Africa’s Big Issues of 2022

The February Summit of the African Union (AU) which will run from 2nd?to 6th February 2022 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia will find the continent confronting a number of challenges in 2022 that are likely to extend way into the future and shape the trajectory of individual countries and perhaps the continent as a whole.

COVID-19 will continue to be a matter of concern for policy makers, but for most Africans it will not be the issue in 2022 as it once was. The latest wave, the Omicron, appears to have peaked in Africa according to the World Health Organization (WHO). The fear that COVID-19 sent up the spines of people has largely disappeared. Infections are managed at home. The dystopian world of “anywhere between 300,000 and 3.3 million African people” losing their lives “as a direct result of COVID-19” predicted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) has not materialized Africa. Neither did the World Health Organization’s (WHO) more conservative estimate of “eighty-three thousand to 190,000 people in Africa” dying if no preventive interventions are undertaken. This means that COVID-19 vaccines will not be a policy issue on the continent if it is not pushed by donors and international development agencies.

Most Africans are now managing their lives with it in view. But for the reactions of advanced countries to the emergence of new variants of SARS-CoV-2, COVID-19 would have become to Africans one of the many diseases that they just have to contend with while life goes on. For most Africans, the major challenge in the area of health will not be fear of death from COVID-19 but living with COVID-19. Vaccine availability and vaccine equity will not be as important as it is made to appear by the media and international organizations. Tablets will be. Vaccine reluctance or hesitancy on the continent will increase as a consequence of evidence that soon-to-expire vaccines are donated by the West to the continent from their hoard of COVID-19 vaccines. African countries have destroyed millions of donated vaccines because they expired (or where about to expire) before they could be administered to citizens. Most Africans, having survived two years of COVID-19 without vaccines, may be reluctant to take it. Consequently, Africa in 2022 will be focused on living with COVID-19, not on zero SARS-CoV-2 infections and deaths. Building and strengthening capacity to treat COVID-19 will therefore be a more important policy and programme priority for Africa in 2022 than COVID-19 vaccines and preventing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and its variants.

There were many conflicts in Africa in 2021. Africa is unlikely to be more peaceful in 2022. Many of the countries on the continent deemed politically stable and strong about 5 years ago are experiencing difficulties keeping the peace. Democratic transition appears stalled in a number of?Francophone African countries in 2021. Military coups made a comeback big time. As at ?January 2022, five countries- Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Chad and Sudan- are under military rule. The African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance which came into effect in 2012, appears to be fast losing relevance.

The Charter could become less relevant in 2022 and beyond. The Russian Federation and China, who recently blocked United Nations Security Council (UNSC) support for additional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sanctions on Mali’s military leaders for their decisions to delay elections scheduled for this year to 2026, could accelerate the irrelevance. Both Russia and China, appear to see Africa as the arena where they must settle scores with the West. The actions of Russia and China, if they continue, may undermine democratic transitions and democracy in Africa in 2022. The result could be that the military in other countries will be emboldened to attempt to take over government, and more African countries could come under military rule in 2022. But Russia and China may not be alone in undermining the AU Charter. Mali’s leaders having rejected the transition programme endorsed by ECOWAS and have approached Mauritania (a non-ECOWAS member) and Guinea, (an ECOWAS member also under ECOWAS sanctions), for help in breaking the sanctions. Reports suggest that they have succeeded. Mali’s and Guinea’s neighbors will suffer significant losses due to the sanctions and their self-interest may cause them not to enforce the sanctions.

The Jan 23 2022 coup in Burkina Faso complicates matters even further even ECOWAS imposes sanctions on Burkina Faso. ?Cote d’Ivoire and Niger, for example, will be adversely affected by sanctions on Mali and Burkina Faso and may not be inclined to enforce them in the absence of compensation for economic losses. For the first time in recent history, a fifth of ECOWAS member States is under military rule. Given that, and the unhelpful attitude of China and Russia, sanctions could instigate exit from the regional integration arrangement may therefore not be ECOWAS’ best response to unconstitutional change of government in its member States at this time. For the first time, West African regional integration could be under threat.

