THE AL FASHAGA BORDER DISPUTE

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the leader of Sudan's ruling Sovereign Council, deployed more than 6,000 troops to the Ethiopian border at the outset of the conflict in the Tigray region, in accordance with an agreement reached on November 1, 2020. This agreement stipulated that Sudan would close its borders to prevent any infiltration to or from Sudan by an armed group, specifically referring to the TDF. These troop deployments placed Sudanese forces in a historically disputed border region along the international boundary between Sudan's Gedaref state and Ethiopia's Amhara and Tigray regions. In 2008, negotiations between the TPLF and the Sudanese government designated the land known as the al-Fashaga triangle as Sudanese territory, while allowing Amhara farmers to continue farming there. However, with periodic clashes and attacks in the area since 2014, the arrangement was ultimately dissolved with Sudanese troop deployment in November 2020. These forces have been accused of displacing Amhara and Tigrayan farmers from the area, particularly after Amhara forces redeployed to support the federal government's efforts in the TPLF conflict in northern Tigray.

Amhara regional militias and special forces (Liyu Police) have responded to the displacement of ethnic Amharas from these areas, attacking Sudanese forces in regions inhabited by Amhara farmers since the mid-1990s. This situation has put Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in a challenging position. On one hand, Abiy relies on powerful Amhara militias to maintain positions against a potential resurgence of the TPLF to the north. On the other hand, he cannot afford an international conflict that might involve other actors like Egypt, given the disputes over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

It appears that the leadership of the Sudanese army may be using the conflict for internal political gains rather than being genuinely concerned about land ownership. While this suggests that neither Khartoum nor Addis Ababa is interested in escalating the fighting, there is a risk that local conflicts over valuable farming land could gain momentum as factions on both the Sudanese and Ethiopian sides continue to have political incentives to keep the conflict unresolved, potentially drawing in armed actors. Hardline Amhara nationalists and militiamen, including Fano, have the potential to sustain the conflict even if the federal government disapproves, with unpredictable consequences.

The conflict has primarily involved infantry from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and SAF 'reservists' known as Rapid Support Forces (RSF), who appear to be paramilitaries mobilized from the region. On the Ethiopian side, infantry from the Amhara regional special forces, often operating alongside local Amhara militias, have been actively engaged. Militiamen working with the Amhara regional special forces are typically part of legitimate, semi-regular militias operating at the kebele level, forming the lowest tier of the Ethiopian security apparatus. While there have been reports of shelling, likely involving mortars by the SAF and Ethiopian security forces, there have been no verified accounts of helicopter or aircraft strikes. Given the armed conflict between the SAF and Sudanese forces and the reintegration of regional special forces into various security sectors in Ethiopia in April, future conflicts might only involve local militias and paramilitaries.

Criminal and vigilante militias also operate in Amhara-occupied regions, and they are likely responsible for most abductions, cattle raids, and attacks on Sudanese civilians and farmers in areas surrounding Gallabat town, near the southern fringes of the disputed area. These various militia groups are often conflated or described as "Shifta."

External media coverage has frequently conflated the Amhara regional special forces with federal soldiers from the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF). There is some evidence to suggest ENDF involvement in the conflict, although its role appears limited, with few specific or verifiable accounts indicating that the ENDF crossed the internationally recognized boundary into Sudan after hostilities began. For example, Sudanese news reported a prisoner exchange in which ENDF soldiers were handed over, but it is possible that they were mistaken for Amhara regional special forces. There are frequent claims of troop build-ups on both sides of the border, although precise information on the actual size of these forces is lacking. In some cases, troop deployments may not have been directly related to the border fighting but instead linked to military operations in the western Tigray zone. Between November 2020 and the end of 2022, the deployments could also be efforts by Amhara regional special forces to forcibly relocate Tigrayan civilians to central Tigray.

The exact number of casualties in the conflict remains unclear. Reported casualties are typically low, often in single digits, and reports are infrequent. At least 100 fatalities in the al-Fashaga area have been reported from April 2018 to April 2023. In early 2021, Ethiopia claimed that many Amhara civilians were forcibly displaced after SAF first entered the disputed areas in November 2020.

In 2021, the fighting was concentrated in the Barakhat area of "Greater Fashaga," which corresponds to areas east of the Atbara River within the al-Fashaga locality. At the time, this area was described as the last Ethiopian stronghold in the locality, following territorial gains by the SAF. In "Lesser Fashaga" to the south, fighting has been reported in several locations, with cross-border shelling near Abdel-Rafi on the Ethiopian side. While military clashes are concentrated in the northern half of the al-Fashaga Triangle, sporadic reports of ransom-motivated attacks and abductions of Sudanese farmers in Eastern el-Gallabat and Basundah localities to the south have been noted. It's worth mentioning that these attacks preceded the current conflict by several years, causing increasing discontent among Sudanese residents in the area, leading to protests in late January 2021.

During the summer of 2022, tensions between the Sudanese and Ethiopian governments escalated when Sudan accused the ENDF of killing seven captured SAF members and one civilian. In the spring of 2023, Sudanese media sources claimed that clashes reignited in the area following an attack by Ethiopian forces seeking to exploit wider instability in Sudan. Prime Minister Abiy immediately refuted the claim as false and warned that "parties" were spreading false allegations to incite conflict between the two countries. Belligerent rhetoric from elements of the political establishments in Khartoum and Addis Ababa has raised concerns of an escalation of the conflict, with mutual accusations of third-party involvement.