Anna Schuleit-Haber’s Bloom, Phenomenology, and Art Education

Anna Schuleit-Haber’s Bloom, Phenomenology, and Art Education

November 11, 2017

Kyle Andrew Guzik

University of Chicago

College of Visual Art Education (COVAE)

  

Abstract

In this essay I will interrogate phenomenology as a philosophical framework. Phenomenology, as it concerned Husserl, can be described as the study of “all experiences of consciousness and the attendant structures of those experiences” (Streb, 1984).  In order to propose my philosophical framework, I wish to utilize psychophysical reductionism to describe a rational phenomenology. To emphasize this concept, I have selected a work of art by the visual artist Anna Schuleit-Haber that relates strongly to concerns from phenomenology. Art educators should avoid the trap of the failed student art show scenario by avoiding denial of authorship.  Second, art educators, most importantly teachers at the primary and secondary educational levels, should avoid any instructional methodology that encourages students to create homogeneous “finished” art objects. Instead, study by art educators of the concept of phenomenology, as it is informed by psychophysical reductionism, will help art educators to teach their students to create more complex and personally meaningful artwork with deeper conceptual associations.

Description of Phenomenology as a Philosophical Framework

In this essay I will interrogate phenomenology as a philosophical framework. Phenomenology, as it concerned Husserl, can be described as the study of “all experiences of consciousness and the attendant structures of those experiences” (Streb, 1984).  In order to propose my philosophical framework, I wish to utilize psychophysical reductionism to describe a rational phenomenology.

According to Sartre (1991) in Hegelian and Marxist dialectical monism “history continually effects totalizations of totalizations” (p. 15). Sartre (1991) views this as problematic because principles from dialectical monism cannot be taken for granted. Sartre claims that “most anthropologists” would reject principles such as “the details of an analytical-synthetic and regressive progressive method” surrounding dialectical monism (p. 15). I find it convincing that Hegelian and Marxist thought can be described as dialectical monism and will proceed from this foundation as a definition. Anthropologists study humans and this field is relevant to the field of art education as art teachers must be astute observers of both their students and the human condition in order to be effective instructors.

 

Phenomenology can be defined as the study of the human subjective experience of qualia, instantiations within consciousness of sensory reception and interpretation (or perception). Examples include the experiences of watching pelicans swim on and fly over a lake or of walking on a bridge across as river at night and observing the lights. Marx provides insights into the nature of existential phenomenology. Marx (1978) states:

Labour is not the source of all wealth. Nature is just as much the source of use values (And it is surely of such that material wealth consists!) as labour, which itself is only the manifestation of a force of nature, [is] human labour power (p. 525).

This can be viewed as a philosophical statement of the phenomenological kind because it relates Marx’s concern with the value of the natural world. Marx describes nature in terms that seem intended to be compelling to the proletariat, indicating that a good proletarian should view human labor power as a force of nature, yet this concept is only a subcomponent of a larger concept (the natural world). Secondly, we see in Marx a description of the human population as comparable to a complex machine:

It is, likewise, the development of the population… in that the productive power of labour, like the application of machinery, is related to the population; whose growth in and for itself already [requires as prerequisite] the presupposition as well as the result of the growth of the use values to be reproduced and hence also to be consumed (Tucker, Marx, and Engels, 1978, p. 291).

This idea reflects the political-geographical-historical context of Marx’s writing: the Industrial Revolution in Europe. Industrial machinery made new standards of living possible and Marx may be suggesting that humans aspire to become more like machines with the hope of generating greater material abundance for the proletariat. We can see a similar interest in the interrelationship between humans and machine technology in Haraway’s (2000) description of biological-determinist ideology:

Biological-determinist ideology is only one position opened up in scientific culture for arguing the meanings of human animality… Far from signaling a walling off of people from other living beings, cyborgs signal disturbingly and pleasurably tight coupling (p. 294).

Haraway’s ideas may be viewed as suggestive of the idea of a pleasant and optimistic future in which humans interface with machines to move beyond biological determinism, the notion that one’s biophysical constitution (psychophysical attributes, genetics) predetermine the life outcomes, quantity, and quality of lived experiences of an individual or group. These are core tenets of a rational phenomenology grounded in psychophysical reductionism.

Alignment with Critical Theory

Phenomenology is a concern from postmodern thought. The postmodern roots of critical theory can be found in the work of John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Critical to the understanding of postmodernism is the concept of deconstruction.

