Auckland High Court Judges Falsifying Facts to Distort and Defeat Natural Justice. "Irrespective of what the law says."- Downs J
The following is the legal content of a recall and recusal application for Justice Peters in response to his decision: [2024] NZHC 2399,
On 26 August 2024, I received a “decline of leave” to file new proceedings by Justice Peters, CIV-2024-404-1896 [2024] NZHC 2399, this decision is procedurally and factually incorrect and therefore MUST be recalled, and to avoid the perception of bias, I request Peters J recuse himself for an impartial judge to grant leave on the legal merits the same simply needs to establish.
The Courts appear to be deliberately exploiting the unlawful s166 restraint as an excuse to obstruct all proceedings under the basis of “no legal merit” which is in err and amounting to mass human rights violations of over 85 separate cases and extensive breaches of human rights under s27 NZBORA 1990 for indefinite delays.
With regards to the errors of this judgement:
First cause of action
[3] In the first cause of action, Ms Dunstan alleges breaches by two lawyers, Ms Emma Gibbs and Ms Christina Riddell, of rules of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 (“rules”) and of s 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“NZBORA”). Section 27 affirms the right to justice. Ms Dunstan alleges that on 14 December 2018 she filed urgent applications for a temporary protection order and under the Care of Children Act 2004 but the two lawyers concealed these from Judges by Ms Gibbs making an urgent application on 19 December 2018. Ms Dunstan contends the application filed by Ms Gibbs prevented her application(s) from being heard.
Due to the courts obstructing 17 matters remitted from the Court of appeal in my 17.5 case win on 14/02/2023: [2023] NACA25, [WITH ONLY THE ONE BEFORE Justice Anderson ever heard and ruled in my favour] none of these matters raised years ago have been heard and as such can not be lawfully determined.
Second to fourth causes of action
[4] By way of background to the second, third and fourth causes of action, in late-December 2018 Ms Dunstan was arrested on charges of contravening a protection order and one of abduction. Ms Dunstan appeared before a Justice of the Peace in the New Plymouth District Court on 29 December 2018. She was remanded in custody until 3 January 2019, when she was granted bail.
This is a false statement and appears to be a deliberate “falsified finding” for the courts to conceal an obvious miscarriage of justice that I was never brought before any judicial officer or justice of the peace to seek bail, as per my sworn evidence. Further more, As Per Justice Andersons admissions in her judgement issued pertaining to other remitted matters I was successful in on 29 September 2023: [2023] NZHC 2742: “no one can be charged for abduction for acting in good faith to protect children” As such, pretending this was not a malicious charge is in err and contemptuous of her finding in, also noting the exhaustive efforts of Auckland based District Court Judges to deny facts and obstruct legally strong charges filed:
[42] The charges were referred to Judge BA Gibson. By his minute of 14 March 2023, Judge Gibson refused to accept the four charges for filing. Judge Gibson considered that the Abduction Charge was not adequately particularised in that it asserted the children were “detained unlawfully” when what is required under s 210 of the Crimes Act is an intention to deprive a parent or guardian of possession of a young person unlawfully.
Justice Peters goes on to dissect the statement of claim to prevent my RIGHT to justice to have these matters heard and judged accordingly on their ACTUAL merits, not falsified facts or “imaginings” of Judges now taking to making their own submissions to obstruct proceedings:
[5] In her second cause of action, Ms Dunstan alleges a conspiracy to bring a false accusation against her, such being a crime pursuant to s 115 of the Crimes Act 1961.”
This has been substantiated with police records pertaining to a call Emma Gibbs made to Sergeant Vickers at Manukau station on 17 December 2018 to change constable Crabtree “K3 no offense” of 14/12/2018 to “K9 arrest” in the NIA file and is pending a call over, indefinitely stayed by Judge Rae in Northshore court since being remitted by Justice Brewer on 15/05/2024.
THE FOLLOWING ARE VERY SERIOUS CHARGES THAT JUSTICE DOWNS REFUSED THE EXPANSION OF SCOPE AT THE HEARING BEFORE HIM STATING: “No I will not hear anything on that, If you want to raise those matters that will require separate proceedings.”
