ANSI 42.55 Organic Detection: 100% Totally Inaccurate and WRONG!!!!

The ANSI 42.55 is a USA portable x-ray standard for public safety Bomb Technicians and has a section on organic detection. The standard has many different tests that are supposed to be used to verify a portable x-ray system meets the requirements to be deployed in the USA. The organic detection section is probably one of the biggest injustices that have been done to the bomb disposal community that I have ever seen. The test itself and how they describe how it can be used to detect explosives are beyond inaccurate and potentially put people's lives at risk.

The first thing you need to know is that the term "Organic Detection" originated from this document, and outside of what the document claims, there is no such thing as "Organic Detection." When this was written, the people who wrote it KNEW that the standard for determining a materials classification was an industry-standard called "Materials Discrimination." For all of you that know and understand materials discrimination and how it is actually measured, when you see what the ANSI 42.55 has done, you are going to say one of two things:

1. The people that wrote this are idiots (They are actually very smart and knew exactly what they were doing)
2. There must be some kind of scam going on here (and there is).

The organic detection test that they developed does not require a dual-energy measurement, nor does it use a non-organic material to verify that the test is, in fact, accurate. This test was purposely designed to allow portable x-ray systems that cannot do a dual-energy scan "Claim" that can do organic detection. The fact of the matter is that you cannot determine the Z eff of any material to classify it as organic, inorganic, or metal without doing a dual-energy scan. Because the mainstream x-ray professionals have not seen this document, this very flawed test and organic detection term have been allowed to propagate in the USA Bomb Technician community.

Because the test object they use only has organic items for the tests, that alone tells you the test is not valid. They also used very thin samples which is another dead giveaway that the test is a scam. The only way ANY real lab would conduct a materials test is to use a nonorganic material to verify that the system is only calling the organic items "organic" and nothing else. In the above image, you can see that a single energy scan in either greyscale or pseudo color cannot tell you the difference between the ANSI POM material and the aluminum. There is also other POM material in the scan of much more realistic thickness (what actual explosives would be) that looks totally different in a single energy scan. The image below is of an accurate dual-energy (materials discrimination) image and the greyscale and pseudo color single energy scans. The materials discrimination image shows you what each material actually is based on the standard organic, inorganic, and metals ranges. You CANNOT determine material type with a single energy scan, and you never will. If any vendor is trying to tell you they can they are flat out lying to you. The fact that the ANSI has tried to pull off this fake "organic detection" is disconcerting and dangerous. We will go into detail about why this is so very dangerous to the actual end-users and how they have been 100% lied to.

What is even more "shocking" is that the writers of the ANSI 42.55 could have used several already developed test objects, but they ignored all of them and created ones that you need an outside lab to perform. Anybody that uses an x-ray and works in the X-ray market knows about these test objects, and one of the more common is the Standard Test Piece (STP). I bring this one up because it has a test for determining if a system can identify an organic material. However, unlike the ANSI 42.55, it uses organic and inorganic material for the test. It uses this method because it makes sense and does not allow single energy scans to make false claims about being able to identify a material. So why did they not use an off-shelf test object like the STP vs. creating a test that is not valid?

The STP and many other x-ray test pieces could have been used for the majority of the tests in the ANSI 42.55. They did not utilize any of these and created a scenario that you have to go to a lab (people who wrote the document) to get this testing done. When you really look at the ANSI 42.55, it is a scam to drive customers to their labs and generate revenue. It has created a massive knowledge gap in the bomb technician community that does not foster the end-user the ability to evaluate their own tools. I have NEVER seen a bomb technician tool have a standard that totally cuts off the actual end-user from doing any sort of evaluation of their tools. You can buy an STP anywhere, plus a ton of other prevalent x-ray testing tools that will let you evaluate a system. The ANSI 42.55 should have used any one of these test objects and let the end-user do the testing. That is "Exactly" how the checkpoint x-ray world does it, so why are Bomb Technicians not doing the same?

