Antitrust Enforcement Actions: September 2024
Rohit Arora????
Competition/Antitrust Lawyer | Supporting National & International Clients with Indian Competition Law | Litigation & Compliance Solutions | Comprehensive Antitrust Advisory
A. India ????
1. Key Amendments to Competition Commission's General Regulations: Highlights from the 2024 Update
On April 11, 2023, the Competition Act, 2002, was amended, leading to changes in the General Regulations of 2009. The revised draft, named General Regulations, 2024, incorporated these amendments and other updates based on the Commission's experience since 2009. The draft was open for public consultation from June 6 to July 8, 2024, and received feedback from 10 stakeholders.
Key changes include clearer definitions for Interlocutory and Miscellaneous Applications, a requirement for signatures and affidavits for substantive submissions (with some exceptions), and extending the deadline for final orders in cases involving interim orders to 180 days. The inquiry process under Section 26 of the Act was aligned with the Amendment Act, incorporating minor adjustments based on feedback. Confidentiality of sensitive information was also enhanced with red ink markings.
The amendments also addressed stakeholder concerns about the representation by legal counsel and the validity of authorization letters. However, several suggestions, such as cross-examination rights and document translation procedures, did not lead to further changes as they were deemed sufficiently covered under existing provisions. Finally, the role and confidentiality of monitoring agencies overseeing the execution of Commission orders were clarified, with no significant alterations required.
2. CCI Dismisses Allegations of Anti-Competitive Practices in Chhattisgarh's Cable TV Network Case
The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has dismissed the case brought by Vande Mataram Cable TV Network and Jaipal Singh Gulati (Informants) against the Information & Broadcasting Ministry, Grand Vision Television Network (OP-7), Star Television, Zee Television, and others, alleging violations of the Competition Act, 2002.
The informants, Vande Mataram Cable TV Network (a Multi System Operator) and Jaipal Singh Gulati (owner of M/s Korba Cable TV Network, a Local Cable Operator), accused Taranjeet Singh Hora (OP-5), Gurucharan Singh Hora (OP-6), and their associates of using their political influence to monopolize the cable TV network business in Chhattisgarh. The informants claimed that these individuals had misused their power to intimidate and force cable operators to transfer their networks through coercion, false FIRs, and void agreements, allegedly violating Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.
The informants further claimed that Star Television and Zee Television were influenced by OP-5 and OP-6 to disrupt signal supply and withhold payments to financially vulnerable MSOs, pushing them towards bankruptcy. As of September 2021, out of 39 MSOs in Chhattisgarh, only 30 were operating independently, as many had allegedly come under the control of Grand Vision Television Network.
The CCI, after reviewing the information, observed the following:
Consequently, the CCI concluded that no contravention of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act had been established and directed the case to be closed under Section 26(2) of the Act.
3. CCI Dismisses Allegations Against Mitera Hospital for Abusing Dominance via YouTube Content
The Competition Commission of India (CCI) recently dismissed a case filed by Dr. Sabine S., Managing Director of Sabine Hospital and Research Centre Private Limited (“Informant”), alleging violations of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 by Mitera Hospital.
Case Overview
The Informant, a consultant gynecologist and active member of the Human Rights Foundation, accused Mitera Hospital, a specialized infertility care provider, of spreading misleading information through a YouTube video titled "Whether IVF treatment can be done for Rs. 50,000, the reality about treatment cost, Cost of IVF." The video allegedly discredited hospitals offering affordable IVF treatments, suggesting that lower prices implied poor-quality drugs or hidden costs.
The Informant argued that Mitera Hospital's statements could negatively impact the competitive market, particularly for hospitals like Sabine Hospital that provide affordable treatment. Additionally, the Informant claimed that Mitera Hospital’s social media presence gave it a dominant position, influencing patient decisions and undermining competitors who lack similar resources to promote their services online.
Allegations of Misleading Information
The primary grievance was that Mitera Hospital’s video discouraged market players from offering affordable infertility treatments by portraying them as low-quality, thereby impacting patient rights and market competition.
CCI's Ruling
After reviewing the case, the CCI concluded that the allegations did not amount to a prima facie violation of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. The Commission noted that while the Informant raised concerns about misinformation, the Competition Act does not cover such content-related grievances. The CCI held that the issue of misinformation did not fall under the abuse of dominant position provisions and therefore, no investigation was warranted.
