Australia's Future Air Mobility
I have written to DSR, Federal Representatives, Defence Representatives and in public on the matter of potential replacement for C130J and perhaps C27J.??I am motivated to write because I am concerned that for matters of convenience and comfort, enabled by a lack of strategic insight, Australia may be wasting $10Bn to buy the wrong aircraft for our future air mobility.??This article capture my many LinkedIn Posts on the matter and offers some additional reflections.
I firmly believe that this decision needs to be better informed and granted far more detailed consideration.??I acknowledge that my views are potentially wrong, but the publicly visible reasons for the decision do not offer any comfort that the decision is either properly considered or wise.
For context as to why my thoughts might be considered I offer the following:
Disclaimer:??These are opinions I developed from my military and commercial experience.?Data I have used is open sourced and may be erroneous. Analysis conducted is wholly by me and could equally be erroneous.?I have not been rewarded by anyone to develop these insights, nor is there any expectation that I will benefit from expressing these opinions.
The key headline points:
I conclude that we should not immediately proceed with the commitment to buy C130J.?We should conduct the first stage of potential KC390 program by leasing two aircraft to undertake an Australian Comprehensive Capability Assessment program.??While this will have costs, many of them will be embraced into the future capability if it proceeds and the potential is for realised savings to far exceed the costs.
Posted LinkedIn 14 Nov 2022 (Join Discussion)
I have commented on the recent $10Bn intent by Government to buy new C130 for Australia. This has been reported in the Australian, but that report is only a shallow analysis of submission.
I have flown C130, C17, C27J, CH47 and UH1H operationally and in combat conditions in Europe and Middle East. I commanded Australia’s airlift fleet, including large twin engine jets, at many levels. I know these systems, the supporting arrangements, and all the qualities and problems intimately. I have not made my comments lightly.
I have also flown the Embraer KC390 simulator, visited the robotic factory, and investigated why this aircraft that was unknown to me previously, was being proposed as an alternative to C130.
I am not simply a champion of one aircraft over another. Rather, I am a champion of the right system for Australia, that can enhance our insight, deliver our logistics and advance our air combat capability in uncertain and changing times. I champion Australia’s capacity to operate as a sovereign nation with minimal dependence on matters beyond our control. We need to have the agility to be where circumstances demand our presence and to do so without others gaining advantage over us. This agility demands airport access, speed, altitude, reach, reliability, and efficiency not only of the aircraft, but its sustainment, its payload management and support, and workforce training.
My submission to the Defence Strategic Review is based on analysis of the systems required to meet our future circumstances. If we get it wrong, we waste $10Bn. Yet the public debate on this matter is simple and shallow. If we get it right, we can control expenditure and delivery risk, adapt efficiently, and avoid the dreaded capability gap.
My comments are not a simplistic comparison of alternate aircraft. More C130 might be right, but KC390 might also be right. Shouldn’t there be a proper debate about the private analysis that has been done by Air Force so we can all be comfortable with the decision; whatever it happens to be? The notion that the only replacement for a C130 is a C130 is wrong, but it might be that the correct replacement for C130 is indeed C130 or is KC390. I don’t pretend to know, but we should debate the matter.
I am also 100% independent. I have never and am not now receiving any money or benefit from my commentary or analysis. I have no current or future commercial relationship with any manufacturer or supporter of such aircraft. I am only writing from the informed perspective of being a proudly Australian individual, with the passion and courage to put my ideas forward for strategic consideration. Knowing what I do, I would be remiss in not offering comment on the matter, regardless of whether I am right or wrong.
In due course, I may offer my submission for public review, but for the moment I judge it is best that my submission be a matter for Government, Parliament, Defence Strategic Review, and Defence to consider.
Posted LinkedIn 15 Nov 2022 (Join the discussion)
Recently I offered an opening insight to my thinking about the future air mobility capability for Australia. Reflecting upon the resultant discussion, I realised that I am stimulating a debate but not offering a foundation framework for that debate.
Consequently, I now plan to offer over the coming week or two a series of posts which will explore the following areas that I think are the key elements that need exploration:
So, I am now committing to a substantial body of writing. If you are interested, please read, reflect, and discuss. This will not be about the loudest opinion, but an exploration by colleagues on a professional platform. Note I will not be responding publicly to any one comment but will consider all reasonable comments in my writing. I will think carefully for each post, please offer the same in return.
I hope you find value, but more importantly I hope the debate offers insight to our Community, our government, and the Defence Strategic Review to properly test the C130 decision on well informed merit, considered in a whole of nation and whole of defence context.
Posted 17 Nov 2022 (Join the Discussion)
Question 1: What is air mobility and how does it vary from air lift?
Major capabilities have two major pillars: systems and services: what is it and what does it do??This applies equally to air delivered logistics.?It also helps if we consider outputs, outcomes, and benefits as taxonomy of what results from the operation of the system.?
Recently, RAAF renamed Air Lift Group to be Air Mobility Group.??We realised that we had become too focussed on the aircraft and systems at the cost of not fully appreciating our purpose.?Rebalance was required.
Our new approach saw air lift as the system and air mobility as the purpose.??Our commitment to that purpose was “We fly important people and stuff to tough places on time.” Deliberately written in an easy-going form, non-corporate, and focused on those who we served.?We proposed to change to Air Mobility Group.?This incidentally led to useful alignment with USAF Air Mobility Command.
Discussions at the time revolved heavily around our substantial difficulties to deliver missions, on time, to the destinations promised.?Colloquially put, if you bought a ticket to New York from us, you might not get airborne at all, you probably get airborne a day or more later, but you would likely end up in Dallas with your bags in Chicago. Hence the need for a profound change in culture and resultant performance management of operations, maintenance, and logistics as a whole.
Granted, there were some specific problems at the time, but within months our mission success (people and their stuff to the right place at the right time as promised) went from mid-40% to more than 90% and stayed there.
