A Beijing-Moscow Axis?

Putin's trip to China following his re-election as Russia's leader led to a series of collaboration pacts in industry, finance, energy, culture, technology, and defense. The Western media and analysts couldn't ignore the geopolitical importance of this visit amidst Russia's involvement in Ukraine. However, most of the analysis is biased towards highlighting the shortcomings in the Russia-China partnership and portraying it as a lopsided, and unequal relationship, with Russia playing the junior partner.

Specifically, many analysts pointed out the lack of a formal agreement on the "Power of Siberia II" gas pipeline project. However, this may not be due to Chinese disinterest in the mega project, as China's demand for natural gas is forecasted to increase over the next two decades. It could instead result from challenging negotiations linked to financial and operational burden-sharing in a multi-billion dollar project, as well as pricing mechanisms and delivery schedules for the additional natural gas - up to 50 billion cubic meters per year - that could be delivered through this pipeline. (Interested readers can send an email to [email protected] to get a full analysis on this specific issue).

High-level visits often involve the preparation of technical cooperation agreements well in advance, but in this case, the symbolism holds greater importance. As part of the official visit, Putin’s trip to Harbin signifies that Russia and China have moved past territorial issues along their shared borders. Some territories, including the region historically known as Northern Manchuria, were once under the Chinese Empire's control before becoming an integral part of the Russian Empire following treaties signed in the 17th and 19th centuries. The Sino-Russian border incident of 1969, which caused a "Cold War inside the Cold War," was completely resolved in the 1990s. Since the 2000s, Russia’s Far East province and China’s Heilongjiang province have transformed into a vibrant center for trade, human interaction, and cross-border economic integration between both countries.

The importance of cross-border economic integration should not be underestimated at a time when the conflict in Ukraine and the impact of Western sanctions on Russia's economy remain top priorities for Russia. Trade between Russia and China soared to $240 billion in 2023 following the Ukraine crisis, but there are signs that this momentum may be slowing down or reversing. There is evidence suggesting that Chinese banks, particularly major ones, are more hesitant to process payments for Russian companies importing goods from China. This has led to longer onboarding processes and transaction reviews for new clients. Some institutions have completely halted Russian payments due to concerns about potential US sanctions. As a result, many small companies are now turning to local money brokers and chains of intermediaries. Vladimir Putin has likely discussed this issue with Xi Jinping behind closed doors.

China is already facing a containment policy from the US. It is trying to hedge its exposure to Russia to avoid crossing a “red line” that could lead to even harsher Western sanctions, tariffs, import restrictions, and other measures pushing towards the decoupling of US-China relations, and incidentally EU-China relations as well. China has recently been accused by Ukraine of supporting Russia's war effort by providing dual-use or even outright lethal military equipment. The intention is evidently to drive a wedge between Beijing and Moscow, compelling China to restrict its involvement with its northern neighbor. However, due to various factors, such as China's need to secure access to sanction-proof energy and other natural resources in times of crisis, this is unlikely to occur.

If anything, the two non-Western powers appear to be more aligned and integrated on a range of issues, forming a de facto geopolitical alliance. From a Western perspective, particularly from the US viewpoint, the idea of China and Russia joining forces after the Cold War was initially ridiculed. However, as Shi Jiantao writes in the South China Morning Post, Putin’s visit to China confirms the West’s fears about an emerging Beijing-Moscow axis. Accordingly, the Cold War era playbook that Washington should divide, not unite, Russia and China, resurfaces. There are however two problems with this playbook.

The first problem is that there is no consensus in Washington on how to approach the Russia-China relationship.

Back during the Cold War, China was seen as the junior partner in its relationship with the Soviet Union, so it made sense for the US to reach out to China. Henry Kissinger is often recognized as being behind this move, which began with his secret visit to Beijing and led to Nixon's trip there in 1971 and then normalization of US-China relations in 1979. However, just months before his death, while expressing his admiration for China’s culture and civilization, Kissinger suggested that the US should reverse course and focus on nurturing its relations with Russia to contain China. Donald Trump seemed to grasp the rationale behind this shift, as he attempted to address Russia's concerns while aggressively pursuing a confrontational approach toward China.