The CCI, however, took note of the Informant's plea for interim relief, requesting the removal of the video from YouTube. Yet, given that no contravention of the Act was found, the Commission decided not to grant the requested relief.
B. European Union ????
4. EU Commission Conducts Surprise Inspections in Financial Services Sector
The European Commission has conducted unannounced antitrust inspections at the premises of companies involved in the financial services sector in two EU Member States.
These inspections are part of an ongoing investigation into possible violations of EU antitrust laws, specifically Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 53 of the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, which prohibit restrictive business practices.
The investigation focuses on financial derivatives products. Officials from national competition authorities also participated in the inspections, alongside the Commission.
It is important to note that such inspections are preliminary steps and do not imply guilt. The investigation could take time, as no specific legal deadline exists for its conclusion, and its duration depends on various factors such as cooperation from the inspected companies and the complexity of the case.
C. European Court of Justice ????
5. Booking Com Price Parity Clauses Under Scrutiny by EU Law
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) addressed the legality of price parity clauses used by Booking.com , which is incorporated under Netherlands law. These clauses prevent hotels from offering lower prices for overnight stays on their own sales channels or third-party platforms. Initially, this restriction applied to both channels (known as a ‘wide parity’ clause), but since 2015, it has been limited to the hotels’ own sales channels (referred to as a ‘narrow parity’ clause).
The German courts had ruled that these price parity clauses were contrary to EU competition law, a conclusion also reached by the German Federal Cartel Office. Booking.com sought a declaration of validity for its parity clauses, prompting the District Court in Amsterdam to refer questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.
In its judgment, the CJEU emphasized that online hotel reservation platforms like Booking.com have had a neutral or positive effect on competition, allowing consumers access to a wide range of accommodation options. However, the Court found that it had not been established that price parity clauses are objectively necessary for the operation of the platform or proportionate to the objectives pursued.
The ruling noted that wide parity clauses could reduce competition between hotel reservation platforms and might disadvantage smaller platforms and new entrants. Narrow parity clauses, while less restrictive, do not appear necessary for the platform's economic viability.
This case highlights the ongoing scrutiny of practices that may limit competition in the digital marketplace.
6. General Court Annuls €1.5 Billion Fine Imposed on Google
The General Court has upheld the majority of the European Commission’s findings but annulled the nearly €1.5 billion fine imposed on Google. The Court ruled that the Commission did not adequately consider all relevant circumstances when assessing the duration of the contract clauses deemed abusive.
Since 2003, Google has operated an advertising platform called AdSense, which includes an online advertising intermediation service known as AdSense for Search (AFS). This service allowed website publishers with integrated search engines to display ads linked to user queries, enabling them to earn revenue from ad displays. Publishers could negotiate a Google Services Agreement (GSA) with Google, which contained clauses that restricted or prohibited the display of ads from competing services.
The European Commission's investigation was prompted by complaints from various undertakings, including Microsoft, Expedia, and Deutsche Telekom, regarding three specific clauses in the GSAs, identified as the ‘exclusivity clause,’ ‘placement clause,’ and ‘prior authorization clause.’ The Commission indicated that these clauses could potentially foreclose services competing with AFS. Google subsequently removed or amended these clauses in September 2016.
In March 2019, the Commission determined that Google had committed three separate infringements, constituting a single and continuous infringement from January 2006 to September 2016, leading to the substantial fine. However, the General Court found that the Commission made errors in assessing the duration of the clauses and the relevant market in 2016.
The Court concluded that the Commission did not demonstrate that the clauses were capable of deterring publishers from using Google's competitors or that they could significantly impact the market for online search advertising intermediation in the European Economic Area (EEA). The General Court criticized the Commission for failing to consider all relevant circumstances, particularly regarding the duration of the GSAs, many of which had a relatively short duration and were subject to renewals.
The Court further noted that the Commission did not provide evidence that the clauses had a foreclosure effect in 2016, as it lacked specific data for that year. Consequently, the General Court held that the Commission failed to show that the clauses deterred innovation, helped Google maintain its dominant position in the online search advertising market, or harmed consumers. As a result, the General Court annulled the Commission's decision in its entirety.