These points seem at face value to be inconsequential, but reality is they redefined behaviours at all levels and became part of my daily language as I moved around our team.??I believe that the ease of language and focus on outcomes also led to confidence amongst our technicians, aircrew, and wider workforce.?The real result in my mind was that we went from being the squeaky underperforming wheel, always the subject of critique, to becoming the quiet achiever assisting others to deliver their outcomes reliably.?
One lesson I learnt from this experience is one I should have learned from the airlines.?Every day an air lift aircraft fails to fly a mission as directed, is a day of benefit never ever delivered.?It is a day of disappointment, and of consequence lost forever.?It can never be recovered by any means.?A completely lost opportunity. Productivity and reliability really, really matter.
Air mobility therefore is a service which sits at the heart of most other military activities and many national activities.??It must work always, and always deliver outcomes on time, as promised.?Time spent to make aircraft better, waiting for parts, doing maintenance, training people, waiting for critical materials all detract from delivering tonnes and people over distance quickly.
“We fly important people and stuff to tough places on time.”
Posted 18 Nov 2022 (Join the Discussion)
Question 2: Why does air mobility matter for Australia? What are we actually buying?
Warfare uses three key pillars that I learned and like from my days at Army Staff College: firepower, manoeuvre, and protection.?The most obvious of these are firepower and protection: the best gun vs the best armour.?The most interesting and the one I believe has the most benefit with the least realised cost is manoeuvre.
Manoeuvre suggests the prospect of leveraging firepower by applying it where an adversary is weak, and amplifying protection by not being where the enemy is strong.?Manoeuvre is achieved through having insight, judgement, speed, and reach: the capacity to understand the enemy’s decisive point, or point at which they are disadvantaged, and then threatening that point.
This decisive point can be conceptual but in a physical sense can be the location of critical enemy capability – perhaps logistics, fighting forces, or means of manoeuvre.
The area Australia “has an interest in” is huge and well represented by the USINDOPACOM area which is permeated by people, transport routes, economic nodes, and resources that are essential to Australia and its friends.
The distance from Sydney to Hawaii is about 8,100 km.?From Sydney to Mumbai is over 10,000 km.?For an aircraft at 0.8 Mach (roughly 1000 kph) this is on average 9 hours flight. For an aircraft at 300 knots (roughly 550 kph) this is 16 hours flight. So, speed and distance matter.
The vastness of the area means that surveillance in detail is difficult even from space.?Changes can occur between satellite passes and certainly can occur between aircraft and ship visits.?This is both good and bad. We can surprise others if we have the right capability.?We can be surprised by others and be unable to respond if we have the wrong capability.
Bringing these ideas of widely dispersed people and infrastructure, and manoeuvre together, air mobility becomes critical as armies cannot traverse the area without aircraft or ships.?Ships carry the weight but may not deliver the required speed to achieve required manoeuvre.
From this we can see that what we are buying when we buy air mobility is not aircraft.?It is in fact speed, reach, presence (akin to concurrency), payload, and access (ability to land and take off where we need to): what I will later explore under the headings of closure, presence, and access.
The value for money question becomes how much closure, presence, and access we can have for the money we are spending to buy and sustain?
Question 3: What are Australia's national requirements for air mobility??What performance pillars can be used to specify requirements for and assess air mobility fleet options? How can they be applied?
I will use closure, efficiency, access, availability, balance, and presence as pillars.
Requirements in Defence planning often stem from scenario analysis that steps through a series of stages in a possible battle.??These are really jumps between states and unless considered carefully can miss the point that logistics is both a game of state (being the measured parameter at any one time) and rate, being the trend change of state over a period.?
This is a bit obscure so an example: the STATE of the fuel tank in my car is 40litres.?The RATE of fuel usage is 10 litres per 100km.?Assuming a small reserve of 10 litres I should be able to make 300km which is just after the next refuel station.
Good scenario planning will consider a range of states and rates as well as disruptions such as weather or the actions of the enemy or a neutral nation upon whom we might be depending.?In short, the specific numerical requirements are difficult and inevitably can be wrong.?Many have said the actual requirement for air mobility is as much as we can afford.?This is perhaps closer to the truth, but what is the quanta we are buying so we can judge value for money and avoid the unrecoverable opportunity cost of buying an expensive but unproductive capability??
CLOSURE is a great measure.?It suggests that output is the movement of freight or people over a distance within a defined period.?Closure can be specified as tonne nautical miles per hour (tonne nm/hr) or if people movement is a key measure by people (ppl nm/hr).?The bigger it is the better.?Closure is primarily affected by speed, range, and aircraft payload.?Range matters because it potential avoids dead time on ground refuelling; clearly air-refuelling is a benefit to closure as there is no dead time on the ground. Secondary factors are efficient load preparation and marshalling, capacity to use standard loaded pallets without provision for walkways for direct transfer between C17 and tactical aircraft, all pallets loaded at maximum load (commonly 10,000 lbs), integration of passengers safely with freight loads, and strong floors for wheeled vehicle loads.
EFFICIENCY considers the cost of the proposed movement and recognises that all input resources are finite.?Surprisingly, the least limited of these resources in warfare is money, the most limited is people because we can’t make more in a hurry, aircraft are also a very limited resource.?Spare parts and consumables fall somewhere in the middle and can generally be monetised.?I see the true measures of efficiency as perhaps threefold:
ACCESS is at best an educated guess which depends on terrain; runway length width, surface, and softness; weather; enemy action; supporting approach aids and services; aircraft mounted systems such as GPS, enhanced vision, synthetic vision; armour; defensive aids; structural, electrical and digital survivability.?A matrix approach best enables comparisons.