Conway (1991) defines deconstruction and identifies a significant flaw in its methodology, the denial of authorship:

Deconstruction presupposes the critics insight into the contingency of the construction of authority. By exposing the empowering presuppositions of the author’s discourse, deconstruction effectively discredits any claim to an epistemically privileged authority. But does deconstruction adequately provide for the author's own insight into the construction of textual authority? (Conway, p. 91)

One might argue that a work of art exists as a thing-in-itself, or text, and that critique of any artwork can be made only in reference to this text. However, a narrative, from Mill (1975) can be used to demonstrate why this idea is problematic. Mill (1975) wrote:

To prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures, it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down. But as the king of the vultures would be no less bent upon preying on the flock than any of the minor harpies; it was indispensable to be in a perpetual attitude of defense against his beak and claw (p. 3)

Mill uses vultures as a metaphor for one way in which the state maintains its monopoly on the use of the violent, the counterbalancing of the interest of various actors. While Mill (1975) recognized the value of the state as a final arbiter in human relations, he also viewed this function as a threat to individual autonomy and human freedom Mill: “Their power was regarded as necessary but also highly dangerous” (p. 3).

Understanding the finality of the state's authority to regulate society provides “a collective view of the economical phenomena of society, considered as existing simultaneously” (Mill, 1975, p. 65). With this comprehension Mill (1975) argues it is possible “to infer, in a general way, the contemporaneous state of possession of the economical laws of a stationary and unchanging society” (p. 65). However, human cultures and societies are not static, in fact they are subject to frequent changes and upheavals. This leads Mill (1994) to conclude: “We have to consider what these changes are, what are their laws, and what their ultimate tendencies, thereby adding a theory of motion to our theory of equilibrium- the Dynamics of political economy to the Statics (p. 65). This digression into the nature of socio-economic power sheds light on the problematic nature of the denial of authorship in postmodern deconstruction. One cannot understand the political-cultural complex as an unchanging set of images and objects. One must account for the dispositions and intentionality the individuals that populate any governed cultural group in order to more accurately model this construct. This means that a nation state does not exist only as a text that may be critiqued by a theoretical external interpreter.

One role for visual art is to function as an hermeneutic critique of the society in which the art creator operates. To deny authorship from text causes resentment in society because the human population of the society critique is ignored. On a smaller scale denial of authorship in an individual art work critiqued as text also leads to resentment. This is problematic because as Solomon (1990) writes:

According to Nietzsche… the modern age is virtually defined by bourgeois resentment- the resentment of a class that is no longer “slave” in any ordinary sociological or political sense but is still wholly servile in a profound psychological sense (p. 278)

According to Solomon (1990). “Nietzsche’s … view… is that resentment is disastrous, incapacitating to the strong (as ‘bad conscience’) and injurious to the weak as well” (p. 278). Nietzsche can be considered a progenitor of postmodern critical thought because “the emotional thrust of Nietzsche’s philosophy… is to diagnose and extinguish resentment from our basic repertoire of emotions” (p. 278). Critical theory concerns the elimination of conditions that lead to suffering particularly the suffering of individuals that comprise historically marginalized populations. This is why arguments from critical philosophy extend from Mill to Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Sartre. This crux of this argument rests in the notion that the authorship of texts is meaningful and that the postmodern critical denial of authorship causes resentment. This is why critical theorists should reject postmodern philosophy as an ideational turn within a larger discourse that extends from Mill and his philosophy of utilitarianism. One solution to the problem of the denial of authorship is to account for the subjective interpretations individual humans. Human perceive sensory information in the context of their unique dispositions, intentions, motivations. The hermeneutics of lived experience is the concern of phenomenology.

Contemporary Artwork: Anna Schuleit-Haber’s Bloom

To emphasize this concept, I have selected a work of art by the visual artist Anna Schuleit-Haber that relates strongly to concerns from phenomenology. Bell (2011) describes her artwork, Bloom as follows:

‘Bloom’ was a four-day installation at Massachusetts Mental Health Center in November 2003 after the original building was closed and the staff, patients, and services were moved to a different location in Boston. Schuleit installed 28,000 flowers and grass in the hospital and arranged a one-day symposium and opportunity for oral testimony at the original building (p. 314).

I find this artwork personally meaningful, because, as a schizophrenic person disabled by mental illness, I know patients in mental hospitals do not receive flowers. This is due to the danger posed to the patients by the plants themselves as well as their containers and any decorations. According to Bell (2011) Bloom:

commemorated the life and history of the buildings – and the people who worked in and had been patients in them – at times of transition in their histories. They brought together former patients, caregivers, and families who had entered the buildings for mental illness treatment over a period of many years with others who had never been inside before. The artworks juxtaposed easily recognizable elements – sacred music and living flowers, hospitals and asylums, audiences and patients, testimony and symposia – in a surprising and beautiful, even haunting way (Bell, p. 314).