For any judge to now obstruct that right is in breach of my rights to justice under s27 NABORA 1990 AND IN CONTEMPT OF Justice Downs directions. [The audio exists and should be heard prior to judges making uninformed assertions of how they “imagine” the hearing went- bound by the findings of Justice Ellis in W v W pertaining to an unfair trial rendering the judgement “null”.
[6] Ms Dunstan’s third cause of action concerns the circumstances in which she was remanded in custody on 29 December 2018. Ms Dunstan alleges that a lawyer, Mr Paul Keegan, informed the Court that Ms Dunstan consented to a remand in custody for six days, when Ms Dunstan did not.
[7] In her affidavit, Ms Dunstan states that Mr Keegan has advised her he has no recollection or record of the events alleged. The Court’s record of the appearance is annexed to Ms Dunstan’s affidavit. On that, the Justice of the Peace dealing with the matter has recorded that Mr Keegan was acting as the duty lawyer, that the police opposed bail, and that there was to be a remand in custody “by consent” to 3 January 2019
[8] Ms Dunstan alleges that what occurred was in breach of s 113 of the Crimes Act, and that Mr Keegan breached rr 13.2 and 13.13 of the rules. The effect of s 113 of the Crimes Act is to render fabrication of evidence by means other than perjury a criminal offence. Rule 13.2 requires a lawyer to respect the processes of the Court, and r 13.13 to protect their client from being convicted but to refrain from misleading the Court.
[9] In her fourth cause of action, Ms Dunstan alleges that her right to justice under s 27 NZBORA was breached during the six day period between 29 December 2019 and 3 January 2019, when Ms Dunstan was remanded in custody. Ms Dunstan alleges that she was detained without a [*lawful] warrant for six days of solitary confinement and that this amounted to an act of torture
Fifth cause of action
[10] The fifth cause of action concerns the circumstances in which Ms Dunstan pleaded guilty to two charges, one of breaching a protection order and the other of breaching a parenting order. Ms Dunstan, represented by Ms Echo Hoanga, then sought a discharge without conviction on the two charges, which Judge Johns granted on 3 May 2019. Ms Dunstan contends that she was not guilty and should not have been coerced into pleading guilty.
The judge conceals the initial plea was “not guilty” I was then coerced into a false guilty plea as a “plea deal” to release my passport to return home. This in no way reflects guilt and is on par with recent findings of unethical police tactics to mislead justice as per “Complex Investigation Phased Engagement Model (CIPEM), which was at the heart of a false confession”
Justice Peters then declines leave in para [12] stating “for the following reasons.”
[13] The first two causes of action have no prospect of success. Any alleged breach of the rules is a matter for the Law Society. Any alleged breach of NZBORA is not a matter to be levelled against solicitors. "
It is not for a judge to make a predetermined outcome of the case and this says more about the prejudicial bias of the courts to protect offenders when they are solicitors. The court should be deeply ashamed of how blatantly they discriminate against members of the public when the offenders are solicitors. Simply because a case is not “guaranteed success” is not a basis to prevent the “right to ventilate a view or have a case heard.” And if this case is “doomed to fail”, it would only be due to Judicial bias and not based on the legal merit of the case. Thus establishing plausible grounds Justice Peters is not “impartial” and should recuse himself to avoid the appearance of bias.
Most recently a solicitor and two police officers have been charged for Allan Halls false arrest and convictions in the appeal he secured in decision [2022] NZSC71 Allan Hall v the Queen. Therefore there is a precedent and a matter of public importance with the collaboration of police and solicitors to conspire to bring false accusations which amounts to a matter of public importance affecting multiple victims- not just me and Allan Hall.
“Former cops, Crown prosecutor ordered to appear in court after ‘methodical’ investigation into Alan Hall miscarriage of justice” Anna Leask Senior Journalist - crime and justice ·NZ Herald· 23 Aug, 2024
[14] Likewise the third cause of action. It raises several issues incapable of determination, such as whether the Justice of the Peace correctly recorded that the remand in custody was by consent; if so whether Ms Dunstan did consent; and if not whether there was any prospect of bail given the police opposition. There is no prospect of running these matters to ground now, if indeed they have not already been run to ground.
