Assessing the Impact of JSOC Leadership in USASOC Units
Sal Artiaga
Irregular Warfare & National Security Strategist | Intelligence & Latin America Professional | Opinions = my own. Sharing ≠ endorsement.
Assessing the Impact of JSOC Leadership in USASOC Units
Balancing Benefits and Challenges
Opinion Paper
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Introduction
The U.S. Army continuously adapts to the evolving landscape of modern warfare, striving to develop leaders who can effectively navigate the challenges that arise in complex operational environments. Key to this development is the careful selection and placement of officers within specialized units, such as the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). Recent changes in the assessment programs for command positions, namely the Colonel Command Assessment Program (CCAP) and the Battalion Commander Assessment Program (BCAP), have led to an increased number of JSOC officers assuming leadership roles in USASOC units. This paper examines the positive and negative aspects of this leadership arrangement, with a focus on the potential challenges and implications for both organizations' operational effectiveness.
Assessment Programs: BCAP and CCAP
The U.S. Army has introduced innovative assessment programs to ensure that the most capable and effective leaders are placed in key command positions. The Colonel Command Assessment Program (CCAP) and the Battalion Commander Assessment Program (BCAP) are designed to evaluate and select the best candidates for leadership positions at the colonel and battalion commander levels, respectively. These programs are intended to provide a comprehensive and fair assessment of the candidate’s leadership skills, strategic thinking, and overall potential for success in command positions.
The BCAP is a rigorous, multi-day evaluation process that assesses the capabilities of lieutenant colonels and promotable majors aspiring to assume the role of battalion commanders. The BCAP selection process includes various components such as physical fitness tests, psychological assessments, cognitive ability tests, and interviews with senior leaders. This thorough assessment ensures that only the most qualified individuals are selected to lead battalions, enhancing the overall effectiveness and readiness of the Army.
The CCAP is designed to evaluate and select the most capable colonels and promotable lieutenant colonels for brigade command and key billet positions. Like BCAP, CCAP consists of a multi-day evaluation process that includes physical fitness tests, psychological assessments, cognitive ability tests, and interviews with senior leaders. CCAP aims to identify leaders who possess the strategic vision, leadership qualities, and adaptability necessary to succeed in the complex and dynamic operational environments that characterize modern warfare.
JSOC Influence in USASOC
The implementation of CCAP and BCAP has been a significant step forward in enhancing the U.S. Army's ability to select and develop effective leaders. These assessment programs provide a more comprehensive and objective evaluation of candidates' leadership potential, ultimately ensuring that the most capable individuals are placed in critical command positions. By identifying and promoting exceptional leaders, CCAP and BCAP contribute to the development of a more adaptive, resilient, and effective fighting force. As the nature of warfare continues to evolve, the importance of these assessment programs in maintaining the Army's edge in leadership and readiness cannot be overstated.
The implementation of the Battalion Commander Assessment Program (BCAP) and the Colonel Command Assessment Program (CCAP) has had a direct impact on the leadership dynamics within JSOC and USASOC. As these assessment programs aim to identify and promote the most capable individuals for critical command positions, they have inadvertently led to a higher number of JSOC officers assuming leadership roles within USASOC units relegating USASOC officers to TRADOC and Garrison Commands. This shift in command structure can be attributed to the rigorous evaluation process encompassing physical fitness tests, psychological assessments, cognitive ability tests, and interviews with senior leaders that both BCAP and CCAP employ. Or simply to less command influence from USASOC and JSOC on the decision and placement of subordinate commands. In either case, these assessment programs have led to a growing trend of JSOC officers serving in USASOC command positions, which raises concerns related to cultural differences, operational focus, and disparities in training and expertise between the two organizations.
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Benefits and Challenges
Challenges
JSOC and USASOC have distinct organizational cultures that influence their training, operations, and overall effectiveness. JSOC officers, accustomed to a more direct action-oriented approach, may struggle to adapt to USASOC’s emphasis on unconventional warfare, which relies heavily on relationship-building and working with indigenous forces. This cultural clash could create friction within the units and negatively impact operational effectiveness.
JSOC's primary mission is to conduct high-risk, counterterrorism operations, whereas the USASOC focuses on unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and counterinsurgency. JSOC officers leading USASOC units may prioritize direct action missions over the USASOC’s traditional areas of expertise. This shift in focus could detract from the USASOC’s effectiveness in its core mission areas.
The extensive training and expertise that JSOC officers possess in specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures may not directly translate to the skills required for USASOC operations. This potential mismatch in training and expertise could lead to a decrease in the quality of leadership and mentorship provided to the USASOC operators, adversely affecting their operational readiness and effectiveness.