7. General Court Reduces Qualcomm's Fine to €238.7 Million
The General Court has set Qualcomm's fine at approximately €238.7 million, reducing it from the €242 million imposed by the European Commission.
Qualcomm, a US company established in 1985, specializes in cellular and wireless technologies, selling chipsets and licensing system software for use in mobile phones, tablets, laptops, and other consumer electronics. The case originated from a complaint lodged by the British company Icera on 30 June 2009, which was later updated in April 2010. After Nvidia acquired Icera in May 2011, they supplied further information, alleging that Qualcomm engaged in predatory pricing.
Between June 2010 and July 2015, the European Commission conducted an investigation, issuing requests for information and organizing hearings. On 18 July 2019, the Commission adopted a decision imposing a fine of €242,042,000 on Qualcomm, concluding that the company held a dominant position in the market for slim and integrated baseband chipsets compliant with the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) standard from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011. The Commission found that Qualcomm abused this position by supplying certain quantities of its UMTS chipsets to Huawei and ZTE below cost prices to eliminate Icera as a competitor.
Qualcomm sought to annul or reduce the fine, raising fifteen legal pleas, including claims of procedural irregularities, excessive investigation duration, and errors in the Commission's assessment. The General Court thoroughly examined all the pleas, rejecting them entirely except for one related to the calculation of the fine amount, which it found partially valid.
The Court dismissed Qualcomm's arguments regarding the need for the 'small but significant and non-transitory increase in price' test for defining the relevant market and upheld the cost benchmarks used by the Commission. It emphasized that the Commission was not obligated to demonstrate that the share of the market affected by predatory pricing had a significant magnitude to yield anti-competitive effects. The Court also noted that the Commission’s approach to assessing Qualcomm's pricing included an ‘as-efficient competitor’ analysis.
The General Court substantiated the Commission's finding regarding Qualcomm's intention to eliminate Icera, providing both direct and indirect evidence. However, it concluded that the Commission unjustifiably deviated from its established methodology in the 2006 guidelines for calculating fines. Consequently, the Court exercised its unlimited jurisdiction to set Qualcomm's fine at €238,732,659.
8. Court of Justice Upholds Google's Fine for Antitrust Violations in Comparison Shopping
On 27 June 2017, the European Commission found that Google had abused its dominant position in the market by favoring its own comparison shopping service over competing services in 13 countries of the European Economic Area (EEA). This favoritism was manifested by prominently displaying results from Google’s comparison shopping service on its general search results pages, while relegating competitors’ results to generic blue links, which were more susceptible to demotion by Google’s algorithms.
The Commission concluded that this conduct amounted to an abuse of Google’s dominant position in both the online general search and specialized product search markets. Consequently, it imposed a hefty fine of €2,424,495,000, with Alphabet (Google's parent company) jointly and severally liable for €523,518,000.
Google and Alphabet challenged this decision before the General Court of the European Union, which largely upheld the Commission's findings in its judgment on 10 November 2021. While the General Court maintained the fine, it did not find sufficient evidence to prove that Google's practices had any potential anti-competitive effects on the market for general search services. Thus, it annulled the Commission's decision regarding this specific market infringement.
Subsequently, Google and Alphabet appealed to the Court of Justice, seeking to overturn the General Court’s judgment and annul the Commission’s decision. In its latest ruling, the Court of Justice dismissed the appeal and upheld the General Court’s findings.
The Court reiterated that EU law does not prohibit the existence of a dominant position per se, but it does prohibit the abusive exploitation of such a position. Specifically, conduct that hinders competition on the merits and is likely to harm both individual businesses and consumers is deemed unlawful. The Court emphasized that any practice that undermines the maintenance or growth of competition—particularly in markets already weakened by the dominance of one or more undertakings—is prohibited.
While the Court acknowledged that a dominant undertaking might favor its own products or services under certain circumstances, it agreed with the General Court’s assessment that, in this case, Google’s actions were discriminatory and fell outside the bounds of competition on the merits.
9. AG Medina: Google’s refusal to provide third-party access to Android Auto platform may be in breach of competition rules
In 2015, Google launched Android Auto, an application that enables users to access compatible apps on their Android devices through a car's integrated display. As part of its strategy, Google provided templates for third-party developers to create their own apps compatible with this platform.