AVAILABILITY.?Availability is ratio of aircraft available from the total fleet available to generate outcomes.?For example, in his article of 18 Nov, Nigel Pittaway noted Defence was seeking 24 aircraft of which 18 would be available for operations and of these 14 would be fully mission capable.?This means the availability planned for the C130 fleet acquisition is 58.3%.?Modern aircraft designed for high levels of return on capital are generally offering a minimum of 80% availability by avoiding such cumbersome, expensive, and disruptive activities as intermediate or deep level maintenance.??Old aircraft structures and systems cannot avoid such maintenance, but modern systems are designed to avoid it OR they can’t be sold.?Availability can be dramatically disrupted further when expensive block upgrades and obsolescence management are added in after the initial purchase in order to retain fleet alignment to OEM approved logistics support.?Remember my comment in an earlier post where is stated that every day of production lost is an unrecoverable opportunity cost.
BALANCE.?Working on the premise that air mobility is a staged process whereby C17 delivers to a tactical area and C130 or its replacement does forward distribution, modelling can show whether balance exists between the C17 strategic lift closure and the tactical capacity.??In the INDOPACIFIC context this model may be overtaken by several factors which may improve overall logistics productivity.?
PRESENCE.??This measures the capacity to be in many places within a specified window.?Some people erroneously suggest at “any one time” thus suggesting that more aircraft will be require.?I view this over a period as this allows high speed to add value and acknowledges that most military effects are planned to occur within a window of time.?The greater the dispersion of places to be the more that speed will matter.?Travelling at 300 knots is profoundly different from over 550 knots as I discussed at Question 2.
These performance pillars are best applied to a specified model or operating fleet to enable fleet vs fleet comparisons in different scenarios.?This approach enables detection of new insights and opportunities that a direct comparison of aircraft to aircraft cannot possibly illuminate.
The approach ensures that any selection of options is a contestable comparison based on meaningful parameters.?It also enables accountability in the specification of contracts and delivery of contracted performance.??
In short, I am suggesting that while aircraft vs aircraft comparison is important is potentially only one factor in a wider suite of considerations that underpin Australia’s capacity to fight and win within the available resources.??
Question 4: What are the addendum capabilities an air mobility capability should offer given its "semi-persistent" presence across the operating environment?
Air mobility is a fundamental part of the wider concept of air power; a view that sees joint effects delivered from and in the air in support of the other domains of land, sea, space and cyber. ?This is a critical idea because it supposes that air mobility is not a pillar standing alone.??
The air lift systems that deliver air mobility:
In short, these systems are pervasive and interconnected.?They also have a very low density across the theatre except when they “swarm” to support a focussed military strategy.
At his presentation to the Williams Foundation in 2016, LTGEN Davis USMC proposed:
“Every platform a SENSOR, every platform a SHOOTER, every platform a SHARE/ CONNECTOR, and every platform an EW Node.”
Subject to affordability, practical implementation, value for money and opportunity cost, this approach offers force level resilience, enhancement, and insight across the widest area.?If operated throughout the continuum of conflict it also normalises our efforts in peacetime while creating increased uncertainty for adversaries in conflict.
There are four broad classes of addendum capability air refuelling, surveillance and reconnaissance, communications, weapons.
Air refuelling including to offload fuel, consolidate airborne fuel and to enable enhance payload and range.?I note that with only seven KC30 and over 100 boom and 24 probe refuellable receivers the ratio of supply to demand for air refuel in RAAF is exceptionally low and unlikely to support enduring air operations over a wide area.?I also note the likely presence of US Navy with the theatre with many more probe refuelled aircraft and the potential for some Australian and other helicopters to be air refuellable in future.
For air refuel integration, both C130 and KC390 offer options for integration of Cobham air refuel systems, but only KC390 doe this natively and with the addition of a natively integrated probe for fuel consolidation, payload improvement, take-off improvement, and range improvement refuelled form other KC390.?RAF C130K for a while had probe refuel and some US C130 have integrated UARSSI fuel receivers, but these are expensive, not native to the aircraft and would increase demand on limited booms.
Surveillance and reconnaissance pods have been proven on both C130 and KC390 albeit only KC390 does so as a native capability. Reconnaissance integration enables confident self-assessment of airfields from a safe distance before committing to land and so aids access.?Surveillance (visual, radar or EW) particularly if able to be conducted through cloud from cruise altitude with sufficient fidelity, offers substantial sovereign capacity for improved “pattern of life” analysis and identification of non-compliant actors.?When paired with reconnaissance and direct streaming support to tactical surface operators the potential for robust detection and identification including for such matters as fishery management can be exceptional.
Future battle must consider space denied conditions.?By this I mean the denial of all or some space base services including communications, surveillance, reconnaissance, and PNT (GPS) services.?Semi-persistent aircraft that act as secure rebroadcast nodes, nodes in the network or direct communications support to other forces can add to force resilience and effect.?This support can be of exceptional value when applied over mountainous terrain such as PNG where high mountain ranges impede VHF and UHF services.?
Weapons seem attractive and may be so in some cases.?They can be of substantial value particularly if the air mobility asset can act as the weapons truck for more capable aircraft such as F35, P8 or E7.?Lockheed Martin proposes a system called Rapid Dragon which embodies palletised missile delivery by any unmodified air transport aircraft; this might have value but will naturally be complex to apply and will demand substantial logistics support.?The likelihood is that the opportunity cost of weapons integration is excessive and that better systems will be available.
In summary, addendum capabilities are likely best focussed on enhancing air refuelling and enhancing situational awareness.
Question 5: What are the sustainment risks on a new military system? How do we assure adequate confidence in potential productivity?
Unfortunately, I am going to have to dip into some solution comparison here.?To be clear, I am a fan of both C130 and KC390 when applied to their specific circumstances correctly.??They are both awesome aircraft.
Part 1 – Engines
Because propulsion systems are the most expensive bit of the aircraft and where most of the maintenance effort and reliability lies, I will focus that area for my initial abbreviated analysis.??This is also where most of the concerns about maintenance maturity will sit and where much of the effort lies in maintaining ongoing safety and productivity. Please note that my analysis here is based on informed guesses based on openly available data – I could be completely wrong.