This is false and knowingly in err. Simply having Paul Keegan appear to speak to his conduct would be a good start. Currently as no evidence exists to dispute my sworn (and logical evidence) the balance of probabilities states that is correct and was found in LCRO 86/2023 para [73] “It is probable that Ms Dunstan did NOT appear in court.” decision of Rex Maidement.
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It is unbelievable a judicial officer can draw this conclusion as common sense- however the High Court Judges are so determined to distort this fact and feign confusion at a perceived “complexity” as to whether I did or did not “agree to remain in custody for 6 days by consent”? WHY?!.
[15] The events Ms Dunstan seeks to litigate in her fourth cause of action are the subject of a judgment Downs J delivered in November 2023, following a two day hearing. This was a proceeding Ms Dunstan brought against the Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections.
[16] Downs J found on the facts that Ms Dunstan was not in solitary confinement and that she had not established the other allegations she had made. Downs J said that as a result, no question of torture, or breach of statutory duty of any claim in tort or of consequential damage arose. I note also that the proposed proceeding with which Grau J was concerned appears to have been addressing similar matters.
It would be wise for the Judges to proceed cautiously when championing obvious errors of law and unethical conduct of judges who have “strayed to the fray” and become involved in proceedings, making their own “extra judicial” submissions that no one asked for: nbsp; nbsp; CIV-2022-404-002159 [2023] NZHC 3221
[27] I do not doubt Ms Dunstan felt isolated and vulnerable. However, given the features identified, I conclude she was not in solitary confinement irrespective of how that concept is defined.” nbsp; [55] I find Ms Dunstan did not make an initial telephone call, or any other. This determination is consistent with the records. It is also consistent with all of the other evidence, including Ms Dunstan’s and that given by Ms Phillips. However, I also find Ms Dunstan was not prevented from making calls as she alleges”
Thus putting this breach of statutory rights down as “a source of my frustration as I simply mustn’t have requested any calls” and being gaslit by a judge attempting to “recreate facts” by alleging: “I am mistaken.”
This amounts to an act of psychological abuse by a Judge.
[56] I am not persuaded Ms Dunstan asked to call the Australian Consulate, for the reasons identified by Mr Cuff; that he would have remembered such a request—and documented it. I accept Ms Dunstan believes she made such a request, but I consider she is mistaken."
Mr Cuff gave evidence under oath that he “walked off” and did not hear the conversation or requests for calls.
[53] In cross-examination, Mr Cuff said another officer dealt with Ms Dunstan’s initial phone call, as he left to deal with other duties
[45] Ms Dunstan is correct she was not allowed visitors at the centre. But this is because no visits are available at the centre, which is explained in the induction pack and which Ms Dunstan had. Mr Cuff and Mr Bennett said had Ms Dunstan been in custody for more than six days, she would have been transferred to Arohata Prison to facilitate in-person visits. Their evidence recognises the statutory entitlement to visitors is weekly; Ms Dunstan was not in custody for a week”
Another “error of fact” by Judge Downs, I was taken by police on 28/12/2018 and detained until 3/01/2019- this is, as a matter of fact, 7 days amounting to a week.
[17] Given Downs J’s findings of fact, there is no merit in the fourth cause of action. It seeks to relitigate issues already addressed. It is not saved because it is against individual Corrections officers rather than the Department of Corrections. nbsp; [61] That a single page is missing does not necessarily imply anything sinister. After all, Ms Dunstan did not complain about her treatment until 2022, and the records go back several years. Approached the other way, Ms Dunstan’s incarceration at the centre is documented, and that documentation is unremarkable. nbsp; The judge is unable to comment on the importance of a document, or whether it is “remarkable” or not until seeing it. As such this is aiding and abetting contempt of disclosure orders made by Associate Judge Gardiner which corrections obviously breached.
