Alfred Thayer Mahan: Still Relevant in the 21st Century

Alfred Thayer Mahan's core theory posited that the outcomes of major power conflicts in the 17th and 18th centuries were significantly influenced by the effective use of naval force by certain states (Mahan 1890). Mahan presented a historical and strategic analysis of great power competition between 1660 and 1783, heavily shaped by geographical factors. He clearly understood the geographic context that allowed Great Britain to achieve naval supremacy. However, Mahan's theoretical goals extended beyond providing historical strategic guidance for his nation. In his magnum opus, he also envisioned future "transnational" cooperation among the leading trade-dependent maritime powers to ensure open seas for free trade in an increasingly global market (Sumida 2006). Thus, Mahan's grand theory was global in scope, though rooted in the analysis of select European states' histories. Given that he wrote at the end of the 19th century, an era of rising inter-imperial rivalries (Hobsbawm 1987, Parker 1985), it is unsurprising that his theories were acknowledged and adapted by nationalist, imperial, and state-centered elites in the West and beyond (Sumida 2006; Cropsey and Milikh 2012). Therefore, it is significant to examine how Mahan's ideas influenced U.S. strategy and theoretical discussions on maritime supremacy, particularly concerning the Caribbean region.

In his 1897 study, "The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future," Mahan focused on the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico regions. He warned that the United States was "woefully unready, not only in fact but in purpose, to assert in the Caribbean and Central America a weight of influence proportioned to the extent of her interests." Mahan lamented that the U.S. lacked both the navy and the willingness to create one that could "weigh seriously in any disputes with those nations whose interests will conflict there" with those of the U.S. At a time when Britain dominated the seas and Germany's naval power was rapidly rising, Mahan was concerned about the U.S.'s lack of strategic positions in or around the Caribbean, which had "great natural advantages for the control of that sea" and were being fortified to become practically unassailable. Although he did not regret the U.S.'s inability to match the great navies of the Old World, he noted that "despite its great surplus revenue," the U.S. remained "poor in proportion to its length of seaboard and its exposed points." This, he argued, was a "reasonable cause of deep national concern," as the nation seemed indifferent to securing its sea frontier and building a powerful navy to fully exploit its geographical and strategic position.

Mahan argued that in a rapidly expanding global economy, a navy capable of protecting both the homeland and seaborne trade was crucial. His "naval doctrine" anticipated a key aspect of what late 20th-century social scientists would later call "globalization." From a realist perspective, he emphasized that only by dominating its own region could a state consistently project power and influence abroad. For the U.S., achieving a monopoly of power in its own "Mediterranean" was essential before establishing a network of forward bases.

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Mahan highlighted that the significance of specific regions on Earth's surface, and their interest to humanity, fluctuates over time—a theme later elaborated by Dutch-American scholar Nicholas J. Spykman in the 1930s. The Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico formed an inland sea and archipelago resembling the Mediterranean Sea in Europe. Mahan noted that Great Britain derived nearly twenty-five percent of her commerce from the Caribbean during periods when the Mediterranean contributed only two percent. This indicated the strategic potential of the Caribbean for trade. By comparing the Mediterranean and Caribbean seas, Mahan argued that their "conspicuous characteristics" were their political and military importance, affecting not only bordering countries but the world at large. Thus, a global strategic significance was inherent in the push for dominance over this inland sea.

There was a fundamental geostrategic difference between the Mediterranean and Caribbean regions: while the former had several strong land powers, the U.S. was the only one in the latter. This gave the U.S. a unique advantage, provided it maintained a strong, technologically advanced navy. If achieved, no external power could challenge the U.S.'s dominant position. The Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico would then become U.S. inland seas and strategic assets. Unlike Halford J. Mackinder's European concerns about a rising Eurasian power, Mahan's outlook on maritime power was optimistic. He advocated for an expansionist U.S. maritime strategy aimed at securing Cuba, Hawaii, and Jamaica, with the control of the Caribbean "Mediterranean" being a prerequisite for a broader strategy.

Reception in 21st Century’s China

Alfred T. Mahan's studies are indeed being examined in China, particularly within the context of naval strategy in the 21st century. His theories, often referred to as the "evangelist of sea power" and the intellectual father of the modern US Navy, have gained significant attention among Chinese analysts. They advocate for building a powerful navy, driven primarily by economic motivations such as securing sea lanes for foreign energy supplies and other commodities. This focus aligns closely with China's military priorities, emphasizing the importance of maritime dominance (Holmes and Yoshihara 2008).

Mahan's influence extends beyond historical relevance; his ideas are seen as having contemporary applicability. Chinese naval strategy in the 21st century reflects a turn towards Mahanian principles, incorporating them into their strategic planning and decision-making processes. This adaptation is part of a broader shift in China's approach to naval power, aiming to assert control over critical maritime areas and ensure the safe passage of vital trade routes. China's initial interest in Mahan's theories dates back to the early days of its reform and opening-up policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As China embarked on economic reforms and began to see the importance of maritime trade, it started to recognize the strategic value of controlling sea lanes and establishing a strong naval presence.

The study of Mahan in China is not limited to theoretical exploration but also involves practical application. Chinese naval strategists are examining how Mahanian thought could shape their encounters on the high seas, influencing both tactical decisions and long-term strategic objectives. As China's economic growth accelerated and its maritime trade routes expanded globally, Chinese naval strategists began to look beyond the near seas. Inspired by Mahan's emphasis on the importance of controlling distant seas for a nation's prosperity, China started to express interest in expanding its naval presence further afield, reflecting a growing ambition to project power globally.

This engagement with Mahan's work underscores the ongoing relevance of his theories in the modern geopolitical landscape, particularly as it pertains to maritime power and global trade.

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Keywords: #geopolitics, #SeaPower, #Mahan, #Spykman, #NATO, #Mackinder, #China

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References

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·???????? Mahan, A.T. (1890). The Influence of Sea Power upon History.

·???????? Mahan, A.T. (1897). The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future.

·???????? Sumida, Jon. (2006). "Geography, Technology, and British Naval Strategy in the Dreadnought Era," Naval War College Review, Summer 2006, 59(3), 89 ff.

·???????? Hobsbawm, Eric. (1987). The Age of Empire.

·???????? Parker, Geoffrey. (1985). Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century.

·???????? Cropsey, Seth, and Arthur Milikh. (2012). "Mahan’s Naval Strategy: China Learned It. Will America Forget It?" World Affairs, March-April 2012. [Link](https://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/mahan%E2%80%99s-naval-strategy-china-learned-it-will-america-forget-it).

·???????? Holmes, J. R., and T. Yoshihara (2008), Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century. The Turn to Mahan.