Enel X, a subsidiary of the Enel Group that specializes in electric vehicle charging services, introduced JuicePass in May 2018. This app offered features tailored for charging electric vehicles. However, when Enel X sought to make JuicePass compatible with Android Auto in September 2018, Google refused, citing a lack of a specific template for such apps and expressing security concerns.
The Italian Competition Authority found Google's actions to be in violation of EU competition rules, determining that Google had abused its dominant position by obstructing the publication of JuicePass on Android Auto. In response, Google appealed this decision to the Italian Council of State, which subsequently referred the matter to the Court of Justice.
In her recent opinion, Advocate General Laila Medina evaluated whether this case fits the established Bronner conditions regarding refusals to grant access by dominant companies. She concluded that these conditions do not apply when the platform in question was designed for use by third-party apps, rather than solely for the dominant company's exclusive use. Therefore, it is not necessary to prove that the platform is indispensable for the adjacent market.
Advocate General Medina stated that an undertaking abuses its dominant position if it engages in practices that exclude, obstruct, or delay access for a third-party app to the platform, provided such actions could produce anti-competitive effects harming consumers and lack objective justification.
A refusal to grant access may be justified if:
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However, merely requiring the dominant undertaking to develop a software template tailored to the third party’s needs cannot, on its own, justify a refusal. The dominant company must allow a reasonable timeframe for development and communicate this clearly to the requesting operator.
Additionally, EU competition rules do not mandate predefined objective criteria for evaluating access requests. However, if multiple simultaneous requests are made, a lack of such criteria might be relevant in assessing whether the dominant undertaking's actions constitute abuse, particularly if they lead to excessive delays or discriminatory treatment among applicants.
10. Court of Justice Sets Aside Commission's Review of Illumina-Grail Acquisition
On 21 September 2020, Illumina Inc., a genetic analysis solutions company, proposed acquiring sole control over Grail LLC, a US company specializing in blood tests for early cancer detection. Despite the deal's potential significance, it was not notified to the European Commission since Grail had no turnover in the EU or elsewhere, and it also did not meet the national thresholds for notification within EU Member States or EEA States.
However, following a complaint, the European Commission invited Member States to submit requests for it to examine the acquisition under the EU Merger Regulation. Several national competition authorities, including those from France, Greece, Belgium, Norway, Iceland, and the Netherlands, joined in requesting the Commission's review. The General Court subsequently dismissed Illumina’s challenge to the Commission’s decision, prompting both Illumina and Grail to appeal the ruling.
In its latest decision, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) set aside the General Court's ruling and annulled the Commission's decision to review the acquisition. The CJEU found that the General Court erred in interpreting the Merger Regulation, which allows national authorities to refer concentrations for review. Specifically, the CJEU ruled that the regulation does not permit Member States to request a review of a concentration that both lacks a European dimension and falls outside their national jurisdiction.
The Court emphasized that the thresholds for determining whether a transaction must be notified are crucial for legal certainty and foreseeability for the companies involved. Businesses must be able to easily determine whether their transaction requires review and, if so, by which authority and under which procedural rules.
D. United States of America ????
11. DOJ Sues Visa for Monopolizing Debit Network Markets
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has filed a civil antitrust lawsuit against Visa, accusing the company of monopolization and other anti-competitive practices in the debit network markets. The lawsuit, filed in the Southern District of New York, alleges that Visa violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by using its dominant position to stifle competition and block the growth of rivals.
According to the DOJ’s complaint, Visa controls over 60% of debit transactions in the U.S., earning more than $7 billion in annual fees. Visa allegedly maintains its monopoly by imposing exclusionary agreements on merchants and banks, penalizing those who route transactions through other networks, and offering monetary incentives to potential competitors to prevent them from entering the market. These actions have allowed Visa to smother smaller competitors, block innovation, and burden consumers and businesses with billions in additional fees.
The DOJ seeks to restore competition in the debit market and reduce fees for American consumers. The lawsuit highlights Visa's use of its vast network and exclusionary agreements to extend its dominance, preventing smaller networks and tech entrants from competing. The DOJ previously challenged Visa’s attempted acquisition of Plaid in 2020, forcing the companies to abandon their $5.3 billion merger.
