Afrin and Idlib in the Russian-Turkish Deal
“A Russian-Turkish deal: Afrin in return for Idlib,” was the interesting title of an article published on the website of Russia Today, suggesting we are about to see another major deal similar to the deal for East Aleppo nearly a year ago. According to the article, “Damascus wishes for Turkey to gather the largest possible number of opposition groups to attack Afrin” as this would allow the regime to seize as much land as possible in Idlib province. In Idlib, Russia believes there is an opportunity that must not be missed to eliminate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, formerly the Nusra Front. Russian forces have withdrawn from Afrin, while Turkish forces were set to enter it with the participation of the Free Syrian Army, under cover from fierce bombardment and airstrikes, to drive out Kurdish forces from the city before moving on to the city of Manbij in northern Syria. Ankara wants to establish a 30-km safe zone in Syria, according to Turkish Prime Minister Binali Y?ld?r?m, and restore “3.5 million Syrian refugees to their country,” as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said. Washington has criticized the Turkish operation, but has not clearly objected to it beyond calling for ‘self-restraint’, and backed France’s call for a UN Security Council session to discuss the situation in Ghouta, Idlib, and Afrin. Russia’s Foreign Minister described the French initiative as “bias towards a certain development of the Syrian settlement,” which he said was “worrying”. Lavrov accused the US-led international coalition of seeking “clemency” for the Nusra Front, alleging Washington wants to preserve this extremist group as a “plan B ”for ousting the regime. "It is absolutely unacceptable for us and we will offer tough resistance to such attempts," Lavrov said. But while Moscow seems to have accepted Turkish military operations in Afrin Tehran expressed ‘concern’. For his part, Bashar al-Assad said Turkey’s “aggression” is an extension of Turkey’s support for “terrorism and terror groups” of various names. Simply put, the guarantors of the Syrian ceasefire, namely Russia, Turkey and Iran, are not in full agreement at this juncture, and the regime in Damascus is cautiously observing the multiple scenarios being floated at the current stage of bargaining aiming to share influence, territory, and resources in Syria.
Erdogan has made up his mind. His positions and demands are clear, violent, and full of challenges and defiance. He throws the ISIS card against those who oppose his first card, that is his bid to crush the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which he believes to be the Syrian mirror of the PKK, a group Turkey designates as a terror organization and is battling in the southeastern front. He considers fighting Kurdish aspirations for self-rule or statehood, or even for gaining important positions in Syria, to be at the top of his priorities. Indeed, Erdogan does not care if his focus against the Kurds in Syria undermines any serious opposition to the regime in Damascus and to Assad, even though Erdogan has called on him to step down.
Turkey has long sought a ‘safe zone’ along its borders inside Syrian territory. Now that Turkey has felt the window for ‘sharing Syria’ is opening, it has decided its interests lie in quickly executing a three-fold strategy: Containing Kurdish ambitions, establishing the safe zone, and returning up to 3.5 million refugees to their country.
The Syrian Kurds’ alliances are flimsy. At times it has been said they are friends of Russia, at others that Moscow seems them as an obstacle standing the path of its Syrian bulldozer. At times the US shirks its responsibilities and pledges to the Syrian Kurds, at others it makes them its main partner and supplies with funds and arms.
Sergei Lavrov has accused Washington of encouraging Kurdish separatism, saying US activities near the Syrian-Turkey border was “either…a misunderstanding of the whole situation, or a deliberate provocation”. He added: “We have already drawn attention to the fact that the US have embarked on the creation of alternative authorities in large parts of Syrian territory…In Syria, Washington supplies arms both openly and discreetly to groups that cooperate with them, especially the SDF,” in reference to the Syrian Democratic Forces dominated by the Kurdish YPG. However, Lavrov was also keen to stress the need for Kurdish participation in the Syrian peace process later, saying Kurdish representatives were invited to attend the Syrian National Dialogue conference in Sochi on 29 and 30 January.
The main issue of contention between Washington and Moscow remains the future of the Iranian role in Syria. Tehran fears that US pressure on Russia could seriously undermine the strategic alliance between Moscow and Tehran in Syria. For its part, Moscow understands well that a radical shift has taken place in US policy on Syria, in a stark departure from former President Barack Obama’s complacency and encouragement of Russia to take charge in Syria, while avoiding to confront Iran’s ambitions to safeguard the nuclear deal with Tehran. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has made a firm decision on Syria, despite previous indications of having different positions from those of the White House and other administration figures like H.R. McMaster, national security adviser. The new US resolve on Syria will not be reassuring for Lavrov, who had grown accustomed to his former counterpart John Kerry’s appeasement and deferral on all his demands in Syria.
What the Russian diplomacy knows well is that Trump’s resoluteness and ability to overcome the huge media pressures on him could endanger Russian schemes in Syria. There is a campaign in the United States aiming to undermine and weaken Donald Trump, and this would be good news for Russia, as this would also undermine his foreign policy particularly in Syria. If Trump is to survive these pressures and campaigns, Russia could expect to see a US push to thwart its plans and sharing of influence in Syria.
Russia, however, cannot afford to be on the back foot in Syria because this could harm it elsewhere, including in Ukraine. However, Moscow is also well aware that despite all its achievements and restored international standing via Syria, it is not the reincarnation of the Soviet Union, a true superpower that shared a bipolar world with the US once.
France has picked up on the signs of Russia’s resentment of the new US coherence on Syria, saying that Russia cannot resolve the Syrian crisis and does not have the ability to lead the war-torn country’s reconstruction. France would not have thrown down the gauntlet like this had there not been in Washington a new president and a new policy.
The article about a Russian-Turkish deal on Afrin and Idlib was written by Oleg Moskvin and Andrei Rezchikov in Vzglyad. The attack on Afrin will be a gross violation of Syria's sovereignty, leading researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow Stanislav Ivanov told the newspaper. “Russia insists that the Kurds should be equal participants in the peace talks in Astana and Geneva,” he added, saying he doubts Russia would give up the Kurds. The original headline of the article was also interesting: “Turkey is trying to force Russia to surrender an important ally in Syria”.
But who are the allies of the Syrian Kurds today, in light of the Turkish operation dubbed Olive Branch? The answer for now remains in the back corridors of that grand deal for Ifrin, Idlib, and the fate of Syria.