BA & London City Airport - same coin?
Paul Bondsfield
Marketer | Strategist | Traveller | Author | Musician | Dad | Foodie
So, BA are getting back on track having successfully lost more than £100m in compensation alone, vast amounts of good will - and not to mention 4% off the share price of parent IAG.
The intricacies of their IT system and exactly what went wrong will probably never be known outside of the company, but the two things that are absolutely plain to see are that no system is infallible and BA's communications strategy sucks, big time!
First up, crisis communication. Whether BA decided to hold true to the pilots maxim in an in-flight emergency, "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate" - and the Aviate and Navigate bits took far longer than they anticipated - or whether they simply didn't have the wherewithal to simply talk, I don't know. But, they really should know that the golden rule of crisis communications is just to say something (as long as it's factual) - and keep repeating that something until you have something new to say and then you keep saying that. But, you never, ever, say nothing at all.
Next, to the IT system collapse.
When the news story of London City Airport's announcement they were shipping out their control tower to a virtual tower down at NATS in Fareham popped up, I had the immediate reaction that it was an accident just waiting to happen. The TV presenter obviously had the same thought as he questioned the spokeswoman - what if the IT system goes down? She confidently stated that the layers of back-up meant there was not an issue and the CEO said he was "absolutely confident" the system is safe from a cyber attack. But surely BA's experience with its uninterruptible power supplies and its mirrored back ups - plus the experiences of hundreds of large organisations around the world hacked a couple of weeks' ago might suggest that best laid plans...and all that.
I understand there may be cost benefits to moving the tower to an environment where the infrastructure is in place, where skilled practitioners are available etc...and I love the idea of the tech behind this development...but surely, the risk, no matter how slight, of the system going down - or being hacked - should be backed up by someone looking out of a window at the airport?
I would love to work with BA to help them sort out their crisis comms (BA, just give me a call and I'll be there), but God forbid London City Airport ever have need of a crisis comms when two aircraft collide because a camera stopped working and there was simply no one available with eyes on the runway. Even I would baulk at trying to explain that one away.