Baby steps being taken to confront the immensity of war crimes in Ukraine, with portents to future co operation militarily speaking by EU states
The EU has woken up to the immensity of the war crimes disaster in Ukraine but much more needs to be done:
Here is a step to a war crimes tribunal for Ukraine war crimes
quote
Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin, during a recent visit to the U.S., describing such a tribunal as “the most feasible and efficient route for accountability” and a way to “restore the world order.”
While it remains unclear what a potential tribunal will look like in practice and under whose authority it will be established, diplomats and legal experts are actively discussing different scenarios. Many of them have coalesced around a short-term proposal for an interim prosecutor’s office tasked with gathering evidence for a potential future trial, jump-starting the judicial process even as the specifics of where and how the prosecution might take place remain to be defined. Earlier this month, at a joint?press conference?with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the establishment of an international center for the prosecution of the crime of aggression in Ukraine to be set up in The Hague and tasked with gathering evidence in support of a potential future prosecution.
end of quote
whereas eventual European solidarity for such action was made more likely due to deliveries like the following:
quote
Ukraine has already received 32 Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns from Germany.
The list of the assistance transferred to Ukraine on the German government’s?website?has been updated.
This time, two more Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns and 6.000 rounds of ammunition were shipped to the frontline.
Another five Gepard anti-aircraft guns are also listed in the list of aid being prepared for dispatch.
end of quote
whereas the baltic states and Poland have taken it further
quote
Lublin, a city in southeast Poland, is notable as the site where, in 1569, the rulers of Poland and Lithuania (which then included large parts of present-day Ukraine)?signed a pact?to unite the two countries into a single state to better withstand aggression from Russia. Four and a half centuries on, the city continues playing a role in connecting these three countries as home to the headquarters of the?Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade, or “Trilateral Brigade” in members’ own parlance. The brigade’s headquarters is staffed with a mix of soldiers from Lithuania (five), Poland (fifty-eight), and Ukraine (eighteen), and is capable of planning, organizing, commanding, and controlling three associated combat units—one mechanized infantry battalion from each of Lithuania and Poland and a Ukrainian air assault unit—and combat support units (approximately 4,500 total personnel) for?international military operations. Despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian personnel continue to be assigned to the unit, and the headquarters continues its four main missions of international cooperation: executing and participating in battle staff training, battalion staff officer courses, multinational exercises, and activities of the?Joint Military Training Group–Ukraine.
end of quote
All this are small baby steps in terms of what needs to be a total EU mobilization to confront the immensity of the crisis, with the seriousness it deserves
quote
MOMENTUM GROWS ON SPECIAL TRIBUNAL TO PROSECUTE PUTIN’S AGGRESSION IN UKRAINE
European nations are nearing a consensus on an interim prosecutor’s office to gather evidence for a future trial.
February 13 2023, 12:49?p.m.
WITH THE ANNIVERSARY?of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine around the corner, several European countries are nearing a consensus to set up a special tribunal to prosecute Russia’s leaders, including President Vladimir Putin, for the crime of aggression. Ukrainian officials have been calling for an ad hoc court since the early weeks of the invasion, with Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin, during a recent visit to the U.S., describing such a tribunal as “the most feasible and efficient route for accountability” and a way to “restore the world order.”
While it remains unclear what a potential tribunal will look like in practice and under whose authority it will be established, diplomats and legal experts are actively discussing different scenarios. Many of them have coalesced around a short-term proposal for an interim prosecutor’s office tasked with gathering evidence for a potential future trial, jump-starting the judicial process even as the specifics of where and how the prosecution might take place remain to be defined. Earlier this month, at a joint?press conference?with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the establishment of an international center for the prosecution of the crime of aggression in Ukraine to be set up in The Hague and tasked with gathering evidence in support of a potential future prosecution. The center, von der Leyen added, would be a part of an ongoing joint investigation team effort, a European Union framework for international cooperation on criminal justice matters.
The announcement marked a significant shift from the hesitation that characterized early talks about a special tribunal for Ukraine.
