The Almost Complete Pursuit of the Deep Ecology Ideal

Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to apply Thich Nhat Hanh’s interbeing principle to rationally argue that all of Nature has instrumental value. If the living parts of Nature rely on the nonliving parts, and we rely on them both, it is in humanity's best interest to maximize the health of Nature as a whole, especially since we don't fully understand the interconnections. Given this, Nature can be valued instrumentally within the lens of ethical anthropocentrism and heavily prioritized. Since capitalism is deeply entrenched at the global level, and the deep ecology ideal at its most extreme demands the end of capitalism, it is not realistic to pursue this ideal at its most extreme. The almost complete pursuit of the deep ecology ideal is the level of ‘generosity towards Nature’ that is sensible to pursue.

I began my Environmental Ethics class with a firm, deeply held conviction that anthropocentrism is an evil belief, like racism, classism, and sexism. I saw it as a fixation that must be unlearned and untaught for humanity to be able to evolve (or perhaps return?) to a more harmonious relationship with Nature. After reading Hayward, I must admit that I did not recognize the true name of the enemy: speciesism and human chauvinism. Anthropocentrism, by contrast, is an inescapable point of view because, as Ferré said, “humans have no choice but to think as humans.” (Ferré, 1994, p. 72). And it must be understood in the context of its two flavors — ontological and ethical — which do not necessarily have to correlate with each other. One can accept both, or just one of them. Ontological anthropocentrism is the idea that humans are at the centre of the world. “Anthropocentrism can intelligibly be criticised as an ontological error, but attempts to conceive of it as an ethical error are liable to conceptual and practical confusion.” (Hayward, 1997, p. 49). This is because ethical anthropocentrism means the favoring of human interests, and this is something that humans cannot avoid. Thus, it is not possible for humans to behave non-anthropocentrically.

To conflate anthropocentrism with speciesism and human chauvinism is to ignore key nuances and the fact that there are two types of anthropocentrism. So, if we want to check the supremacy of human interests, we must focus our righteous anger on speciesism and human chauvinism. 

The argument for the existence of intrinsic value is sound, but only when this argument rests on the foundation of subjectivism rather than objectivism. The essay “In Defense of Anthropocentrism” spells out exactly why the objective approach to intrinsic value falls apart: values cannot exist without a valuer. (Beckerman and Pasek, 2001, p. 84, Environmental Ethics). Arguing for the subjective intrinsic value of Nature is more tricky, so I will not attempt that. 

One can rationally argue that all of Nature has instrumental value by virtue of the interbeing principle (Hanh, 1987). If the living parts of Nature rely on the nonliving parts, and we rely on them both, it is in humanity's best interest to maximize the health of Nature as a whole, especially since we don't fully understand the interconnections. Given this, Nature can be valued instrumentally within the lens of ethical anthropocentrism and heavily prioritized.

To effectively harness “non-anthropocentric” ethics like deep ecology for purposes of cultural change through public persuasion, we must accept that this ideology’s founder, Arne Naess, said “Except to satisfy vital needs, humans do not have the right to reduce this diversity and richness.” Such concessions are pragmatic and unavoidable. After all, “People do right, not wrong, to have a particular regard for their own kin and their own species.” (Midgely, 1997, p. 142, Environmental Ethics)

Aldo Leopold’s land ethic is very similar to deep ecology because it values the ecosystem significantly more than the individual and the species. This orientation can come at the expense of animal welfare, because a central tenet of his thinking was that our primary concern should be the healthy functioning of whole biotic communities rather than their individual members. Our judgements about a species’ worth are limited by our scientific understanding of ecological integrity and cascade effects. “When men act on nature, they do not simply modify a particular quality of a particular substance. What they do, rather, is to interact with a system of interactions, setting in process new interactions. Just for that reason, there is always a risk that their actions will have consequences which they did not predict.” (Passmore, 1975, p. 107, Environmental Ethics) 

Deep ecology and the land ethic are both captivating “non-anthropocentric” ideologies that are useful to environmentalists because they lend themselves well to political rhetoric. Deep ecology goes even further than Leopold’s land ethic because in its purest form, it advocates for the end of capitalism. Taken too literally, it ceases to provide wise guidance for the realities of our complicated modern world. To effectively restore water bodies, air quality, forests, biodiversity, and mitigate global temperature rise, we must stop short of deep ecology at its most extreme — at least in how we act and speak in the world. After all, we study ethics to examine our beliefs and thought processes so that we can effectively guide our actions, and action tends to require persuasion.

