AVOIDABLE PRESSURE

AVOIDABLE PRESSURE
Ad-Dustour January 27th 2016
By: Oraib Al Rantawi
Had it displayed any genuine wisdom or acumen, the Riyadh Syrian opposition conference could have avoided much of the pressure, cutting down to size and marginalization that it has been subjected to.
This would have been possible had it agreed to include some main opposition groups in its ranks, and opened itself up to leading opposition figures and their discourse, and relied on them to agree on some shared visions and common denominators. This would then have offered a solid basis for forming a united delegation and coming up with an authoritative common body to negotiate with the regime.
At the time, we said that unifying the various Syrian opposition groups requires an international umbrella, a neutral capital that can embrace them all, and an honest mediator. But the struggle over the Syrian opposition, which is a struggle over Syria's future, has silenced the voice of reason and wisdom. It has ended up consolidating the opposition's divisions rather than uniting them.
Its insistence on consuming the entire cake has exposed the opposition convening under the umbrella of Riyadh conference to the arrows of criticism and pressure. These have come from the opposition's allies before their enemies: from Washington and New York, before Tehran, Damascus and Moscow.
What we are witnessing is a prime example of profound mismanagement and shortsighted views of the Syrian scene and the complexities that surround it. It is a sign of a chronic 'narrowness of horizon' – unless holding the Riyadh conference in the manner that it was held and the choice of the supervisory body and negotiating delegation reflected a desire on the part of the conference's sponsors to undermine the Geneva-3 option from within, drawing an end-line for the negotiating track even before it begins.
The head of the delegation, the senior negotiators, and other delegates could have been chosen from outside the circle of provocative figures. These are the figures that even the opposition's allies find difficult to bear on their shoulders or promote as defenders of a free, democratic, and pluralistic Syria, or advocates of the rights of the country's various minorities and constituents.
The delegation members who will be sitting at the front row could have been chosen from outside the circle of those accused of terrorism, and often of criminal actions – such as the Jayshul Islam group in Damascus's Eastern Ghouta. But the principle that 'whoever is not with us is against us' apparently blinded its advocates, turning them into their own enemies, which is what happened during the formation of the delegation and the subsequent heated regional and international dispute over its composition.
The noble aristocrat and advocate of women's rights, [UN Envoy] de Mistura, wants to see women participating in the opposition delegation. It is as if the man has no idea with whom he is speaking. For there are figures in the leading ranks of this delegation whose devotion to pluralism amounts to a belief in 'the right to multiple wives.' And there are those who share ISIS's views regarding the acceptability of enslaving women, taking women as war booty, and 'having as many women as one can.'
Such figures have rendered the greatest service to their opponents from the other Syrian opposition groups. The latter will head to Geneva bearing a discourse that the world understands, one which the world will not feel queasy when hearing or feel the need to throw up, as it does when it hears some ISIS-like expressions.
What was the outcome of being hasty and try to secure something before the time was ripe for it, other than being punished by being denied the very thing that was sought? Yes, the Riyadh conference is being punished by being stripped of its unique representation of the Syrian opposition. De Mistura had to take a firm line and regain the authority granted to him and not to any regional state, to form the Syrian opposition's delegation; and in doing so, he brandished the sword of the Vienna and New York criteria.
At this point, in particular, it became clear that [U.S. Secretary of State] John Kerry would speak with a 'clear Russian tongue' in Riyadh and that he would use his friend [Russian Foreign Minister] Sergey Lavrov's threats as a sword with which to pressure the opposition and its sponsors, so as to drive the Geneva-3 track forward. And this is precisely what happened.
Up till the time these words were written, the result of the opposition groups' consultations in Riyadh and their debates with each other and with some of their Arab and regional sponsors were still unknown. It was also still unclear to whom the Geneva invitations issued by the UN envoy were issued. But we did see the domestic [Syrian-based] opposition 'absolving' itself of the Riyadh conference, especially when the latter's delegation to Geneva excluded the domestic opposition and when the delegation's statements conflicted with the domestic opposition's customary views. We are also witnessing the formation of a second opposition delegation, shared between the Cairo conference opposition, the Kurdish self-rule authority, the Moscow conference, and a number of independent national opposition figures.
In fact – as we mentioned in a previous article shortly before Kerry's recent visit to Riyadh – Washington sees some of the opposition groups excluded from the Riyadh conference as its allies. It feels at home with them and much prefers them to the factions, brigades and figures that were brought together under the Riyadh conference's umbrella. We also said that Washington may resort to the card of Russian intransigence in order to soften the sharp edges of the Riyadh coalition's positions, and that it will not heed Ankara's shrill warnings against the dire consequences of inviting 'the Kurdish terrorists' to Geneva.
But the Riyadh conference opposition should have seen this before us and in a clearer manner than we did. However, it did not. It continued to march down the road to perdition instead, until it has ended up in this awkward corner, threatened with the loss of its 'exclusive agency' to represent the various Syrian opposition groups.
What we have before us is an exercise in 'narrow horizons' which, on the one hand, reflects this opposition's intolerance of Syrian pluralism even within the opposition framework, and on the other hand, threatens the direst consequences for the negotiating track between the regime and the opposition – if representation and negotiation were to be left to these people and them alone.