“At least within the European Union, the political will is getting there. I think everybody acknowledges the moral, political, and also legal need to hold the top Russian leadership accountable for the crime of aggression in Ukraine,” a Northern European official involved in the negotiations told The Intercept, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss ongoing diplomatic efforts. “Clearly, six months ago, we were more focused on war crimes and crimes against humanity, and now we’re kind of admitting the accountability framework is incomplete if we don’t at least try to do something about the crime of aggression.” But the official added, “Of course, this cannot be done by the European Union by itself, we need a broader coalition. The ad hoc international tribunal will not happen without U.S. support, for sure.”
The U.S. State Department has so far been more cautious, though people close to the deliberations expect the Biden administration will at a minimum throw its support behind the plan for the interim office in the Netherlands.
“Now we’re kind of admitting the accountability framework is incomplete if we don’t at least try to do something about the crime of aggression.”
At a panel discussion with Kostin earlier this month, Beth Van Schaack, the State Department’s ambassador-at-large for global criminal justice, made no commitments but signaled the administration’s openness to the various proposals on the table. “We haven’t seen a full concept note yet for it, but it seems like those sort of interim steps are important to be taken while we work out the details on where the crime of aggression might ultimately be prosecuted,” Van Schaack told The Intercept, referring to the interim prosecutor’s office. “So it preserves the evidence now while it’s still fresh, and gets the process started.” She suggested the U.S. was also open to the proposals currently being debated for an ad hoc court. “We’re still looking at the different models.?They each have pluses and minuses associated with them,” she said.
As evidence of widespread crimes committed in Ukraine mounted over the last year?—?Kostin said his office has?“65,000 registered incidents of war crimes” — multiple judicial processes were launched, including prosecutions at the local level and investigations by several European countries, as well as by the International Criminal Court. But there is no existing legal mechanism with jurisdiction over the crime that has enabled all others: the act of aggression that began when Russian forces invaded Ukraine on multiple fronts last February 24. The ICC is prevented from prosecuting aggression in this case because Russia, which is not a member?of the court and holds veto power on the United Nations Security Council, would certainly block such a move — a limitation imposed on the court’s founding authority by countries including France, the U.K., and the U.S.
As The Intercept?reported before, countries that have been supportive of Ukraine, and of efforts to investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity committed there, have until recently hesitated to respond to the call for a special tribunal, largely over political considerations and because of the precedent that prosecuting Russia’s political leaders would set for political leaders in other countries.
During his Washington tour, Kostin, the Ukrainian prosecutor, nodded to the many reservations and arguments against the special tribunal he has heard since first calling for it. “Our communication about the ad hoc special tribunal several months ago was not easy,” he said. “At the end of the day, I said, ‘Look, starting from February 24, Ukrainians believe in the unbelievable. We are in a difficult condition, but we are optimistic.’”
He added, “History taught us well: It is the waging of aggressive war that leads to war crimes and other mass atrocities. Therefore it is crucial not only to end the act of aggression, but also to hold the masterminds of this supreme international crime fully accountable.”
Double Standards
Still, the advancing prospect of an ad hoc tribunal for Ukraine has renewed long-standing criticism that international justice mechanisms are tilted in favor of a few powerful countries?— a criticism that has?undermined?the ICC’s legitimacy since its founding.
“I’m not sure that everyone understands how toxic this justified perception is that international justice only kicks in against, you know, enemies or outcasts or low-value countries.”
Reed Brody, a human rights attorney specialized in mass atrocities and author of “To Catch?a Dictator,” stressed that the only reason a special tribunal might be necessary for Ukraine is that countries now calling for it restricted the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime. “People talk about a gap and a loophole. Well, how did that gap get created? It was purposeful,” he told The Intercept. “You have to balance, is it better to have some justice at the cost of consecrating double standards? I’m not sure that everyone understands how toxic this justified perception is that international justice only kicks in against, you know, enemies or outcasts or low-value countries.”
Asked about the extent to which concerns over double standards have hindered discussions over a special tribunal for Ukraine, Van Schaack told The Intercept “very little.” She added, “The reality is that Russian aggression is so egregious, it’s such a clear and manifest violation of the U.N. charter. And the conduct of the war is so different from anything that we have seen really since World War II, and maybe the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.”
Kostin, the Ukrainian prosecutor, also dismissed those concerns.
“I don’t want to spend time discussing the past. We can talk about the double, triple standards in the history of many countries, many organizations, but we have no time for this,” he told reporters during his U.S. visit. “After the war, when we win, we will have time to analyze, to discuss and to find out what has happened before.”