The piece itself was aesthetically pleasing. The decrepit and decaying building was the ideal setting in which to locate a floral installation. The utilitarian ugliness of the building complements the aesthetic perfection of the flowers. However, the piece became emotionally moving because of the conceptual associations that surround it. Its haunting beauty comes from the idea that many people suffered there and they really would have appreciated some flowers. The objects within the space also function as a call to action.

To understand how the piece accomplishes this considers Abbott, Lindgren, William, and Thomas’s (2002) description of a simple computer program called Life:

The “Game of Life” starts with an object, or a cluster of objects, made from a configurations of black cells on a white-cell background. Then the automaton follows the rules, and you find out what happens. Many configurations die out completely (all cells white), become static, or cycles through a small number of states. Some configurations…such as the glider…move. Eventually Conway manages to prove that it is possible to construct a Universal Turing Machine- an abstract programmable computer- from the rules of Life. Pulses of gliders carry “information through the Turing Machine” (p. 55)

The decommissioned mental institution is the space in which the installation operates or “the program runs.” Cut rectangles of grass, lilies, roses, and other flowers plans in their pots exist as objects within this demarcated space or grid. Art observers within the installation grid are motivated to action by sensory experiences such as scents, sounds, and colors to move from location to location within the space. As the number of plants installed was enormous, the installation required a large number of human participants in the installation. Schuleit-Haber likely could not have created this installation by herself, but at a minimum, her contribution was the intention and role as a driving force to do this. Co-participants moving the plants functioned like gliders in Life because they were bounded by the physical constraints of the installation space, such as hallways and rooms. An understanding of phenomenology is important to interpretation of this piece because it sheds light on how the piece was socially constructed, observed, and deconstructed.

Relationship to Art Educational Theory and Practice

Smith (2009) describes art school theory as an important component of curricula for non-studio doctoral programs for visual artists. Smith (2009) justifies the need for art theoretical instruction in terms of the intended learning outcomes of a non-studio visual arts PhD program: If we are going to produce the artist-philosopher through academic training, what is needed is nothing less than engagement with philosophy and theory that comes of sustained reading and discussion and culminates in full-fledged dissertations” (p. 89). Theory in this context is meaningful because of its relationship to student cognition: “The artist has no more claim to intelligence than anyone else. But because of her studio training, her style of thinking and seeing does tend to be different” (Smith, 2009, p. 89). In addition, despite initial apprehension about the interest, motivation, capacity of his students to study art educational theories, Smith (2009) observed that his students found inquiry regarding this subject meaningful:

I soon found out there were two good reasons why: First, theory for art students meant something more than “theory”: it was useful to their lives, to their aspirations and personal identity as creative expressive individuals. Secondly, because art students spent most of their time in the studio, where resolving abstract problems was a basic activity of studio practice, dealing with abstraction was a way of life, and analytical thinking was the medium of thought (Smith, 2009, p. 89).

Art educators should understand philosophies involving critical theory because they allow them to make more complex judgments and decisions in art making and provide them with constructs to use as reference points when critiquing a work of art. Unlike visual artists, who work primarily with object-based or conceptual mediums, art educators also include education as a medium, and education requires work with students, teachers, parents and guardians, administrators, and other stakeholders within a learning community.