You would think it could not get any worse, but in the ANSI 42.55 document, they even go so far as to try and insinuate that "organic" detection is how you find an explosive. This document is what has created the mindset in the Bomb Disposal community that organic detection is "Explosive Detection." This is incredibly inaccurate and just plain ignorant even to try and make any claim that a single energy measurement can determine if something is an organic explosive. We will explain to you in detail why this is incredibly inaccurate and even very dangerous to the Bomb Technician Community.

Organic Detection IS NOT explosive Detection.

Explosives can be either organic or inorganic. Most of what is being used by a terrorist are inorganic explosives (chlorates) and organic explosives mixed with an inorganic aluminized powder or paste. These homemade explosive mixtures are much more common in IED incidents vs. commercial and military-grade explosives. Any document that is even remotely trying to insinuate to a Bomb Technician that what they are looking for is an "organic" material is incredibly inaccurate. This also creates an x-ray interpretation process that is very flawed and would lead a person to look for the wrong material in an x-ray image. The below chart lists all of the different types of explosive materials used in FY2017, and it clearly shows that organic explosives are NOT the most common. In fact, it shows the exact opposite and that Inorganic explosives were the most common.

Based on the "Facts," why would the ANSI 42.55 focus on organic detection and totally ignore the more common inorganic explosives being used by terrorists? Why would the USA National Bomb Squad Commanders sign off on this document and "organic" detection when they should know that organic explosives are not what they should be focusing on? The answer is both the writers of the ANSI 42.55 and the people who signed off on it did an abysmal job researching the threat and developing a viable tool for the Bomb Technicians in the field.

It actually gets much worse:

The fact that the ANSI 42.55 stated that "Most" explosives are in the organic range we now know is incorrect. What is worse, they did not explain the actual "organic" range covers to the end-users. There is a very well-established x-ray imaging standard that has been in place for a very long time to use x-rays to determine the material type. This is materials discrimination imaging and requires a high and low energy scan. This scan allows the x-ray to break down materials into 3 categories based on their average effective atomic number (Z eff). These ranges are standardized and have been for a very long time. For the ANSI 42.55 to totally ignore this and make up their own "organic" detection is just mind-boggling. The ranges that each material is categorized based on its Z eff is as follows:

• 0-10 Organic materials: Shown in the color Orange
• 10-18 Inorganic materials: Shown in the color Green
• 18-30 Metals: Shown in the color Blue

In the organic range is where you will see explosives like RDX, PETN, TNT. However, as we have already detailed, all of these organic explosives are not the norm when it comes to IED incidents. These organic explosives ONLY show up in an incredibly small range in the entire 0-10 organic window. Organic explosives only show up in the 7.0 to 7.5 Z eff range. That means that only 0.5 of the total range from 0-10 in the organic window would potentially be explosive. Another way of looking at it is that 95% of all of the other items in the organic range window are NOT explosives. So why would anybody create a test for a portable x-ray standard that focuses on a 5% window that does not even represent what the terrorist are actually using? Why would the National Bomb Squad Commanders sign off on this as being a "Viable" tool? The below chart details where we see organic explosives and some of the inorganics. If you do not understand the below chart and how x-rays classify materials based on dual-energy materials discrimination, you do not need to be writing a standard for portable x-rays nor making a totally flawed "organic" detection test.

Once you understand the above, you will then understand how they use the above data to create automatic detection algorithms in x-ray machines to detect explosives. They DO NOT do what the ANSI 42.55 suggests and try and look at the entire organic range. They figured this out a long time ago and only look in the density and Z eff ranges where we know explosives will show up. This method of detecting explosives has been around for YEARS, and the ANSI 42.55 totally ignored this. The below image is how x-ray machines do automatic detection for explosives. They are a tool that helps the operator identify any material in an x-ray image with a density and Zeff range where we see explosives. It does this by placing a "RED BOX" around that material in the x-ray image. The operators are trained to look inside that red box and look for a potential detonator or IED Circuit components. When you compare what the other x-ray industries are doing to try and detect an IED threat and compare that to what is in the ANSI 42.55 standard, You will see one group is pretty smart, and the other is picking its nose and eating it.