“We can’t leave the situation as it is,” he added. “If an aggressor starts an aggression and there is no valid, effective instrument to punish them, we need to invent this instrument together and punish the aggressor. Not only for this aggression, but to deter any other aggressor in any other place or time in the future.”
Building an Airplane on the Runway
Despite significant momentum, much remains unclear about how a special tribunal for Ukraine will come into existence, and under whose authority.
One option, favored by the Ukrainian government, would be to set up a fully international court, similar to that set up for the Nuremberg trials after World War II. Because Russia sits on the Security Council, where it would certainly exercise its veto power, the proposal might be put to the U.N. General Assembly, where it would need the support of a majority of countries. That’s something that’s never been done before?— and experts disagree on whether the UNGA would have the authority to request that the secretary-general establish such a tribunal along with the Ukrainian government. Alternatively, an international tribunal might be established through a different body, like the Council of Europe, the European Union, or through a group of individual states.
Another option would be to set up a hybrid tribunal that would bring together elements of the Ukrainian judicial system and international ones. While that might be easier to set up, such a tribunal would be limited by the?immunity that heads of state enjoy?against prosecution by foreign states’ courts — something that wouldn’t be an issue with a fully international tribunal. There are more legal questions at stake, and, for months now, international experts have been debating the various scenarios. “I don’t think anyone has a clear-cut answer because it has never been done before,” the European official said. “Nothing in international law happens overnight.”
Prosecuting aggression — as unlikely as it remains that Russian leaders would recognize any process as legitimate and that Putin and other top leaders might see a day in court?— is only one of several justice mechanisms underway, which also include more than 250 Ukrainian-led prosecutions that have already resulted in 25 convictions. On that front, too, Ukraine represents a departure from the norm when it comes to war crimes, which more often go uninvestigated for years, if they are ever investigated at all.
“This is really a unique situation. The more common scenario that we have seen many times over is what happened in Syria or in Myanmar, where you have neither an international option for accountability or domestic international options have been foreclosed,” Clint Williamson, the State Department’s ambassador-at-large for war crime issues, said at the event with Kostin. Williamson cited the Security Council’s veto power as a frequent obstacle to international efforts, as well as the lack of functional mechanisms or political willingness at the local level as countries’ own leadership is often behind the crimes, as is the case in Syria and Myanmar. “More often, what we see is a historical effort to go back, reconstruct evidence, and build cases months or years after the fact.”
In Ukraine, on the other hand, the accountability process is already in motion while the conflict and the crimes are ongoing. That’s presented a number of challenges?— but also a unique opportunity to deliver justice. “I think that we have to be realistic that it’s going to be very challenging to get Russia to pay for the damage that they have caused,” Williamson told reporters. “But that’s not a reason not to do this. So I think it is important to try to pursue this and to try to build consensus on the right way to do it.”
Van Schaack quoted a colleague who compared the efforts to “building an airplane while you’re on the runway, taking off.”
“I think in many respects, this is remaking the field,” she said. “It really is a brave new world of international justice.”
The Elephant in the Room
So far, much of the debate about a potential special tribunal for Ukraine has been limited to European countries and the U.S. But setting up a truly international tribunal, particularly if under the auspices of the U.N., will necessarily require a broadening of the conversations to other countries, including some that hold deep reservations about questions of immunity, as well as those?that perceive international justice mechanisms, like the ICC, as mired in double standards.
“People should put their money where their mouth is, and if they want to do this, they should amend the Rome Statute of the ICC.”
Critics have often referred to the U.S. and U.K. 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was not approved by the U.N., as the most obvious example of that. Former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who had been supportive of the invasion of Iraq, has become one of the U.K.’s?most vocal proponents?of a special tribunal for Ukraine — with some condemning his call to prosecute aggression in Ukraine as hypocritical.
“This will definitely kick in once we enter real negotiations at the U.N. level,” the European official said. “That is the elephant in the room. … I think that’s in the back of the head of many people.”
“But there are a lot of war crimes and crimes against humanity, even potentially crimes of genocide, that are likely to go unpunished and that are not being investigated properly,” the official added. “The fact that we maybe cannot prosecute every perpetrator is not an argument for stop doing what the ICC is doing, for example.”