The argument against the denial of authorship is clear in this context. Consider two possible examples of problems that could occur when an art teacher is unfamiliar with phenomenology and works in art education within a postmodern philosophical framework. First, an art teacher will like be unsuccessful if they create situation in which students create and display art but ignores the authorship of the students’ texts. The students will feel hurt because they worked hard on their pieces. The parents and guardians will be offended because their children are upset. Administrators and other teachers will feel obligated to inform this hypothetical art teacher that their installation was a failure because the stakeholders who created it are not personally invested in the individual pieces. This will create a state of resentment which would be destructive to all of those involved. Second, imagine a scenario in which an art educator employs a “group learning” methodology in an art class with the goal of teaching the students in this hypothetical class how to create a specific type of artwork. The intended learning outcome in this scenario is for each student to create a finished piece that demonstrates that the student has completed, mastered, or learned how to create an art piece with a specific style, form, or function, or created in alignment with a specific visual arts movement. The teacher uses a modified Socratic educational technique in which the students are arranged in a circle. Each student begins working on their piece using the media the art teacher provides. After a certain period of time the teacher tells the students to pass their unfinished piece to the right or left to the next students. The teacher then asks the students to correct the mistakes in the piece their peers hand to them. The teacher asks students to refer to the examples on the board or projection screen in the front of the classroom when deciding what mistakes in the piece must be corrected. The teacher instructs the students to work on this piece for period of time and then pass the work to the right or left. The class continues working in this manner for the duration of the class. The teacher notes in their lesson plan that this methodology employs differentiated instruction via peer critique. This instructional methodology promotes an average uniform series of art objects constructed by the class as a whole. These products will seem finished as the end of instruction and will resemble the examples presented at the front of the classroom. In this nightmare scenario the individual intentions, choices, and motivations of each student are annihilated. No student creates their own work, instead the class creates a series of finished art products in a process that resembles an industrial assembly line. Primary and secondary students will likely hate this form of art instruction because they do not get to make their own work. However, this methodology might be acceptable in a tertiary educational setting if the instructor makes the students aware of the intended learning outcome in advance of the class and does not rely solely on this methodology in instruction. These two hypothetical examples demonstrate why art educators should familiarize themselves with phenomenology and its philosophical-historical antecedents. First, art educators should avoid the trap of the failed student art show scenario by avoiding denial of authorship.   Second, art educators, most importantly teachers at the primary and secondary educational levels, should avoid any instructional methodology that encourages students to create homogeneous “finished” art objects. Instead, study by art educators of the concept of phenomenology, as it is informed by psychophysical reductionism, will help art educators to teach their students to create more complex and personally meaningful artwork with deeper conceptual associations.

 Appendix A

Thought Problem

 

How strange would it be if you met yourself on the street?

How strange if you liked yourself,

took yourself in your arms, married your own self,

propagated by techniques known only to you,

and then populated the world? Replicas of you are everywhere.

Some are Arabs. Some are Jews. Some live in yurts. It is

an abomination, but better that your

sweet and scrupulously neat self

emerges at many points on the earth to watch the horned moon rise

than all those dolts out there, turning into pillars of salt wherever we look.

If we have to have people, let them be you,

spritzing your geraniums, driving yourself to the haberdashery,

killing your supper with a blowgun.

Yes, only in the forest do you feel at peace,

up in the branches and down in the terrific gorges,

but you’ve seen through everything else.

You’ve fled in terror across the frozen lake,

you’ve found yourself in the sand, the palace,

the prison, the dockside stews;

and long ago, on this same planet, you came home

to an empty house, poured a Scotch-and-soda,

and sat in a recliner in the unlit rumpus room,

puzzled at what became of you.

 

References:

Abbott, E., & Stewart, I. (2002). The annotated Flatland a romance of many dimensions. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing.

 

Bell, Susan. (2011). Claiming justice: Knowing mental illness in the public art of Anna Schuleit's 'Habeas Corpus' and 'Bloom'. London, UK: Health, May 15(3)15. 313-34. doi: 10.1177/1363459310397979. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/49849602_Claiming_justice_Knowing_mental_illness_in_the_public_art_of_Anna_Schuleit%27s_%27Habeas_Corpus%27_and_%27Bloom%27

 

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Garland-Thomson, R. (2002). Integrating disability, transforming feminist theory. NWSA Journal, 14(3), 1-32.

 

Haraway, D. (1991). A cyborg manifesto: Science, technology, and socialist-feminism in the Late Twentieth Century. In Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (149-181). New York, NY: Routledge. doi: 15. 313-34. 10.1177/1363459310397979. Retrieved from: https://aestech.wikischolars.columbia.edu/file/view/Haraway-A+Cyborg+Manifesto+ Science+ Technology+%26+Socialist- Feminism+in+the+Late+20th+Century.pdf

 

Mill, J., & Spitz, D. (1975). On liberty 1st ed., Norton critical edition. New York, NY: Norton.

 

Mill, J., & Riley, J.  (1994). Principles of political economy with chapters on socialism (Oxford world's classics). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

 

Nietzsche, F. (1923). The Antichrist. New York, NY: A.A. Knopf.

 

Sartre, J., & Elkai?m-Sartre, Arlette. (1991). Critique of dialectical reason. London, UK: Verso.

 

Seshadri, V. (2009, October). Thought problem. The New Yorker. Retrieved from: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/10/12/thought-problem

 

Solomon, R. (1990). Nietzsche, postmodernism, and resentment: A genealogical hypothesis. In Koelb, C. (Ed.), Nietzsche as postmodernist: Essays pro and contra (267-295). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press

 

Tucker, R., Marx, Karl, & Engels, Friedrich. (1978). The Marx-Engels reader (2d ed.). New York, NY: Norton.