America First, China then, Europe last?

French President Emmanuel Macron landed in Paris after a three-day visit in China where he travelled across the country, partly in company of Ursula von der Leyen, head of the European Commission. The first head of state to be welcomed by President Xi since his formal reelection, Emmanuel Macron was explicitly there to discuss the resolution of the Russo-Ukrainian war, and the role China could hold in this undertaking, a month after the disclosure of a Chinese “peace plan” for Ukraine, and weeks after the new and noteworthy involvement of the Middle Kingdom in the resolution of diverse crises and conflicts, such as a reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, sealed in Beijing. Implicitly, the French President was seeking something else: how to exist when Americans and Chinese are dueling over the fate of the world?

Emmanuel Macron’s answer is to be found in the construction of a “Third Way” as we often hear it in the mouth of the one who – rightly – defines himself as the architect of European sovereignty, theorized in its “Athens” and “Sorbonne” speeches pronounced in September 2017. In this perspective, the French President reiterated his call for a “strategic autonomy”, using a very offensive rhetoric towards the United States: “prevent the Europeans from becoming vassals”; “avoid a bloc-to-bloc logic”; abstain from being “followers” of the pace set by Washington or Beijing…

Emmanuel Macron endeavors to break the gullibility syndrome – an evil Europeans often fall for when facing a situation threatening their interests – and to mobilize Europe in front of repeated American misdeeds. European heads of states and diplomatic representations bugged by the National Security Agency, brain drain in the sprint for breakthrough innovations that would help us adapt to climate change, an Inflation Reduction Act that is fiercely competing with the industrial ambitions of the European Union, soaring gas prices demanded by our American ally to replace Russian hydrocarbons… are only a few of the many threats that need to be answered urgently.

As Europeans, of course, the crafting of a truly continental industrial policy (NextGenerationEU stimulus plan, Chips Act, Critical Raw Materials Act, Net Zero Industry Act…) or the strengthening of the Union’s commercial policy (diverse EU complaints against China or the US, establishment of a European Union – United States Trade and Technology Council, creation of a “European Commercial Prosecutor”, development of an “anti-coercion instrument” …) demonstrate this urgency. In this regard, the presence of the head of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen is to be read as a message of unity sent to China, but also to the United States. As President Macron very correctly reminded it, the United States have revived the America First logic, and the political swing between Democrats and Republicans will not change anything. Even though Biden might be more discerning and astute than Trump, this is a doctrinal and transpartisan reversal of US foreign policy. Other challenges such as hydrogen, quantum or the new spatial frontier await for us and each call for a common answer from the European Union.

Yes, Europe should be more aware of itself. It must carry a strategic vision for its own future. It must not confine the expression of its dawning power to a space limited by the Atlantic and the Urals: it must see further. However, it is better to rise to some challenges with allies. Renewing our vision of China, and more generally how we see the Indo-Pacific region, is one of them, and overact Europe’s singularity is not always the right thing to do.

Beyond voluntaristic declarations and wishful thinking, the strategic and military balance of power speaks in favor of closed rather than dispersed ranks. For several years now, China’s military budget is not comparable with Europeans ones, the latter having been chopped by decades of a credulous belief in the peace dividends. For years now, China became aware of its own weakness in correlation with its position as a massive hydrocarbon importer, especially because of its oil routing through the Indian ocean, with which it has no coastline. A matter China might be solving very soon.

In a scheme reminding Russian obsession for warm seas in its naval doctrine, Beijing has been tackling this issue for two decades by crafting a strictly Chinese architecture in the Indo-Pacific region, to master an environment that is so sensitive for its energy supply. We often talk about the “new silk roads” but hear less about the “string of pearls strategy” through which China has painstakingly interweaved a naval road starting from the south of the country, passing by the strategic Malacca straight, running alongside Burma, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan to arrive by the Ormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb choke points, with numerous naval bases, port facilities and intelligence/surveillance infrastructures.

In this perspective, China has been framing this area for years, without mentioning its multi-secular legacy from which the country can draw some lessons. The United States do the same, with a historic and continuous presence in the region, in addition to the famous American pivot to Asia announced by the Obama administration more than a decade ago. When talking about the Indo-Pacific, Washington can lean on the United States Indo-Pacific Command and its 400?000 civilian and military staff, on a solid network of tens of land, air and naval bases, along with a weave of solid and pampered strategic partnerships with neighboring countries.

Are we going to pretend a few statements of intention, may they be formalized in a non-descript white paper, are enough to create and enact an actual European Indo-Pacific strategy? Facts laid above show the intensity of the effort necessary to nurture any hope to effectively influence this region – home to half of the world population and half of the world GDP (the US included) – is out of reach for Europeans alone, who have neither the experience nor the means to undertake such initiative. A fortiori when maintaining a united front in the face of the existential peril embodied by Russia already seems like a Herculean labor. In this context, the ex-nihilo definition of a European strategy for the Indo-Pacific would be a bit of a fantasy, all the more so as the Union has very limited knowledge of the region: since Brexit, France is the only country to dispose of a territorial and military presence there.

We should not blush at the idea of belonging to an alliance, a camp, a “bloc” leaning on a common core of values built on democracy, a free-market economy and the rule of law, which does not mean abandoning its fate and sovereignty on blind faith. Rather than being obsessed with singularization, we should devote more energy to strengthening our leverage in the conception and enforcement of a response which must be global and shared with allies, beyond Europe and America, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, New-Zealand… Countries with which we share a common concern for the Indo-Pacific to remain open, stable and safe.

?Let’s not give China the opportunity to drive a wedge between us: the significant challenges Beijing will pose us only require unity and solidarity.