[18] As to the fifth cause of action, Ms Dunstan swore or affirmed an affidavit in support of her successful application for discharge in which she acknowledged her offending. Aside from anything else, it is too late now to seek to resile from that admission.
This is inaccurate and disproved with multiple convictions quashed due to unlawful and unethical practices as traversed in Justice Frances statements: “High Court judge Simon France excoriated the interviews, saying the man had been manipulated, and his confession was improperly obtained and not credible. The interviews were not a pursuit of a “neutral truth” but “a sustained pursuit of a particular ‘truth’”, Justice France ruled.”
It is NEVER “too late” to correct a miscarriage of Justice- as per Allan Halls case and most pointedly proven post-mortem with Peter Ellis- one would hope not every victim will have to wait THAT LONG for justice- another great shame of the Judiciary. Case law: Peter Hugh McGregor Ellis v The King - SC 49/2019.
It is now necessary to seek a recall and recusal for this matter to allow to justly proceed, relying on precedents of:
a)Judge Rae: CRI;2024-009-5486 issued 2 September 2024 CRI;2024-009-5486
“It has been drawn to my attention that there is no longer a District Court at Rangiora therefore my decision as to where the Charging Document must be filed is wrong. As a result I recall and rescind the decision I gave on 30 August 2024. The full file will be referred to another Judge for a decision to be made under s 26 Criminal Procedure Act 2011. G A Rea DCJ”
b) And the binding precedent of Justice Peters [2023] NZHC 3089.
[8] Given that conclusion, [errors of law] , I consider the appropriate course would be for me to recall the judgment, and delete [76]. I ask Mr Deliu and Mr Hodge to file brief memoranda as soon as possible (ideally before 4pm, 6 November 2023) if they have any objection to that course, or wish to suggest another
I submit Justice Peters is not impartial in these proceedings and has ignored mandatory considerations, including the apparent miscarriage of justice and Justice Downs submissions in the corrections department matter, over riding legislation and falsifying facts such as:
[3] On Saturday, 29 December 2018, Mr Dunstan appeared in the New Plymouth District Court on two charges of contravening a protection order and one of child abduction. The Court remanded Ms Dunstan in custody, and directed she be “brought back” on Thursday, 3 January 2019.
This is not a submission either party to those proceedings made. This was Justice Downs falsifying of facts to conceal an obvious breach of human rights and breach of protocol which Paul Keegan would have confirmed had the summons not been set aside by Justice Downs, for what appears to be, so as not to contradict his predetermined defense for the corrections department and outcome.
[4] Ms Dunstan was taken to the New Plymouth Remand Centre. The centre is a small, custodial unit run by the Department of Corrections. Ms Dunstan arrived there at 10.05 am.
Justice Downs is aware the warrant exclusively named “Whanganui prison” and NOT New Plymouth- as such any time I was held at New Plymouth there was no warrant (lawful or otherwise) for that location, as such- on a matter of fact and established point of law that meets the legal definition of “arbitrary detention” under s3 Habeas Corpus Act 2001 and s22 NZBORA 1990.
I complied with his suggestion to file new proceedings as the only avenue to have these matters traversed, only to be further humiliated, harassed and have my rights obstructed and denied by the High Court.
The conduct of the Auckland High Court judges is eroding the public confidence in the judiciary and MUST be regulated for the reputation of justice.
If the judges are incapable of being impartial, they have a responsibility under their oath, to transfer the matter to an impartial court to avoid the “perception” of bias or conflict of interest. Although the defamation campaign to discredit me as an effective and competent litigant is strong, the courts are acknowledging the OBVIOUS ERRORS OF LAW, in the judgments against me. [2023] NZHC 2742 Justice Andersen:
[95] I have heard no argument on this minute and have no reason to consider this conclusion is in error. With the setting aside of Judge McNaughton’s decision, arguably that decision is the operative decision on the charges that were laid, 47 and it is relevant to the exercise of my remedial discretion. However, Judge Bergseng did not call for formal statements and exhibits before making his decision. On the face of it this is a procedural error by that Judge also.