THE ASCENDANCY OF VLADIMIR PUTIN TO THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENCY: THE DELICATE ORDER OF THE REGION AND THE REALIST ORIENTED FOREIGN POLICY

Once an isolated “great power-in-making”, the beginning of the 19th century saw Russia expanding on an unprecedented scale and meddling with the affairs of other major European powers as a fresh great power in the region. This new identity that the Russian state accepted played a major role in constructing the Russian foreign policy patterns in the following years. However over the past 18 years, Vladimir Putin has become synonymous with power and policy in contemporary Russia. It is commonplace today to speak not just of ‘the Putin system’ or the quasi-ideology ‘Putinism’, but of ‘Putin’s Russia’ an association between leader and country as intimate as that between Stalin and the Soviet Union more than six decades ago.

?According to Hermann Foreign policy consists of goals, goals and actions of national governments directed at entities outside the nation. However in order to understand foreign policy it is key to note that the state is not the only mutually exclusive entity which influences foreign policy. Other actors such as Multinational Cooperation’s, Intergovernmental organizations and International Non-Governmental Organizations has the capacity to influence the goals and actions of states. Foreign policy behavior can be defined as resulting from the implementation of a political level decision to act so as to influence attitudes, beliefs or actions of one or more other actors where entities external to the political jurisdiction of the decision maker are either the subject of the influence attempt or the channel which is message is conveyed to domestic individuals of collectives. Burchill (2005) suggests that realism can be understood to be a theory which holds that anarchy is a defined condition of the international system, as well as postulating that statecraft and subsequently, foreign policy, is largely devoted to ensuring national survival and the pursuit of national interests. Realism is, therefore, primarily concerned with states and their actions in the international system, as driven by competitive self-interest. Thus, realism holds that international organizations and other trans-state or sub-state actors hold little real influence, in the face of states as unitary actors looking after themselves.

The U.S. and its allies certainly did not expect Russia to transform into such an assertive and forceful state that it is now when they declared their victory over USSR in 1991. The last fifteen years of Eurasian politics saw the Russian state invading Georgia and Ukraine and annexing Crimea which were deemed as highly aggressive actions by Western governments and proved detrimental to their democratic project towards introducing Western institutions to Eastern European states. One of the distinctive characteristics of Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin is the idea of Russian expansion and creation of a sphere of influence in the Eastern European area. For some, these expansionary policies reflect resurgent ideas of imperialism in Russian foreign policy that had been in a hiatus during the Yeltsin administration. Mark Galeotti of the ‘Foreign Policy’ argues that; “The notion of an empire built on the basis of civilization is crucial to understanding Putin. There are neighboring countries, such as those in the South Caucasus, that he believes ought to recognize that they are part of Russia’s sphere of influence, its defensive perimeter, and its economic hinterland. From a constructivist foreign policy perspective, these resurfacing ideas and policy choices can be potentially understood by analyzing the development of Russian imperial identity during the 19th century.

Putin’s ascendancy to the Russian presidency saw what can be defined as the ultra-concentration of authority in one individual ?which has seen Putin aiming ?to be all things to all people including a strongman of a resurgent great power, committed multilateralist, and regional and global problem solver. At times, Moscow appears relatively accommodating, at other times, it will be assertive and even confrontational. But Putin is unrelenting in the pursuit of core goals: the consolidation of political authority at home; and the promotion of Russia as an indispensable power, without whom there can be no real security in the world. After Putin was appointed acting president January 1, 2000, his tactics became to wait and not to involve in any official visits outside Russia. In Europe, Russia was almost isolated, due to the economic crash, the second war in Chechnya and the way Putin came to power, which was seen as a threat to democracy.

The new leader decided to start rebuilding Russia’s position by opening a dialogue with Great Britain. Then, after he was elected president in March 2000, he visited Italy and Spain. One of the first Russian initiatives was a proposal to create a pan-European non-strategic anti-ballistic missile system, that would cover the whole Europe, and attempts to sustain the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as the US planned to walk away from it. Such an approach showed that Russia’s policy towards Europe still lacked autonomy and it was subordinated to the rivalry with the US, and treated primarily as a means of pressure. The fourth country Putin visited was Germany. France had to wait to welcome the Russian president until October 2000, which was a consequence of its strong criticism regarding the Kremlin’s policy in Chechnya seen as an intervention in the internal affairs of Russia.