If the ANSI 42.55 was going to pick a material for a portable x-ray to try and highlight for a Bomb Technician, they could have done some research about the subject. If you went to any airport or security checkpoint and asked the person behind the x-ray machine what they were looking for, they would not say "organics." This is because 90% of the bags they are looking at are organic, and the same is true for mail screening. The entire "organic" detection developed by the ANSI 42.55 is exactly the opposite of what the rest of the x-ray world is actually doing. The material range that x-ray screeners actually use more to try and locate a potential threat in an x-ray image is the color blue. Earlier I explained that the metals in a materials discrimination image show you them in the color blue. Looking for a metal "material" is a much more effective color to help a person looking at an x-ray image pick out any potential threats. With an IED, the batteries, wires, and switches will all turn blue. The reality is that nobody is looking at organics in an x-ray image; they are looking for metals. They are also not using the color orange (organic) to locate explosives; they use detection software that only looks in a very specific range and red boxes that area.

I only focused on the "Organic" detection part of the ANSI 42.55, but many other parts of that standard are a poor tool for any end-user to test a portable x-ray system. When you look at it from the perspective of how it is helping the Bomb Disposal community with ensuring they get a good x-ray tool, it is a complete failure. The document is more of a scam to drive revenue back to the labs and not empower the end-user. Many advances have happened in the x-ray world that the Bomb Disposal community is completely unaware of. The ANSI 42.55 as a standard is a huge part of the blame for that because none of these advances or already established standards are covered. Because it is so poorly written, the portable x-ray market is very uneducated about what they "Could" be doing and how they could be advancing their technology. If you are outside of the USA and are looking for a standard for a portable x-ray, my suggestion is DO NOT use the ANSI 42.55 and develop your own test plan. Figure out your operational requirements and develop a list of what you need your x-ray system to accomplish. The below is a list of what should be getting addressed for a portable x-ray, but you will never find it in the ANSI 42.55.

What a Portable X-ray Standard Needs

1. The ability to let the end-user do the testing themselves: When you learn how to test a system, you start educating yourself about each technology and properly evaluating it. You will also be much more knowledgeable about what each vendor is capable of.
2. Utilize established test objects available on the open market: Any standard that does not allow you to do the testing yourself and provides a matrix for scoring a system is not a viable tool. You have to have test items that the end-user can use to conduct the testing themselves. There are a ton of these on the market that can be used, and they provide detailed testing and scoring for each test.
3. Line pair per millimeter (LP/MM) testing that meets the Bomb Disposal mission requirements: For Bomb Disposal, you need a Minimum of 2.2-2.5 lp/mm to identify the component of an IED and also not have the pixelate when you zoom in. There is a well-established test object that has been used for years in the medical industry to score a system lp/mm resolution. The below is the LEEDS# Type 38 lp/mm test, and you can score a system all the way to 5 lp/mm. This is a great tool, and if you start using something like this, a ton of vendors will be changing what they say the score off of their website. You will also see very quickly who has the best image quality and how your generator plays a big role in your image.

4. Realistic Drop testing Requirments: Drop testing has to be done by companies that actually do this, and they provide a detailed report when they do these tests. You do not have to do this test, and all of the vendors will get this test done. What we need is a standard that details how the testing needs to be performed. The ANSI 42.55 is a complete joke when you look at how it does the drop testing (12" in the freaking storage case). The standard drop test is 1 meter, and any drop testing for a portable x-ray needs to be done as follows:

• The x-ray generator dropped from 1 meter out of the case (Good Luck Golden)...;)
• The detector panel dropped from 1 meter out of the case and with NO PROTECTIVE armor. Good luck aSi panels
• Whatever attaches to the system when you go down range also needs to be tested in a 1-meter drop test exactly how it would be deployed.
• A report with images from the test company of the test was done to verify they did not use protective armor.

5. Logical Ingress Protection ratings: Ingress protection is for dust and water, and IP54 should be the minimum level for a portable x-ray system. It is "nice" if it can go higher but not required. The same with the drop testing, all of the items that go downrange with you need to have a minimum of IP 54. This test is also done by a lab, and the vendors only need to send you the report showing that each part of the system was tested and the level it achieved.

