ALDOUS LAW GROUP Successfully Enforces Settlement in Equine Dispute.

In a recent decision, Brigante v. von Ballmoos, et alius, 2024 WL 4129729 (Sup. Ct., Washington Cnty. Sept. 5, 2024) (Muller, J.), the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Washington County, issued a decision and order:? (i) enforcing a settlement agreement; (ii) dismissing a special proceeding; and (iii) awarding Aldous Law Group clients, Jaisen von Ballmoos and Fairview Stable, LLC (“Fairview”), full and unqualified ownership of four Morgan show horses.

Although the parties’ extensive pleadings, briefing, and motion practice explored various aspects of New York’s lien law, N.Y. Lien Law §§ 183, 201-a, as applied to the boarding, care, and training of horses, the Court’s decision turned on a written settlement agreement, memorialized in correspondence between the parties’ counsel, CPLR § 2104, in February 2024.

Factual Background

In January 2021, Jaisen von Ballmoos, a professional horse trainer, and his then-client, Elizabeth Brigante, traveled to a Morgan horse breeding farm in western Pennsylvania for the purpose of shopping for horses with show potential.? At the farm, they developed an interest in two horses:? a five-year-old mare named “Kinzu Unconditional Love” (a/k/a “Lily”) and a young cold named “Kinzu All or Nothing” (a/k/a “Tommy”).? Mr. von Ballmoos and Ms. Brigante thereafter entered into an oral agreement whereby:? (i) Ms. Brigante would purchase the two horses; (ii) Mr. von Ballmoos and his facility, Fairview, would carry the expense of boarding and training one of the horses (i.e., Lily); (iii) Ms. Brigante would pay the expense of the other horse (i.e., Tommy); and (iv) Mr. von Ballmoos and Ms. Brigante would share in Tommy’s economic value, such that, when Tommy sold, they would split the sale proceeds equally.? (N.B.:? Ms. Brigante claimed that Mr. von Ballmoos agreed to board and train Tommy at no cost and that he would be paid a 10% commission, when Tommy sold.)? Brigante, 2024 WL 4129729 at *1.

In October 2021, Mr. von Ballmoos presented Lily at the Grand National and World Championship Morgan Horse Show in Oklahoma City, where she won significant accolades.? As a result, Ms. Brigante and Mr. von Ballmoos agreed to breed Lily to Tommy.? The following year, Tommy similarly received accolades in Oklahoma City and, in April 2023, Lily gave birth to a foal (“Junior”).? Later that year, Ms. Brigante and Mr. von Ballmoos agreed to bring Tommy to Oklahoma City for the purpose of attracting a potential buyer.? Unfortunately, however, Mr. von Ballmoos did not receive any offers to buy Tommy.? Id. at *1-2.

On October 21, 2023, Ms. Brigante sent Mr. von Ballmoos a text message, expressing her difficult financial situation and her inability to pay various bills.? She also advised Mr. von Ballmoos that she was ending her training at Fairview, her horses were no longer for sale, and that she would make arrangements to retrieve her horses and pay the cost of showing Tommy, together the expenses for various treatments he received.? Mr. von Ballmoos replied that he was owed more than just the expense of the shows and would not permit Ms. Brigante to remove the horses from Fairview, unless Ms. Brigante paid $25K.? Id. at *2.

Procedural Background

Mr. von Ballmoos retained Aldous Law Group and, on October 23, 2023, Ms. Brigante received a letter from Mr. von Ballmoos’s and Fairview’s counsel at Aldous Law Group, advising Ms. Brigante that the horses would be retained, pursuant to N.Y. Lien Law § 183, until she paid the outstanding balance in full.? Two days later, a commercial equine truck arrived at Fairview, accompanied by Ms. Brigante and her boyfriend, to remove the horses.? After the owner and driver of the transport company were advised of the situation, the driver left without the horses.? The following day, counsel sent a second letter to Ms. Brigante, advising her of his client’s legal position and enclosing copies of the unpaid invoices.? Then, on November 1, 2023, the same counsel sent Ms. Brigante copies of the Verified Notice of Claim and Intention to Sell, pursuant to N.Y. Lien Law § 201, demanding payment in the amount of $59,614.06, for the boarding, care, and training of the horses, within 14 days and that, if not redeemed, the horses would held for sale on November 27, 2023.? Id. at *2.

In response, Ms. Brigante (“Petitioner”) commenced a special proceeding, against Mr. von Ballmoos and Fairview, by filing a Petition.? In response, Mr. von Ballmoos and Fairview (“Respondents”) filed a Verified Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim, seeking a declaratory judgment finding the Notice of Claim valid and dismissing the Petition.? Three weeks later, Petitioner filed a companion plenary action, Brigante v. von Ballmoos, et alius (Sup. Ct., Washington Cnty. Index No. EC2023-36410) and, shortly thereafter, moved to consolidate the actions, convert the special proceeding into a plenary action, and grant the sale of the horses, pursuant to CPLR § 2702. Respondents opposed the motion and, during a court conference, the parties agreed the plenary action would be held in abeyance, pending disposition of the then-pending motions.? Id. at *2-3.

Thereafter, counsel for the parties engaged in a number of conversations and exchanged correspondence (i.e., a letter and emails) regarding settlement.? As a result, on February 16, 2024, Respondents’ counsel at Aldous Law Group filed a motion to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement.? Id. at *3.