Since 1999, the president has pursued two main goals: To preserve the unity of Russia and to restore its status as a great power in the global arena. He has achieved both, yet he also recognizes that Russia must operate in an increasingly fluid and unpredictable international environment. Understanding this does not obviate ideological inclinations but requires that they be adapted to circumstances. Sometimes it pays to underplay their influence, for example when establishing military deconfliction arrangements, or, in the past, concluding nuclear disarmament agreements. At other times, though, ideology and strategic calculus are mutually reinforcing. The result is a foreign policy that blends ideological biases with cold calculation. Putin acts on the basis of certain preconceptions: an unwavering belief in Russia’s timeless ‘greatness’ and unique identity; an ingrained political and social conservatism; and a deep mistrust of democratic sentiments

Additionally, the Soviet Period further developed the concept of “Russian sphere of influence” through the creation of Soviet satellite states. During this period, the ideas of nationalism and pan-Slavist protection of Eastern European states gave way to a so-called ideological monolith that changed the meaning of these countries for Russian statesmen. Once a nationalist mission of expansion, the Soviet objective towards Eastern European satellites was transformed into a mission for safeguarding Soviet states against Western capitalism. “The Soviet model while entrenching new ethnic and cultural divisions also sought to provide a unifying ideology that would bind all the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics together. In this way, through narratives of internationalism and friendship among peoples, bolstered and enforced by iron-rule authoritarianism, the Soviet Union fostered an ideology of Soviet patriotism. Whilst providing protection for Eastern European states, Moscow was also providing protection for itself by using these states as a “buffer zone”, in order to isolate itself from the Western world and secure its territory. The Soviet period transformed the relationship between the Russian state and its “sphere of influence” into a mutually dependent symbiosis whose impact had not diminished even after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. When analyzing the Russian wariness against Western expansion and Moscow’s determination to retain Russian influence on the post-Soviet space, one must not neglect the significance of identity constructions for the “Soviet Space”, “Eastern Europe” and “Western World” throughout the Cold War and should consider the impacts of these identities on the Russian foreign policy making in the 21st century.

Before setting out to explain how Russian foreign policy has changed so frequently since Putin became president, it is necessary to understand that foreign policy in Russia is currently decided by Putin himself. The reasons for such an extended power being concentrated in the hands of a single man are primarily historical. In fact, as Kotkin (2016) rightly noted that the cone of the main historical drivers of Russian foreign policy has been its struggle to be (and be recognized as) a great power.?The control over foreign policy in the hands of one leader has remained true in post-Soviet Russia, and it was legitimated by the Constitution. Articles 80 and 85 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation give the President the authority to govern the country’s foreign policy (Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993). However, it cannot be ignored that differently from the Russian leaders who preceded him, Putin can exercise such an enormous amount of personal power also, and to a great extent, because he was able to win over the trust and the love of most ordinary Russians. Indeed, one shouldn’t forget that the situation in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union was a dramatic one, marked by economic depression, street crime, and an extremely violent fight among the oligarchs for winning control of former Soviet assets that were being privatized (Laqueur, 2015). Richard Sawka defined that period as “the greatest economic depression in peace time in modern world history”. Since Putin came to power, by exploiting rising energy prices, but also thanks to his personal skills, he was able to re-establish a functioning state. The President promised he would put an end to the chaos and the corruption that had flourished under Yeltsin, and that he would restore Russia’s rightful place as an independent great power (Braithwaite, 2015). Essentially, Putin entered an unofficial ‘contract’ with the Russian people according to which, in exchange for almost uncontested authority, he would restore security and economic prosperity, and give the population reasons to be proud of their country, by bringing it back to being an internationally influential player