6. Ability to provide accurate materials imaging: There is a standard already in place for this, and the majority of portable vendors claim that can provide a materials discrimination image. we need a test to verify that the units can, in fact, do it accurately and that they are covering all of the ranges correctly. However, with portables, we will need to add a test that verifies that it is accurate in all locations on the panel.

7. Wireless communication: There are many issues in this area for the end-users, and it needs to be addressed. The vendors need to be forced to get much better at providing a platform that is mission capable to Bomb technicians. The fact that this has not been addressed is kind of odd, but any standard needs to set basic requirements. Here are a few of my suggestions:

• Ability to operate on another frequency vs. 2.4 GHz and be selectable by the end-user in the software. 2.4 is probably the worst frequency to operate any Bomb Disposal tool for many reasons, and the big one is of all of the frequencies that you MUST jam for an RCIED; 2.4 is that frequency. Maybe we should get away from 2.4, and that is something to think about too.
• Software that is intelligent and can find an open place to transmit. If you jam 2.4, the system will automatically switch to the "Other" operating frequencies.
• Establish standard wireless operating ranges required to include the ability to transmit inside buildings, subways, etc.
• Ability to operate in a wireless mode when the robot is also running. The robot and x-ray are always going to be operating simultaneously, and one should not interfere with the other.

8. Lower edge image cut-off: This REALLY needs to be addressed so end users understand that the panel dead zone and generator height off the ground has a huge effect on how much a package can get cut off. Image cut off of a suspect package is a BIG DEAL, and we need to make sure this is addressed in a standard. When I see a USA bomb squad specifically ask for a panel with a lower edge dead zone of 8 mm, we have a problem. The system needs to be testing in the exact configuration that it will be used downrange to verify the overall lower edge dead zone in the image actually is. This is not just the panel but also the generator deployment because if they have the generator raised for whatever reason, that affects the cut-off.

9. Verifying that the measuring tool is accurate: Some of you may not know this, but you can use your measuring tool to do RSP development. This is old-school stuff, but it is important that the software's measuring tool is accurate and can be recalibrated to a different plane. XTK is cool, but the old-school method also works great and is very effective. Plus, you are not lugging around the Grid Aim system on your back in a dismounted scenario.

10. Focal spot size of the generator: This measurement determines how well your generator works. The smaller the focal spot size, the better, so in any evaluation, a generator should be scored on its focal spot size. This is a standard practice in the medical world because they understand the importance. Bomb Disposal needs to educate itself about focal spot size and how it benefits your overall imaging capability.

11. Robot Integration: I swear to God I have seen some of the stupidest integrations between a robot and an x-ray, so we REALLY need a standard. The standard needs to ensure that both the x-ray and the robot, when integrated, do not lose any of their mission capabilities (Like turning the robot into an x-ray taxi or mounting the generator on the robot chassis). If we can get these two systems integrated correctly, it would be a viable tool for the Bomb Disposal community. What I have seen thus far is what I would expect from a 3-year-old with a roll of duct tape. There is a right way to do this, and that method needs to be standardized, and each portable x-ray system has that capability.

12. Radiation levels: I am only bringing this one up because there is no reason for any standard to require you to test the generator's output. The manufacturers already do this, and more importantly, nobody is standing next to the x-ray when it fits, so who cares how much it is putting out. What matters is your specific state's laws and regulations and complying with those rules. A standard does not need any TEST for the amount of x-ray that is around the system when firing because you should not be anywhere near it. This is stupid and why I keep seeing it as a "test" is not mission-relevant.

13. How to Write technical Specifications for procurement: In the USA, they REALLY need this and a basic class on contracting basics. You guys are tore up from the floor up on this at the state and local level. I just watched a county pay $22,000.00 more for an x-ray machine, and that is just pure ignorance. We all work for the taxpayers in either a county or city, and we owe it to them to make sure our contracting practices are legitimate. The stuff I see at the state and local level would have a contracting officer on the federal level lose their Warrant and cause a GAO investigation. Maybe the National Bomb Squad Commanders and even the People providing Federal Grant monies need to establish some rules because many of you are doing some very shady stuff in your procurements.