E. Germany ????
12. Bundeskartellamt Designates Microsoft as a Market Powerhouse in Germany
The Bundeskartellamt, Germany's Federal Cartel Office, has classified Microsoft as an undertaking of paramount significance for competition across markets. This designation subjects Microsoft and its subsidiaries to extended abuse control under Section 19a of the German Competition Act.
Microsoft’s vast digital ecosystem, particularly for business customers, spans a wide range of interconnected products. With long-standing market dominance in PC operating systems (Windows), server operating systems (Windows Server), and productivity software (Office and Microsoft 365), the company has extended its reach into cloud services through Azure, standing alongside Amazon Web Services (AWS) as a market leader.
Over time, Microsoft has expanded its portfolio through acquisitions and innovations, benefiting from strong technical interconnections within its ecosystem, giving it a significant edge over competitors in individual submarkets. This dominance extends into areas like video conferencing (Teams), gaming (Xbox), and professional networking (LinkedIn).
Additionally, Microsoft has a strong foothold in artificial intelligence, thanks to its partnership with OpenAI and the integration of AI models like Copilot into its services on Azure. The company's products are crucial to business operations in Germany, Europe, and beyond, with developers often reliant on compatibility with Microsoft’s framework.
For the next five years, Microsoft will be under close scrutiny by the Bundeskartellamt to prevent the abuse of its dominant position. However, no formal proceedings have been initiated to investigate any specific practices yet.
F. United Kingdom ????
13. Court of Appeal Rules in Favor of CMA in Hydrocortisone Price-Fixing Case ??
The Court of Appeal (CoA) has ruled in favor of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) by overturning a prior decision of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) related to a pharmaceutical price-fixing case.
In July 2021, the CMA found that Auden Mckenzie and Actavis UK had charged excessive and unfair prices for hydrocortisone tablets, critical for treating conditions like Addison’s disease. The CMA also discovered that Auden/Actavis UK had made payments to another pharmaceutical firm, AMCo (now Advanz), to stay out of the market, ensuring their dominance and inflating prices. As a result, NHS spending on the drug soared from ￡500,000 to over ￡80 million annually, prompting the CMA to impose penalties exceeding ￡260 million.
Although the CAT upheld the findings of excessive pricing and an anti-competitive market sharing agreement, it ruled in March 2024 that the CMA had failed to properly cross-examine former Advanz CEO John Beighton on the agreement. However, after the CMA appealed, the CoA ruled that the cross-examination was conducted appropriately and criticized the CAT for unjustly revisiting and overturning its own findings.
This decision marks a significant victory for the CMA in holding pharmaceutical companies accountable for anti-competitive practices that harm public health and the NHS.
14. CMA Investigation: Google’s Anti-Competitive Practices in AdTech Under Scrutiny ???♂?
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has provisionally found that Google is engaging in anti-competitive practices in the open-display ad tech market, potentially harming thousands of UK publishers and advertisers. According to the CMA's statement of objections issued on Friday, 6 September, Google has been using its dominance in digital ad tech to disadvantage competitors, limiting their ability to provide better, more competitive services for publishers and advertisers.
The investigation revealed that Google’s ad tech services are widely used by UK publishers and advertisers to sell advertising space. In 2019, advertisers in the UK spent around ￡1.8 billion annually on open-display ads. The CMA is concerned that Google has been using its position to favor its own services and strengthen its AdX ad exchange at the expense of competition. This conduct has allegedly been ongoing since at least 2015.
Key Findings:
This investigation runs alongside similar probes by the US Department of Justice and the European Commission, highlighting global concerns about Google's influence in ad tech. The CMA’s findings are provisional, and they are considering steps to ensure that Google stops its anti-competitive practices.
G. Brazil ????
15. CADE Investigates Big Tech's AI Acquisitions for Potential Antitrust Violations ??
The Office of the Superintendent General of the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) has launched four administrative procedures to scrutinize Big Tech's acquisitions of artificial intelligence (AI) start-ups. These investigations aim to assess whether these transactions, which typically do not require mandatory notifications, could result in competitive harm.
