Arab and International Policies on Syria Need Prudence and Demystification

Russia will assume the presidency of the UN Security Council in April, the highest position at the UN rotated in alphabetic order among Security Council members each month. For Moscow, the priority remains Ukraine and the battle with the United States and the West. However, Syria has always been a top Russian concern at the Security Council, where it has vigilantly deployed its veto power to abort any resolutions unfavourable to Moscow, paralyzing the top UN body since 2011. In the wake of the war in Ukraine, Russia has downgraded its interest in Syria, outsourcing the protection of the Assad regime to Iran, its ally on the ground in Syria, with full consent from Damascus. Today, it appears that Russian diplomacy has decided it is expedient to restore its direct involvement in Syria, not just to maintain its military bases there, but also as part of strengthening ties with Turkey, challenging American objectives in Syria, and building on the new page some Arab states have started opening with Damascus, and their enthusiasm to end Assad’s isolation and welcome him as though he has been born again. There are many questions about the reasons and objectives of the partial Arab engagement of Damascus, amid continued divisions among Arab states and the Arab League. There are also questions about Russian-Israeli relations as Israel steps up its raids in Damascus Governorate and other regions, targeting Syrian and Iranian military sites. And there are questions about the real position of the Biden administration on Syria and Assad, and the electoral calculus of Turkish President Erdogan as it relates to Syria. Then there is the Syrian refugee ‘bomb’ that Bashar al-Assad does not want on Syrian territory, the Europeans do not want in their states, and the Arab and international community continues to ignore, even as countries like Lebanon host millions of refugees whose unresolved fate poses a threat to these countries’ survival.

?Let’s begin with an attempt to dissect the Syrian situation with its external dimensions, to clarify the circumstances that have enabled Bashar al-Assad to overcome the revolt of his people and attempts to topple him, to escape accountability following his use of chemical weapons on his countrymen, and to use the Lebanese people’s ordeal and porous borders to methodically smuggle out their basic needs.

?Next week, the deputy foreign ministers of Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Syria will meet in Moscow to agree on a deal, part of whose main objectives is to reach an agreement that would ultimately strengthen Assad. The Turkish president invited his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to attend the opening ceremony of Turkey’s first nuclear reactor, built by Russia’s Rosatom, on 27 April, either in person or via video link. The two leaders continue to closely discuss various matters, including Syria.

?Sources familiar with this issue say that Erdogan is close to acknowledging Assad’s survival, and that therefore dealing with him and complying with Russian demands in Syria is necessary on the eve of the Turkish elections.

?Assad has benefited from the earthquake that struck Turkey and Syria to ease his Arab and Turkish isolation. Indeed, Erdogan was compelled to double down on foreign policy to paper over accusations from the opposition he had failed to prepare Turkish infrastructure adequately. Bashar al-Assad benefited from the earthquake, which softened Erdogan and made him more amenable to pursue a different approach to Syria and its president, his erstwhile nemesis.

?The Russian war in Ukraine also benefited Assad, with Putin now in dire need for other successes that deflect from the Russian failures in the war. ?Four hundred days have passed since the star of the Russian invasion, without Russia achieving a major military success or being able to mount an offensive that settles the war for Russia. The Russian people are asking questions about the purpose of the war that brought them economic suffering and national decline. While there are no open protests, there are what the Russians call ‘kitchen protests’ where they express their views openly. President Putin is aware of this and needs to appear as though preserving Russia’s foreign interests, with Syria geopolitically and Iran strategically.

?During the recent visit by Iran’s foreign minister to Moscow, it was agreed to complete the comprehensive strategic pact between the two countries, supposed to emulate the one between China and Iran. The Russian Foreign Minister is expected to visit Tehran soon to sign the agreement. When the Chinese president visited Moscow last month, the two countries affirmed that the China-Russia-Iran Troika must press ahead, while acknowledging differences in the nature of Moscow and Beijing’s respective relations with Tehran.

?Indeed, Russia and Iran are allied militarily in Syria and Ukraine. Syria’s relations with Iran have always been a strategic choice for Damascus, under Hafez Assad then under his son Bashar. For this reason, all talk of Arab attempts to lure Assad away from Iran is fantasy or obfuscation. Which brings us to the Arab component of the Syria equation.

?UN Security Council resolutions stipulate that the Syrian government and opposition negotiate on a new constitution followed by elections, but the Russian grip has undermined international resolutions and decimated the liberal Syrian opposition and any chance for a democratic transition in Syria. Since then, Syria has been fragmenting, pulled apart by various players, including Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Kurds, the Americans, and the Russians on the pretext of fighting ISIS and terrorism. The Arab League isolated the Assad regime and suspended Syria’s membership, citing the brutal practices of the regime including the dispossession and the tormenting of the Syrian people. Most Arab states adhered to the Arab League’s decisions.