Brody, the human rights lawyer, told The Intercept that it is “somewhat unseemly for people who invaded Iraq to talk about a tribunal.” At a minimum, he added, echoing a?proposal?raised by several countries, “people should put their money where their mouth is, and if they want to do this, they should amend the Rome Statute of the ICC.”
“I’ve spent my life working with victims. I know the importance of getting any justice that you can, and none of the African victims I’ve ever worked with have said, ‘No, we don’t want justice until you can bring George Bush to trial,’” Brody added. “But also as someone who’s spent the last 25 years working in Africa, I know how toxic it would be to the whole international justice project if the very states that fought for and imposed a limitation on the ICC’s jurisdiction to investigate aggression would now establish a tribunal for aggression for Ukraine.”
领英推荐
end of quote
also
quote
8 February, 2023
Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun in Ukraine. Photo credits: Ukrainian Armed Force
Germany transferred two more Gepard anti-aircraft guns to Ukraine
Ukraine has already received 32 Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns from Germany.
The list of the assistance transferred to Ukraine on the German government’s?website?has been updated.
This time, two more Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns and 6.000 rounds of ammunition were shipped to the frontline.
Another five Gepard anti-aircraft guns are also listed in the list of aid being prepared for dispatch.
Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun of the Ukrainian military. October 2022, Ukraine. Photo credits: Bild
The German Handelsblatt?reported previously?that Germany is preparing to hand over these anti-aircraft guns by the end of the month.
Besides, five Dachs armored engineer vehicles should arrive in Ukraine by the end of February, and five Biber bridge-layer tanks will be delivered in March.
German Biber bridge-layer tank of the military of Ukraine, December 2022. Frame from the video
The current transferred assistance package also includes:
5 cars that previously belonged to the German Border Guard;
As previously?reported, Germany, along with the Netherlands and Denmark, are ready to supply 100 Leopard 1 tanks to Ukraine. The first 25 units of the equipment should arrive in Ukraine by the summer of 2023, and the delivery of Leopard 2A6 tanks is expected at the end of March.
Gepard?SPAAG is based on the chassis of the Leopard 1 tank. Two 35mm Oerlikon KDA guns and two radars installed on the tower determine the target at a distance of up to 15 km.
The system can hit targets at a distance between 100 meters and 4 km. Its crew consists of only three people: the driver, the commander, and the gunner.
In January, Armin Papperger, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Rheinmetall,?announced?that by the middle of next year, Germany will transfer 300 thousand rounds of ammunition for the Gepard SPAAG to Ukraine.
“М?л?тарний” працю? завдяки пост?йн?й п?дтримц? Сп?льноти
Нав?ть донат в 30 грн (ц?на 1 кави) допоможе нам працювати дал?:
Будь з “М?л?тарним” на вс?х платформах
end of quote
quote
MEET THE LITHUANIAN-POLISH-UKRAINIAN BRIGADE, A LITTLE-KNOWN UNIT THAT PRESENTS A NEW MODEL FOR SECURITY COOPERATION
Jahara Matisek?and?William Reno?| 09.28.22
Lublin, a city in southeast Poland, is notable as the site where, in 1569, the rulers of Poland and Lithuania (which then included large parts of present-day Ukraine)?signed a pact?to unite the two countries into a single state to better withstand aggression from Russia. Four and a half centuries on, the city continues playing a role in connecting these three countries as home to the headquarters of the?Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade, or “Trilateral Brigade” in members’ own parlance. The brigade’s headquarters is staffed with a mix of soldiers from Lithuania (five), Poland (fifty-eight), and Ukraine (eighteen), and is capable of planning, organizing, commanding, and controlling three associated combat units—one mechanized infantry battalion from each of Lithuania and Poland and a Ukrainian air assault unit—and combat support units (approximately 4,500 total personnel) for?international military operations. Despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian personnel continue to be assigned to the unit, and the headquarters continues its four main missions of international cooperation: executing and participating in battle staff training, battalion staff officer courses, multinational exercises, and activities of the?Joint Military Training Group–Ukraine.
