No More Coups: An Anti-Coup Policy Brief

In the 66 years since Sudan’s independence, the military held power for 53 years of that time. The longest-lived elected government in Sudanese history was less than 4 years old when it was dissolved by the military.

Continuing the tradition of assassinating democracy in its fledgling infancy, on the 25th of October 2021, military forces detained most of the civilians in the transitional government, shut down communications, dissolved the government, left general Al-Burhan as the head of the Sovereignty Council and declared a state of emergency. An auto-coup attempt by all measures.

That leaves us wondering why military takeovers happen so often, why democratic governments never last, and what makes a Sudanese coup? This essay is an attempt at answering those questions, as well as an exploration of existing and proposed preventative policies and mechanisms.

Anatomy of The Sudanese Power Structure

Following the deposition of Al-Bashir, and after a brutal massacre of peaceful protestors, the military signed a power-sharing deal with the political incubator: the Forces for Freedom and Change. However, they offered no concessions that would threaten their control. They remained in command of the Ministry of Interior and were poised to head the Sovereignty Council for the better part of the transitional period. These critical roles in government granted them the ability to protect both their assets and personnel from the reach of transitional justice.

Economically speaking, the military and the security sector control a vast network of companies which offer them an unmatched ability to manufacture crises while answering to no one. Those companies primarily extract resources from the rural areas of Sudan and run the financial wheel of the security apparatus without oversight. Throughout the transitional period, the security apparatus chose to share very little of their companies’ revenue with the Ministry of Finance while simultaneously blaming it - and the civilian wing by extension - for the deteriorating living conditions. Civilians, on the other hand, were unwilling to “rock the boat” and confront the generals, choosing to bide their time until they head the Sovereign Council instead. An opportunity that never came.

What Was Supposed to Happen

The end of October marked the end of Al-Burhan’s position as the head of the Sovereign Council and the start of a truly civilian-led government. For the first time in over two years, civilians would have had the power and political security necessary to seize key industries from the military and begin laying the groundwork for democracy without the menace of an economic crisis. More importantly, civilian control of the economy meant the vulnerability of the military to reform - an existential threat to top generals.

What Happened

The power-sharing Constitutional Charter outlined the creation of institutions that would have aided the civilian wing in facing the military. However, the establishment of the Legislative Council was neglected by all parties due to arguments over proper representation and general lack of political will. That left legislation in the joint hands of the Sovereign Council and the executive branch of government, which gave the military, who controlled the council, the power to block any meaningful legislation. But perhaps the most significant consequence was the opaqueness and confusion about authority and responsibility such an institutional vacuum created, allowing the military to redirect blame and failings onto the civilian wing.

The Eastern Port Blockade

Two months prior to the military takeover, protests erupted in Eastern Sudan claiming the central government's negligence to their grievances. Tribal political leaders closed the port, leading to subsequent shortages in medicine, fuel and wheat in the centre. Among other demands, leaders of the blockade called for the cancellation of the Juba Agreement, and the suspension of all projects within the region until a new agreement is reached that gives the Eastern Sudanese their fair share.

Despite the threat of the blockade to national security at a time of transition, not a single security body was deployed or even considered. The military held to the narrative that this issue was entirely political, and must be solved politically by the civilian wing. Furthermore, the blockade was later used to partially justify the military seizure of power.

Not All Sit-ins Are Created Equal

Leading up to the coup of the 25th of October, thousands of protestors calling for the dissolving of government staged a sit-in outside the usually off-limits gates of the Presidential Palace - many of which were transported in from outside Khartoum with the support of rebel groups and some political parties. Most notable was the uncharacteristically minimal police presence and muted response.

Since the seizure of power, there were at least 12 marches of hundreds of thousands against it, which were met by deadly force every time, in addition to an anti-coup sit-in that was brutally dispersed on its first day.

