Applying game theoretical analysis to understand the effectiveness of poker strategy in nuclear deterrence

The game of poker and nuclear deterrence may seem vastly different at first glance, but they share a number of key strategic principles. Game theoretical analysis provides a framework for understanding the effectiveness of poker strategies in nuclear deterrence, and it can be applied to the decision-making processes of regimes such as Russia, Iran and North Korea.

One key concept in game theory is the idea of Nash equilibrium, which states that in any given situation, each player will choose the strategy that is best for them given the strategies of all other players. In poker, this means that each player will make decisions that are optimal for their own situation, while in nuclear deterrence, it means that each nation will make decisions that are optimal for their own security.

For example, the Putin regime in Russia has been known for its aggressive foreign policy and for its willingness to use military force if and when required. Within the context of nuclear deterrence, the Putin regime's policy of aggression can be seen as a strategy to increase its own security. By projecting strength and showing a willingness to use force, the Putin regime may believe that it can deter potential adversaries from (preemptively) attacking Russia. The regime accomplishes this via its tacit threat to potentially use nuclear weapons in the Ukraine conflict if war momentum threatens a Russian existential crisis. In this case, the Putin regime's aggressive behavior is an example of how a country can use its military might as a means of achieving a Nash equilibrium in the context of nuclear deterrence.

Similarly, the Iranian regime has been known for its (covert) development of nuclear weapons, and its repeated threats to use them. The regime's nuclear program may be seen by policy analysts as a strategy to increase its own security in the face of potential adversaries. By developing nuclear weapons, the Iranian regime may believe that it can deter potential adversaries from attacking Iran. From their own perspective, the Iranian regime's nuclear program may represent an example of how a country can use nuclear weapons as a means of achieving a Nash equilibrium in the context of nuclear deterrence for its own gains.

On the other hand, the North Korean regime has been known for its aggressive rhetoric and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. However, they also have used a strategy of brinkmanship, playing with the threat of nuclear war, as a means of achieving its strategic objectives. By threatening to use nuclear weapons, the North Korean regime may believe that it can deter potential adversaries from attacking North Korea, and at the same time, use the threat as a means of extracting concessions from other countries such as the United States, South Korea and China. In this case, the North Korean regime's brinkmanship is also an example of how a country can use the threat of nuclear war as a means of achieving a Nash equilibrium in the context of nuclear deterrence.

Another important concept in game theory is the idea of mutual assured destruction (MAD). In poker, this concept can be applied to the idea of "all-in" betting, where a player risks everything on a single hand. In nuclear deterrence, MAD refers to the idea that if a nuclear war were to occur, both sides would suffer devastating losses, leading to the deterrence of nuclear war through the threat of mutually assured destruction.

For example, the Kremlin controls arguably rhe world's largest nuclear arsenal and has made it clear that it would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if it believed that its national security was at stake. This willingness to use nuclear weapons serves as a deterrent, as potential adversaries are aware that an attack on Russia would result in massive retaliation.

This MAD strategy is an example of how a country can use the threat of nuclear war as a means of deterring potential adversaries.

Similarly, the Iranian regime, may not yet have fully developed nuclear weapons, however, they have made it clear that they are working on developing nuclear weapons and they have repeatedly threatened to use them if Iran's national security is at stake. This threat serves as a deterrent, as potential adversaries are aware that an attack on Iran would result in massive retaliation. This MAD strategy is an example of how a country can use the threat of nuclear war as a means of deterring potential adversaries, even without actually having nuclear weapons yet.

As alluded to prior, the North Korean regime, has a small nuclear arsenal and has repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons if North Korea's national security is at stake. However, they have also used the threat of nuclear war as a means of extracting concessions from other countries. This MAD strategy is an example of how a country can use the threat of nuclear war as a means of achieving its strategic objectives, both through deterring potential adversaries and through extracting concessions.

Game theory also helps us understand how players (or nations) can use deception to gain an advantage. In poker, players often use deception by bluffing, or making it seem like they have a stronger hand than they actually do. In nuclear deterrence, nations may use deception by making it appear that they have more weapons or are more willing to use them than they actually are.

For example, the Kremlin's foreign policy isn't only limited to brute aggression and militarism. They are also able to use deception to gain advantage, by making it appear that they have more military capability than they actually have. This deception strategy can be used to deter potential adversaries and to achieve strategic objectives.

The Iranian regime similarly deploys this deceptive tactic by making it appear that they have more nuclear weapons or are closer to developing them than they actually are. This strategy can be used to deter potential adversaries and to extract concessions from other countries as evidenced with various concessions attained for Iran in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iranian nuclear) deal.

North Korea also has used deception in their nuclear program, by making it appear that they have more advanced nuclear weapons than they actually have or that they are closer to developing them. This deception strategy can be used to deter potential military invasion of the Korean peninsula and also coerce neighbouring countries and the US to grant it with more concessions.

The strategic utility of "nuclear poker" is intuitively understood by the leadership of Russia, Iran and North Korea. Thus, it's no surprise that these three countries are somewhat allies and that both North Korea and Iran voted against or abstained from UN sanctions on Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

To summarize, game theory provides a valuable framework for understanding the effectiveness of poker strategies in nuclear deterrence. The concept of Nash equilibrium, mutual assured destruction, and deception are just a few examples of how game theory concepts can be applied to both poker and nuclear deterrence to gain a deeper understanding of the decision-making processes and strategies involved. The examples of the Putin, Khamenei and Jong Un regimes, demonstrate how these concepts can be applied in the real world, and how countries use strategic thinking, risk management and deception to achieve their objectives in the realm of nuclear deterrence. It's important to remember that nuclear deterrence is a complex and nuanced subject, and game theory should be used as a tool to aid in understanding and not as a definitive answer.