Benefits
Having JSOC officers lead USASOC units could facilitate the exchange of knowledge and best practices between the two organizations. This cross-pollination could lead to improved operational capabilities for both JSOC and USASOC units, as they learn from each other's experiences and adapt their methods accordingly.
By integrating JSOC officers into USASOC leadership positions, the two organizations could develop a better understanding of each other's capabilities and limitations, ultimately enhancing their ability to work together in joint operations. This improved interoperability could contribute to more effective and efficient joint missions.
Assigning JSOC officers to lead USASOC units could serve as a unique leadership development opportunity for both the JSOC officers and USASOC non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Exposure to different leadership styles and experiences can promote adaptability and resilience, potentially benefiting both organizations in the long run.
The Global SOF Network
The increasing trend of JSOC officers leading USASOC units can lead to a loss in networking and a diminished effectiveness of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) Global Network, especially when these officers lack familiarity with their assigned area of responsibility. The SOF Global Network relies heavily on the established relationships and trusts that USASOC units have built with local partners, governmental organizations, and other actors in their respective regions. JSOC officers, who may not have the same level of regional knowledge, cultural understanding, and rapport with local stakeholders, risk undermining these relationships and hindering the ability of the SOF Global Network to effectively collaborate and coordinate joint efforts. This loss of networking could have significant consequences for unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense missions, as well as for the overall operational effectiveness and strategic alignment of the SOF Global Network.
Conclusion
The U.S. Army's commitment to developing effective leaders is evident through the implementation of CCAP and BCAP assessment programs, which aim to identify and promote the most capable individuals for critical command positions. However, the growing trend of JSOC officers leading USASOC units raises several concerns related to cultural differences, operational focus, and disparities in training and expertise. While there are potential benefits to this arrangement, such as knowledge exchange and improved interoperability, it is essential to carefully evaluate and consider the unique missions, cultures, and capabilities of both organizations before implementing any leadership changes. Ultimately, the Army's success in maintaining its edge in leadership and readiness will depend on its ability to balance these competing considerations and foster an environment that supports the continued growth and effectiveness of its specialized units.
Regional Emergency Coordinator at US Department of Health and Human Services
1 年I have been retired a long time now but was around in the early years when the Ranger Regiment and JSOC began. This article, I think, speaks to what was obvious then, and that was an organizational manifestation of how much the conventional Army hated Special Forces and was game for anything that knocked them down. Essentially the new units were created to allow the conventional Infantry in to the special operations world and in fact take it over, making Special Forces a junior partner. The result has been a Special Operations structure which emphasizes and often only really understands the direct action missions and world. So as this article suggests, the leadership and staff structures which supposedly know "special operations" in fact only know a certain part of it. They are very, very good at that part, but the impact to the broader spectrum of needs is to limit our knowledge and capabilities. Great article which highlights one part of the problem which has evolved.
Green Beret (Ret) | Threat Tec, LLC | OE/OPFOR planner, TRADOC G2 JPMRC (USARPAC)
1 年Sal, obviously you do not know or have ever worked for Jon Braga. i believe you're article is dead on arrival to all those that do and have or that ever have gotten close to the spears of his influence...
Leadership Keynote Speaker, Mentor, Coach; Outdoor Enthusiast; Appalachian Trail Thru Hiker; Retired US Military
1 年As has always been the case, as the commander goes, so goes the command. We all lean toward what we are most familiar with, it is human nature. If we look at a micro scale, 5 year window, it may have served us well depending on the world situation. If we look at the macro scale, very arguable as to whether we exertide the most influence we(U.S.) could have, and therefore, had the greatest impact.
Lieutenant Colonel (R), Special Forces, District Ranger - St. Joe Ranger District, Idaho Panhandle National Forest
1 年Sal, GPF doesn’t see the same challenges bc TRADOC battalions are branch immaterial and not tactical commands. If 18As start commanding infantry or other combat arms battalions, then it would be similar. JSOC officers do have the advantage from an OER standpoint. Multiple O6/O7s in every directorate in JSOC make it easy to ensure every officer gets top block rating with enumeration; combined with their unique experience, this makes them highly competitive in every board. ARSOF officers usually get the chance to compete for maybe a few tactical commands a year group. JSOC can compete for all JSOC, ARSOF, and probably other branch commands. Has there ever been a non JSOC 18A or 11A ever command a JSOC formation? If not, why? Around 2022, my guess is that it was around 50% of all tactical SF commands were commanded by JSOC officers. The optic is terrible, thanks for trying to shed light on this issue.