Air travel stall and spin

Over the past few weeks or so, the world has been awash with images of crowded airports, piles of suitcases, crowds of tired people helplessly waiting for their flights. Strikes, staff shortages, delays that are hard to hide between papers. What has happened? How is this even possible?

The end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century augured a bright future for aviation. Air traffic was like the beloved child of the world - everything was allowed, delays were treated innocently, anything was possible and everyone was happy. Money flowed in a steady and rapid stream, surplus budgets allowed for whims, both large and small. Then came the era of low-cost flying, which forced cost-cutting and increasing of so-called efficiency (which was to be translated into additional cost-cutting). Outsourcing, cheap brokerage, short contracts and even shorter relationships entered the aviation world. A good manager became one who supported only what was necessary, shedding as many costs as possible outside the company. Also on the passenger, who was deluded by an attractive offer.

In the case of air traffic control, this was not an easy task. One, because of the way this area is organized and financed. Two, because of the natural tendency to look for savings there. After all, a plane fueled with half the necessary fuel will not make it to its destination. So the world started to check whether more modest 'refuelling' of everything around would have the desired effect. That is cheapness. For the passenger such a situation, happening completely outside his or her awareness and knowledge, seemed like a blessing. Open Europe or even the whole world, cheap relocation, access to new labour markets, business and travel opportunities. All this brought profit and therefore contentment. It never occurred to anyone that passenger safety might be at stake. Until we started hitting a wall we did not want to see.

I remember when, at the beginning of my air traffic control career, I asked (to no avail, unfortunately) if we were doing about 300 operations a day at our airport, should our procedures and training be ready for 300 or, better still, maybe for 400 operations? So that we are ready when such a move comes. So that we have time to prepare and so that today's maximum is more like a healthy routine and less like an unnecessary panic. I recall a mathematically-described and empirically-tested procedure for the capacity of take-offs from the airport where I worked. It was first lost in an unspecified desk, only to be found 12 years later and to finally exist in a slightly altered form. Out of curiosity, counting how much time and fuel the airline had lost over those 12 years, I found it hard to contain my amazement at such a loss. So I can easily imagine how much time was lost, by us and our customers, to a conservative attitude of inaction. Until we reached the real threat of stopping or severely restricting air traffic, if only in Poland. And until we have reached delays of hours as well as hundreds of cancellations, even though we have spent two whole decades trying to minimise their numbers. And until we, as it happens nowadays, witness piles of abandoned suitcases and terrorist's 'wet dream' scenario - thousands of people squeezed in the stuffy depths of airport terminals.

As in any field, in aviation, or air traffic control as it is best known to me, there are many very committed people. Professionals with ideas, with energy and with a stubbornly undiminished desire to create a system that is real, possible, feasible but not necessarily idealistic. Some of them, whom I know personally, call themselves 'troublemakers'. These are people who are not afraid to open their mouths and point out transgressions that have no right to be there. These are people who have paid for their honesty with their own jobs or careers. These are people who rarely fit into the scheme of things but have guts to continue on their journey.

Meanwhile, instead of using them, sometimes visionaries and sometimes just committed enthusiasts, we chose the most short-sighted option - money. In the conditions that 'cheap flying' created, this was the best option for business. Not only did it offer savings but it also reduced liability. As a result, disagreements over the lack of real information about a plane being delayed for hours were met, in a response by a spokesman for the airport I flew from, with the argument 'it's not us, it's the subcontractors'. Gradually, airline requirements for time spent in the air by newly hired pilots decreased. B2B contracts became common, partially relieving companies of responsibility for crew rest time and the cost of that rest (however perfidious that may sound). It was becoming popular to fly for an airline by paying that airline for the opportunity to gain experience (often having already taken out a loan of several hundred thousand dollars to finance your training). On several occasions I have witnessed discussions on how to shorten air traffic controller training or how to reduce its cost. I am just waiting for the moment when controller candidates start paying for courses and then, perhaps also for the right to do the necessary apprenticeships.