Months later, Petitioner retained new counsel and, on July 16 2024, filed an order to show cause, seeking a permanent injunction preventing Respondents from showing Petitioner’s horses or using them in any manner outside the scope of maintaining their health and well-being and setting a bond as surety during the pendency of the matter.? With the Petition and three motions pending, the Court held oral argument on August 29, 2024.? Id.

The Court’s Decision

Rather than address the Petition and motions ad seriatim, the Court first determined whether the parties had entered into an enforceable settlement agreement.? In doing so, the Court specifically noted that, on February 1, 2024, Petitioner’s counsel had sent a letter to Respondents’ counsel, stating, in relevant part, “[m]y client agreed to transfer to ownership [sic] of all three (3) horses (including the unborn foal) in exchange for mutual general releases thus resolving all claims between the parties” and “[t]his offer is good until Monday February 5, 2024 at 5:00 pm.”? Id.

On February 2, 2024 at 11:19 am, Respondents’ counsel replied, via email, to Petitioner’s offer letter, stating:? “I am writing on behalf of my clients Jaisen von Ballmoos and Fairview Stable, LLC, to respond to your letter, dated February 2, 2024.? My clients agree to accept the transfer of ownership of the three (3) horses (including the unborn foal) from your client, Elizabeth Brigante, in exchange for mutual general releases and other typical settlement terms (e.g., NY choice of law/jurisdiction, integration clause, etc.), as set forth and agreed in a written settlement agreement.? My clients would like to complete the settlement quickly.? To that end, I will prepare a draft agreement, a draft copy of which I will send you ASAP (likely over the weekend or Monday).”? Respondents counsel also addressed some details that would be required in order to effectuate the ownership transfer.? Id.

Approximately, an hour and a half later, Petitioner’s counsel responded: ?“OK.”? Id. at 4.

After Respondents’ counsel sent Petitioner’s counsel a draft settlement agreement and made further efforts to follow up, on February 14, 2024, Petitioner’s counsel sent an email, advising he had been ill and stating that Petitioner “rejects your settlement papers and . . . I think the possible settlement is dead at this point.”? Id.

Two days later, Respondent moved to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing that their counsel’s acceptance of the offer, less than 24 hours later, and counsel’s acknowledgement of that acceptance, satisfy the requirements of CPLR § 2104 and constitutes a binding settlement agreement.? Petitioner, by contrast, opposed the motion, arguing that her offer was rejected by Respondents when they set forth a new term – namely, how the documents for the transfer of ownership should be completed – and, as a result, there was no written agreement of the parties setting forth the material terms.? Id.

The Court began its analysis by distinguishing two cases, cited by Petitioner, where the parties had reached out-of-court settlements and the courts found material terms of the agreements were notably absent from the parties’ writings.? The Court then proceeded to underscore that “[s]tipulations of settlement are judicially favored, will not lightly be set aside, and are to be enforced with rigor and without a searching examination into their substance as long as they are clear, final and the product of mutual accord.”? Id., citing, Herz v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 172 A.D.3d 1336, 1337 (2d Dep’t 2019).? “A stipulation of settlement is enforceable so long as it complies with the requirements of CPLR § 2104 and sets forth all the material terms of settlement.”? Id., citing, Phila Ins. Indem. Co. v. Kendall, 197 A.D.3d 75 (1st Dep’t 2021).

The Court then observed “[w]here, as here, an attorney sends an email with the intent of relaying a settlement offer or acceptance, and their email account is identified in some way as their own, it is unnecessary for them to retype their own signature to satisfy the subscription requirement of CPLR § 2104.”? Id. at 5.? Finding that the manner in which the paperwork is completed, resulting in the transfer of the ownership of the horses, is not a material element of the agreement, the Court stated “it is not disputed the offer letter and acceptance email were in written form and subscribed to by the parties’ attorneys, therefore, the Court finds the exchange of emails between the parties satisfies the requirements of CPLR § 2104.”? Id.

Accordingly, the Court granted, in part, Respondents’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement and directed the parties to exchange mutual general releases.? The Court also denied Petitioner’s consolidation motion as moot, adding that, if it were to consider that motion, the Court “would deny it based upon insufficient pleadings.”? Id.? Finally, noting, in a footnote, that it is without jurisdiction to dismiss the related plenary action, the Court denied Petitioner’s order to show cause as moot.? Id.

The decision put to rest a drawn-out effort by Aldous Law Group’s clients to protect their important and substantial economic interests.? The end result involved the transfer to them of four Morgan horses, one of which had not even been born when the dispute first arose!

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Aldous PLLC (d/b/a Aldous Law Group) is a law firm located in mid-town Manhattan and upstate New York, dedicated to providing quality and cost-effective legal services to its clients.? The Firm provides trusted advice and legal strategy to international companies and select individuals, facing issues with legal, financial, and reputational ramifications.? Aldous Law Group’s founding member, Ken Aldous, is an experienced lawyer, qualified to practice in both the U.S. and UK, who has represented a broad range of diverse interests in complex litigation before various federal and state courts, as well as in domestic and international arbitration.

With the right experience, an unwavering dedication to client needs, and a strong commitment to quality – not to mention a strategic network of outside legal professionals in a variety of specializations and geographic locations – Aldous Law Group offers its clients an attractive alternative. ?Whatever your legal needs, Aldous Law Group is well situated to help you and your business effectively and efficiently find your way through a complex and fast-paced world.

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