Practically no region of the continent was free of conflicts in 2021. This is likely to persist in 2022. The Islamist insurgency in Mozambique has sucked in a number of countries, African and non-African. The long-running Islamist insurgency in the Sahel was alive in 2021 and remain so in 2022. The Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), Boko Haram and terrorist bandits control significant swathes of territory in Northern Nigeria. Al-Shabab remains a threat in Somalia. Any hopes and expectations that ongoing reforms and “opening up” in Muslim-majority countries like The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates, and Egypt would have a softening effect on Africa’s Islamists will be unfulfilled in 2022. Conservative Islam may be entrenching in Africa in response to the rapidly spreading Pentecostal Christianity.

?Libya remains tense; its future hangs on the outcome of elections postponed to this year. Russian mercenaries operate in Central African Republic and Mali. In Cameroon, the conflict in the Anglophone west could tear the country apart. The civil war that broke out in Ethiopia in November 2020, probably the biggest civil conflict going on right now on the planet, is in its second year and shows no prospects of ending in a negotiated settlement. Somalia’s election remains problematic, and tensions are likely to increase in Somalia as Somaliland seeks international recognition. The Horn of Africa is likely to have the highest concentration of Africa’s bloody conflicts in 2022. The transhumance problem that has led to farmer settler conflicts in Littoral West Africa due in part to climate change and Islamic insurgency in the Sahel is unlikely to abate. Finally, tensions between African states (for example Ethiopia-Sudan; Ethiopia-Egypt; Rwanda-Uganda) could escalate into open but limited scale wars in 2022 if not properly managed.

?Elections are often an instigator of conflicts and wars in Africa. About twenty elections are scheduled to be held on the continent in 2022. Many will not be national elections, yet each of them could trigger violent conflict on a continent where the default response to deep political disagreements is seldom negotiations. Of these, the ones to watch very carefully are Kenya and Angola. The Kenyan elections which appear to be a contest between current Deputy President William Ruto and erstwhile Prime Minister Raila Odinga are laden with ethnic and class overtones could redraw the ethnic geography of power if Odinga wins. In Angola, the election will test the reformist and anti-corruption agenda of President Jo?o Louren?o. Even countries without elections in 2022 present significant risks: Septuagenarians are in power in a number of countries. They all appear to be in good health, yet the likelihood of anyone of them dying in office is high. Although countries have constitutional provisions for the peaceful transfer of power in the event of the death of an incumbent, Chad has shown that these provisions are likely to be breached.

?Africa’s youth were for years accused of political complacency, uninterested in revolution, unconcerned about the misgovernance of their countries and more interested in migrating to any part of the world that could give them the peace and possibilities denied them by their home countries. That changed in 2010 in Egypt and Tunisia when youth rose to overthrow the authoritarian and despotic regimes that had long ruled these countries. The end of Africa’s youth complacency will continue and is likely to increase in 2022. ?Sudanese youth, undeterred by killings, continue to lead protests against their country’s new military leaders. The #EndSARS protest in Nigeria, shook the very foundations of Nigerian democracy in a way that it never had been in recent times. Once peaceful Senegal experienced youth protests in 2021. Growing within country inequality, the digital revolution, and high African Diaspora interest in their home countries are fueling the end of youth complacency on the continent.?No longer content with just sending remittances home, Africa’s very young Diaspora are increasingly becoming an external agent of political change in their countries of origin. A good example is the involvement of Ethiopia’s large Diaspora in the country’s ongoing civil war. This involvement in country-of-origin politics is likely to accelerate in 2022. How African governments react to this phenomenon could define 2022.