C130 first flew in 1954 and while the A model had some drawbacks, later iterations through C130E and C130H really matured the aircraft and thousands have been sold.?Australia was one of the first direct commercial buyers of C130J bought at a time before it was fully certified and before the USAF had committed to it.?Since 1994, around 500 C130J have been manufactured with structures largely drawn from post C130A heritage, but a total new pack of engines and avionics.??This means there are about 2000 AE2100D3 engines and a similar number of propellors plus a few extras for spares.??Assuming each aircraft operates around 500 hours per year and an average life of 10 years across the fleet, we might guess that there is a combine experience of roughly 14 million engine hours.
KC390 uses the IAE V2500 engine which is also fitted to the A320 and MD90 fleet.?The A320 fleet launched in 1984 with 10,563 built as of 31 Oct 2022.?They have the majority of installed V2500 engines being around 21,000 plus spares.??On the basis that most airline aircraft need to be flying, I will assume that each aircraft flies around 4 hours daily on average.?This suggests that perhaps there have been around 270 million engine hours on V2500.??The repeat orders for these aircraft suggest that the engines perform reliably and efficiently, but more to the point they must be productive, or they would not be bought.
On this comparison the V2500 engine is the most mature engine and the one with the widest global supply chain for spare parts.?When integrated with the global Pratt and Whitney maintenance support program that delivers global fleet performance efficiencies and assured support, the foundation for confidence in procurement and through life sustainment is compelling.
For Australia, we already have direct access to the Pratt and Whitney joint facility at Christchurch NZ specifically built for support of V2500, so we have an experienced engine maintenance, repair, and overhaul facility locally available and able to be operated under the Australian Government Industry Capability framework.
Part 2 – Intermediate and Deeper Maintenance and Block Upgrades
Traditional military aviation maintenance planning is based around:
For C130J there has been additional, repetitive, unbudgeted, overhead of regular block upgrades aimed to deal with an ongoing cycle of obsolescence and upgrades of technical systems to new standards.?This cycle also causes substantial repairable stock obsolescence and procurement cycles that also are unbudgeted at the time of procurement – mostly because they can’t be defined.?Many C130 structures are “life managed” because of their original certification and various Aircraft and Engine Structural Integrity programs imposed by RAAF.?These programs assure safety through inspections, analysis, and replacement of major components.
The block cycle removes aircraft from operations for long periods and must synchronised with IM and DM.?Australia’s decision, discussed in ADM, noted the intent to buy 24 aircraft to have 18 available for 14 to be fully operational and this does not account for aircraft taken out for block upgrades or aircraft unavailable due LM.?This is 58% operational availability without discounting for block upgrades, life management, or line maintenance effort.
KC390 heritage is from the airlines and features of the Embraer E190-E2 from which most of its repairable parts are drawn.?The pressure on Embraer is to provide spare parts that have do not have an inbuilt obsolescence cycle.?Airlines purchasing such aircraft cannot afford to be swapping airframes before end of productive life. Some military specific components such as radios and data links may change, but with the fully digital backbone of KC390, such changes are likely relatively simple.
Notably KC390 does not use IM or DM at all.?All maintenance is LM and is conducted in small packages throughout the operation of the aircraft with a small footprint of personnel and parts.?I am advised that with a normal support pack contracted KC390 should achieve, based on Embraer’s global airline experience, around 80% of aircraft fully operational.
Taking away the IM/ DM program, not requiring any propellors, and only using 50% of the number of engines, the demand for workforce, spare parts, warehousing, maintenance floor space and management overhead rests strongly in favour of KC390.
And yet the Australian comment in regard of KC390 being not suitable is that its maintenance program is immature.?It would be good to understand the basis of that analysis, because the actual costs and productivity variances are substantial and indicate a decision which may not be value for money.
Posted 21 Nov 2022
Senate Estimates Review (Posted over several posts originally) is conducted in open forum in the Australian Parliament. These three posts report what was discussed as posted by the Parliament House website, and my analysis of what was discussed.
What was discussed?
Senator FAWCETT: Could I speak to somebody about C-130Js, please. I noticed the media release from Defence on 1 November saying that Defence will only bring forward the C-130J as an option to government for next year. Firstly, can I assume that that is subject to the DSR, the strategic review?
Air Marshal Chipman: That would be correct. All decisions will be subject to the DSR outcomes, yes.
Senator FAWCETT: Lockheed Martin's rep at the Dubai Airshow, nearly a year ago now, said that RAAF had reached out about 20 C-130Js and six KC-130Js, being the air-to-air refuelling aircraft. Is that correct? Are they part of the fleet that's being considered?
Air Marshal Chipman: We have not sought information on KC-130J air-to-air refuelling capability, no.
Senator FAWCETT: Are there any plans to deploy the aircraft to the Antarctic, given the tasking load that is on the C-17s that normally fly those six missions each year?
Air Marshal Chipman: We haven't got a specific task in line at the moment for C-130J to go to Antarctica, but the aircraft would be capable of that mission, and it has been bought for the purpose of being a utility transport aircraft.
Senator FAWCETT: So it can deploy to the Antarctic. Does it need to refuel there before returning?
Air Marshal Chipman: I'd have to take that question on notice.
Senator FAWCETT: There has been some discussion that it would need internal fuel tanks. I think we used to have them for the C-130H. Is that correct?
Air Marshal Chipman: We have previously operated C-130H to Antarctica, but I'd have to get more details on the specifics of that mission.
Senator FAWCETT: Do we still have those fuel tanks?
Air Marshal Chipman: I'll have to take that on notice.
Senator FAWCETT: If you could. I seem to recall that they were quite a specialist and expensive fit but were very fit for the purpose. The media release said that you'd evaluated a number of aircraft types. Could you tell us which other aircraft types had been evaluated?
Air Marshal Chipman: We had a look at the Airbus A400M, the Embraer KC-390 and a Japanese C-2.
