing’s TAO also denounced that Act as “draconian.” Almost immediately, the KMT echoed these sentiments. Chairman Eric Chu agreed, calling the Anti-Infiltration Law and related national security laws “harmful to human rights” and a tool of political repression that “hinders cross-strait exchange”. The KMT even announced plans to amend the law in cooperation with the smaller TPP, essentially doing exactly what Beijing had demanded. DPP lawmakers pointedly asked: “The TAO calls it an evil law and the KMT rushes to change it – is the KMT basically a subsidiary of the TAO?”. This alignment suggests that channels like Ma’s and Fu’s dialogues with CPC officials feed directly into KMT legislative agendas, potentially at the cost of Taiwan’s security interests.
Advancing Beijing-Favored Initiatives: On the flip side, KMT legislators have introduced measures that dovetail with PRC unification strategies. Chen Yu-jen’s push for special economic zones in Kinmen (with features like PRC-friendly trade and healthcare access) is one instance. Another is the effort by some KMT members to shorten the required residency for PRC spouses to obtain Taiwanese ID from 6 years to 4 years – equalizing them with foreign (non-PRC) spouses. This was justified on human rights grounds, but mirrors Beijing’s goal of easing integration for mainland spouses. Hsu Chiao-hsin’s statements explicitly framed the existing stricter rules as discriminatory and “pro-independence”, signaling intent to change them. Although such bills did not always pass (often due to DPP majority or public backlash), the legislative conversation was clearly being steered in a direction sympathetic to Beijing’s positions by KMT members. Each proposal forced debates on Beijing’s terms – e.g. “Should Kinmen be a bridge for cross-strait unification?” or “Should PRC nationals get equal treatment in Taiwan’s political system?” – which can normalize some of Beijing’s demands within Taiwan’s legislature.
Economic Leverage and United Front Projects: Through individuals like Fu and Chen, Beijing’s economic incentives have been injected into Taiwan’s policy discussions. Fu Kun-chi returned from Beijing touting promises of Chinese tourists and buyers for Taiwan’s agricultural produce. He and his delegation effectively acted as intermediaries for Beijing’s economic offers (and threats). A report by academics noted this as a classic case of Beijing using “以經促統” – using economics to promote unification. Indeed, Fu’s trip demonstrated how PRC economic coercion works: China dangled partial tourism resumption but tied it to new direct routes that have sovereignty implications. Back in the legislature, Fu and KMT colleagues then pressured the government to accept those terms, creating a policy dilemma. Similarly, Chen Yu-jen consistently advocated opening travel links and other exchanges even when the Taiwanese government had security reservations (for example, concerns that unlimited mainland tourism could be used to flood Kinmen or that PRC students/programs might be channels of influence). By raising these issues in committee hearings and public forums, she amplified the PRC’s united front agenda inside Taiwan’s policy process. Thanks in part to KMT pressure, the government did reopen the Mini Three Links on a limited scale and began discussing mechanisms for tourism re-opening. Each concession was framed by KMT as a goodwill gesture to China, reflecting how their Beijing contacts influenced Taiwan’s policy sequencing.
Budgetary and Defense Posture Shifts: One of the most consequential impacts has been on budget allocations for defense and propaganda-related matters. After the 2024 election, the opposition KMT (bolstered by the TPP) gained the upper hand in the legislature’s budgeting process and made sweeping cuts. They targeted areas Beijing would be happy to see cut: for instance, significant portions of the national defense budget (such as the submarine development funds) were frozen, and budgets for agencies countering PRC disinformation or promoting Taiwan’s global outreach were slashed. Chen Yu-jen spearheaded a drastic cut to the public broadcaster (PTS) budget, an institution Beijing often complains propagates pro-independence narratives. These cuts prompted an outcry that the KMT was “doing Beijing’s bidding” by weakening Taiwan internally. A pro-Taiwan commentator lamented that such budget reductions in critical areas amounted to “turning back the clock on national defense – the one most pleased is China”. The KMT defended the cuts as eliminating waste or forcing efficiency, but the pattern aligns with CPC interests: reduced spending on defense, culture, and international advocacy makes Taiwan an easier target for influence and military coercion. It is hard to ignore that legislators like Hsu Chiao-hsin or Chen Yu-jen, who maintain cordial ties with PRC actors, were at the forefront of these budget moves. Their attitudes in debate – from Hsu’s mocking of an indigenous submarine, to Chen’s dismissal of domestic cultural programs – often mirrored talking points seen in Chinese state media.
Shaping Public Discourse: Beyond tangible policies, the presence of CPC-aligned voices in Taiwan’s legislature has shifted the tone of domestic discourse. After engaging with Chinese officials or media, figures like Fu, Chen, and Hsu often return to parliamentary sessions or press conferences with reframed narratives. For example, when Beijing in 2023 began pushing a “discussion on peace” (during Ma Ying-jeou’s visit), KMT lawmakers suddenly floated the idea of a cross-strait peace agreement or at least confidence-building measures, echoing Beijing’s language. When the DPP government tried to fortify laws against Chinese infiltration, KMT speakers took to branding those efforts as oppression or “Green terror,” language that parallels CPC claims that Taipei “suppresses pro-unification voices”. These narratives can influence legislative priorities – making it harder to pass security legislation and easier to justify engagement proposals. The net effect is a Taiwanese politics somewhat divided against itself: the ruling party wary of China’s intentions, and a significant opposition bloc that not only downplays those concerns but at times actively pushes the legislative envelope in favor of Beijing’s preferences. Beijing has skillfully exploited this divide. By selectively engaging KMT individuals (through meetings or economic carrots), the CPC amplifies pro-China positions within Taiwan’s legislature, thereby applying internal pressure on the DPP administration. As one analysis put it, Beijing’s strategy is to “pull in one side and bash the other” – “拉一個、打一個” – creating political heat so that eventually the pro-engagement camp forces the government’s hand.
The KMT-CPC contacts in recent years have a dual effect. They provide Beijing with inroads to influence Taiwan’s democratic processes, and they influence legislative trends toward a more China-friendly posture on certain issues. However, they also galvanized opposing forces within Taiwan to strengthen legal safeguards (such as the Anti-Infiltration Act) and to highlight the risks of over-reliance on China. The cases of Fu Kun-chi, Chen Yu-jen, and Hsu Chiao-hsin exemplify this tug-of-war. Going forward, Taiwan’s ability to balance open political engagement with protecting its sovereignty will be tested continuously. The extent of CPC influence in the legislature – through friendly opposition lawmakers – will remain a key indicator of how Taiwan manages that balance. As the island heads into future elections, voters will ultimately decide if these cross-strait connections are an acceptable price for stability and economic gain, or if they pose too great a threat to the nation’s democratic integrity.
The analysis above is based on Taiwanese news reports, official statements, and expert commentary in Chinese. Key information was drawn from media such as the United Daily News, Liberty Times, Central News Agency, Public Television Service, and China Review News, as well as statements by lawmakers and civil organizations.