In the shadow of Lublin’s suggestive history, the Trilateral Brigade provides a lens for thinking about flexible options in US and NATO responses to contemporary Russian aggression in Ukraine. This flexibility is especially important in the context of current US?doctrine?on deterrence in a new phase of?great power competition. In August, we traveled to Poland on a?DoD Minerva research mission, where we conducted interviews with dozens of military personnel assigned to the Trilateral Brigade. What we found underscores the significance of the organization’s historical roots and highlights the value of this joint military unit acting as a bridge between NATO and Ukraine. While few US and European military personnel are aware of the Trilateral Brigade’s existence, the unit can serve as a template for future security cooperation and facilitate Western efforts in the current Russo-Ukrainian War.
Two Feet in NATO, One Foot Out
The Trilateral Brigade occupies a gray space. While multinational units are?not uncommon—the Dutch-German?Tank Battalion 414, for instance, was founded in 2016—a joint unit composed of NATO members (Polish and Lithuanian) and non-NATO military personnel (Ukrainian) is obviously rare. This presents both opportunities as well as risks that must be managed in order to take advantage of those opportunities.
NATO is an organization built on the?principle of consensus. While this is a critical means of keeping the most successful military alliance in the history of the world together, it also means that even limited activities are difficult when some members are resistant. Here is where an organization like the Trilateral Brigade proves extraordinarily useful. The brigade is a joint training mission, and a lot of activities fall under the category of training—activities that could have direct impacts in the ongoing war in Ukraine, for example. The brigade can therefore play a positive role by enabling Eastern European NATO members who want to lean into what they see as a broad-based confrontation with Russia—what may turn out to be a long conflict of which the war in Ukraine is just the most active and kinetic front—and those further West that might wish to keep the conflict at a distance. These different tolerances for risk point to the range of very real divisions among NATO members and are a foundation of Russia’s strategy of steadily weakening the alliance by exploiting any fissures. The Trilateral Brigade helps bridge these gaps and thus protect against this Russian strategy.
The brigade’s potential contributions to strengthening the defense of NATO’s eastern flank and providing military training in Ukraine is not without difficulties. Chief among these is the risk of escalation, particularly considering the shadow that US and Russian nuclear arsenals cast over the conflict. This concern is real, given the realities of opposed strategic aims: The United States and other NATO members strive to limit conflict to Ukraine’s territory while helping Ukraine’s armed forces inflict enough pain on Russian forces to compel retreat and to deter future aggression. Russia’s leadership seeks to compel the United States and others to stop supporting Ukraine’s armed forces.
Ultimately, the key to managing this risk while also pursuing strategic goals of supporting Ukraine is balance, and the Trilateral Brigade provides additional important options. Assistance managed through the Trilateral Brigade’s decentralized structure is more difficult to target than staging areas and lines of communication associated with assistance to Ukraine. Its functional advantage lies in its capacity to coordinate planning and flows of material resources across a wide territory, and thus may not come with the same risks of escalation as other forward-leaning operations.
Perhaps most fundamentally, the brigade’s unique organization and membership, partly NATO and partly not, should widen our collective perspective on the ways to deliver?security force assistance. It leverages an alignment of strategic interests among a subset of NATO members to generate the close coordination between assistance providers and recipients needed for?effective?security force assistance. With the American?strategic vacation over, the United States and its allies and partners must learn from?security assistance mistakes?with Afghanistan, and forge refined ways of providing military aid that improves Ukrainian military capabilities in a sustainable fashion.
The Trilateral Brigade’s Comparative Advantage
Lublin’s regional and?historical?importance as the center of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth are?cited?as a “factor in the emergence of Ukrainian national consciousness.” Beyond these deep historical ties, official discourse in all three countries involved in the Trilateral Brigade define their identities in terms of?repression?and resistance during Soviet rule. Shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine began codifying relationships for military “training-operational cooperation.” Within this identification of shared strategic interests, cooperation among members of the armed forces of these countries began to establish a shared cultural frame for planning and executing operations, a key element in motivating efficient application of military resources and effort.
Formal cooperation between the three militaries?began?in 1997 with the?Lithuanian-Polish Battalion, followed by the establishment of the?Polish-Ukrainian Battalion?in 1998. Between 2000 and 2010, personnel from the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion (reinforced with thirty Lithuanian troops) were deployed to Kosovo to participate in?NATO-led peacekeeping operations. Additionally, Polish and Ukrainian soldiers deployed to Iraq (2003–2005) as part of the?Multinational Centre-South Division, which?included?two Lithuanian infantry companies and logistics personnel. Individually, all three countries contributed forces to support US and NATO missions in Afghanistan (2001–2021) as part of broader goals of?improving strategic partnerships?with the United States, European Union, and NATO. Personnel from all three countries became familiar with one another as they built personal networks and shared information.