Under Paragraph 7, Article 88 of Law 12529/2011, CADE has the authority to examine mergers that fall outside mandatory reporting but may still pose potential antitrust risks. The initiation of these procedures doesn’t imply that the mergers will necessarily be notified or that they have caused harm. After investigating, CADE will decide whether to dismiss the case, approve the merger, or formally launch an administrative proceeding to assess the competitive impacts.
16. CADE Takes Strong Action Against Price Fixing in Brazil's Real Estate Market ????
On 11 September, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) made significant strides in combating anticompetitive behavior within Brazil’s real estate sector. The Tribunal unanimously convicted 11 unions and the Brazilian Federation of Real Estate Brokers (FENACI) for price fixing, imposing fines totaling over BRL 1 million. In a related case, the Regional Council of Real Estate Agents (CRECI-GO) was also found guilty of colluding to establish a fee schedule that restricted competition and fined BRL 300,000.
Both cases involved imposing mandatory price schedules that real estate brokers were compelled to follow. The investigation into CRECI-GO began after the Office of the Superintendent General (SG/CADE) uncovered documents on its website that indicated price-fixing agreements, associated with a cease and desist agreement from 2018. The documents suggested that real estate agents believed they faced sanctions for not adhering to the prescribed fee schedule.
In the case of FENACI and the unions, CADE found that the Federal Council of Real Estate Brokers (COFECI) issued resolutions that mandated standardized fees across the industry. These practices, highlighted by Commissioner Victor Oliveira Fernandes, were deemed harmful as they artificially inflated prices and obstructed free competition.
The investigations revealed that these anticompetitive agreements provided financial advantages to unionized brokers, with Prosecutor Waldir Alves underscoring the need for stringent penalties for such conduct, which he described as intolerable.
In addition to the fines, CADE ordered the removal of all references to price lists, codes of ethics, and predetermined contracts from the electronic platforms of the convicted parties, signaling a firm commitment to restoring competition in Brazil's real estate market.
H. Canada ????
17. Competition Bureau Probes CREA's Commission Rules and REALTOR? Cooperation Policy ????
The Competition Bureau has secured a court order to further its investigation into potential anti-competitive practices by the Canadian Real Estate Association (CREA) regarding its rules on real estate commissions and the REALTOR? Cooperation Policy.
Key Points of the Investigation:
Public Input Requested ??
The Bureau is encouraging Canadians—home buyers, sellers, realtors, and other market participants—to share their experiences with real estate commissions and CREA’s policies. This feedback is crucial for evaluating whether CREA’s rules raise legal concerns.
Background on CREA and Market Dynamics:
Previous Actions:
In 2010, the Bureau reached an agreement with CREA addressing concerns over MLS rules restricting consumer choice and stifling innovation. As a result, CREA amended its MLS rules to clarify that the nature of services provided is subject to agreement between realtors and their clients. In 2016, the Competition Tribunal sided with the Bureau in a case against the Toronto Real Estate Board, addressing anti-competitive practices that limited access to historical home sales data.
The Bureau's investigation into CREA reflects ongoing scrutiny of practices in the real estate sector to ensure a competitive market for all participants.
I. Singapore ????
18. CCCS Takes Action Against Bid-Rigging in Singapore's IT Sector ????
The Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (CCCS) has made a significant move by taking enforcement action against companies involved in bid-rigging for the first time. An Infringement Decision (ID) was issued today against Rei Securite Pte. Ltd. (“Rei”) and Soh Chee Keong (“Soh”) for colluding to manipulate bids during the tendering process for licenses of vulnerability management software (VMS) and related support services at Ngee Ann Polytechnic (NP).
Key Details of the Case:
The Scheme:
To create a facade of competition, Soh and Rei developed a plan where Soh submitted cover bids through two newly incorporated companies, QBTT Pte Ltd and Contabilita Pte Ltd. These companies had no prior business activity or revenue and were not intended to win any of the ITQs. Soh prepared and submitted bids for Rei, Contabilita, and QBTT on GeBIZ, ensuring the submissions appeared independent while guaranteeing that Rei’s bid would be the lowest.
As a result of their bid-rigging conduct, CCCS imposed financial penalties totaling $8,787: Rei Securite Pte. Ltd. was fined $6,237, while Soh Chee Keong received a penalty of $2,550.
That's all for the month of September. See You Next Month!!