The second problem is that the opportunity for this “divide and conquer” strategy might now be gone as the global balance of power has significantly changed over the last twenty years.

In 1997, at the peak of America's "unipolar moment," Zbigniew Brzezinski published an essay in Foreign Affairs outlining his argument from his book "The Grand Chessboard", proposing that America should maintain its role as "Eurasia's arbitrator" well into the 21st century. This argument is based on classical themes in geopolitics, particularly emphasizing the centrality of the Eurasian mass and implicitly positioning Russia as the "Geopolitical pivot of History," as originally framed by British geographer Halford Mackinder in 1904. Even in 1997, Brzezinski highlighted Russia as the West's primary potential adversary, lending credibility to Mackinder’s thesis. Consequently, Brzezinski openly advocated for Russia to be dismembered - de facto, if not formally - and divided into three loosely knit ("confederated") entities: a European Russia, a Siberian Republic, and a Far-East Republic.

Brzezinski's assumption that China would remain a developing country by 2020 and not become a global power matching the United States in the dimensions of economy, military, technology, and culture has been proven utterly wrong. The accompanying assumption that a potentially resurgent post-Soviet Russia should be viewed as the West's most serious challenger reflects both the still-fresh memory of the Cold War and perhaps Brzezinski's personal history with his Polish descent and long-standing anti-Sovietism. This old idea regained prominence as Vladimir Putin consolidated his grip on power and reasserted Russia’s strategic position on the "Grand Chessboard". Key milestones in this shift include the Russia-Georgia crisis in 2008, the Ukraine crisis in 2013-2014 with Russia’s annexation of Crimea following an "institutional coup" by pro-Western forces in Kyiv, and, finally, the Ukraine-Russia outright war from February 2022 onward.

Samuel Huntington was remarkably more prescient. In his 1993 Foreign Affairs essay "A Clash of Civilizations?" he predicted that China would become the primary adversary to the United States. He foresaw the inevitable modernization of non-Western civilizations and advocated for a form of pluralistic coexistence between the West and the emerging non-Western world, laying the philosophical groundwork for multipolarity. These ideas are reflected in the thinking of prominent non-Western scholars such as Alexander Dugin and Kishore Mahbubani. In Huntington’s own words:

Non-Western civilizations will continue to attempt to acquire the wealth, technology, skills, machines and weapons that are part of being modern. They will also attempt to reconcile this modernity with their traditional culture and values. Their economic and military strength relative to the West will increase. Hence the West will increasingly have to accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power approaches that of the West but whose values and interests differ significantly from those of the West. This will require the West to maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to these civilizations. It will also, however, require the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the others.

The Western talk about a Beijing-Moscow axis drawing historical parallels with the German-Italian-Japanese Axis before World War II is misleading. The Sino-Russian alliance appears more defensive than offensive from a security perspective, given that the military budget of NATO powers still dwarfs the combined Sino-Russian military expenditures. Putin has often argued that the war against Ukraine was a reaction to NATO’s aggressive behavior and ramped up military support to Ukraine in 2021 - despite repeated warnings. For its part, China might resort to military force to force cross-strait unification if other options are exhausted. However, the prospect of Russia becoming militarily involved to support China in a military escalation appears unlikely.

China and Russia play prominent roles as co-sponsors and leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a forum for discussing security issues across Eurasia with participation from countries like India, Pakistan, and Iran. Unlike NATO, the SCO is not a military alliance but serves as a platform for broader geopolitical discussions. Hence, for China and Russia, their alliance appears primarily intended to shape new global governance rules for a multipolar era rather than forming a military partnership. Both countries seek to reduce their dependence on the US dollar and Western-led financial institutions by building partnerships with other nations in the Global South. This year, Russia is chairing the BRICS organization. The upcoming Kazan summit in October will be closely scrutinized as a test of these efforts to promote financial and economic multipolarity, following last year’s Johannesburg summit which led to an extension of the BRICS club to new members in the so-called BRICS+ or BRICS and friends format.