Lithuanian and Polish relationships with Ukraine came to a pause in 2010 when Viktor Yanukovych assumed Ukraine’s presidency, which strained many ties to the US and neighboring NATO countries. Cooperation stagnated until 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and secretly invaded to initiate a separatist revolt in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region. After pro-Western leaders returned to power in Kyiv in the wake of the?Maidan Revolution, the Trilateral Brigade was formed in late 2014. The brigade achieved operational capability and combat readiness by 2017, as demonstrated by successfully executing its?first multinational exercise?in December of 2016. This was followed by further symbolic integration as the Trilateral Brigade chose their patron: Grand Hetman Konstanty Iwanowicz Ostrogski. The?symbolism was significant: Ostrogski was “the three nations’ hero who successfully led campaigns against the Tatars and Muscovians,” with the greatest unifying?victory?occurring against Vasili III of Russia in 1514.
In 2020, given deepening defense ties, increased political coordination between Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine followed. This took the form of the “Lublin Triangle,” an interregional cooperative body with one of its aims being to “coordinate actions to protect international law in the context of Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine both in tripartite coordination and in international organizations.” This was not the first time such a cooperative organization was formed in the region. For instance,?GUAM?(Georgie, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) was formed in 1997 for “quadrilateral cooperation for strengthening stability and security in Europe based on respect for the principles of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of state borders, democracy, the supremacy of law and human rights.”
With these examples of growing collaboration between former Soviet and Eastern Bloc states, the United States and NATO should view the proliferation of such organizations as an opportunity to leverage personal and organizational connections, partnerships, and relationships in a way that strengthens?defense institution building?and the way security assistance is delivered and received.
One caveat is that highly motivated Trilateral Brigade members and their governments may have higher risk acceptance thresholds than the United States and some other NATO country planners; this brings the discussion back to the fundamental concern over escalation described earlier. During our interviews in Poland, we regularly encountered dismissive attitudes toward the risks of Russo-Ukraine War escalation in interactions with the brigade’s personnel and various other members of the three countries’ armed forces. While there is significant alignment of partners’ strategic aims, coupled with significant capabilities, differing assessments of risk pose the possibility that recipients of assistance will use resources in aggressive and provocative ways that are not to Washington’s tastes and would concern NATO partners that do not share experiences of Soviet rule.
Leveraging the Trilateral Brigade in Competition
As the war in Ukraine grinds on, the United States will seek to exploit the opportunity to weaken and undermine Russia in the context of a grand strategy that views Russia as a declining power—though one that happens to possess?about?six thousand nuclear weapons—and China as a growing, revisionist, flexing regional hegemon. Helping Russia fail militarily in the Eurasian geopolitical context is not only vital for European security, but also?for US?and?NATO?plans to pivot resources, military forces, and strategic thinking toward Asia to contain China’s growing power.
There are three important policy implications of having a non-NATO member like Ukraine codifying relationships with NATO members through a joint security organization like the Trilateral Brigade.
First, the greatest value of the Trilateral Brigade lies in its ability to operate outside of the figurative NATO umbrella while minimizing risks of territorial escalation, as the brigade’s?commander?told our research team. In practical terms, it means that while the United States and NATO have to be comparatively more legalistic and bureaucratic in?training, assistance, advising, and equipping?Ukraine, the established regional cooperation of the Trilateral Brigade enables interoperability and long-term relationships between these countries in a way that is difficult for the average US or NATO military unit to achieve. Moreover, such an?established regional security organization?can enable informal coordination and the sharing of information. Per our interviews, the Trilateral Brigade facilitates numerous activities between Ukrainian forces and NATO, such as collecting lessons learned from open sources and personnel involved in the war against Russia. Such data informs military exercises and makes training more realistic between US, European, and Ukrainian personnel.