There are things which did not change at all. We still need a human to blame, if anything tragic happens. We still don't know if we can introduce artificial intelligence on a large scale, for the very same reason as above. We still hunt for managerial talents, that is for people who will not necessarily create a bond with the company but will surely present better numbers to the CEO, only to emerge in a totally different field later for the exact same reason and task. And we still blame each other for the results of not our actions, letting those who by law and logic are responsible. 'There is war', 'there is crisis', 'should they earn that much', 'these are no longer the times ...' etc. are the phrases I hear and read, said and written by experts and passangers. The very same laboratory rabbits who took advantage, me including, of the experiment called 'how low can we go'. At the very same time the cause and effect did not change the expectations on the highest levels of office buildings. In 2021 the american airline, Delta, CEO earned 12.4 million dollars even though the company itselft lost billions. Income of CEOs of companies like Ryanair, TUI or Air France-KLM group were rising in the second half of previous decade, despite the losses their companies were presenting. I shall not generalize. There are positively surprising examples, maybe coming from the company values or maybe from local business culture. An example would be Norwegian CEO whose income is about 10% of that taken by Ryanair boss. Or the CEO of Wizzair, recently popular for its rather unpopular statement 'we are all fatigued', as a reply to pilots' protests against deteriorating safety culture standards. József Váradi cut his salary by 15% and did not take one at all. Heroic? If such cut, in the face of inflation, can be perceived as one in aviation world - then yes. But it is hard to see it that way when 25% cut in Air France - KLM CEO salary is accompanied by over 120% personal bonus, waived only after protests of governmental bodies of two countries and after already receiving billions of euros of financial support from these two governments.

There are a number of ventures and entities that set themselves the goal of modernising aviation. And indeed, aviation has gained a great deal technologically over the past two decades. Systems, procedures, methods all reduce the environmental impact, actually reduce costs (where this is the result of modern technology, not stubborn spending cuts). And yet today we have come to a standstill, helplessly surrendering to a shortage of skilled personnel, removed from the system in the name of protecting money. Security is becoming an argument, not a value in itself. Experience is giving way to business. Cited as an example of cost-effectiveness, the US is struggling with staff shortages just as Europe is. The author of the Hudson River Miracle resigned from the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), citing his concerns about reduced requirements for pilots as the reason. And the content of training for controllers is still reminiscent of the tragic incident in Tenerife, 45 years ago. And this in the context of entirely contemporary problems in communications.

And so we 'travelled' from a 3 hour flights between London and New York to a 4 hours suggested check in time at major airports. From best cuisine on board to no guarantee of having a flight at all. We are witnessing helplessness and a festival of blame-shifting. And who would have thought that it would be the Ryanair Chief Executive Officer Michael O’Leary, the 'king' of low cost flying, who would say that air travel became 'too cheap' and the prices shall rise for at least the next five years. Or we can just switch back to trains. But with the current mindset it would be like replanting a diseased plant into a new pot. With fresh soil but including its rotten roots.

_____________________________________

References:

https://www.eurocockpit.be/sites/default/files/2019-06/Study%20on%20employment%20and%20working%20conditions%20of%20aircrew%2C%20EU%20Commission%202019.pdf

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-airlines-say-faa-staffing-crippling-east-coast-traffic-2022-06-24/

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/miracle-hudson-pilot-stepping-down-international-post-2022-06-23/

https://www.gridpoint.consulting/blog/european-airline-ceo-pay-in-2020

https://skift.com/2018/06/04/the-highest-paid-travel-ceos-in-europe-in-2017/

https://ceoworld.biz/2019/07/29/europes-15-highest-paid-travel-and-hospitality-ceos/

https://fortune.com/2022/07/02/ryanairs-oleary-says-airfares-will-rise-for-next-5-years-ft/