Senator FAWCETT: I noticed that the Dutch defence minister, when speaking to their parliament and explaining why they had purchased the Embraer aircraft, said, essentially, that it cost less, was easier to maintain and had more capacity and more availability than the C-130J. So what operational requirements did the C-130J meet for us that it did not for the Dutch?
Air Marshal Chipman: We had a look at those four aircraft over 22 different requirements. They related to aircraft performance, certification across the roles in which we expect to utilise the aircraft and the ease with which we might transition that aircraft into service. And the C-130J came up on top in that evaluation.
Senator FAWCETT: I have a final question in terms of range and payload, given the expected increase in contestation in our near region. Operating the aircraft into the Indo-Pacific, currently, island nations that we obviously don't control are often used as refuelling stops. If we're not buying aircraft that are capable of being refuelled like the USAF's special operations C-130J, how are we planning to utilise them as a strategic airlifter if our near region is not as accessible and supportive as it currently is?
Air Marshal Chipman: We looked at the aircraft in a range of operational scenarios and were confident that the C-130J met our requirements.
Key take aways with my comments:
C130J acquisition is NOT certain until DSR reports, and that report is considered by Government.
RAAF is not seeking C130J air refuel capability.
RAAF has no Antarctic task in hand.
RAAF sees C130J as suitable for Antarctic missions.
RAAF may have had extended range fuel tanks for C130H, but these might not have been retained for C130J.??
RAAF has evaluated C130J, A400M, C2 and KC390.
The evaluation considered 22 criteria related to aircraft performance, certification across the roles, ease of transition.?C130J was the best.
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In answer to a question about dependency on island fuels and destinations, RAAF stated it has evaluated C130J in a range of operational scenarios and is confident that the C-130J met requirements.
Posted ~28 Nov 2022 (Join the Discussion)
Question 6: What workforce matters result from the different systems available?
Workforce in any system is a finite resource for several reasons:
The purpose of workforce is productivity: a ratio of output to resource applied.?Bureaucracies rarely care about wasted workforce because there is no visible price tag on it and there is no measurable output.??The main solution to need for workers in Defence is get more approved or reassign.?Rarely is the decision to do things better or differently to achieve more efficiency.?Workforce productivity is also burdened by many non-value add activities that constitute waste when tested against productivity.
So, aircrew specifically are a scarce resource.??Given we are using them not to generate flying hours but to generate closure (tonne NM) the benefit of aircraft speed in workforce productivity is enormous and even better if they don’t have to stop to refuel.??On a C130 at 300 kt with a 14t load, those three people on a 12-hr flying day will generate 50,400 tonne nm.?A KC390 with 14t at 550 kt generates 92,400 tonne nm. Nearly TWICE the productivity of C130.
Technician touch time is also a critical resource.?Difficult to analyse but perhaps a simple ratio of aircraft owned vs aircraft operational.?RAAF propose to own 24 aircraft to make 14 mission ready.?This will include deep, intermediate, and operational maintenance. They will probably need 200 OM and 100 IM and DM.?So, 300 people for 14 aircraft or 21 people per operational aircraft.??For 24 KC390, I am told they will achieve 80% mission ready with standard ILM pack.?I am told that all maintenance is done as OM, but I will assume this demands 20% more people than C130 OM (may or may not be).?That implies that there are 240 people for 19 aircraft or 12.6 people per operational aircraft.?
Converting those aircraft to closure capacity, for 14 C130 200 people produce 705,600 tonne nm per day or 3,528 tonne nm per technician.?Whereas for 19 KC390 240 technicians produce 1,755,600 tonne nm or 7,315 tonne nm per technician – over TWICE the productivity of C130.
Training needs to be efficient to achieve outcomes that are pragmatic. Productivity increase is substantial when speed is high, and maintenance is efficient. With KC390, RAAF can probably resource a workforce that is otherwise un-resourcable and may have better capability for rapid increase in a crisis.
Posted ~28 Nov 2022 (Join the Discussion)
Question 7: What infrastructure matters arise from the different systems?
Infrastructure is required in many forms:
I used to Command both the Air Lift Group and the base at Richmond NSW, west of Sydney.?Unless there has been substantial investment there in the last 12 years, the place will demand substantial refresh and rebuild of both buildings and underground services.?I won’t go into details except to say the costs and disruption of base activity during the build phase will be substantial.
What should Defence do to control those costs and avoid disruption that will reduce the effectiveness of the current C130 fleet??Keep in mind that the body of work may take more than 6 years to complete not including design phase.?It will be incredibly expensive and disruptive of both the base and the local community roads and infrastructure.?
Interesting challenge, as the ideal answer is to put the future capability somewhere else like Amberley.?But Richmond is where it will likely stay as it sustains workforce well and operationally Defence needs Richmond to be its Sydney basin air logistics hub.
The challenge is to minimise cost and disruption by minimising change but getting ready for another 20 – 30 years of air mobility operations.?Some key ideas:
These infrastructure matters could have costs in excess of $1BN, so it makes sense to get them right form the very start of SYSTEM selection.
Posted ~29 Nov 2022 (Join the Discussion)
Question 8: How might Australia’s capacity for sovereign operations be enhanced or degraded? How does the choice affect the integrated Joint and Coalition Force?
“Sovereign” suggests that for our national power to be of value, we need to be able to “be where we want to be” and “do what we want to do”.?All while limited by our affordable resources and within the constraints of the stuff we have, the geography that defines us, and the independent national interests that largely surround us.?Sovereign matters because the interests between even friendly nations can diverge.?
Australia needs to independent and seen as independent. Not a vassal state to any other nation: not an easy journey when we achieve so much value with our allies.?Equally, Australia should not always be observed as a nation that sees competitors to our friends as, inherently and without thought, our competitors.
If the foundation of military power is manoeuvre, and logistics is the key brick in that foundation, then air mobility with speed, reach and capacity really matters.
“Integrated” is a term that sits at the right, or most intimate, end of a continuum of ideas starting with “collaborative” and through “interoperable”.??All these concepts require differing levels of commonality in standards of design, certification, process, and procedure.?At the heart of it the concept addresses trust and confidence in our capacity to work together with others for mutual benefit.