State of Resistance

The main force opposing the military seizure of power is the horizontally organised bodies known as Neighbourhood Resistance Committees. In light of dialogue that is critical of political parties at the centre - from revolutionaries, the putschists, and the general Khartoum populace - Resistance Committees remained as the only body that does not attract much controversy nor public ire, meaning that they monopolised the mass base in Khartoum, and political parties can only do so much.

It is important to note that the revolutionary rhetoric is not a complete rejection of political parties, rather a requirement that they self-critique and reform, then admit that they exist by the mandate of the people, and that resistance committees see to the execution of said mandate.

The “mandate” mentioned here is represented in the Political Charter that Resistance Committees across Sudan undertook the task of drafting and forging consensus over. It is a monumental challenge given the structure of a Resistance Committee, as it is not designed for political action. Committees are organisers, trainers and communicators for their local communities, they do not, however, represent them politically. This important distinction can be observed when Committees in Khartoum considered the issue of bread subsidisation, and whether they should move for or against it, and the endless grinding debate it generated. Such fine-grain issues cannot be addressed through bodies that wield massive tools of resistance, as it quickly decimates their mass base support instead.

Nevertheless, the Political Charter remains the task of Resistance Committees, as they are the only form of organisation entrusted with reflecting the public’s baseline for resistance upon which any political project can later take place.

Conclusion

The Sudanese military-industrial complex leverages its control over the economy to gain political power. It does so by kneading the very political landscape in its favour, be it through shortages, blockades, or demonstrations. Top generals have no intention of conceding any part of that control, as it threatens their impunity. Thus, dismantling the Sudanese military/militia-industrial complex and decoupling the economy from the security apparatus is the single most important objective of any transitional period that hopes to create sustainable democracy.

Existing and Proposed Anti-Coup Policy

Whether by ignorance or negligence, civilian signatories of the Constitutional Charter disregarded incorporating any substantial anti-coup defence articles. Of course, the Charter would be violated anyway in the event of a coup, but the goal of anti-coup articles is to politically starve the fledgling seizure of power before it gains any legitimacy. Presented with the opportunity, civilian signatories must specify that citizens are granted the right and responsibility to resist a coup, and denied the right to recognize one as legitimate. The new Charter must also address the security apparatus' control over the economy differently, by emphasising the rights of local populations to their resources, and outlining a mechanism by which they can be returned via local governments. That shifts the effort of breaking down a monolithic military-industrial empire and allows multiple stakeholders to chip away at it instead, all while democratising historically marginalised areas.

On the legislative level, several actions can be taken to deny any possible coup a political foothold:

• Allow resistance committees to lead the organisation of the election of the transitional legislative council with a set deadline.
• Legislation obliging all police and military forces to refuse participation or assistance with a coup.
• Legislation obliging government employees to refuse cooperation with a coup, and to continue operation as per established constitutional and legal procedures and policies.
• Legislation obliging all personnel in the fields of communications, media and transportation to refuse to allow communication or transportation for putschists. The involvement of labour unions in implementation is recommended.
• Legislation obliging all public and private financial institutions to refuse financial relations with the perpetrators of coups.

The transitional executive branch can also prepare plans for the continuation of leadership during the coup attempt in case of the seizure of important government buildings, or the detainment of government personnel. A different plan must be developed that details how the constitutional government should resume control of the country in case of the failure of the coup.

When it comes to foreign policy the transitional government can adopt one that requires all international bodies to remain in recognition of the constitutional government and its legitimacy, consequently denying would-be putschists standing with existing international partners and peers.

Expectation

The public has already demonstrated a high degree of preparedness for anti-coup defence. It immediately denied putschists legitimacy and refused to cooperate. Many institutions maintain operations without recognition of the coup leaders' claims. It is high time our leaders consider anti-coup defence befitting the critical stage Sudan is at in the form of policy and legislation. A complete and comprehensive defence can be a sufficient deterrent on its own, and can be further augmented with a plan to take peoples' grievances into account by reclaiming their wealth and self-governance. Neutralising the threat of abrupt interruption of democratic transition will enhance the coming government’s ability to reform institutions and secure a future for Sudan.

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