Another 'suicide by cop' - could it have been prevented?

My attention was drawn recently to the coronial findings of an inquest into the death of a New Zealander in Queensland.  He died after being shot by members of the Special Emergency Response Team (SERT).  The officers had earlier surrounded the car that the man was in and had tried to negotiate a peaceful outcome with him.  It turned out he was armed with an imitation firearm (albeit it a very good imitation) and was, therefore, never in a position to pose a real threat to the officers involved.  However, that fact was only established after the man had been shot.

Of interest to me was, that despite the SERT officers and other police having been in 'control' of the scene and the actions of the man for some time before the shooting, he still managed to cause them to shoot and kill him.  Why, in the 21st century, with all of the knowledge collectively held about the phenomena of 'suicide by cop' and the 'less-lethal' tactical options available are police still being placed in such situations? 

The circumstances of the man's death are detailed in the Coroner's report and the report is publicly available (see: www.courts.qld.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0003/453459/cif-kumeroa-sb-20160118.pdf) .  However, of note is that the report does not address two points which I believe are central to the circumstances of the event and its outcome. The first - did the man embark upon a course of action which could be rightly described as 'suicide by cop'? and the second point is, what tactical options did the responding officers put in place to prevent themselves being cornered into delivering such an outcome?

The coronial report does outline some of the tactical options deployed by the SERT officers and the Queensland Police.  Those all appeared to be quite standard and responsible steps towards containing and negotiating with an agitated, psychologically disturbed and armed person.  What the report does not describe, however, were what 'less-lethal' response options were considered and deployed, given the nature of the siege. For example, were police dogs (trained to intervene in armed offender situations) available and positioned to respond to the man if he should attempt to leave his car? Were 'less-lethal' munitions available to the officers, such as 'bean-bags' or 'baton-rounds' which can disrupt and disorient a person who is trying to present a firearm at police? Was consideration given to using chemical agents against the man while he was still inside the car in an effort to disorientate and force him from the vehicle in a state whereby presenting a firearm would have been difficult thus allowing him to be overpowered - possibly through use of the previously described options?  None of those options are canvassed in the report.

Given the knowledge collectively held about the phenomena of 'suicide by cop', and given the range of 'less-lethal' tactical options available I argue police services need to ensure their officers, and particularly their special response officers, are schooled on such issues and equipped with those options.  Officers such as the SERT members who responded to this particular event appeared to be well equipped.  They had an armoured vehicle which they used to block in the man's car preventing him from trying to leave, they had communications equipment, they had vision into the vehicle and of the man's actions, and they clearly had lethal force options (firearms - not described in the report) with which to protect themselves and the public.  But, to labour the point, there is no mention of them having or deploying 'less-lethal' options to allow them to truely be in control of the scene, rather than players in a game actually being dictated by an agitated, psychologically disturbed man. 

In the 21st century, I argue it is the responsibility of police services to ensure their staff are equipped with a variety of tools to help resolve situations without to resort to the use of lethal force.  The use of such force not only affects the lives of those it is used against and their loved ones, but it also affects that officers involved and their loved ones.  Perhaps in future coroners need to dig deeper into responses to situations such as the one discussed here and to ask the hard questions about what other options were (or should be) available.

My sympathy's go to all concerned with this particular tragedy.

(The author spent 34 years with New Zealand Police, including five years as the second-in-command of a tactical response unit deployed to deal with incidents similar to the one described above)