With achievement on this scale, we can be assured that we can at least use communications that work, use common fuel, and loads can be transferred between aircraft of different nations.??With further maturity we can share information, interoperate crews, and build capability support arrangements such as common maintenance and repair agreements.??All of these become confidence building arrangements that support mutual interest.
Nonetheless, these ideas of “sovereign” and “integrated” are somewhat in tension. It is normal for some matters and capability to be held in reserve.?Nonetheless, nations need to avoid turning an interoperability “opportunity” into an integrated “dependency”.?After all, a dependency not met becomes very consequential very quickly.
Whatever system we buy for air mobility must ideally be able to support highly integrated joint effects (ISR, Comms, Logistics, Targeting etc) within the national joint force. It must be able to collaborate with the coalition team and must interoperate with our friends and neighbours.?Both C130 and KC390 are excellent at many pillars of this continuum.?However, only KC390 can natively assist with such matters as surveillance, reconnaissance, and air refuelling.
Cooperation with friends and neighbours is something done during good times to enable trust during tough times.?Given the wide distribution of our friends and neighbours, speed and reach matter a lot as they also underpin presence, that capacity to be in many places within the period that matters.
Posted 2 Dec 2022 (Join the Discussion)
Question 9: What are the procurement choices available and how do they affect the availability of best system and performance of the future capability?
We can buy through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process or by direct commercial sale (DCS).?
For FMS, in return for a fee paid to the US we gain US purchasing power and contract governance, alignment with US systems, and sustainment through US.?The choice is limited to what the US Government is buying.
This approach has many benefits but includes constraints such as limits on choice and local variation, lock-in to such matters as block upgrade programs, limits on sustainment arrangements, and some constraints on development.?It is an excellent process if the US has what we need. It offers direct access to global US Government support arrangements, albeit at lower priority than US Military and reduces commercial risk and demand for Australian excellence in contract specification and management.
If we purchase FMS C130J we will be tied into the USAF / US Government supply chain as we were through earlier C130 A/E/H purchases.?We must be lower priority for access to repairable parts than US Forces and must walk in lockstep with whatever upgrade or improvement programs developed by the US.?Such upgrades are undefined and unbudgetable at the time of purchase and can be VERY expensive in $ and lost use of aircraft.
Through DCS we contract a Prime contractor, who may not be the aircraft manufacturer, to supply what we need.??A Prime with experience with Australia can be held accountable to deliver the complete capability or part of it.?Contracts can be specified in Australia’s interests to deliver the outcomes we want including commercial terms that have a mix of capital and expense costs.??Instead of buying the engine fleet, we could contract power-by-the-hour through the engine manufacturer global support program.
We can implement long term arrangements using contracts such as the rolling wave performance approach where each year of success wins the next year of contract extension.??We can establish direct cooperative contracts with neighbouring countries operating the same capability.??We can become part of the global supply chain more easily.
It is very difficult to compete an FMS purchase on a level playing field with a DCS purchase.?The methods of gathering proposal details and the nature of costs vary widely.?Government is usual presented an analysis comparing apples with oranges that does not surface all the benefits and risks.?
Unfortunately, the recent history of DCS projects underperforming suggests a high level of preference for FMS purchasing, distrust in commercial supply, and under-confidence in our own capability to buy DCS.??All at the cost of not getting the best option just because the US FMS system can’t supply it.
The standing wry joke for is that no Defence person has ever been sacked for buying FMS...
Posted 2 Dec 2022 (Join the Discussion)
Question 10: What do each of an FMS C130 or DCS K390 look like and how can Australia maximise benefit?
FMS C130 offers the purchasing power of the US with the relatively small addition of an FMS fee.??We gain access to the US military repairable parts supply chain as it has been contracted by the US, commonly in US.?Opportunities for participation as a supplier are wholly dependent on the interest of key suppliers.?There is no motivation for the US to agree to any Australian Industry Capability to generate Australian sovereign capacity.?They must keep their own capability sustainable and operative.??Underlying this is that the structural and supply heritage of C130 was laid down in the mid-1950’s and has barely changed, and is heavily invested with long contract arrangements, reducing the opportunity for global supply partnership in manufacture of major systems.
DCS KC390 varies widely from this robust and mature manufacture of new versions of old aircraft. It has more capability elements, more opportunity for commercial participation, and more potential for collaboration with regional and global partners.
KC390 is manufactured using high performance, precision automated part manufacturing and assembly.?Parts manufactured for KC390 are pre-drilled and shimless fit; they always fit and don’t need specialist process in the field to drill parts to fit.??Parts can easily be manufactured anywhere that the right systems exist.??In Australia we are developing this capability.?This also means the post battle damage repair parts can be manufactured and fitted here in Australia.?Embraer is motivated to expand its market and has stated an intent to expand its global supply chain to include new sources from client countries.?South Korea is already in negotiation.
KC390 engines are already a very common item globally with over 20,000 in service.?MRO is already in place in NZ.?Pratt & Whitney offer a support program which can deliver power-by-the-hour, thus reducing the cost of owning fitted engines and a large pool of spare engines.??It also increases opportunity for efficient engine replacement during global deployments.??There is no need for propellors...??Capital savings are substantial and contract arrangements can assure delivery of engine performance and replacement / repair.
Air refuel pods for KC30 (Airbus A330 MRTT) are maintained in UK, with substantial lag and limits in availability.??With KC390 potentially bringing another 50 drogue pods into service, a local repair venue will be commercially viable and drive up assurity and timeliness of repair.
A DCS solution also means that all three of these KC390 key pillars can be established as collaboration arrangements with our Asia Pacific neighbours South Korea, Japan, NZ (B757 replacement), and Singapore who also may buy KC390 as they have similar needs to Australia.??An FMS C130J solution might offer a limited selection of these opportunities but must always pivot on the interests of the US.