The European direction of Russia’s foreign policy became a priority from the very beginning of Putin’s presidency, overtaking the CIS direction. This ‘European choice’ was contained in the conception of multipolar world, which would be based on the rules of international law, the UN and attempts to manage globalization. The Russian authorities assumed that the RF would remain an indispensable element of the European order. Such an evolution in foreign policy resulted, to a great extent, from a historical tradition of Russia's permanent presence in European affairs. This was emphasized by the deteriorating relations with the US. In the years 2000-2001, the Russian-European relations underwent a revival. The division between the Western and Eastern European policy remained, with the latter virtually non-existent. No political conception concerning Poland and other Central European states was developed; there was only some hope to again open this territory to Russia’s influence. The fact that the official documents concerning Russia’s foreign policy, prepared in 2000, include virtually no reference to this area, serves as a good example. ?

Answering a question on where the Kremlin could be expected to agitate next in Europe, Mr. Carpenter pointed to the countries of the Western Balkans that remain, in his view, “in the crosshairs of Russian influence operations now.” He said that Serbia and Macedonia are particularly vulnerable and the potential for a full-fledged ethnic conflict in the Balkans is very high.

Mr. Rademaker added that the Western Balkan countries lie outside of NATO and therefore “present an opportunity for Russia.” He also expressed worries that the Baltic states, although members of NATO, are at risk as the Kremlin sees the area as a “near-abroad” and thinks Russia is entitled to play “a special security role” in the region.

In his quest to establish a great power and maintain a sphere of influence, European countries that share a border with Russia have lived with the possibility of a Russian invasion for the better part of their history. In all of these countries, perceptions of current relations with Russia are heavily influenced by a legacy of Russian domination and occupation, not only during the Soviet period but stretching back into the years of czarist rule. Negative bilateral images persist in many of these countries at the popular level, and even if those perceptions are not reflected at all or to the same extent at the elite level, they affect the political discourse in these countries. Those historically rooted perceptions influence how they view Russia in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. One Finnish official noted that Russia is Finland’s No. 1 security concern (“and will always be”) for historical reasons. The incorporation of Finland into the Russian empire during the 19th century, the securing of Finnish independence only by force of arms in 1918, the Soviet invasion and attempted annexation of Finland in 1939–1940, renewed Finish-Soviet hostilities in 1941–1944 as an offshoot of Nazi Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union, and the constraints on Finnish sovereignty that Moscow imposed during the Cold War remain important factors that continue to influence Finnish perceptions of Russia. This view is supported by the Stimulus Response Mediated by Perception analysis of Foreign Policy. This method of analyzing foreign policy states that government A’s response towards government B can be estimated using government B’s prior behavior. Hence many security concerns of European countries that share boarders with Russia can be dated back as early as the 1930s. Even in Norway, with its short Norwegian-Russian border in the Arctic region, Russia continues to be one of the defining elements of Norway’s security policy that prompted it to join NATO in the early days of the Cold War. Although Norway has enjoyed cordial relations with Russia over the past few years, particularly after the resolution of the territorial dispute in the Barents Sea in 2010.

Russia’s western neighbors are also painfully aware of the military imbalance between their own forces and Russia’s unless they receive NATO and particularly U.S. reinforcement. In conditions of a hypothetical Russian conventional attack, officials from Estonia and Latvia argued that Russian capabilities relative to the Baltic countries gave Russia a time-space advantage that Russia could exploit in any number of scenarios. Officials from both Baltic States estimated that they would have very little reaction time in a crisis. One Latvian official, for example, according to the Centrum Stosunków Mi?dzynarodowych Center for International Relations (2005) assessed the warning time for a conventional attack to be only 48 to 72 hours, while a former official also from Latvia hypothesized a scenario in which Russian airborne forces could seize Riga with virtually no warning. Finally, Russia’s “snap” exercises such as a July 2013 exercise in which 160,000 troops were deployed in less than 72 hours have raised concerns in Poland, especially as NATO is lacking the ability to rapidly deploy substantial ground forces. Out of nine countries surveyed in early 2015 by the Pew Research Center, Poland showed the greatest concern about Russia, with 70 percent of those surveyed considering it to be, militarily, a “major threat” to its neighbors. This Cybernetics and Adaptation method of analyzing Foreign Policy was suggested by Deutsch (1966) and Steinbrenner (1974) where they state that decision makers or their representatives monitor the status of a goal and in this case the behavior of Russia towards other weaker European states.

