Airspace Threat Assessment - What Next?

The unintentional shoot-down of Flight PS752 once again highlights the current gaps within the existing airspace threat assessment process for Flight Information Regions, (FIRs). ICAO had originally recognised the issue in the wake of the loss of MH17 and included an amendment to Annex 17 Standard 3.1.3 that requires contracting states "keep under constant review the level and nature of threat to civil aviation within its territory and airspace above it…….". With the establishment of the ICAO Conflict Zone Information web-page after the shoot-down of MH17, ICAO responded with the same sense of urgency last seen in the aftermath of the Dawson's Field hijacks that saw the development of the 1970 Hague Convention within a 6 month timeframe. Fast forward to today and a review of ICAO's CZ web-page shows that there are NO POSTS from member states regarding global airspace threats. Why is this? Are states not complying with Standard 3.1.3?

Within the US and Europe, there have been timely updates of either directions or advisories to civilian carriers regarding the safety of flights into Conflict Zones, (CZs). For individual carriers whose routes and networks see them operating within CZs, there are primarily two scenarios, operating through the CZs at an altitude above FL260, essentially to mitigate the risk of MANPADs, and to carry passengers and cargo to airports within a particular CZ. 

With the former scenario, operating at FL330 or higher has, for literally thousands of flights within the ME region, proven to be effective with evidence for this clearly visible via a check of the Flight Radar 24 website. For the latter scenario, carriers face additional risks from small arms, heavy weapons and In-Direct Fire attacks. These scenarios have previously affected flights into airports within the more active CZs of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, with individual carriers choosing to continue to operate or not, based on their exposure to the risks.

With these scenarios seemingly addressed, the more serious threat from Surface to Air Missile systems is, once again, headline news with tragic consequences. It is here where the gap in the airspace threat assessment process lies. At face value, the current perception would appear to be that SAM systems, as one aviation security information provider reported, ‘remain under the full span of control by the state’ . If we examine this statement in more detail it would appear to be based on the premise that generally, SAM weapon systems are subject to strict weapon control orders issued by a military command organisation. Such orders are intended to prevent the unintentional engagement of friendly military aircraft in a conventional war scenario. That said, there have been incidents where both military and civilian aircraft have previously been subjected to ‘friendly fire’ from SAM systems. The shootdown of PS752 now alters the perception that states retain full control of SAM systems, particular where quasi military organisations are concerned. This observation is not intended to diminish the value of the particular source provider, but rather address the reality borne out by the events of 8th January. The basis for the admission of responsibility for the launching of two missiles at a civilian passenger aircraft would seem to be an error due to the ‘fog of war’ . Again, this is a false reality. The ME airspace is used hourly by a number of carriers, albeit with various NOTAMs in place addressing the airspace risks. What is different within the ME region is the type of conflict that is taking place. The current regional tensions can perhaps be summarised as an ongoing series of asymmetrical warfare events between state actors, with the involvement of non-state actor groups who are receiving state actor support. While this situation was confined to Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia, there was a limited impact on civilian aircraft. Reports did confirm that drone attacks had targeted Abha Airport in Saudi Arabia, resulting in a number of people being killed and damage to one aircraft. However, 2019 saw a geographical shift in the conflict to the Gulf region. Given the number of passenger flights that operate each day within Gulf airspace, airlines face substantial challenges from balancing the increased risk present in CZ airspace with the commercial need to maintain their respective schedules. While the earlier focus of airspace risk assessment was on the use of MANPADs by non-state actors, notably in northern Sinai, Iraq and Afghanistan, the solution was essentially to avoid the hot spots, by flying above FL260 and not operating through the CZ. However, with the availability of SAM systems to quasi-military organisations and the deployment of land and sea based SAMs within the littoral confines of the Gulf, the dynamics have changed. How then are states and operators able to assess this risk? 

Assessing the capabilities of various state and non-state actors within the region using open sources is particularly challenging. From an outsider’s perspective, state’s will likely hold the view that intel processes and products are simply too sensitive to share with civilian government agencies, i.e. the states’ appropriate authority. Intelligence sharing initiatives are almost certainly in place that allow countries to pass on information to others, the 2010 printer cartridge bomb attack is a case in point. However, shared intelligence is more likely to focus on either strategic or extremist themes rather than the perhaps more routine but vital airspace threats. Turning again to ICAO, there is the existence of the Global Risk Context Statement that has been periodically updated. While any work to improve the overall aviation threat and risk assessment processes is welcome, aviation security practitioners still have need for a documented process that gives them some indication of the airspace threat level within a particular FIR. Is there an answer?

A potential solution previously existed within ICAO Document 8973 Edition 8. Appendix 37 provided a template for undertaking ‘in-house’ threat assessments, in this case for both extremist threats and associated airport vulnerabilities. Edition 9 of Doc 8973 saw the removal of these appendices, essentially taking away a toolset that had the aim of providing guidance to those states who did not have a mature threat assessment process based on intelligence. Why was this? At face value, it would seem that the appendices were outdated, using terminology like ‘system essential’ which translates into a more readable ‘capabilities’. Moreover, the publication of the ICAO Global Risk Context Statement would seem to have been regarded as a welcome update. That said, the key word within this document is Global. The risk context statement does provide focus points for the nature of the threat and associated risks but goes on to explain that the responsibility for local threat assessment remains with the state. Going back to the Edition 8 Appendix 37, despite using some anachronistic terminology, the underlying principle of measuring threat using five key factors via a series of Yes, No or Unknown responses to standard questions would seem sound. The process certainly lends itself to the use of open sources that are much more readily available today than they were in September 2001. So why has this process not been reviewed when recent events would seem to support a clear need for its use?

Adapting the earlier threat assessment process to address airspace threats is entirely feasible. The five factors should cover the conflict, weapons system availability, particularly to non-state actors, deployment of SAM systems, the command and control procedures in place and the actual use of SAMs. States and operators would, in the absence of a current process, be able to at least gain a more insightful view of airspace risks Current airspace threat information is available via the EASA CZIB web pages, and from commercial open source intelligence service providers, (certainly for those with the available budgets). The use of a threat assessment process using these information sources would seem to be a sensible option to address the gaps in airspace threat assessment. While it is not suggested that such a process could have prevented the loss of PS752, the airspace threat assessment needs of operators, particularly within the Gulf region, would seem one area that would benefit from greater involvement by ICAO, IATA et al.