Posted 4 Dec 2022 (Join the Discussion)
Question 11:?What are the C130J / KC390 options?
Disclaimer: My data is open source, my calculations have many assumptions, I may have made an error, but…
Baseline: Defence wants to buy 24 C130J to have 14 available to fly 7,000 hours annually.?At the closure rate calculated, based on aircraft speed and payload, fleet has the capacity for 264 tonne per day.?C130J fleet proposal costs CAPEX at USD 6.136Bn, total 30 Year Cost of USD 6.892 Bn CAPEX in 2017 dollars.
Defence may be seeking a total number of aircraft, a specified mission availability, a closure capacity, a limiting capital budget, or a limiting total cost for life budget.
Model 1: Buy the number of KC390 that offer the same number of MISSION AVAILABLE aircraft to generate the sane number of hours.?Comparison:
Model 2: Buy a FLEET OF 24 KC390 and operate it at the proportionally higher rate to C130J (8,800 hrs vs 7,000 hrs)
Model 3: Buy the EQUIVALENT CLOSURE of the C130J capability and operate at reduced hours (2,800 hrs vs 7,000 hrs)
Model 4: Buy the NUMBER OF KC390 AFFORDABLE within the specified C130J CAPEX budget and operate at higher hours (15,166 hrs vs 7,000 hrs)
Model 5: Buy the NUMBER OF KC390 AFFORDABLE within the specified C130J TOTAL CAPEX and OPEX budget and operate at lower hours (15,166 hrs vs 7,000 hrs)
Summary: KC390 offers opportunity for substantial improvements on many measures.?There are many additional factors this simple analysis does not consider. The potential to buy better capability AND make immediate Defence budget savings as great as $4.6Bn seems to be worth considering.??
Posted 4 Dec 2022 (Join the Discussion)
Some have suggested we have enough air refuelling capability. I guess in a crisis seven KC30 might make a small difference, but with over 100 aircraft of our own needing air refuelling there are clearly not enough.
War of this nature is a come-as-you-are party. We won’t be able to get more refuelling in time for it to matter. We need to start thinking about alternative solutions that can affordably and efficiently deliver the additional capacity we need.
Whatever we get to do that future refuel task should ideally be useful for something else while waiting for war time missions to come along. Maybe it could also do ISR and air mobility.
Posted 5 Dec 2022 (Join the Discussion)
Question 12:?What strategies are available to resolve the uncertainty of suitability and assess actual cost of the proposed capability?
The benefits of KC390 appear clear.?The headwinds to change appear to be unwillingness to embrace more work, OR fear of yet another “bad” procurement.
The second problem is the real one.?This fear results from a traditional acquisition approach of buy the whole capability as a total package; all pivoting on one decision.?Unfortunately, this does not embrace uncertainty an complexity and also brings all the commitments and risk to the front.?A useful alternate strategy is to control the risk through a series of stages; a programmatic “crawl, walk, run” approach.
Stage 1 – Test and Evaluate.?Lease two KC390 with an option to buy, develop a test, validation and certification program run by a specialist organisation such as the RAAF ARDU.?Test and develop embryonic training, engine support and logistic support arrangements.?Validate datalink and communications.?Confirm battleworthiness of systems and TTP.?Assess validity of synthetic and enhanced vision systems for battle conditions including visual flight in PNG.?Conduct actual certification testing against all possible operational roles including air mobility, ISR, firefighting, and air refuelling, and environments including Antarctica.?Review the airworthiness certification.?Develop the infrastructure requirements.?Assess cyber risk.?Consider collaboration with other interested nations such as Netherlands and South Korea; maybe Japan, Singapore and New Zealand.
Stage 2 – Initial Mobility, Air Refuel and ISR Capability. Subject to achievement of suitable test outcomes, convert the two leases to a purchase and then lay in additional fleet acquisition.??If they don’t pass, buy C130J then.?This remaining stage one purchase of perhaps an additional 6 – 8 aircraft could then replace C27J with that capability being quickly disposed to countries with less demanding requirements.
Stage 3 – Full Mobility, Air Refuel ad ISR Capability.?Following confirmation of Initial Capability Performance, retire C130J and replace with a further batch of perhaps 10 KC390 to achieve the maximum force benefits and stage the development of workforce, and logistics.
Stage 4 – Boom Refuel Capability.?Following the confidence and lay in of capability in earlier stages and proof of KC390 Boom Refuelling by L3 Harris, compete the KC390, KC30 and whatever the USAF buys as its new tanker as future boom tanker capability.?Perhaps funded in part by the savings from not buying expensive unproductive C130J.
This staged approach retains C130J as the bridging capability, removes the unsatisfactory C27J, controls costs, builds information to inform decisions, enables use of the rapid manufacturing capability of Embraer’s automated systems, establishes confidence in the Prime Contractor, builds regional relationships, and advances Australia’s capacity to win future regional security contests.
Posted 5 Dec 2022 (Join the Discussion)
Question 13: What are the consequences of getting the choice wrong? How do we consider opportunity cost and the cost of lost opportunity?
Buying a 1950’s design with a 1990 update, supported by built-in unbudgetable obsolescence management is no different to wanting to fight future war with last century’s techniques and obsolete weapons.??The consequences are profound: loss of sovereignty, loss of security, money wasted on stuff that could be better spent elsewhere.
I have suggested the opportunity to save over $2Bn – that money could buy us more air tankers, affordable housing for perhaps 40,000 people displaced by fire and floods, maybe 6,000 village-scale off grid power systems, or just fix our over-extended Federal budget.?My point is that the C130J decision at face value is a huge opportunity cost and a profound waste.
If we do not buy KC390 we miss the opportunity to have improved air refuelling, improved ISR, high speed responsive air mobility, greater access to address our strategic interests in Antarctica, removal of non-crashworthy seating from our entire mobility force, capacity for increased global reach to support pour future war operations.?We also lose the opportunity to transform the air logistics program for Defence.?This cost of lost opportunity is even greater that the opportunity cost.