Russia’s influence is reinforced through its “Compatriot Policy” supporting Russian speakers in former Soviet Republics. According to one think tank analyst in Riga, Russian propaganda is “undermining social integration” by encouraging unachievable demands for language and citizenship. In Latvia, one interlocutor maintained that the Russian-speaking population exists in a separate media environment; they generally have little interest in watching Latvian-language programs, since Russian programs are easier to understand and have significantly higher production values, including broadcasts of popular Western shows. These TV stations subtly weave Putin’s messages in between these programs. Similarly, a report on Russian soft-power influence in Estonia notes that Estonians and non-Estonians live in different information spaces, often with contrasting content, ( Most of the Russian-speaking population derives its information and views on history and current events from Russian television channels that are directly subordinate to the Kremlin and can be used as a mechanism of propaganda. A former Latvian government official observed, however, that the Russian media mixes two separate messages one intended for internal Russian audiences, which emphasizes Putin’s authority, and the other, for external audiences, which hypes the U.S. imperialist threat.

However it is key to note that to solely claim that Russia has been playing the aggressor state in Europe would not be a fair assumption because, while Russia is seen as capable and potentially willing to carry out a conventional attack against its neighbors it does not directly mean that such an attack is seen as likely. Polish and Finnish officials and analysts interviewed tended to describe Russia’s behavior such as the stationing of nuclear capable missiles in Kaliningrad and overflights over Polish airspace as “bullying,” “intimidation,” or “posturing” rather than as indication that Russia is seriously planning an invasion. In Poland, a large-scale conventional war is seen as possible but unlikely. As one Polish official put it, “Russia is ready but not suicidal.” Russia’s behavior under Putin has been more inclined towards consolidation of power and influence. Power can be presented as a position of will, as a supreme factor to which the wills of others are subject. ?Usually the attention remains focused on the power that is most visible, on who has the formal authority and power to make decisions. The standard theory of power is not one specific formal theory but rather a set of general assumptions about the relationship between power and influence which is shared by all the classic theories of social influence (Sadan 1997). Hence in the case of Putin’s Russia a powerful Russia translates to an influential Russia and Russia will stop at nothing to gain that position in Europe.

According to the Centrum Stosunków Mi?dzynarodowych Center for International Relations. (2005) Interlocutors in Estonia and Latvia contended that Putin would be unlikely to take military action against the Baltic States as long as the war in Ukraine continued. Officials interviewed recognized that Russian interests in Ukraine are greater than those in the Baltic States. Some Baltic officials speculated that the most likely period when conflict might begin would be two to three years in the future, as the increasing pressure on the Russian budget from declining oil prices would begin to have a strong impact on the Russian economy, although this view was not universally held. Sweden, too, has signaled that it takes the Russian threat seriously, even if Swedish officials do not foresee any immediate threat of attack against the Nordic countries. The Swedish defense bill for 2016–2020, which represents a consensus view of the country’s shifting defense priorities, highlights Russian aggression in Ukraine and the possibility of further aggression in the future. Sweden has also sought to strengthen its bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In particular, it has used its leadership of the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) group in 2014 to press for a stronger defense against potential Russian aggression in the region

In conclusion it is important to note that Vladimir Putin’s position as the dominant personality of the post-Soviet era has enabled him to realize many gains in implementing his foreign policy. There is broad consensus in Moscow that Putins foreign policy objectives fir Russia have been outstandingly successful, and that Russia has emerged as a formidable power. But alongside an overall sense of confidence, there is also caution and even anxiety. Putin recognizes the importance of tactical flexibility in an international environment that is increasingly fluid and unpredictable. He is also aware that Russia’s foreign policy gains are fragile and potentially reversible, and that the country faces considerable obstacles in its quest to become a rule-maker in a new, post-American world order as he tries to maintain influence in Europe.

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