Compassion for humanity is a more sensible position to project, and it inevitably must lead to the consideration of human interests. “Self-love can be considered a precondition of loving others. By analogy, only if humans know how to treat their fellow beings can they begin to treat other species decently. So a positive regard for humans does not automatically entail disregard for non-humans, it may even promote more regard for non-humans.” (Hayward, 1997, p 52). 

In “Encounters With the Archdruid”, Charles Park, Charles Fraser, and Floyd Dominy are all operating from a mindset of concern for human welfare. Dominy grew up in dry, Western farm country and he experienced times of deprivation in his youth due to the vagaries of Nature. “In some years, more than twenty inches of rain would fall and harvests would be copious. In others, when the figure went below ten, the family lived with the lament that there was not enough money to buy clothes, or even sufficient food. These radical uncertainties were eventually removed by groundwater development, reclamation--the storage of what water there was, for use in irrigation.” The tension between David Brower and his three opponents can be described as a tension between a land ethic in the style of Aldo Leopold (described by Brower in wildlife conservation terms), and ethical anthropocentrism (favoring human interests).

This tension raises the question “to what extent should we prioritize people over the other lifeforms that we share this planet with?’. Our species has a selfish tendency to encroach, exploit, and prioritize short term gains even more than we intended at the beginning of the decision making process about a particular resource; excessive logging of forests, overfishing, industrial-scale factory farming, and accelerating urban sprawl are particularly relevant examples of this principle today. Given this tendency to escalate, an environmental ethic based on ‘the middle ground’ is very likely to eventually slide too far in our favor, at the expense of Nature and our own long-term interests. 

So how do we accept ethical anthropocentrism and still respond effectively to environmental problems? My own answer to this is that we have to give generous weight to the value of ecological integrity, not equal weight relative to human interests. A corollary of generosity towards Nature is that we also end up giving more weight to future generations of humans, who are traditionally undervalued by the rules of cost-benefit analysis. In other words, the sweet spot on the spectrum of environmental ethics ideas is somewhere between ‘the middle ground’ and the extremes of deep ecology (the total replacement of capitalism) and land ethics -- closer to this extreme but not quite touching it. This is where adjustments must be made to decelerate economic growth, population growth, and resource extraction. It is in this part of the spectrum that Leopold’s land ethic exists. Rather than (pretend to) pursue a middle path, humanity must take the absolute minimum required resources from Nature and give the absolute maximum that our technology, budgets, and modern habits will allow, while decreasing our numbers as rapidly and humanely as possible over the course of this century and those to come. 

Buddha said “Believe nothing until you have experienced it and found it to be true.” When I visited the Peruvian Amazon in 2018 and lived in the jungle for a month, I got a glimpse of what generosity towards Nature could look like. My friends and I stayed on the land of a master shaman, Se?or Wagner; he and his wife and two children lived in a way that was as close to 100% sustainable as people can get. We lived in isolation huts (tambos) that he had built for guests who came to his ayahuasca retreat, with the help of villagers who lived further down the Ucayali River. There were only a few of them, and they were built from wood, with thatch roofs on top and mosquito nets inside. The groundwater that was pumped up through the makeshift wooden showers and wooden sinks tasted fresh and clean. We didn’t have the luxury of toilets, but we managed just fine by digging holes in the ground, 50 feet from the huts, and burying them when they reached capacity. The family grew most of their food themselves, raised chickens, and made their soap, toothpaste, and shampoo from the jungle plants. They utilized solar powered electricity to charge their phones, and they had Wi-Fi. Their simple lifestyle was civilized, enjoyable, and life-affirming to witness. "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.” (Leopold, 1949, p. 200, Environmental Ethics).

Bibliography

Beckerman, Wilfred, and Joanna Pasek. “In Defense of Anthropocentrism.” Justice, Posterity, and the Environment. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 

Ferré, Frederick. “Personalistic Organicism: Paradox or Paradigm?” In Robin Attfield and Andrew Belsey, eds., Philosophy and the Natural Environment, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 36. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp 59-73. 

H?nh, N. Thich. “Interbeing: Fourteen Guidelines for Engaged Buddhism." (1987).

Hayward, Tim. “Anthropocentrism: A Misunderstood Problem.” Environmental Values 6. Cambridge: The White Horse Press, 1997.

Leopold, Aldo. “The Land Ethic.” A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949.

Midgley, Mary. “The End of Anthropocentrism?” Animals and Why They Matter. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1983.

Passmore, John. “Attitudes to Nature.” In R.S. Peters, ed., Nature and Conduct. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975, pp 251 - 64.