If we do not buy KC390 we miss the opportunity to advance our economy through enhanced global supply chain, development of local manufacturing for rapid aircraft structural repair, integration of unique Australia capabilities like the SINAB pod, establishment of sovereign air refuelling pod MRO, establishment of regional support MRO for aircraft and engines.?Very little of this can be delivered through an FMS C130J buy.
Defence concerns that we cannot take the risk of buying the wrong aircraft are real but over-emphasised and manageable.?A staged programme approach conducted quickly through a detailed test and evaluation program can satisfactorily surface all the information necessary to better inform the value and suitability of KC390 while not unreasonably delaying purchase of C130J if that is the outcome.
This choice will define air mobility for 30 years and may not be affordably recoverable if wrong.??We won’t be able to recover much of the $10Bn spent on C130J if it happens to be wrong for our future.
Posted 6 Dec 2022 (Join the Discussion)
How do we find a way to assess the suitability of future air mobility options affordably, without precipitate commitment, and perhaps building international partnerships along the way?
Initial comment: when we committed to buy the current C130J fleet, it was a paper aircraft that had not yet flown.?In spite of that and our unwillingness to properly invest in the initial capability, Australia eventually gained the value of an excellent aircraft that met its missions of the day.?Today is no different, we can again take an approach that embraces the value of new technology and meets today’s missions which have evolved directly from substantial changes in our strategic context.
Previously I have suggested Defence in Australia put off the big decision to buy C130J and lease two KC390 for 2 years for a test, evaluation, and certification activity.?How might this work and what would it achieve?
The purpose is to collect data and for Defence to be an informed buyer with independent data.?
The system under assessment should be the NATO standard KC390 variant that the Netherlands has committed to including fitment of advanced DIRCM systems
The scope of assessment should be operational and cover:
The outcomes of assessment should be a full data pack that enables true and complete comparison against the C130 informing understanding of:
The integration of other aligned international partners such as South Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal and so on could offer additional insights, sharing of cost burden, future collaboration on sustainment and development.?By including Embraer and potentially Brazilian Air Force, we could also improve the quality and velocity of the assessment.?This could be the foundation of a global KC390 cooperation program.
Assessment could be based alongside C130J at RAAF Base Richmond, technically managed by RAAF Aircraft Research and Development Unit and supported by the RAAF Air Mobility Group.
The benefit is that a hugely important and expensive choice for Australia’s future would be well informed and sized for purpose, and any resultant procurement process would have better-defined scope for rapid delivery within a better-defined budget and procurement plan.
Final Commentary
Following my public commentary on LinkedIn and various letters I have written I received a letter from a senior Government member.?
While addressed personally to me it did address any of my analysis and merely re-asserted previously made public statements which demonstrate that the Government has made its mind up and that there is no room for alternative solutions.??The letter states in part:
·??????Defence seeks a low-risk, proven, mature and affordable replacement aircraft to meet Australia's air mobility needs. Defence approached a number of aircraft manufacturers and received information on their respective capabilities. The merits of each aircraft type were assessed and compared against Australia's capability needs.?
·??????The C-130J Hercules aircraft represents the only option that meets Australia's capability requirements and assures Defence's medium air mobility capability without introducing substantial cost, schedule and capability risks.
In my opinion, these words are all very carefully chosen to reflect the and support the Government decision to buy C130J. I recognise and agree the need for management of cost, schedule, and capability risk management.??But I do not accept that C130J is the only solution. ?(Reminder: I used to command this capability as Air Commodore (Brigadier General) Commander of Air Lift Group and was qualified as a Tactical Captain on C130H.)
C130J might be low technical risk but has high strategic risk. KC390 is already proving to also have low technical risk and will be excellent at addressing strategic risk.
I think the uncertainty of C130J through life cost and operational availabuility indicate it is not the solution.?
I see no reason for urgency to replace C130J quickly, so schedule risk is only what Defence wants it to be.
To address those three risk pillars identified by the Government leader, I have proposed the conduct of a Comprehensive Capability Assessment.??Proposed over two years, led by the RAAF Aircraft Research and Development Unit, potentially at Richmond, conducted under a structured assessment program, using leased aircraft, supported by Embraer and potentially the Brazilian Air Force and other industry partners, partnered by other nations, this would enable certainty of understanding of all the various factors that under pin the project and become a foundation for assured contract outcomes.
Downsides are:
Upsides are:
The consequences of buying C130J are profound and mostly not in Australia's interest:
Amplifying these matters is the strong potential that nations like Netherlands, Portugal and others will move toward KC390, and we will be the last major purchase of C130J.
KC390 resolves all these matters and with manageable program risk if an approach like the Comprehensive Capability Assessment is taken.
Commercially, I know that industry is interested in progressing, but no industry leaders will advance a contest of Government position on this matter for fear of being damaged profoundly.
Conclusion
We have an opportunity for a better and more affordable capability, and a sound approach to establishing the potential benefits before making an unrecoverable commitment. ?I understand that this will not be easy but spending $10Bn should not be taken lightly as the opportunity costs and consequences are exceptional.??
I also understand that Governments need to be seen as decisive and strong on Defence, but this necessity should not lead to blind commitment to untested decisions.?I accept I could be wrong on KC390, but I see no evidence from Government or Defence that there has been any investigation or consideration of the matters I have raised. ?A properly structured analysis would be affordable, valuable, and not intolerably disruptive of Australia’s air mobility capability.
Attended Port Moresby Business College
8 个月Any possible ways that I can apply?
??aircraft acquisition ??Leasing ??private charter ??parts sales
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Distinguished Engineer, Flight Control Systems at EMBRAER's Chief Engineer Office
1 年This gentleman knows his stuff. Impressive analysis.
i/c at Preparing for Grey-Nomadding, between consultancies.
1 年That KC390’s a ‘fairly interesting’ bit of kit … it will be an interesting time for Defence, nonetheless!