Attending the 2024 Doctrinal Conference of the Romanian Naval Forces

● I had the honour to attend on behalf of the?New Strategy Center the conference “Envisioning a Black Sea Maritime Strategy and Defining the role of Unmanned Systems in Modern Conflict”, organized by the Romanian Naval Forces on 20 and 21 November in Constanta.

● I participated in the panel “Policy and Planning: Crafting a Future Maritime Security Strategy”, with the presentation “Considerations for a Future Maritime Security Strategy – A Personal View”, focused on the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, the debates in Europe on this issue and the implications for the Black Sea region.

● The Oceans and Seas matter in Geopolitics once more; from the High North, to the Baltic, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Red Sea and the Indo-Pacific, old and new risks and threats are challenging NATO, EU and our partners all over the world.

● In May this year, RUSI hosted the “NATO's Allied Maritime Power at 75” Conference. Speakers focused on the role of carrier strike, submarines and amphibious power projection as key enablers for the Alliance’s Deterrence and Defence. Sessions explored NATO’s current planning and defence posture, the strategic challenges in the Alliance’s seas, and the potential impact of new technology.

● Admiral LISA FRANCHETTI, presented her Navigation Plan (NAVPLAN) for America’s Warfighting Navy on 18 September, this year. Beyond the remarks on China and Russia, there is one statement I would like to underline: “we have seen a breakthrough in battlefield innovation in the Black Sea and Red Sea”.

● Here is the DIA’s 2024 Annual Threat Assessment on China’s Navy and Space capabilities.

● This is China’s Fielded Conventional Strike, according to DoD 2023 Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments on PRC.

● And the Fielded Nuclear Ballistic Missiles.

● In her Navigation Plan (NAVPLAN), Admiral LISA FRANCHETTI’s strategic guidance focuses on two strategic ends: readiness for conflict with the PRC by 2027 and enhancing long-term advantage.

● And these are the 5 key Capabilities and the 4 key Enablers, as the core of the Warfighting Ecosystem.

There is still one important question: will the investments in capabilities, especially in Robotic Autonomous Systems compensate the relative Chinese advantage in platforms numbers?

● So, here are a few questions on this topic for us in Europe:

- Do Europeans consider acting on behalf of Taiwan in case of a war between the United States and China?

- Does Europe has the capabilities to credibly deter China?

- Will the conflict in Indo-Pacific lead to a vacuum that will upset deterrence in the European theater?

In the end, whatever Europeans decide, the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions are linked economically, and both theaters are linked militarily by virtue of the central role the United States plays in both.

● Very specific denial and land attack capabilities provided by the nuclear-powered attack submarines possessed by France and the United Kingdom may be an exception, as well as fifth-generation fighter jets possessed by NATO allies, particularly the F-35s. Beside taking part in the underwater fight during a war over Taiwan, French and British attack submarines could be armed with cruise missiles to target land-based Chinese anti-access/air denial capabilities, according to this Report (TWO-THEATER TRAGEDY: A RELUCTANT EUROPE CANNOT EASILY ESCAPE A SINO-AMERICAN WAR OVER TAIWAN).

However, French and British submarines would also be expected to play a critical role in ensuring NATO conventional deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic, where they would be involved in anti-submarine warfare activities against Russian attack submarines, as well as provide protection for the British and French nuclear deterrents.

So, we should expect a simultaneous heightened threat from Russia to take advantage of the situation in Indo-Pacific, as a result of which these limited French and British assets would be in high demand.

● Now, let's go back to the Black Sea!

NATO is facing a complex, volatile and unpredictable security environment in the Black Sea region which combines armed conflict of Russia against Ukraine, frozen conflicts, aggressive actions by Russia using hybrid warfare, violation of the principles of freedom of navigation, attacks on civilian infrastructure and many other that put peace and security at serious and imminent threat.

● Russia has also clearly demonstrated that it is ready to further escalate the tension in the Black Sea including by direct threat to assets and territories of NATO member states. The future trajectory of the Russian Federation remains shady, plagued by hostility and expansionist aims. This dilemma is amplified by the fact that even if the Russian Ground Forces suffered big losses in Ukraine, its Strategic Forces still remain strong.

● Russia uses militaristic rhetoric against NATO member states, including threats to use nuclear weapons. The threat of nuclear escalation must not be underestimated.

According to General Christopher Cavoli, Commander of US EUCOM and NATO SACEUR, Russia’s primary focus is on development of six specific systems:

1. a nuclear-powered cruise missile;

2. a nuclear-armed hypersonic boost glide vehicle;

3. a more capable heavy Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (Sarmat);

4. a nuclear-armed, nuclear powered underwater drone (Poseidon);

5. hypersonic cruise missiles;

6. and lasers.

These weapons provide Russia asymmetric threats to NATO and present new challenges to Western response options, according to General Cavoli.

● The Black Sea is home to several critical pipelines, and will soon host new energy projects, such as an underwater electric cable from Azerbaijan to Romania, and the?exploitation of offshore gas?resources by Türkyie, Romania and Bulgaria. In 2027 Romania will become the largest gas producer in the EU for at least a decade when the exploitation of the Neptun Deep perimeter will start, with estimated reserves of at least 100 billion cubic meters. It is worth noting that all these projects may be subject to Russian hybrid interference.

● In this complex situation, the infrastructure in the Black Sea could be in danger of disruption. Russia has been investing in capabilities that would allow specialized submarines to place explosives on the seafloor, physically endangering underwater communication infrastructure. In addition to the Russian navy, the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) — known as Russia’s “Deep-Sea Spetsnaz” — can undertake covert operations along the seabed.

● In the end, here are some of the proposals from the study “NATO’s role in addressing security threats and challenges in the Black Sea: Time for a Comprehensive Strategic Approach for the Region?”, a project jointly developed by the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) from Türkiye, the Sofia Security Forum from Bulgaria and the New Strategy Center (NSC) from Romania.

● And the ambitious Plan of Action of the this year study “The Battle for the Black Sea is not over”, developed by the NSC and the Hudson Institute from USA.

● So, what’s the way ahead? The regional initiatives? These are some examples (JEF, AUKUS, European Carrier Group Interoperability Initiative, Mine Counter-Measures Task Group Black Sea).

● Here are some conclusions and final thoughts.

● Many thanks to Vice Admiral Mihai Panait, Chief of the Romanian Naval Staff for his kind invitation and to his team for making this year Conference a great success.

● It was great to be in the company of so many great leaders, experts and professionals and to learn so much about this essential domain.