Second, given?growing discussions?about Ukraine acquiring 48 to 128 American F-16s, the precedent of a Trilateral Brigade suggests that similar cooperative activities could take place between NATO members and Ukraine. For example, Poland has?forty-eight F-16s?and Romania has?seventeen?(plus thirty-two more being?acquired this year). This suggests an opportunity to form a bilateral Polish-Ukrainian air squadron or a trilateral Polish-Romanian-Ukrainian air squadron. An operational template of sorts already exists with the?Heavy Airlift Wing?in Hungary, where?twelve countries?(the United States, nine other NATO members, and Sweden and Finland)?jointly operate?three C-17s. Employing joint air force units would be a bridging function for the Ukrainian military, enabling Ukrainian pilots and associated support personnel to learn best airpower practices from their neighbors. This would prevent the?Faberge Egg military problem?that typically occurs when American advisors are not around to monitor a partner force operating an expensive and complicated weapon system like the F-16 (Iraq, for example,?struggles?to operate its fleet of F-16s). The significance of this was highlighted while interviewing a Polish fighter pilot, who explained a “mentality change on every level” was needed when Poland?established?its first F-16 squadron at Poznań air base in 2006. He admitted numerous struggles in the transition away from Soviet-era aircraft and standards for logistics, maintenance, and airfield support. Finally, growing regional cooperation between air forces could possibly accelerate timelines for Ukrainians to be able to employ F-16s more skillfully in combat operations once they are deemed capable of operating independently out of air bases in Ukraine (likely two to three years).
Third, given the deep ties the Trilateral Brigade is fostering between Lithuanian, Polish, and Ukrainian forces, there is an opportunity for NATO and the United States to further enhance the relationship between Western militaries and Ukrainian security forces. For instance, the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade’s leadership mentioned how beneficial the US National Guard?State Partnership Program?was in facilitating training sessions with National Guard units of California, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, which helped them refine training courses on the?Military Decision-Making Process. Future engagements with the Trilateral Brigade could include the Canadian military teaching the?Operational Planning Process?and the British military instructing their?7 Questions?combat estimate method. Finally, with the Trilateral Brigade having submitted a plan of training ten thousand Ukrainian infantry by 2023, this presents an opportunity to assign officers and noncommissioned officers from the United States and NATO to act as liaison officers in advising, developing, and facilitating such activities. This would further enhance and improve the combat power and professionalization of Ukrainian forces.
Leaders from the United States and other NATO members continually consider the ladder of escalation—in terms of what lethal and nonlethal aid to provide next to Ukraine—and how Russia might respond. Numerous fundamental realities shape the contours of the overall war, however. Ukraine cannot fight the war with Russia to total victory, for instance, since Russia would never let Ukrainian forces march on Moscow without a?nuclear strike. This is precisely why the Trilateral Brigade offers such a significant opportunity. It presents an alternative capability to NATO, a means of indirectly hurting Russia via the training of Ukrainian troops and other coordination activities that enable Ukrainian combat power. It is also a powerful proof of concept, and a strong argument for NATO leadership to encourage the forming of similar joint units with non-NATO members (e.g., Moldova, Georgia, etc.) that also view Russia as a threat to their security. Such collaboration lays the foundation for future security cooperation to improve interoperability capabilities that might be needed in a future conflict.
Lieutenant Colonel Jahara “FRANKY” Matisek, PhD, (@JaharaMatisek) is the fellowship director for the?Irregular Warfare Initiative?and US DoD Minerva?researcher?that will be a military professor at the US Naval War College beginning in October 2022. A 2020 Bronze Star recipient for his time as the director of operations and commander of the 451st Expeditionary Operations Support Squadron, he is a command pilot that previously served as a?senior fellow?for the?Homeland Defense Institute?and?associate professor?in the Military and Strategic Studies Department at the US Air Force Academy.
Dr.?William Reno?is?professor and chair?of the Political Science Department at Northwestern University.?He has conducted fieldwork and interviews in conflict zones across Africa and the Middle East for over thirty years, having authored three books:?Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone,?Warlord Politics and African States, and?Warfare in Independent Africa. Dr. Reno has published over one hundred articles in peer-reviewed journals, policy-relevant periodicals, and edited volumes on civil wars, rebels, and military assistance. Finally, he is the principal investigator for the US DoD?Minerva-funded program?studying how the United States can improve foreign military training.
end of quote
Andrew Beckwith, PhD
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/kyiv-and-moscow-are-fighting-two-different-wars?fbclid=IwAR3KApdYPhAcfTdejC4ZHh4JJmM3esF75EurpoqGKNZMqHJODDRN4o68T9A