?China’s growing footprint in Africa continues to be a source of concern to the West, and increasingly, to many Africans. The West is also uncomfortable with Russia’s much written about return to Africa. In 2021, G-7 countries set up an infrastructure fund to compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Managing extra-Africa international relations will be a challenge in 2022 for individual African countries and African continental organizations as China and Russia increasingly see Africa as an arena where they can “settle” their differences with the West. A good recent example is both countries’ recent opposition to a UNSC resolution supporting additional ECOWAS sanctions on Mali. China and Russia will scuttle efforts at peaceful resolution of conflicts and wars on the continent if doing so “prevents” the West from advancing her interests in Africa without regard to whether their actions serve Africa’s interests or not. Africa’s wars and conflicts could thus become more intractable, last longer, with consequential loss of lives and destruction of property and infrastructure and could threaten the continent’s efforts to accelerate regional integration.

The challenge of managing extra-Africa relations will be further complicated by the growing involvement in African affairs of medium/middle powers such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, intent on projecting their power on the continent. While serving as a haven for illicit financial flows out of Africa, the UAE has become more aggressive in Africa, especially in East Africa and the Horn. Turkey has become aggressively visible in Africa too, with an embassy in more than half the countries of the continent. Managing the relationship with Russia, China, Europe, the middle powers and the US without offending any will be a great challenge for many African countries in 2022 and beyond. A good example of this challenge is the still unresolved controversy over Israel’s admission as an observer member of the African Union.

Climate change will remain a top African and international global concern in 2022. ?Africa will host the 27th session of the Conference of Parties (COP27) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Egypt in November 2022. In announcing his country’s offer to host COP27, Egyptian president Al Sisi said it will be “a radical turning point in international climate efforts in coordination with all parties, for the benefit of Africa and the entire world.” There is a lot of hysteria in non-African circles and in international organizations about the havoc that climate change, if not reversed, will wreck on the continent. For example, a new world bank report projects that 86 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) will migrate domestically because of climate change by 2050, the largest of 6 regions studied in the report.

While this and other findings could be true (and no one doubts that climate change is a reality), Africa should not be “frightened” into adopting resolutions on climate change that are not in her people’s long-term interests. 2022 should see a more assertive African voice-both government and non-government-on climate change. The continent will insist on a nuanced, just energy transition, a transition that does not lock them forever on a low growth, low technology growth path and forever dependent. There can be no justice in any climate change solution that will require energy deficit and foreign exchange constrained African countries to leave their large reserves of fossil in the ground forever. An agreement must be found that would enable African countries to harness their ample reserves of coal, gas and petroleum to power economic growth and prosperity, to attain “The Africa We Want.”

Growing Africa’s economy and reducing poverty will remain big issues in 2022. Forecasts suggest a grim year. Managing inflation (largely imported) will be a challenge. In spite of the allocation of new Special Drawing Rights (SDR) by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and an increase in commodity exports, inadequate availability of foreign exchange will continue to fetter many African economies in 2022, COVID or no COVID, due to rising debt service obligations. Innovations in financial technologies will persist in 2022. Many more countries are likely to emulate Ghana and Nigeria to set up their own central bank digital currencies. The African Continental Free Trade (AfCFTA) will remain a potential in 2022 in spite of hopes that trade under it may begin to grow in 2022, aided by innovations such as the recently launched Pan-African Payments and Settlement System which will enable “instant cross-border payments in respective local currencies for cross-border trade” according to the Afriexim Bank. Africa reported the most conflicts and wars in 2021. Africa, according to the IMF had the smallest GDP of all regions of the world in 2021. Africa also had the highest poverty rate of all regions of the world in 2021. Put differently, Africa was the conflict/war, and poverty “capital” of the world in 2021. This is unlikely to change in 2022. Conflicts, wars, and threats to peace and stability will constrain Africa’s growth in 2022.

In summary, 2022 could be a tough year for Africa if the headwinds and risks are not managed out with reasoned care. It is hoped that Africa’s leaders meeting at Addis Ababa next month for the African Union February 2022 summit will tackle some of these issues and decide on a collective response to them in the interest of the continent’s citizens and their future.

21 January 2022 Revised 25 January 2022