Afghanistan’s Youth: Force of Progress or Future Firebrands?
Jorrit Kamminga Ph.D.
Global Policy @ RAINCLOUD Defense | AI Ethics | Former Oxfam | Former Clingendael Fellow | 15 years Afghanistan | Graphic Novel Zahra | Book on 20 yrs NL in Afghanistan | Colombia | Sustainable Livelihoods | Drug Policy
While Afghanistan has one of the youngest populations, the country’s political scene is still dominated by the powerholders of old: former warlords, tribal strongmen, and religious leaders. Will the youth be a force of modernization or of future conflict?
Every election in Afghanistan you see the same candidates: former warlords and politicians that came to the fore after the toppling of the Taliban regime in 2001. Still mostly men of course. While they do not necessarily all represent conservative values, they have one thing in common: they belong to a previous generation from a past characterized by four decades of conflict. Afghanistan has one of the youngest populations in Asia, but these demographics have so far not translated into a new generation of younger politicians.
Not long after 9/11, German sociologist Gunnar Heinsohn came up with a possible explanation for the ongoing war and terrorism in Afghanistan. He pointed out that, while conflicts are mostly explained by ethnic and religious tensions, there is another factor that is often neglected: enormous population growth. In short, his argument is that conflicts continue because there is an endless amount of young men who make these conflicts possible. He writes in the 2008 (Dutch) version of his book S?hne und Weltmacht:
“When you consider the enormous number of children and young people, it is not surprising that Afghanistan did not settle down after the rapid American victory on November 25, 2001. (…) It will be (…) a miracle if peace can be restored before 2025, when the population will almost have doubled. In that year, at least half of the 52 million inhabitants will be under the age of 20 (…).”
He uses the term “youth bulge,” a disproportionately large group of young people in the population. This is the case if at least 20 percent of the population consists of 15- to 24-year-olds or at least 30 percent of 0- to 15-year-olds. Estimates vary but more than 60 percent of Afghans are under 25. The situation is not unique in the region. Pakistan and India both have similar youth bulges, while in Iran it is getting smaller quite rapidly. In the view of Heinsohn, the youth bulge is a "demographic weapon" that does not explain all the violence in the world, but often plays a crucial role in conflicts.
Continue reading the article on the Leiden Islam Blog of the University of Leiden.
Agile Business Analyst
4 年I read the piece you have written. The youth and desire for riches are blamed for the conflict and other key factors are simply ignored. how about engineered radicalization? How about the failure of political leadership in creating programs? there are so many other factors responsible for the conflict t
Policy Advisor Food and Agriculture at Oxfam Novib
4 年Interessant Jorrit! 'k Word er alleen niet heel optimistisch van :( Met 'The Great Game' in gedachten en gezien alle geopolitieke belangen zie ik een echte politieke transitie en democratiseringsproces niet zo snel van de grond komen, helaas
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4 年This situation is not unique to Afghanistan, or other countries you mention, in large parts of Africa we see the same, think of Burkina Faso and other of the G5 Sahel, but also Mocambique and Angola; UNFPA promotes the "demographic dividend" concept, which is somehwat problematic or unclear/not self-evident at least; what is the policy recipe for Afghanistan or other fragile States? What are lessons for the international interventions and sometimes chaotic initiativbes?