?Today, the Gulf states are divided on Assad and Syria. Countries like Kuwait have a different approach to countries like the UAE. Kuwait insists on adhering to Arab League decisions, while the UAE has decided to fully engage with Assad and break his isolation, hosting him officially in Abu Dhabi with surprising ceremoniousness. Oman has adopted a similar position to the UAE and in turn has hosted Assad. Qatar is engaging in quiet mediation, while Saudi Arabia has decided to open a consulate to relieve certain pressures on the Syrian people but does not appear willing to circumvent the Arab League. The same applies to Bahrain.

?At the wider Arab level, similar divisions and varying levels of interactions with Syria are playing out. Egypt has engaged in sustained dialogue with the Assad regime through soft diplomacy including through the UN representative, and with the opposition. Egypt has some ideas for returning Syrian refugees. Jordan is leading efforts to rehabilitate Assad and restore Syria to the Arab fold. In North Africa, Algeria is a keen supporter of the Assad regime, and Tunisia has moved closer to this position recently.

?All these states pretext the need to restore Syria’s unity and territorial integrity as justification for their positions vis-à-vis Bashar al-Assad. But this deserves some interrogation.

?Bashar al-Assad must have felt revitalized after his Gulf visits, yet this has not pushed him to seek a new way of thinking vis-à-vis the opposition, the return of Syrian refugees, or the respect of Lebanon’s sovereignty by stopping to violate its borders to smuggle various contraband, including Gulf-bound Captagon drugs, as demanded by the Arab states engaging Assad today.

?If the justification for engagement with Assad is ending the impasse for the benefit of the Syrian people, then the Arab states pushing for this should reveal what progress they made on these issues in their conversations with Assad and put forward a roadmap to demystify their policies to rebut other interpretations and assumptions.

?No one questions the motives of these states, which believe that the right way forward is confidence-building measures, and that boycotting Assad does not serve the opposition. But fears of the partitioning of Syria do not justify the continuation of the Syrian government’s repression of the opposition and the population, and its refusal to agree to a new constitution. There is a need for a roadmap for Syria and for Syrian relations with Lebanon, to end the violation of its sovereignty, the profiteering from its economic ruin, and the obstruction of the return of Syrian refugees from Lebanon.

?Prudence is necessary here, so that the Gulf and Arab positions do not appear as though bypassing these domestic and external imperatives, just to rehabilitate Assad and enable his impunity. There is a valuable opportunity in a new approach by key Arab states if the goals are clear, especially since these countries do not have direct interests with Assad that would otherwise put them under suspicion.

?Some believe the positions of these countries stem from their desire to chart an independent course from US dictates. Others believe that a segment of these countries want to prepare Syria for a major shift in relations with Israel in return for safeguarding its regime and its territory, in the wake of Gulf-Israeli normalisation.

?Saudi Arabia is singing a different tune. It is unready to make a leap towards Israel, nor to bypass Arab League decisions on Syria.

?The UN appears absent from the Syrian theatre, having played no significant role there for years through its special representative. Still, UN Security Council resolutions have been blocked by Russia in its quest to break the back of the Syrian opposition.

?Russia is perplexed by the Israeli assaults inside Syria. Russia previously considered a military response, but such a decision could cause it distractions from Ukraine. Iran for its part has yet to respond to Israeli attacks on its positions in Syria and the Iranian interior, despite its threats to respond.

?The Biden administration is divided given the priority of the Ukraine war and its policies on Syria are incoherent. The administration at times issues threats and affirms its position to the rehabilitation of Assad, and at others it promises waivers for Caesar sanctions that would allow the regime to benefit from electricity projects, believing this helps Lebanon while it essentially helps Assad.

?If the Biden administration was truly interested in helping Lebanon out of its ordeal, it would have been vigilant to the need to expose Assad’s rejection of the return of Syrian refugees from Lebanon where they number nearly half its population. Instead, the refugees are given aid by the US, Europe, and international agencies while aid is withheld from the people of the host country, turning them into second-class citizens.

?If the Biden administration was serious about helping Lebanon, it would have been vigilant to the flagrant smuggling of basic goods from Lebanon to Syria, which deepens Lebanon’s economic woes and the suffering of its people. Indeed, it is insufficient for the Biden administration to celebrate the demarcation of maritime borders between Lebanon and Israel to allow exploration for oil and gas. Like it succeeded when there was a will, it can do something similar on the Lebanese-Syrian border to help stop the bleeding.

?Of course, this bleeding results in part from the greed of Lebanon’s ruling class, led by Prime Minister Najib Mikati and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, and Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s control of Lebanon through weapons outside the state’s legitimacy.

?The Syrian contribution to Lebanon’s suffering has always been there. Today, it is not playing out just through politics, but also through partnership with Hezbollah, systematic smuggling, and the exploitation of the refugee crisis. None of this is a coincidence.

?All those concerned with Bashar al-Assad and the territorial integrity of Syria must invariably scrutinize the cost of their policies for both Syria and Lebanon, if they don’t show prudence and demystify their policies, and present a roadmap for their good-faith efforts in Syria and Lebanon.